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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN GUIDING THE 
INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM 
VIOLENCE UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 
 
H COMBRINCK 
 
LLD Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape 
 
 
The South African Constitution expressly guarantees the right to freedom from 
all forms of violence from either public or private sources. The government has 
in recent years made significant advances in its response to violence against 
women, including the enactment of progressive legislation such as the Domestic 
Violence Act of 1998. However, the levels of violence against women remain 
disconcertingly high.  
 
South African courts have dealt with a number of cases relating to women’s right 
to freedom from violence and concomitant State obligations to respond to such 
violence when committed by private actors. The emerging body of jurisprudence 
may be criticised for its inadequate consideration of the full scope of this right in 
international law – as required in terms of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution.  
This study accordingly sets out to examine how the development of women’s 
right to freedom from violence in international human rights law may guide the 
interpretation of the right under the South African Constitution. 
 
The thesis firstly looks at how women’s right to freedom from violence has 
developed in international (global) human rights law since the early 1990s. In 
this regard, the study finds that while the issue of violence against women (and 
women’s rights generally) was barely on the international human rights agenda at 
the beginning of this period, an enormous degree of development has 
subsequently taken place. Through the adoption of documents such as General 
Recommendation No. 19 by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, the Declaration on Elimination of Violence against Women and 
the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, international norms and 
standards were set regarding role of the State in providing women with 
 
 
 
 
 iii
protection against violence.  
 
These standards have subsequently been clarified and refined further through 
events at regional level. The thesis also investigates the human rights instruments 
and jurisprudence of regional bodies, and finds that the normative framework has 
been advanced through instruments such as the inter-American Convention of 
Belém do Pára and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, as well as recent judgments of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights relating to violence against women.  
 
Turning next to the question of how women’s right to freedom from violence has 
been  dealt with in South African case law, the thesis finds that although South 
African courts initially (at the beginning of this line of judgments) took 
international law into consideration, this analysis has been watered down in more 
recent judgments. Drawing on practical examples from the investigation into 
international human rights law, the conclusion is reached that South African law 
must be given the benefit of a more nuanced and in-depth reading of women’s 
right to freedom from violence. This will only be possible if the courts engage in 
a more considered analysis of the normative framework provided by 
international human rights.   
 
8 July 2010 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE 
 
 
 
 
1. ORIGIN OF THIS STUDY 
 
 
Violence against women1 is a global phenomenon, transcending all distinctions 
of geography, race and class. This is not a recent development – violence against 
women has been part of human existence as long as has patriarchy.2 So, too, has 
women’s resistance to such violence.3 This resistance, which grew increasingly 
visible and more organised with the general expansion in feminist campaigns in 
the 1960s and 1970s,4 received enormous support in the past fifteen years from 
the burgeoning recognition of women’s rights in international law5. Moreover, 
the entrenchment of women’s right to freedom from violence in international 
                                                 
1  This thesis adopts the definition of violence against women as set out in Art 1 of the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, i.e. ‘any act of gender-
based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological 
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life’ -  Declaration on 
the Elimination of Violence against Women GA Res 48/104 UN Doc A/48/104 
(adopted 20 December 1993) [hereafter ‘the Violence Declaration’].  
2  See in this regard S Brownmiller Against Our Will (1975) 16-30, 31-113 for a 
description of rape during various historical periods; also L Fryer ‘Law versus 
prejudice: Views on rape through the centuries’ (1994) 1 SACJ 61 at 64 et seq.  
3  Brownmiller op cit note 2 at 14-15.  
4  See A Gruber ‘The feminist war on crime’ (2007) 92 Iowa Law Review 741 at 748-749. 
5   Strydom & Hopkins explain that ‘international law’ is traditionally defined as ‘that 
body of law which binds or regulates states in terms of their relationships with other 
states’ – H Strydom & K Hopkins ‘International law’ in S Woolman et al (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (Original Service 2005) 30-1; see also  
J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 3 ed (2005) 1. A distinction 
should be made between public international law (which seeks to govern the relations 
between states) and private international law (which concerns the relations between 
individuals whose legal relations are governed by the laws of different states) – Dugard 
op cit at 2. This study focuses on public international law; however, in the interest of 
brevity, the term ‘international law’ will be used.  
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human rights law6 contributed to shifting the issue of violence against women 
from secret shame to a priority on the worldwide human rights agenda. 
 
This study originated against the background of this growing recognition of 
violence against women as a ‘legitimate’ international human rights concern, and 
more specifically in research relating to violence against women conducted by 
the candidate at the Gender Project of the Community Law Centre7 at the 
University of the Western Cape from 1997 to 2009.8 At the beginning of this 
period, the ‘new’ South African Constitution9 with its express guarantee of the 
right to freedom from all forms of violence10 came into operation and within 
                                                 
6  Brownlie points out that many lawyers refer to an entity described as ‘International 
Human Rights Law’, which is assumed to be a separate body of norms – I Brownlie 
Principles of Public International Law 7 ed (2008) 554. He explains that while this is a 
convenient category of reference, it is also a source of confusion: human rights 
problems occur in many contexts. The issues may arise in domestic law, or within the 
framework of a standard-setting convention, or within general international law. But 
there must be reference to the specific and relevant applicable law. There is thus ‘the 
law of a particular State’, or ‘the relevant principles of general international law’. He 
notes that in the real world of practice and procedure, there is no such entity as 
‘International Human Rights Law’. Brownlie’s persuasive viewpoint notwithstanding, 
the concept is used in this study for ease for reference.   
7  The Community Law Centre is a human rights research, education and advocacy 
institute forming part of the Faculty of Law at the University of the Western Cape, 
Cape Town. 
8  This work included inter alia participation in the drafting of new domestic violence 
legislation; research on the reform of sexual assault legislation (including several 
submissions to the South African Law Reform Commission and parliamentary portfolio 
committees); the determination of bail in sexual assault cases; a comparative analysis of 
sexual assault legislation in selected African jurisdictions; monitoring the 
implementation of the Domestic Violence Act by the South African Police Service; 
promoting access to justice of women experiencing domestic violence; exploring the 
intersections between HIV/AIDS and violence against women; research on the right of 
women experiencing domestic violence to have access to adequate housing; and 
research on violence against marginalised women, including commercial sex workers 
and women with disabilities.  
9  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 [hereafter ‘the 
Constitution’]. This Act came into effect on 4 February 1997. 
10  Art 12(1)(c) of the Constitution.  
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three years, the Constitutional Court was called on to consider the ambit of this 
right in the context of violence against women in S v Baloyi.11 At the same time, 
the case of Carmichele, which would prove to be a watershed moment in South 
African law, was making its inexorable way towards the Constitutional Court via 
the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. These events naturally 
influenced the work of the Gender Project and the candidate.12 
 
Significant advances were simultaneously unfolding at the international level.13 
In 1994, the Organisation of American States accepted the influential Inter-
                                                 
11  2000 (1) SACR 81 (CC). 
12  See  H Combrinck ‘Positive state duties to protect women from violence: Recent South 
African developments’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 666-690; B Pithey et  al 
Legal Aspects of Rape (1999); H Combrinck ‘The right to freedom from violence and 
the reform of sexual assault law in South Africa’ in J Sarkin & W Binchy (eds)  
The Citizen and the State – South African and Irish Perspectives (2001) 184-194;  
H Combrinck ‘“He’s out again”: the role of the prosecutor in bail for persons accused 
of sexual offences’(2001) 5 Law, Democracy and Development 31-44; H Combrinck & 
Z Skepu Bail in Sexual Assault Cases: Victims’ Experiences (2003); R Barday &  
H Combrinck Implementation of Bail Legislation in Sexual Assault Cases: First 
Research Report (2002); H Combrinck & L Artz ‘“A wall of words”: Redefining the 
offence of rape in South African law’ (2003) Acta Juridica 72-91; H Combrinck ‘The 
dark side of the rainbow: Violence against women in South Africa after ten years of 
democracy’ (2005)  Acta Juridica 171-199; H Combrinck & L Chenwi The Role of 
Informal Community Structures in Ensuring Women’s Rights to Have Access to 
Adequate Housing in Langa, Manenberg and Mfuleni (2007); H Combrinck &  
L Wakefield At the Crossroads: Linking Strategic Frameworks to Address Gender-
Based Violence and HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa (2007);   H Combrinck & L Artz 
‘Sexual Assault’ in E Bonthuys & C Albertyn (eds) Gender, Law & Justice (2007) 298-
320; H Combrinck ‘Claims, entitlements or smoke and mirrors? Victims’ rights in the 
Sexual Offences Act’ in L Artz & D Smythe (eds) Should We Consent? Rape Law 
Reform in South Africa (2008) 262-282; H Combrinck & L Wakefield Training for 
Police on the Domestic Violence Act (2009); H Combrinck Living in Security Peace 
and Dignity: The Right to Have Access to Housing of Women Who Are Victims of 
Gender-Based Violence (2009); H Combrinck ‘Rape law reform in Africa: “More of the 
same” or new opportunities?’ in C McGlynn & VE Munro (eds) Rethinking Rape Law 
(2010) 122-135. 
13  R Coomaraswamy Preliminary Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/42 
(dated 22 November 1994).  
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American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence against Women (known as ‘the Convention of Belém do Pará’),14 
which expressly entrenches women’s right to freedom from violence.  
 
The year 1995 saw the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing, 
China, and the adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action. This document, 
which identified violence against women as one of its twelve critical areas of 
concern, consolidated several of the standards set out in the General 
Recommendation adopted by the committee monitoring the implementation of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women15 and the Violence Declaration. The newly-appointed UN Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Radhika Coomaraswamy, also published her first thematic report (addressing 
domestic violence) in 1995. Closer to home, in September 1998 the Southern 
African Development Community (‘SADC’) approved an Addendum,16 aimed at 
addressing violence against women and children, to its Declaration on Gender 
and Development.17  
 
I posed the question in 1998 as to how the right to freedom from violence, which 
was now guaranteed in the South African Constitution, would take shape in 
                                                 
14  Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará) OAS/Ser.L.V/II.92/doc31 rev.3 (1994), 
signed 9 June 1994, entered into force 3 March 1995.    
15  Adopted 18 Dec 1979, GA Res 34/180, UN GAOR, 34th Session, UN DOC A/34/46 
(1980), entered into force 3 September 1981 [hereafter ‘the Women’s Convention’]. 
16  The Addendum on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and 
Children set out detailed commitments from signatory States regarding measures to 
address violence against women and children. This Addendum was adopted at Grand 
Baie, Mauritius on 14 September 1998 - reprinted in (1999) 26 Review of African 
Political Economy 415-417. 
17  Adopted on 8th September 1997. Text available at official SADC website at 
[www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/174]. (Accessed 17 May 2010.) 
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practice in South Africa in the light of the standards emerging in international 
law.18 At the time, the question was formulated mainly with reference to 
measures to be taken on legislative and executive level, rather than interpretation 
by the courts. However, the way in which the right to freedom from violence has 
subsequently been interpreted by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court 
of Appeal (‘SCA’) led to the identification of the research problem addressed in 
this thesis. A preliminary assessment indicated that this interpretation could 
benefit from a closer investigation of the norms and standards emerging in 
international human rights law. In addition, the Constitutional Court and the SCA 
are courts of precedent, and thus hold the potential to effect important structural 
changes to State practice on a broad level. 
 
 
2. RATIONALE 
 
2.1 Current position in South Africa 
 
Gender-based violence19 has been described as ‘one of the most extreme 
manifestations of power inequality between women and men’.20 Given this 
imbalance of power, it is not surprising that women have in recent times 
increasingly looked to the influence of the State for intervention (both 
responsive, in the sense of punishing perpetrators, and proactive, in a preventive 
                                                 
18  H Combrinck ‘Positive state duties to protect women from violence: Recent South 
African developments’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 688-690. 
19   This term is defined in Section 3.2.1 below.   
20    A Obando ‘How effective is a human rights framework in addressing gender-based 
violence?’ (2004) WHRnet [www.awid.org/eng/Issues-and-Analysis/Library/How-
Effective-is-a-Human-Rights-framework-in-addressing-Gender-based-Violence]. 
(Accessed on 5 May 2010.)   
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sense) to address violence against women.21 This strategy, while not 
unproblematic from a feminist perspective,22 has resulted in major reforms in the 
response of the legal systems of many jurisdictions worldwide to domestic 
violence, sexual violence, marital rape, female genital cutting and other forms of 
violence against women. These reforms not only relate to the substantive legal 
provisions, but also the practices of those State officials responsible for 
implementation, including police, prosecutors and judicial officers.  
 
The efforts of South African women’s rights activists since the 1970s have 
similarly focused on challenges to the State’s response to violence against 
women.23 From the early 1990s onwards, these efforts began to pay off as the 
South African government increasingly made efforts to improve its response to 
such violence. In the past fifteen years, important advances have accordingly 
been made in the areas of legal reform, policy development and the introduction 
of ‘structural’ reform projects such as specialised sexual offences courts and 
multi-discipinary centres for victims24 of sexual violence.25  
                                                 
21  R Coomaraswamy & LM Kois ‘Violence against women’ in KD Askin & DM Koenig 
(eds) Women and International Human Rights Law (1999) 177 at 178-179. 
22  Increased levels of state intervention in the lives of women are not necessarily 
beneficial. For example, mandatory arrest and mandatory prosecution policies in 
domestic violence cases have been criticised for removing women’s decision-making 
capabilities from the legal process, thus undermining individual agency and ultimately 
leaving victims disempowered yet again. See eg Miccio, who observes that ‘the anxiety 
[among feminists] associated with mandatory arrest is emblematic of the paradox 
inherent in working with systems that have been the source of the problem’. -  
GK Miccio ‘If not now, then when? Individual and collective responsibility for male 
violence’ (2009) 15 Wash. & Lee Journal Civil Rights & Social Justice 405 at 414; also 
Gruber op cit note 4 at 758-759; 804-806.  
23  See eg D Hansson ‘Interim reflections on the Cape Attorney General’s task group on 
rape’ in S Jagwanth et al (eds) Women and the Law (1994) 411 at 415.  
24  There is a long-standing debate among feminists as to whether the term ‘victim’ of 
violence should be abandoned in favour of ‘survivor’ – the latter often being preferred 
as one denoting empowerment and agency rather than powerlessness and vulnerability. 
Although I recognise the validity of this argument, I have opted to use ‘victim’ for 
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In respect of law reform, two legislative initiatives have been particularly 
significant: the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act26 and the Criminal Law 
(Sexual Amendment and Related Matters) Amendment Act,27 which address 
domestic violence and sexual violence respectively. However, these initiatives 
have not yet had a demonstrable impact on reducing the incidence of violence in 
South Africa,28 and it is arguable whether they have succeeded in uniformly 
reducing the levels of secondary victimisation29 experienced by victims at the 
hands of the criminal justice system.30 
 
Contemporary research studies show that the South African Government’s 
attempts to effect changes in its approach to violence against women regularly 
fail on the level of implementation.31 These failures may consist of ‘systemic’ 
                                                                                                                                    
purposes of this thesis, given that it is an accepted and familiar term in areas closely 
related to the central inquiry, such as the criminal justice system. 
25  See eg L Vetten ‘Violence against women in South Africa’ in S Buhlungu et al (eds) 
State of the Nation: South Africa 2007 (2007) 425 at 426-438. 
26  Act 116 of 1998 [hereafter ‘the Domestic Violence Act’]. This Act replaced the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act 113 of 1993. The candidate was a member of the 
South African Law Reform Committee’s subcommittee tasked with considering the 
drafting of new domestic violence legislation during 1997-1998, which culminated in 
the adoption of the Domestic Violence Act.  
27  Act 32 of 2007 [hereafter ‘the 2007 Sexual Offences Act’]. This Act aims to reform 
various aspects of the law relating to sexual violence. 
28  See discussion of the levels of violence against women in South Africa in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.1. 
29  ‘Secondary victimisation’ can be described as the unsympathetic, disbelieving and 
inappropriate responses that victims of sexual assault experience at the hands of society 
in general and at each stage of the criminal justice process – S Stanton & M 
Lochrenberg Justice for Sexual Assault Survivors? (1997) 1.  
30  See eg H Combrinck & Z Skepu Implementation of Bail in Sexual Offence Cases: 
Second Report (2003) 18-19.  
31   See eg P Parenzee et al Monitoring the Implementation of the Domestic Violence Act: 
First Report (2001); L Vetten & D Motelow ‘Creating state accountability to rape 
survivors: A case study of the Boksburg Regional Court’ (2004) 62 Agenda 45-52; L 
Artz & D Smythe ‘Case attrition in rape cases: a comparative analysis’ (2007) 20 SACJ 
158-181; L Vetten et al Tracking Justice: The Attrition of Rape Cases through the 
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failure to conduct sufficient training of state officials, or to allocate sufficient 
budgetary and other resources to ensure effective implementation, but may also 
consist of individual instances of failure to comply with existing policies or 
directives.32 In practice, these failures often expose women (either the ‘original’ 
victim, as would typically happen in cases of domestic violence, or other 
identifiable victims), to further acts of violence by the perpetrator.  
 
The South African courts have been presented with a number of opportunities to 
evaluate the consequences of failure on the part of the State to respond to acts of 
(private) violence, and a progressive body of jurisprudence on State liability for 
such failure has evolved. It is apparent that the line of judicial interpretation 
exploring the scope of women’s right to freedom from violence and concomitant 
State liability for failure to secure this right has not yet reached its final point. 
This study accordingly sets out to establish how the standards and norms 
emerging in international law may guide this development and thus lead to a 
clearer understanding of the nature and extent of women’s right to freedom from 
violence in South African law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Criminal Justice System in Gauteng (2008); R Sigsworth et al Tracking Rape Case 
Attrition in Gauteng: the Police Investigation Stage (2009).  
32  The SAPS and National Prosecuting Authority have issued national instructions and 
policy directives setting out how cases of sexual assault and domestic violence should 
be dealt with. In addition, the Domestic Violence Act imposes specific duties on police 
officials and clerks of the court.  
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2.2 Significance of this study 
 
The employment of a human rights paradigm to address violence against women 
is one that it is in need of considerable development in South Africa.33 As is the 
case with many other areas of legislation and policy, drawing on rights-based 
arguments to motivate challenges to State responses is a strategy that has 
emerged only relatively recently, and much remains to be done to develop and 
enforce this approach in the context of violence against women.  
 
The right to freedom from violence, as guaranteed in section 12(1)(c) of the 
Constitution, is one that has received remarkably little attention from legal 
academic commentators, both in South Africa and in the broader international 
environment. This is unfortunate, given the relevance of this right especially to 
women who are victims of violence. This study accordingly aims to make a 
contribution to the currently available body of knowledge on the right to freedom 
from violence, with specific reference to the interpretation of this right in the 
context of violence against women. Particular attention is paid to recent 
developments in regional human rights systems, including the African human 
rights system, and in this way, the study aims to also make also make a 
contribution to the broader field of women’s rights in Africa.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33    See H Combrinck ‘Claims, entitlements or smoke and mirrors? Victims’ rights in the 
Sexual Offences Act’ in L Artz & D Smythe (eds) Should We Consent? Rape Law 
Reform in South Africa (2008) 262 at 279-282. 
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3. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
3.1 Substantive scope 
 
The study considers the broad area of gender-based violence committed against 
adult34 women by private actors. While it is not necessary for purposes of this 
delineation to compile a comprehensive list of the various manifestations of 
violence that fall in the ambit of this study (for example, domestic violence, 
sexual violence, etc.), it is important to note that certain phenomena are 
specifically excluded.  
 
The first exclusion is human trafficking. Although the Women’s Convention 
clearly denotes human trafficking as a form of discrimination against women, 35 
and trafficking has also been identified as a human rights violation,36 this issue 
has developed into an area of specialisation of its own, especially since the 
adoption of the so-called ‘Palermo Protocol’37 as one of the additional protocols 
to the Convention of Transnational Organised Crime.38 Because of the singular 
dynamics of human trafficking, the norms and standards that are emerging in 
international law in relation to human trafficking can be described as sui generis, 
bearing characteristics of a strong law enforcement approach with certain human 
                                                 
34  ‘Adult’ means a woman over the age of eighteen years. Children have been excluded 
from the study, firstly because of the particular characteristics and consequences of 
violence against children, and secondly because of the specialised human rights 
protection framework in place in respect of children. 
35   Art 6.  
36  R Coomaraswamy Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women,its 
Causes and Consequences UN Doc E/CN.4/1997/47 (dated 12 February 1997) Part IV.  
37  Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime UN Doc A/55/383, Annex II). 
38  GA Res 55/25, Annex I of 15 November 2000, entered into force on 29 September 
2003. 
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rights protections for victims of trafficking. More importantly, because of the 
separate implementation mechanisms for the Palermo Protocol and regional 
instruments, the inclusion of human trafficking would have taken this study 
beyond manageable proportions.  
 
A second exclusion is that of (voluntary) commercial sex work or prostitution.39 
(Forced prostitution and the exploitation of prostitution,40 on the other hand, do 
fall within the ambit of the study.)  
 
 
                                                 
39  Two broad schools of thoughts on sex work/ prostitution can be distinguished, i.e. those 
who view it as work, and those interpreting it as exploitation. Commentators who view 
sex work as work believe women have a right to choose to engage in the activity, as in 
any other form of work, and they should therefore have the same rights as other 
workers.
 
This perspective - with which I align myself - aims to construct (voluntary) 
sex work as a legitimate occupation, and argues that where some adult sex workers 
make a ‘free’ decision to go into sex work, they should be able to do so.
 
A fundamental 
premise here is that not all sex work is forced or coerced. There is, however, a 
recognition that the choice to enter sex work may be one choice exercised within a 
limited range of options, as is generally the case for women in the context of neo-liberal 
capitalist economies.  
 On the other end of the spectrum is the view that sex work is inherently exploitative, 
and that domination and violence are its essential features. Proponents of this view 
challenge the notion that sex work is a victimless crime, relying on studies and 
interviews with current and former sex workers documenting the fear and violence they 
experienced while in the industry.
  
They reject the claim that sex work is a valid 
employment opportunity for women,
 
arguing instead that it is one of the most graphic 
examples of men’s domination of women. This school of thought also refutes the notion 
of women freely choosing to enter sex work, claiming that most women are coerced or 
physically forced into sex work and cannot escape.
 
Such coercion may consist in 
‘direct’ coercion, or may consist in the economic marginalisation of women through 
educational deprivation and job discrimination, which ultimately render them 
vulnerable to recruitment into sex work - South African Law Commission Project 107 
Issue Paper: Adult Prostitution (2002) paras 4.9-4.26; see also generally  
S Schwarzenbach ‘Contractarians and feminists debate prostitution’ (1990-1991) 28 
Review of Law and Social Change 103 at 104 et seq;.
 
V Jenness Making It Work: The 
Prostitutes’ Rights Movement in Perspective (1993) 34-36; M Levick A Feminist 
Critique of the Prostitution / Sex Work Debate (1996) 1.  
40  As referred to in Art 6 of the Women’s Convention. 
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3.2 Key concepts 
 
3.2.1 ‘Gender-based violence’ 
The study employs the definition of the term ‘gender-based violence’ as set out 
in General Recommendation No 19 adopted by the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, i.e. ‘violence that is directed at a 
woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately’.41 This 
definition is broad enough to also include violence committed against men based 
on their gender42 - although it is generally accepted that the vast majority of 
victims of gender-based violence are women.  
 
3.2.2 ‘Violence against women’ 
As noted above, the definition as set out in Article 1 of the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women is employed, i.e. ‘any act of gender-
based violence that results is, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or 
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats or such acts, 
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in 
private life’.43 
 
                                                 
41  CEDAW General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women UN GAOR 11th 
Sess UN Doc CEDAW/C/1992/L/1/Add.15 (1992) para 1; see also Chapter 3, Section 
2.3.2 .  
42  Mitchell provides the vivid example of sexual violence committed against the male 
Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison – DS Mitchell ‘The prohibition of rape in 
international humanitarian law as a norm of jus cogens: Clarifying the doctrine’ (2005) 
15 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 219 at 219-220.   
43  See note 1 above. 
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Because of the particular focus of this study (i.e. gender-based violence against 
adult women), the term ‘violence against women’ will be the operative phrase 
used, except where the context requires otherwise.   
  
 
3.2.3 ‘Domestic violence’ 
The Domestic Violence Act contains a comprehensive definition of ‘domestic 
violence’:44 it includes a range of acts, for example, physical abuse, economic 
abuse, intimidation, and stalking, each of which is given further content in the 
definition section of the Act. 
 
 
3.2.4 ‘Rape’, ‘sexual assault’ and ‘sexual violence’ 
These concepts will be given the meaning accorded to them in current South 
African legislation, with specific reference to the 2007 Sexual Offences Act. 
These definitions are as follows:  
 
 
                                                 
44  According to s 1, these acts include:  
(a)  physical abuse; 
(b)  sexual abuse; 
(c)  emotional, verbal and psychological abuse; 
(d)  economic abuse; 
(e)  intimidation; 
(f)  harassment; 
(g)  stalking; 
(h)  damage to property; 
(i)  entry into the complainant’s residence without consent, where the parties do not 
share the same residence; or 
(j)   any other controlling or abusive behaviour towards a complainant,  
 where such conduct harms, or may cause imminent harm to, the safety, health or 
wellbeing of the complainant.  
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(a) ‘Sexual violence’ 
The 2007 Sexual Offences Act does not make provision for an offence or 
category of offences such as ‘sexual violence’. However, the term is used in this 
study to indicate the broad category of violence, consisting of rape (penetrative) 
and sexual assault (non-penetrative) combined. It should be noted that these 
definitions often differ across jurisdictions, which means that references (eg to 
rape) arising from particular contexts or drawing on direct citations should be 
treated with some caution: terminological equivalence is almost impossible to 
achieve in this regard.  
 
(b) ‘Rape’   
Any person (‘A’) who unlawfully and intentionally commits an act of sexual 
penetration with a complainant (‘B’), without the consent of B,45 is guilty of the 
offence of rape.46  Sexual penetration, which is the determining component of 
this definition, is defined as follows: 
 
 [A] ny act which causes penetration to any extent whatsoever by - 
 (a)  the genital organs of one person into or beyond the genital organs, 
  anus, or mouth of another person; 
 (b)  any other part of the body of one person or, any object, including 
  any part of the body of an animal, into or beyond the genital 
  organs or anus of another person; or 
 (c)  the genital organs of an animal, into or beyond the mouth of 
  another person;47 
 
 
                                                 
45  S 1(2) provides that ‘consent’, for purposes of this definition, means ‘voluntary’ or 
‘uncoerced agreement’. S 1(3) provides a list of circumstances in respect of which the 
complainant does not voluntarily or without coercion agree to an act of sexual 
penetration as contemplated in s 3. 
46  S 3 of the 2007 Sexual Offences Act.  
47  S 1(1) of the Act.  
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(c) ‘Sexual assault’ 
According to Section 5 of the 2007 Sexual Offences Act -  
(1)  A person (‘A’) who unlawfully and intentionally sexually violates48 a 
 complainant (‘B’), without the consent of B, is guilty of the offence of 
 sexual assault. 
(2)  A person (‘A’) who unlawfully and intentionally inspires the belief in a 
 complainant (‘B’) that B will be sexually violated, is guilty of the offence 
 of   sexual assault. 
 
 
  
  3.2.5 ‘Femicide’ 
‘Intimate femicide’ has been defined as the ‘killing of a female person by an 
intimate partner’ (i.e. her current or ex-husband or boyfriend, same-sex partner, 
and so forth).49  Femicide constitutes the killing of a woman by a person other 
than an intimate partner. 
                                                 
48  S 1(1) provides an expansive definition of ‘sexual violation’, which covers a range of 
‘sexual’ acts of a non-penetrative nature. This category of offences broadly captures the 
common law offences that previously resorted under indecent assault and crimen 
iniuria, but without an element of sexual penetration.  
49  S Mathews et al ‘Every six hours a woman is killed by her intimate partner’ MRC 
Policy Brief (June 2004) 1. 
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4. A FEMINIST READING OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 
 
This study provides a feminist50 reading of international human rights law. It 
does not set out to conduct a feminist critique or analysis of international human 
rights law: this project has already been undertaken. Feminist commentators have 
long expressed ambivalent views on international law. In a pioneering article 
published in 1991, Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright posed the question why 
international law had until then largely resisted feminist analysis,51 and analysed 
the organisational and normative structures of international law in order to 
address this question. In this short overview, I draw on this piece, as well as later 
articles by these authors, to develop an understanding of the feminist comments 
on international law.52  
 
In terms of its organisational structure, the authors pointed out that the primary 
subjects of international law are States (and, increasingly, international 
organisations). They expressed the view that in both States and international 
                                                 
50  The term ‘feminism’ has taken on such expansive and varied meanings across academic 
disciplines that to provide a single definition is almost an impossible task – see in this 
regard generally K van Marle & E Bonthuys ‘Feminist theories and concepts’ in  
E Bonthuys & C Albertyn (eds) Gender, Law and Justice (2007) 15 at 15-17. Broadly, I 
subscribe to MacKinnon’s view of feminism as theory ‘impelled by the realities of 
women’s situation’ – CA MacKinnon Are Women Human? (2006) 44. I do not find it 
useful to categorise this understanding into a particular ‘school’ of feminism: apart 
from the fact that the boundaries between the different categories can be relatively 
fluid, the practical value of these classifications in this context is dubious. 
51   H Charlesworth et al ‘Feminist approaches to international law’ (1991) 85 American 
Journal of International Law 613 at 614.  
52   In my view this is a helpful method of tracking the gradient of developments in both 
international law and feminist analysis, as Charlesworth et al review progress at various 
points subsequent to their original 1991 piece. One also finds that much of the 
subsequent analysis is built on the foundational work of Charlesworth et al.   
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organisations, women were invisible in the sense that they were either 
unrepresented or under-represented in decision-making processes.53 On a 
normative level, Charlesworth et al explained that international law principles, 
which do affect individuals (and not only States) are not universally applicable 
and neutral, as is generally assumed. It is often overlooked that these principles 
may impinge differently on men and women, and consequently, women’s 
experiences of the operation of these laws may be discounted.54  
 
The normative structure of international law also allows for the reproduction of 
various distinctions between the public and the private sphere.55 The impact of 
this public/ private dichotomy in excluding women from international law can be 
seen in the international prohibition on torture.56 The right to freedom from 
torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is broadly 
accepted as a fundamental civil and political right, and is included in all 
international civil and political rights instruments. It also forms the subject of 
specialised treaties.57 The right to freedom from torture is further regarded as a 
norm of customary international law. 
 
                                                 
53   Charlesworth et al op cit note 51 at 621-625. I recount the authors’ argument here 
briefly, at the risk of oversimplification. Certain of these themes are also explored in  
H Charlesworth & C Chinkin The Boundaries of International Law (2000) 201-249.   
54   Idem note 51 at 625.  
55   Ibid. See in this regard also C Romany ‘State responsibility goes private: A feminist 
critique of the public/ private distinction in international human rights law’ in RJ Cook 
(ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (1994) 85 at 85; 
K Mahoney ‘Theoretical perspectives on women’s human rights and strategies for their 
implementation’ (1996) 21 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 799 at 842-843; UA 
O’Hare ‘Realizing human rights for women’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 364 at 
368-370; B Meyersfeld Domestic Violence and International Law (2010) 100-102. 
56  I return to the definition of torture again in Chapter 2, Section 5.1. 
57   Charlesworth op cit note 51 at 627-628. 
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Charlesworth et al pointed out that the international definition of torture requires 
that it takes place in the public realm: a public official or person acting officially 
must be implicated.58 The rationale for this limitation is that private acts of 
brutality would be ‘ordinary’ criminal offences, which national law enforcement 
is expected to address. However, this excludes the acts of torture that many 
women are subjected to – with the only difference that these acts are committed 
not in the most public context of the state, but rather in the home, committed by 
private persons.59 
 
The 1991 article concluded that there was a need for further study of traditional 
areas of international law ‘from a perspective that regards gender as important’.60 
While admitting that modern international law is both androcentric and 
Eurocentric and relies for its implementation on fundamentally patriarchal 
institutions and principles, the authors did express the belief that a feminist 
challenge to this system could result in meaningful development and change.61 
Examples of this would be a focus on structural abuse and the revision of the 
notions of state responsibility.  
 
Writing in 1998, Charlesworth pointed out that there was now a significant body 
of literature critiquing the international system for the protection of human rights 
from a feminist perspective.62 She listed the main themes of this work, 
elaborating on certain of the points made in the 1991 article,63 and concluded that 
                                                 
58  Idem at 628, citing Art 1(1) of the Convention against Torture.  
59  Idem at 629. 
60   Idem at 643.  
61   Idem at 644-645. 
62   H Charlesworth ‘The mid-life crisis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 
(1998) 55 Washington and Lee Law Review 781 at 785 fn 26 and authorities cited there.  
63   Idem at 786-788.  
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the human rights system’s responses to the criticisms of feminist activists have 
been very mixed.64 Although the international community seems to have 
accepted ‘the rhetoric of women’s rights’,65 the human rights system has 
generally only recognised claims of women that involve claims akin to those that 
men might sustain. This means that the recognition of rights violations in the 
private sphere is still the exception.66 
 
In conclusion, the author again raises the feminist debate, which was also 
touched on the original 1991 piece, about whether human rights discourse is a 
useful strategy.67 Many feminists have argued that civil and political rights are 
manipulable, individualistic and unlikely to respond to the more general 
structural disadvantages that women face. Charlesworth is however of the 
opinion that the significance of human rights discourse outweighs its 
disadvantages, since it allows women to claim specific entitlements from the 
specified holder of an obligation. Moreover, there are international, regional, and 
national systems in place that can be invoked to protect human rights.  
 
In 2005, the three authors took another joint look at international law.68 In the 
interim, the world had again seen major shifts, with perhaps the most 
fundamental changes in global politics brought about by the events of 11 
September 2001, and the concomitant ‘war on terror’. Their assessment, as 
before, is a varied one. They observe that because of the significant scholarly 
                                                 
64   Idem at 794. 
65   Idem at 791. 
66   Idem at 794. 
67   Ibid. See in this regard also C Smart Feminism and the Power of Law (1989) 139-146. 
68   C Chinkin, S Wright and H Charlesworth ‘Feminist approaches to international law: 
Reflections from another century’ in D Buss & A Manji (eds) International Law: 
Modern Feminist Approaches (2005) 17-45.   
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literature produced in this area over the last 15 years, some feminist ideas have 
now been absorbed in the rhetoric of international law and its institutions. In 
many areas, however, progress has been limited, in the sense that feminist issues 
have either been marginalised or ‘rendered so bland that they have no 
transformative bite’.69 Moreover, many of the tensions and contradictions 
regarding the use of feminist ideas in international law remain.  
 
The feminist analysis briefly sketched above demonstrates that although 
important inroads have been made, international law remains far from ideal when 
viewed through a feminist lens. This is especially true on the organisational level 
mentioned by Charlesworth et al.70  
 
However, as Engle pointed out in the early years of feminist critique of 
international human rights law, as much as women’s rights advocates express 
their doubts about this system, they keep returning to it: 
 
The literature and movement surrounding women’s human rights 
has possibly challenged the human rights core more than any 
other literature or movement. At the same time, it has become one 
of the core’s staunchest defenders. Even as every author identifies 
and conveys difficulties with the discourse, they all make it 
somehow work for them.71 
 
                                                 
69  Idem at 44.  
70  See also generally A Gallagher ‘Ending the marginalization: Strategies for 
incorporating women into the United Nations human rights system’ (1997) 19 Human 
Rights Quarterly 283-333; RL Johnstone ‘Feminist influences on the United Nations 
human rights treaty bodies’ (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 146 at 180-185.  
71  K Engle ‘International human rights and feminism: When discourses meet’ (1992) 13 
Michigan Journal of International Law 517 at 610. The author’s ‘follow-up’ article, 
published in 2005, is also of interest: see K Engle ‘International human rights and 
feminisms: When discourses keep meeting’ in D Buss & A Manji (eds) International 
Law: Modern Feminist Approaches (2005) 47-66.  
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I accordingly argue that significant progress has been made on the level of 
normative development, as seen in the adoption on international and regional 
level of numerous instruments relating to women’s rights generally and violence 
against women specifically. This normative development has further been 
enhanced by the judgments and opinions of courts and other bodies. Importantly, 
the notions of both State accountability for non-state actors and individual 
accountability (for example, in armed conflict) have been revised, as called for 
by feminists, leading to greater protection of women’s rights.  
 
The standards and norms emerging in international law, while perhaps still 
constituting an imperfect paradigm, therefore offer a persuasive basis for 
interpretation of rights on domestic level in South Africa, and will accordingly 
form the basis of closer scrutiny in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
 
5. CHAPTER OUTLINE  
 
Chapter 2 below presents the research design and the framework of analysis that 
will be used for purposes of the study. It commences by setting out the broad 
problem statement underlying the thesis, and then distils the central research 
questions from this formulation. The framework for analysis is outlined, 
consisting of three components: the role of international law in South African 
law, the nature of State obligations generated by human rights and the standard 
of ‘due diligence’ as applied to violence against women. Finally, I narrow down 
the scope of the study by considering certain thematic exclusions.  
 
Chapter 3 examines the development of women’s right to freedom from violence 
in international law (in the ‘global’ sense), with specific reference to the 
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Women’s Convention. It pays specific attention to the nature of State obligations 
arising from the recognition of this right, drawing on the typology of duties set 
out in Chapter 2 above, and also looks at the interpretation of the Convention in 
communications relating to violence against women considered by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.  
 
Chapter 4 continues this investigation of international law, with reference to the 
international documents adopted subsequent to the introduction of CEDAW’s 
General Recommendation No. 19 in 1992.    
 
Chapter 5 considers women’s right to freedom from violence in the three regional 
human rights systems, i.e. the Inter-American, European and African systems. 
The investigation of each system commences with an examination of the 
applicable human rights instruments, with specific emphasis on documents 
addressing the right to freedom from violence, and briefly looks at the 
implementation mechanisms for these instruments. It then moves on to the 
relevant jurisprudence.  
  
Chapter 6 looks at the right to freedom from violence in South African law. It 
first examines the right as guaranteed in the Constitution, and then investigates 
its treatment by the Courts around certain broad themes, including the duty to 
enact legislative measures to address domestic violence and sentencing 
proceedings in rape matters.  
 
Chapter 7 draws together the central research questions and the findings from 
each of the above chapters into a set of conclusions.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the research design and the framework of analysis that will 
be used for purposes of the study. To begin with, the problem statement is set 
out, and then the central research questions are formulated. I then sketch the 
framework that will be used for analysis in subsequent chapters, with specific 
reference to the key aspects of international law in the South African context, the 
nature of obligations generated by human rights and the standard of due 
diligence. Finally, the scope of the study is outlined with further precision by 
means of a brief thematic exploration of international human rights law.      
 
 
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
2.1. Violence against women: The global, regional and South African 
picture1 
 
Violence against women, as noted in Chapter 1, is a universal phenomenon – in 
the sense that there is no region worldwide in which women’s freedom from 
violence has been secured.2 The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, 
reporting on an in-depth study on all forms of violence against women, has noted 
                                                 
1  This section is based on the chapter published as H Combrinck ‘Rape law reform in 
Africa: “More of the same” or new opportunities?’ in C McGlynn & VE Munro (eds) 
Rethinking Rape Law (2010) 122 at 122-124. 
2  UN Secretary General (2006) In-Depth Study on Violence against Women  
UN Doc A/61/122/Add.1 (dated 6 July 2006) para 69. 
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that the pervasiveness of violence against women points to its roots in patriarchy, 
i.e. the systemic domination of women by men. The report identified a number of 
explanations for violence against women, that is, patriarchy and other relations of 
dominance and subordination, cultural3 norms and practices and economic 
inequalities. It also identified certain specific causal factors such as the use of 
violence in conflict resolution, State inaction and the doctrine of privacy well as 
individual or family behavioural patterns, which create a higher risk of violence.4 
 
At the risk of generalisation, it is among the broader systemic factors identified 
above, such as cultural norms and economic inequalities, prevailing in African 
societies that one finds the explanation for the high levels of violence against 
women that have been observed in the region. For example, 50-70 per cent of 
Ethiopian women experience gender-based violence in their lifetime, among the 
highest levels globally.5 A South African study published in 2004 reported the 
highest rate of intimate femicide noted in international research, amounting to a 
woman being killed by her intimate partner every six hours.6 While unacceptable 
anywhere, in developing7 countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 
gender-based violence has greater negative impacts on human development than 
elsewhere because of its high prevalence, limited access to legal services, 
                                                 
3  It is acknowledged that the notion of ‘culture’, how it is constructed (and by whom) and 
its perceived role in limiting women’s rights are all highly contested in the African 
context. For two interestingly divergent views, see M Ssenyonjo ‘Culture and the 
human rights of women in Africa: Between light and shadow’ (2007) 51 Journal of 
African Law 39 at 51-64; S Tamale ‘The right to culture and the culture of rights: A 
critical perspective on women’s sexual rights in Africa’ (2008) 16 Feminist Legal 
Studies 47 at 56-62.   
4  UN Secretary General op cit note 1 paras 69-91. 
5  M Philpart et al ‘Prevalence and risk factors of gender-based violence committed by 
male college students in Awassa, Ethiopia’ (2009) 24 Violence and Victims 123.  
6  S Mathews et al ‘Every six minutes a woman is killed by her intimate partner’ MRC 
Policy Brief 5 (June 2004) 4. 
7  It is acknowledged that the terms ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries are not 
unproblematic; however, they will be used in this thesis for ease of reference.  
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insensitivity of law enforcement, and limited constitutional efforts to address 
gender inequality.8 
 
It has been said that contemporary Africa finds itself ‘poised between tradition 
and modernity’.9 While important strides have been made across the region in 
terms of changing the role of women from that of a perpetual minor, restricted to 
the home with the duties of childrearing, to an independent, equal partner with 
choices in terms of entering the public sphere, the ‘ideology of domesticity’ is 
still in many respects the persistent reality.10  
 
For example, in 2002, Specioza Kazibwe, then the Vice-President of Uganda, 
made public the fact that she had, over a number of years, been subjected to 
physical violence by her husband. While she did receive some support, mainly 
from women’s groups, the majority of people felt that she had been wrong to 
make public what had happened within the privacy of her home. Her husband 
responded in public that he had ‘only’ slapped her and that this was to correct 
her, because he felt that she needed to know that her public role ended at the gate 
– when she entered the home, she was his wife and not the Vice-President. In her 
role as his wife, she had to submit to him and not be impertinent.11  
 
As Banda observes, this incident underlines the resilience of the traditional 
notion of ‘the good wife’: one who is obedient and who does not challenge 
accepted gender roles.12 It also illustrates how strongly the division between the 
                                                 
8  Philpart et al op cit note 5 at 122-123. 
9  F Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa (2007) 268. 
10  S Tamale ‘Gender trauma in Africa: Enhancing women’s links to resources’ (2004) 48 
Journal of African Law 51-53; see also Viljoen op cit note 9 at 268-269. 
11     F Banda Women, Law and Human Rights: An African Perspective (2005) 159; see also 
Anonymous ‘Uganda Tackles Wife-Beating Taboo’ BBC News (19 March 2002). 
12  Ibid. 
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public and private still operates in African societies – by no means unique to 
Uganda.13 
 
Adjetey, cautioning against oversimplification and essentialism, observes that 
because traditional African institutions are broadly diverse, the articulation of 
women’s rights varies from one society to another.14 However, it can be stated as 
a general rule that women’s sexuality remains a deeply contested area. In some 
parts of Africa, marriage results in a woman’s physical person, including her 
sexuality, becoming part of her husband’s property.15 Unsurprisingly, customary 
law regards all sex within a marriage as consensual. This has, for instance, 
resulted in marital rape proving to be a major area of controversy in virtually 
every Anglophone16 African country where women’s rights activists have 
advocated for law reform.17 The conceptual impossibility of a man raping his 
wife, originating in customary law, has been reinforced by the ‘marital rape 
exemption’ from common law.18  
 
The confluence of women’s inequality with various structural factors implies, in 
real terms, that women are often coerced into having sex without being in a 
                                                 
13  See also eg LV Martin (ed) ‘Domestic violence in Ghana: The open secret’ (2006) 7 
Georgetown Journal of Gender & Law 531 at 539-542.   
14  FN Adjetey ‘Reclaiming the African woman’s individuality: The struggle between 
women’s reproductive autonomy and African society and culture’ (1995) 44 American 
University Law Review 1355-1356. 
15  Idem at 1359-1360; Banda op cit note 11 at 172; KSA Ebeku ‘Considering the Protocol 
on the Rights of Women in Africa’ (2006) 36 Africa Insight 24 at 26. 
16  The candidate’s review of African jurisdictions was limited by language constraints.  
17  For example, the passage of the Ghanaian Domestic Violence Act in 2007 was almost 
derailed by the inclusion of a provision that could criminalise marital rape (see A 
Charnock ‘Confusion over marital rape following passage of Domestic Violence Act’ 
The Statesman (24 February 2007); N Oye Lithur ‘See how far we’ve come’ Modern 
Ghana News (10 March 2009).  
18  See eg N Zondi ‘When marriage as an institution ceases to be a partnership: Contested 
issues of rape and other forms of sexual abuse as condoned by culture’ (2007) 74 
Agenda 20 at 20-22. 
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position to protect themselves against sexually transmitted diseases, including 
HIV/AIDS. In 2009, sub-Saharan Africa remained the region most heavily 
affected by HIV. Women, accounting for approximately 60 per cent of estimated 
HIV infections in this region, bear a disproportionate burden in the pandemic.19  
 
Moving to the South African situation, it is disconcerting to note that the levels 
of violence against women have consistently remained high.20 According to the 
most up to date police statistics, 71,500 cases of sexual violence were reported 
during the 2008/2009 period.21 Statistics on the number of domestic violence 
incidents reported to the South African Police Service only recently started 
becoming available, which makes the identification of trends somewhat 
difficult;22 however, community-based prevalence studies have shown that 
domestic violence, in one form or another, affects as many as one in two women 
in South Africa.23  
 
Various explanations have been advanced for the high levels of violence against 
women currently experienced in South Africa. In this regard, it is useful to 
consider that the incidence of violence directed at women in a particular society 
                                                 
19  UNAIDS 2009 AIDS Epidemic Update (2009) 21-22. 
20  The following section is based on L Artz & H Combrinck ‘Sexual assault’ in  
E Bonthuys & C Albertyn (eds) (2007) Gender, Law & Justice 298 at 300-301.  
21  South African Police Service 2009 Annual Report (2009) 5. These numbers represent 
child and adult, as well as male and female, victims in the broad category of ‘sexual 
violence’ (which includes rape and sexual assault as defined in terms of the Criminal 
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 [hereafter the ‘2007 
Sexual Offences Act’]’. See Chapter 1, Section 3.2.4 for definitions of these offences.   
22    These statistics are contained in reports submitted to parliament on a six-monthly basis 
by the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service in terms of s 
18(5)(d) of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. The reports are included in the 
minutes of the National Assembly portfolio committee on Safety and Security, 
accessible through the website of the Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
(www.pmg.org.za).     
23   L Vetten ‘Violence against women in South Africa’ in S Buhlungu et al (eds) State of 
the Nation: South Africa 2007 (2007) 425 at 429. 
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tends to reflect the general level of violence expressed in such society.24 In spite 
of fifteen years of democracy and the development of a human rights culture, 
South African society is still, at the time of writing, characterised by 
extraordinarily high levels of inter-personal violence.25   
 
If one accepts that violence against women cannot be divorced from the broader 
social context, it is further to be expected that the power imbalances inherent 
within patriarchal relations will intersect with those arising from class and race 
structures, especially in a society such as South Africa, which is highly structured 
along class and race lines.26 Researchers have therefore proposed that in the 
South African environment, where working class (and particularly, black) men, 
daily experience themselves as ‘oppressed and impotent’, their frustration arising 
from the public domain is likely to take expression in domination in the private 
realm in the form of dominating women.27 It is posited that the emasculation 
brought about by high unemployment levels (given the traditional expectation of 
                                                 
24  L Vogelman & G Eagle ‘Overcoming endemic violence against women’ (1991) 18 
Social Justice 209 at 215-216.  
25  Hamber traces the ‘culture of violence’ still prevalent in South Africa from the State 
and political violence of the apartheid era (with the 1980s as one of the most violent 
periods in South African history) to the 1990s, when political violence gradually gave 
way to ‘criminal’ violence. He notes that social inequality and the enormous 
deprivation caused by the apartheid system are at the root of most violence in South 
Africa. However, violent crime has other multiple causal factors, including (inter alia) 
the historical development of a culture of violence, where violence was seen by all 
significant political parties as a legitimate means to achieve their goals; the deregulation 
of state control during the period of negotiation in the early 1990s; an ineffective 
criminal justice system and the perception that there will be no serious consequences 
for criminal activity - see B Hamber ‘“Have no doubt it is fear in the land”: An 
exploration of the continuing cycles of violence in South Africa’ (2000) 5 South 
African Journal of Child and Adolescent Mental Health 9-13. Analysts writing more 
recently have posited that the root causes of violence have not changed much since the 
apartheid era: see eg C Njoki ‘Why so much violence in South Africa’ ISS Today (10 
October 2006).  
26 Vogelman & Eagle op cit note 24 at 214. 
27    Idem at 214-215.  
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men as principal breadwinners) is also likely to result in assertions of power in 
relation to women.28  
 
Economic dependence on men has been identified as the most fundamental 
structural constraint that South African women face.29 One consequence of this 
material dependence is the perception by men that women and their children are 
in some sense owned by them. This objectification or view of women as property 
in turn results in a view on the part of men that they are entitled to use violence 
against ‘their’ women.30 
 
Another consequence is that women remain in abusive relationships due to a lack 
of real alternatives, such as access to adequate housing. It has been noted that a 
lack of access to safe housing alternatives is often a major factor in keeping 
women ‘trapped’ in violent relationships.31 This is said to be true for women all 
over the world, regardless of whether they are living in developing or developed 
countries; in our experience, it certainly holds true in the South African context.32  
 
Sanday draws a distinction between so-called ‘rape-prone’ and ‘rape-free’ 
societies, and in her attempt to identify some of the correlates associated with 
                                                 
28    L Vetten Race, Gender, and Power in the Face of Social Change in J Park et al (eds) 
(2000) Reclaiming Women’s Spaces 47 at 67-68. 
29  Vogelman and Eagle op cit note 24 at 216; L Artz ‘The weather watchers: Gender, 
violence and social control’ in Van Zyl, M & Steyn, M (eds) The Prize and the Price: 
Shaping Sexualities in South Africa (2009) 169 at 177; D Smythe & P Parenzee ‘Acting 
against domestic violence’ in B Dixon & E Van der Spuy (eds) Justice Gained? Crime 
and Crime Control in South Africa’s Transition (2004) 140-162.  
30  Vogelman and Eagle loc cit; see also AK Wing ‘A Critical Race Feminist 
conceptualization of violence: South African and Palestinian Women’ (1997) 60 Albany 
Law Review 943 at 958. 
31    Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) Sources No 5: Women and Housing 
Rights 2 ed (2008) 34.  
32    See H Combrinck & L Chenwi  The Role of Informal Community Structures in 
Ensuring Women’s Rights to Have Access to Adequate Housing in Langa, Manenberg 
and Mfuleni (2007) at 1-2. 
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each type, observes that in rape-prone societies women hold limited power and 
authority, and males express contempt for women as decision makers.33 In such 
societies, ‘masculinity’ is predicated on an ideology of toughness and an 
acceptance of interpersonal violence.34 In the case of South Africa, sexual assault 
can therefore be said to reflect the substantial gender power inequalities that 
pervade our society. These inequalities are multiplied where different forms of 
domination intersect, for example, race and gender, resulting in the particularly 
brutal sexual assault of women who are perceived to be non-compliant with 
‘acceptable’ norms of sexual behaviour, such as black lesbian women.35 
 
In terms of the profile or characteristics of sexual violence, it is estimated that in 
South Africa 60 per cent of sexual violence victims know their assailants.36 This 
goes contrary to the often-held perception that sexual violence is usually 
committed by a ‘stranger’. The range of relationships in which such violence 
occurs includes marital37 and dating relationships. The extent of sexual violence 
in marriage or dating relationships is difficult to assess, as it is even more 
underreported than sexual assault by strangers. Significantly, many women who 
are assaulted in the context of dating or marriage do not in fact view themselves 
as victims of sexual violence. In dating relationships, sex is often viewed as a  
 
 
                                                 
33  PR Sanday Rape and the Silencing of the Feminine (1986) cited in L Vetten ‘Roots of a 
Rape Crisis’ (1997) 8 Crime & Conflict 9-12. See also D Greene Gender Violence in 
Africa: African Women’s Responses (1999) 95-97. 
34  Vetten loc cit. 
35  See A Martin et al Hate Crimes: The Rise of Corrective Rape in South Africa (2009) 
12.  
36  S Usdin & L Ramafoko ‘Callous normality of rape in South Africa’ Mail & Guardian 
(7 May 1999). See also R Hirschowitz et al Research Findings on Rape (2000) 13.  
37  Until 1993, a husband could not be charged under South African law with raping his 
wife. This so-called ‘marital rape exemption’ was abolished by s 5 of the Prevention of 
Family Violence Act 133 of 1993.  
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sign of love even where it is accompanied by assault or violence:  
 
Assault is described as a regular feature of sexual relationships 
and some respondents said this is the main reason they continue to 
have sex. Physical assault is so commonplace, women said, that 
many of their peers actually see it as an expression of love.38  
 
 
This phenomenon attests to both the normalisation of sexual violence and 
perceptions of ‘ownership’ of women’s sexuality on the part of men in South 
Africa.39  
  
An additional aspect that must be factored into a consideration of violence 
against women in South Africa is the extent of the HIV epidemic here. 
According to the 2008 UNAIDS Global Report, the estimated total of 5.7 million 
South Africans living with HIV in 2007 makes this the largest HIV epidemic in 
the world.40 It is now increasingly accepted that gender-based violence is a key 
factor in increasing women’s risk of contracting HIV.41 For example, because 
rape is by definition non-consensual, it has a higher risk of leading to HIV 
infection by virtue of physical injury to the women’s genitalia or anus.  Dunkle et 
al report that experience of violent and controlling behaviour from male partners 
is associated with increased risk of HIV infection for women.42 Women in 
                                                 
38 Usdin & Ramafoko op cit note 36. 
39  See in this regard also M Motsei The Kanga and the Kangaroo Court (2007) 49, 67. 
40   UNAIDS loc cit. Although HIV data from antenatal clinics in South Africa suggest that 
the country’s epidemic might be stabilising, there is no evidence yet of major changes 
in HIV-related behaviour – UNAIDS 2008 Report on the Global AIDS Pandemic 
(2008) 40. See however TM Rehle et al ‘A decline in new HIV infections in South 
Africa: Estimating HIV incidence from three national HIV surveys in 2002, 2005 and 
2008’ (2010) 5(6) PLoS ONE 1 at 4-5. 
41  See eg Y Ertürk Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its 
Causes and Consequences: The Intersections of Violence against Women and 
HIV/AIDS UN Doc Ref E/CN.4/2005/72 (dated 17 January 2005) paras 26-54. 
42   K Dunkle et al ‘Gender-based violence, relationship power, and risk of HIV infection 
in women attending antenatal clinics in South Africa’ (2004) 363 The Lancet 1415 at 
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violent relationships may also be at risk more indirectly by being unable to 
negotiate the use of safer sex methods, such as condoms.43 This means that 
where women are vulnerable to gender-based violence (such as domestic 
violence), their risk of HIV infection also increases exponentially.  
 
The highly-publicised criminal trial of (then) deputy president Jacob Zuma44  on 
charges of rape45 during the early months of 2006 brought together and amplified 
many of the elements that make up the complex picture of violence against 
women in South Africa: gender stereotypes, rape myths, HIV/AIDS 
(un)awareness and disputed cultural practices.46 Although feminist commentators 
agreed that the prosecution had not succeeded in proving its case beyond 
                                                                                                                                    
1419. See also R Jewkes et al ‘Understanding men’s health and use of violence: 
Interface of rape and HIV in South Africa MRC Policy Brief (June 2009) 2. 
43  See H Combrinck & L Wakefield At the Crossroads: Linking Strategic Frameworks to 
Address Gender-Based Violence and HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa (2007) 18 fn 56 and 
authorities cited there. 
44  President of South Africa at the time of writing.  
45  Briefly: Jacob Zuma was charged with the rape of one ‘Khwezi’, a 31-year old woman 
living with HIV. It was common cause that the complainant, who was well known to 
the accused, had visited his home on the date in question, and that later that evening 
unprotected sexual intercourse took place between them. The details of the events 
leading up to the intercourse were disputed to a greater or lesser extent, but the material 
difference between the state and defence versions lay in whether or not the complainant 
had consented to the intercourse – see S v Zuma 2006 2 SACR 191 (W) 191f-192b. One 
of the contentious aspects of the trial was a ruling by the Court (per Van der Merwe J) 
allowing the defence to cross-examine the complainant on her past sexual history and 
also to lead evidence in connection with this history – see S v Zuma (above) 198f et seq. 
The Court ultimately accepted the defence version of the complainant’s history of false 
rape allegations, resulting in the acquittal of the accused (223e).  
46   For discussion of these elements, see eg Motsei op cit note 39 at 145-171; S Robins 
‘Sexual rights and sexual cultures: Reflections on “the Zuma affair” and “new 
masculinities” in the new South Africa’ (2006) 12(26) Horizontes Antropológicos 149-
183; P Govender ‘You have struck a woman, you have struck a rock’ Mail & Guardian 
Online (17 March 2006).  
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reasonable doubt, they were also greatly disturbed by the gender divisions in 
South African society laid bare by this case.47      
 
 
2.2 Practical implications of women’s right to freedom from violence  
 
In response to the phenomenon of violence against women, the South African 
Government has put in place a relatively elaborate legislative and policy 
framework, consisting of the Domestic Violence Act, the 2007 Sexual Offences 
Act and various supporting policy measures.48 These initiatives should also be 
understood in the light of the constitutional protection of the rights to freedom to 
violence, dignity and gender equality. 
 
Given this response, the first question that arises is what women who are victims 
of violence can realistically expect from the State.49 Or to put this differently, to 
what extent do the constitutional rights in practice translate into specific 
‘benefits’ for women experiencing violence? I have posed the question elsewhere 
whether, for example, the right to equality implies that the victim and accused 
are entitled to an equal number of supporters to be present in court during the 
                                                 
47  See eg N Naylor ‘The socio-political eunuch called an impartial judge’ Pambazuka 
News (11 May 2006); S Ndashe ‘Can I speak please!’  Pambazuka News (11 May 
2006). 
48  See eg Vetten op cit note 23 at 426-438. 
49  The emphasis placed on the role of the State in this thesis should not be taken as an 
assumption that violence against women can only be addressed through State action – 
see in this regard eg P Scully ‘Should we give up on the State? Feminist theory, African 
gender history and transitional justice’ (2009) 2 African Journal on Conflict Resolution 
29 at 37-38. Similarly, I hold the view that recourse to ‘the legal system’ (in its various 
aspects) is not necessarily an appropriate solution for all victims under all 
circumstances.  
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rape trial?50 Does the right to privacy entail that the victim may refuse to answer 
defence questions about her previous sexual history, even after the court has 
ruled in favour of the defence in an application brought in terms of section 227 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act?51 Does the right to bodily integrity imply that a 
sexual assault victim has the ‘right’ to know the HIV status of the person who 
allegedly assaulted her? These are some of the practical questions that arise when 
considering the scope of victims’ constitutional rights in the context of the 2007 
Sexual Offences Act. 
 
Going beyond the Sexual Offences Act, what is the position of a victim of 
domestic violence upon finding that the perpetrator, charged with breaching the 
protection order that she obtained against him, has been acquitted – can she 
‘force’ the prosecution to appeal against this finding?52 What happens where the 
police forensic laboratory misplaces the medico-legal samples taken in a rape 
                                                 
50  This question may appear to be a facile one. However, it is interesting to note that in the 
Zuma rape trial, the presiding officer allowed the following arrangement: the victim’s 
evidence was given in camera, and she and the accused were both allowed fifteen 
supporters in the courtroom during her testimony. The accused had to identify his 
supporters in advance and the victim had a ‘veto right’ if she didn’t want a specific 
person to be present. In addition, accredited media reporters were allowed in court - see 
H Combrinck ‘Claims, entitlements or smoke and mirrors? Victims’ rights in the 
Sexual Offences Act’ in L Artz & D Smythe (eds) (2008) Should We Consent? Rape 
Law Reform in South Africa 262 at 265. I questioned whether this arrangement served 
to protect the victim’s dignity or privacy in any meaningful way.  
51  Ibid. 
52  In terms of current South African law, the simple answer is ‘no’. The prosecution may 
not appeal against an acquittal, unless it is on a point of law – see s 310 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Furthermore, the victim is not a party to the criminal trial 
and therefore has no standing; this means that she has no right to appeal either against a 
finding on the merits or, in the case of conviction, against the sentence. If the 
prosecution decides not to appeal against the latter, the victim has no rights, procedural 
or otherwise, in terms of criminal procedure. Her remedies against the prosecution may 
lie in administrative law; however, this would not change the outcome of the criminal 
case.  
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case, resulting in the matter being permanently withdrawn without any prospect 
of a prosecution – can the rape victim hold the state accountable for this?53  
 
The above examples have focused on the position of individual women. Perhaps 
one should broaden the scope, and consider a group of marginalised women, 
such as lesbian women, who are victims of sexual violence in the form of so-
called ‘corrective rape’,54 and find it difficult to get the criminal justice system to 
devote serious attention to these cases. Can they compel the police and 
prosecutors to conduct diligent and timely investigations and prosecutions, based 
on their right to freedom from violence? Even more broadly, can they expect the 
State to address the damaging gender stereotypes underpinning these crimes?  
 
These examples do not constitute an exhaustive list of the practical questions that 
may arise for consideration under women’s right to freedom from violence. 
However, they begin to indicate the broad range of issue that may fall to be 
decided by the Courts in terms of this right. I will accordingly return to these 
examples following the examination of international law in the chapters below.  
 
 
                                                 
53  Assume that identification is in dispute, and that the only way of potentially linking the 
accused to the offence would be through DNA analysis of bodily fluid. The loss of the 
samples, apart from scuppering the criminal prosecution, therefore also implies that the 
victim is deprived of any opportunity of taking action against the alleged perpetrator in 
civil law.  
54  ‘Corrective rape’ is the prejudiced notion that a lesbian woman can be raped to ‘correct’ 
her lesbian sexuality. ‘Corrective rape’ seeks to justify the rape of those people who are 
perceived to not conform - or to disrupt - expected gender roles, behaviour and/or 
presentation. Misogyny and homophobia underpin the prejudice associated with 
‘corrective rape’ - JA Nel & M Judge ‘Exploring homophobic victimisation in Gauteng, 
South Africa: Issues, impacts and responses’ (2008) 21 Acta Criminologica 19 at 24 fn 
2. 
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3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
Against this backdrop, I have formulated the following central research 
questions: 
 
1. Do women have a right to be free from violence under international human 
rights law? If so, what understanding has been given to this right under 
international human rights law? 
 
2. To what extent and in what way has women’s right to be free from violence 
under the South African Constitution been guided by international human 
rights law? 
 
3.  Given the experience thus far, how should international human rights law 
guide women’s right to be free from violence under the South African 
Constitution in future?  
 
This study will proceed from the central hypothesis that a more in-depth and 
nuanced understanding of the nature and scope of women’s right to freedom 
from violence, as it has recently emerged in international human rights law, is 
essential for a correct and comprehensive interpretation of women’s right to 
freedom from all forms of violence as guaranteed in the South African 
Constitution. 
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In addition to the feminist understanding of international human rights law 
referred to in Chapter 1, the broad approach adopted in this study is one of 
transformative constitutionalism as critique.56   
 
 
4. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  
 
4.1 International law as interpretative guide in the South African 
Constitution  
 
4.1.1 Background 
 
It has been observed that before the introduction of the 1993 Constitution,57 
international law did not play a prominent role in the development of human 
rights jurisprudence in South Africa.58 This was in part due to certain of the 
consequences of South Africa’s international isolation during the apartheid 
regime, such as the fact that the country was party to only one document with 
human rights provisions, i.e. the United Nations Charter.59 
                                                 
56   I find Van Marle’s description of transformative constitutionalism as critique to be an 
appealing one: ‘an approach to the Constitution and law in general that is committed to 
transforming political, social, socio-economic and legal practices in such a way that it 
will radically alter existing assumptions about law, politics, economics and society in 
general’ - K Van Marle ‘Transformative constitutionalism as/ and critique’ (2009) Stell 
LR 286 at 288.  
57  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 [hereafter ‘the 1993 
Constitution’]. 
58   J Dugard ‘The role of international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 
South African Journal of Human Rights 208 at 208.  
59   Dugard explains that since the UN Charter was not incorporated into domestic law, no 
direct effect could be given to the relevant provisions (Articles 55 and 56) – J Dugard 
International Law: A South African Perspective 3 ed (2005) 336. Various attempts to 
persuade the courts to draw on these clauses as a guide to statutory interpretation were 
by and large unsuccessful. For a comprehensive discussion of these attempts, see  
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According to Dugard, the failure of South African courts to make greater use of 
the limited opportunities they had to apply human rights norms can furthermore 
be ascribed to an unfamiliarity with international law, a lack of awareness of the 
importance attached to international human rights norms in other jurisdictions, 
and an antipathy to the international human rights movement, which had 
succeeded in isolating South Africa from the international community.60   
 
The 1993 Constitution already made it clear that the approach towards 
international law would change, with the inclusion of a Bill of Rights strongly 
influenced by the major international human rights instruments.61 The document 
also contained provisions firstly explaining how international law should be 
incorporated to become part of our substantive domestic law,62 and secondly 
directing how international law should be considered in the interpretation of 
South African law.63 At the same time, the advent of the new political 
dispensation saw a willingness on the part of the South African government to 
become party to the major international human rights agreements.64  
 
The 1996 Constitution65 confirmed the above provisions, with minor changes.66 
The sections relating to interpretation are of specific importance to this 
discussion. 
                                                                                                                                    
J Dugard ‘The South African judiciary and international law in the apartheid era’ 
(1998) SAJHR 110 at 113-125. 
60  Dugard op cit note 58 at 210.  
61      Idem at 211-212.  
62   Ss 231(2) - (4).   
63      Ss 35(1) and 232 of the 1993 Constitution.   
64   See in this regard ME Olivier ‘South Africa and international human rights agreements: 
Procedure, policy and practice’ (Part 1) (2003) TSAR 293 at 293. 
65  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 [hereafter ‘the 
Constitution’]. 
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4.1.2 Constitutional Provisions  
 
Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution provides as follows: 
 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum: 
(a)  must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom; 
(b)  must consider international law; and  
(c)  may consider foreign law.67 
 
 
The formulation of this section raises two distinct questions regarding the role of 
international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, i.e. which sources of 
international law a court may consult and secondly, the extent to which a court is 
bound by the principles of international law.  
 
(a) Sources of international law to be considered  
The question here is whether a court’s inquiry is limited to international treaties 
or conventions to which South Africa is a party and to the rules of customary 
international law that have been accepted by the courts. Dugard ventured an early 
opinion in 1994, in respect of section 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution,68 that South 
                                                                                                                                    
66   Ss 231 and 232 of the Constitution deal with the incorporation of international law into 
domestic law. S 233 states that when interpreting any legislation, every court must 
prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with 
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law.  
67  Emphasis added.  
68   S 35(1) of the 1993 Constitution provided as follows:  
‘In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values 
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and 
shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the 
protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable 
foreign case law.’ 
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African courts would be required to consult all sources of international law 
recognized by Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
i.e. international conventions, international custom, the general principles of law 
recognized by civilised nations, judicial decisions, and the teachings of 
publicists.69  
 
Dugard points out that such a broad approach has the advantage that it does not 
require the more traditional inquiry by a court into whether a particular principle 
contained in one or more human rights conventions is backed by sufficient state 
practice and opinio juris to qualify as a customary rule binding on South Africa. 
Instead, guidance may be sought in a wider range of (persuasive, but non-
binding) sources, for example, the opinions of convention-interpreting bodies.70 
These sources are often referred to as ‘soft law’.71  
 
His view was soon endorsed by the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane,72 
where Chaskalson P made the following statement:  
 
In the context of section 35(1) public international law would 
include non-binding as well as binding law. They may both be 
used under the section as tools of interpretation. International 
agreements and customary international law accordingly provide a 
framework within which [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and 
understood, and for that purpose decisions of tribunals dealing 
with comparable instruments, such as the United Nations 
Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the 
European Commission on Human Rights, the European Court of 
Human Rights and in appropriate cases, reports of specialized 
agencies such as the International Labour Organisation may 
                                                 
69   Dugard op cit note 58 at 212-213. 
70   Idem at 213-214.  
71    Dugard op cit note 59 at 37-38. 
72   1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at 686D-F. 
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provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of particular 
provisions of [the Bill of Rights].73 
 
Although this dictum does clarify the point that courts may also have regard to 
‘non-binding law’, the judgment unfortunately leaves open the important 
question of which sources should be included under this heading. The matter was 
taken (somewhat) further in Government of the RSA v Grootboom,74 where 
Yacoob J held that the relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation, 
‘but the weight to be attached to any particular principle or rule of international 
law will vary’.75 He further noted that where the relevant principle of 
international law binds South Africa, it ‘may be directly applicable’. In a 
footnote, sections 231-235 of the 1996 Constitution are cited as reference.   
 
The judgment is unfortunately not entirely clear in terms of its application of the 
principles drawn from international law,76 and commentators appear divided as 
to what to make of the above dictum. Strydom and Hopkins, for example, are of  
                                                 
73   Para 35. The text includes a footnote after the phrase ‘binding law’, with Dugard’s view 
on the sources of ‘public international law’, for purposes of s 35(1), cited as the 
reference.   
74   2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).   
75   Para 26. 
76  At issue in the Grootboom matter was the opinion of the UN Committee tasked with 
monitoring the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’) on the obligation resting on state parties to fulfil a 
‘minimum core obligation’ in respect of socio-economic rights, including the right to 
housing. The amici curiae in the matter relied on the ICESCR, which South Africa at 
the time had signed but not yet ratified, amplified by General Comment 3 issued by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1990 (paras 27 – 29). Yacoob J 
ultimately rejected the call by the amici to determine a minimum core in the context of 
the right to have access to adequate housing, largely because he felt that the Court did 
not have sufficient information to determine what would comprise such a minimum 
core obligation. He then also added that ‘it is not in any event necessary to decide 
whether it is appropriate for a court to determine in the first instance the minimum core 
content of a right’ – para 33. 
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the opinion that Yacoob J intends here to link the relevance of international law 
principles to the question of direct applicability:  
 
In terms of this understanding, the role of non-binding 
international law will be limited to provide guidance as to the 
correct gloss to place on a given provision… While directly 
applicable convention law still has a chance of receiving some 
consideration, non-binding norms of whatever kind are likely to 
be met with indifference.77  
  
The authors believe that this more circumscribed approach will likely have a 
stifling effect on the creative use of international law as an interpretative tool. On 
the other hand, Botha and Olivier take a far more ebullient view, noting that 
Yacoob J’s statement ‘offers a ray of hope’ for a turnaround in the neglect that 
international law has (according to the authors) suffered at the hands of the 
Constitutional Court since the judgment in Makwanyane.78 They argue that the 
importance of his approach lies not only in its acknowledgment of the varying 
weight to be attached to different sources of non-binding law, but also in its 
recognition that the value of international law is not in all cases limited to an aid 
to interpretation.79 Sources of international law that are binding on South Africa 
are an integral part of South African law, and should be applied as such. I believe 
that the latter interpretation is the preferred one, especially in the light of the 
second part of section 39(1), discussed below. 
 
 
                                                 
77   H Strydom & K Hopkins ‘International law’ in S Woolman et al Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2 ed (Original Service 2005) 30-13. See also L du Plessis ‘Interpretation’ 
in S Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (Original Service 2008) 
32-176 - 32-180. 
78   N Botha & ME Olivier ‘Ten years of international law in the South African courts: 
Reviewing the past and assessing the future’ (2004) 29 SA Yearbook International Law 
42 at 66.  
79   Ibid. 
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(b) Is the court bound to apply international law? 
The wording of section 39(1)(b) is significant here: the court is under obligation 
to consider international law. It is, however, a different question whether the 
court is also obliged to follow or apply these principles.  
 
The Constitutional Court also provided an answer to this question in S v 
Makwanyane, where it stated that while the courts can derive assistance from 
public international law and foreign case law, they are in no way bound to follow 
it.80 This was reiterated in S v Williams,81 where Langa J82 indicated that 
‘valuable insights’ may be gained from international law.83 Although courts are 
not bound to follow these international law principles, they may not ignore them 
either.84 Similarly, the Court explained in Coetzee v RSA,85 in relation to section 
39(1), that what was required was not a rigid application of formulae but rather 
that due regard be paid to the principles that can be extracted from international 
experience – ‘to look for rationales rather than rules’.86  
 
In this regard, Mokgoro J adds an instructive dimension in her judgment in S v 
Makwanyane. She notes that the task of interpretation often involves making 
constitutional choices by balancing competing fundamental rights and 
freedoms.87 This can often only be done ‘by reference to a system of values 
extraneous to the constitutional text itself’. Guidance as to such as cohesive set of 
                                                 
80   Paras 34, 35 and 39.  
81   1995 (3) SA 632 (CC), 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC).  
82   As he then was.  
83   Para 23.  
84   Para 50. 
85   1995 (4) SA 631 (CC), 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC). 
86  Para 57. 
87   Para 302.  
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values, ideal to an open and democratic society, may be found in the 
international system of human rights protection.  
 
In summary, it can therefore be said that although the extent and depth of this 
‘consideration’ may vary, South African case law from 1994 onwards provides 
numerous examples where the courts have considered international law.88 Based 
on the cursory overview presented here, the practice itself appears to have 
become an accepted interpretative tool (as one would expect, given the 
constitutional mandate).  
 
However, some unanswered questions remain, with specific reference to the 
status of ‘soft law’ for purposes of section 39(1).89 This issue, i.e. whether the 
notion of ‘non-binding’ international law, as employed by Chaskalson P in 
Makwanyane, includes so-called ‘soft law’ (such as declarations and the opinions 
of treaty-interpreting bodies) becomes particularly significant in the context of 
violence against women. Since the Women’s Convention does not address 
violence against women in the document itself, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women subsequently issued a General 
Recommendation dealing with the issue at some length.90 (Such General 
Recommendations are non-binding, but persuasive.) Two important standard-
setting documents, i.e. the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women and the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, similarly have non-
binding status only. 
                                                 
88   See in this regard Botha & Olivier op cit note 77 at 43-74 for a discussion of case law 
between 1995 and 2003; See also Olivier op cit note 64 at 338-340 (with specific 
reference to cases drawing on international human rights law).  
89  See in this regard also E De Wet ‘The “friendly but cautious” reception of international 
law in the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court: Some critical 
remarks’ (2005) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 1529 at 1534-1535. 
90   CEDAW General Recommendation No 19 UN GAOR 11th Session UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add.15 (1992). See also Chapter 3, Section 2.3.2.  
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In Chapter 6, I analyse judgments by the Constitutional Court and Supreme 
Court of Appeal relating to violence against women. In the light of the above 
discussion, this analysis will include consideration of which sources of 
international law the courts consulted in these judgments, and how much weight 
was attached to these sources.   
 
 
4.2 Nature of obligations generated by human rights 
 
4.2.1 Background 
 
Steiner et al propose that in order to understand the significance of rights set out 
in the ICCPR, Women’s Convention and other human rights instruments, it is 
instructive to look at the related duties or obligations resting on states.91 Such an 
examination of duties clarifies the significance ‘and even contents’ of the rights 
concerned. It could also indicate strategies to realise a right, for example, by 
persuading the State to change its behaviour in some respect.  
 
The effort, then, is to deconstruct a right into its related state 
duties, perhaps duties that an advocate seeks to have imposed on 
the state.92 
 
On the most elemental level, one can discern the so-called correlative duties: for 
example, one’s right not to be tortured implies a correlative state duty not to 
                                                 
91     HJ Steiner et al International Human Rights in Context 3 ed (2007) 185; see also JW 
Nickel ‘How human rights generate duties to protect and provide’ (1993) 15 Human 
Rights Quarterly 77 at 86.  
92   Steiner et al loc cit.  
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torture you.93 Other duties may be necessary implications from the nature of a 
particular text: for example, a citizen’s right to vote entails a duty on the state to 
create and implement electoral institutions. Different rights may imply different 
types of State duties; all depends on the nature of the rights and the problems it 
was meant to overcome or prevent. In short, according to the authors, identifying 
the multiple duties that may be relevant to any one right sharpens an 
understanding of what is distinctive to and necessary to realise that right.94 
  
I find that this approach is particularly compelling for purposes of this study, 
where one is looking firstly at a relatively unexplored right, and secondly one 
that is closely bound up with the second type of duty outlined above, i.e. where 
more than a correlative ‘hands off’ duty is imposed on the State.    
 
Shue proposes that every basic right assumes three types of duties:95 a duty to 
avoid violating the right in question, a duty to protect from violation of the right, 
and a duty to aid those whose rights have been violated. All of these duties have 
to be performed if the basic right is to be fully honoured, though not necessarily 
by the same institutions or individuals.96 The right to physical security therefore 
has the following three correlative duties: 
 
(a) Duties not to eliminate a person’s security (avoidance); 
(b) Duties to protect people against deprivation of security by others 
(protection); and 
                                                 
93    Ibid.   
94    Idem at 186. 
95     H Shue Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and Foreign Policy 2 ed (1996) 52.  
96     Ibid.  
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(c) Duties to provide for the security of those unable to provide for their own 
(aid).97  
 
Shue’s tripartite analysis formed the basis for subsequent and more detailed ones, 
such as that presented by Steiner et al.98 The latter authors propose a scheme 
consisting of five types of state duties, set out below. This scheme to a large 
extent corresponds with the exposition provided in respect of socio-economic 
rights.99 
 
1. Respect Rights of Others 
This duty requires the state to treat persons equally, to respect their individual 
dignity and worth, and hence not to interfere with or impair their declared rights, 
whether they be physical security rights or rights to due process, equal protection 
or political protection.100 This duty of respect has often been described as 
‘negative’ or ‘hands-off’: the idea is not to worsen an individual’s situation by 
depriving them of the enjoyment of a declared right.  
 
 
 
                                                 
97     Idem at 52-53. For a more detailed discussion of Shue’s tripartite typology, see   
MM Sepúlveda The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2003) 157-160. 
98     Steiner et al op cit note 89 at 187. See also Sepúlveda op cit note 97 at 163-169.  
99      The Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (‘CESCR’) has adopted the 
analysis that human rights create three forms of state obligation: ‘The right to health, 
like all human rights, imposes three types or levels of obligations on States parties: the 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil’ the right.’ - CESCR General Comment No. 14: 
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (dated 
11 August 2000) para 33. Budlender notes that some commentators add a further 
element, namely the obligation to ‘promote’ the right –  G Budlender ‘Justiciability of 
the right to housing – The South African experience’ in S Leckie (ed) National 
Perspectives on Housing Rights (2003) 207 at 212-213.  
100     Steiner et al op cit note 91 at 187; see also Budlender op cit note 99 at 208. 
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2. Create Institutional Machinery Essential to Realisation of Rights 
Certain rights may be impaired not only by government’s direct interference with 
them, but also by its failure to put into place the institutional machinery essential 
for the realisation or practice of the right. The classic example, as noted above, is 
the right to vote. Public funds must be expended to create the infrastructure on 
which the practical realisation of the right depends.101 
 
3. Protect Rights/ Prevent Violations 
There are a number of human rights instruments that set out explicit state duties 
to protect against and to prevent violations of rights. For example, Article 2 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,102 which imposes on the 
state the duty to ‘ensure to all individuals’ the recognised rights. As with the 
previous category, this entails institutional machinery as well; the state must by 
implication institute a police force to protect people against violations of their to 
physical security, either by state or non-state (private) actors.103 Both normative 
systems (such as criminal law) and institutions (criminal and civil courts) and 
processes (criminal prosecutions) must be created in order to maintain a justice 
system that provides for remedies and sanctions. Importantly, Steiner et al 
observe that this duty to protect has been vital to the development of the 
Women’s Convention and women’s rights.104  
 
4. Provide Goods and Services to Satisfy Rights 
The State’s duty here is primarily to provide material resources to the rights-
bearer, such as housing, food or health care.105 These are rights mainly associated 
                                                 
101     Steiner et al op cit note 91 at 188; Budlender op cit note 99 at 213-214.  
102  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights GA Res 2200A (XXI) UN Doc 
A/6316 (1966), entered into force 23 March 1976 [hereafter ‘the ICCPR’]. 
103     Steiner et al loc cit.  
104     Ibid. 
105  Idem at 189. 
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with the ICESCR. Unlike the duty of respect (which implies not to worsen the 
situation of the rights-bearer), this duty to provide generally is meant to improve 
the situation of the rights-bearer.  
 
5. Promote Rights 
This duty refers to bringing about changes in public consciousness or perception 
about a particular problem, with the purpose of alleviating the problem.106 As in 
the case of the duty to protect, the duty to promote generally requires the state to 
expend funds and create the institutional foundation needed to promote 
acceptance of the right – for example, public education campaigns intended to 
change attitudes about violence against women.107 
 
 
4.2.2 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
 
As noted above, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the ICCPR provides one of the early 
models for the right to security (in the sense of personal integrity). It is therefore 
instructive to look at the state duties that are associated with the recognition of 
rights in this Convention. In terms of Article 2, paragraph 1, of the ICCPR, States 
Parties undertake to ‘respect and ensure’ to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language and so forth. The 
Human Rights Committee, tasked with overseeing the implementation of the 
ICCPR, adopted General Comment No. 31, dealing with the nature of legal 
                                                 
106    Ibid. Budlender explains that to ‘promote’ a right means to further or advance it – op cit 
note 99 at 212. 
107  Steiner et al loc cit. 
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obligations imposed on States Parties to the Covenant.108 This Comment 
provides further understanding of the duties arising from the rights guaranteed in 
this document.  
 
The Committee explained that the legal obligation under Article 2, paragraph.1, 
is both negative and positive in nature.109 States Parties must refrain from 
violation of the rights recognised by the Covenant, and any restrictions placed on 
these rights must be permissible under the Covenant. Where such restrictions are 
imposed, States must demonstrate their necessity and only take such measures as 
are proportionate to the pursuance of legitimate aims in order to ensure 
continuous and effective protection of Covenant rights. In no case may the 
restrictions be applied or invoked in a manner that would impair the essence of a 
Covenant right. In terms of the five-part model set out above, this aspect would 
correlate with the duty to ‘respect’ rights.   
 
Article 2 also requires States Parties to adopt legislative, judicial, administrative, 
educative and other appropriate measures in order to fulfil their legal 
obligations.110 The Committee believes that it is important to raise levels of 
awareness about the Covenant not only among public officials and state agents 
but also among the population at large. This requirement has elements of both the 
duties to create institute machinery and to promote rights proposed by Steiner et 
al.  
 
                                                 
108   Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 31 (80) Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (dated 26 May 2004) [hereafter ‘General Comment No. 31’]. 
109   Idem para 6. 
110    Idem para 7. 
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The positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will however 
only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against 
violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by 
private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in 
so far as they are amenable to application between private persons or entities.111 
There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant rights as 
required by Article 2 would give rise to violations by States Parties of those 
rights, as a result of States Parties’ permitting or failing to take appropriate 
measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress 
the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities. States are reminded 
of the interrelationship between the positive obligations imposed under Article 2 
and the need to provide effective remedies in the event of breach under Article 2, 
paragraph 3.  
 
The Covenant itself envisages in some articles certain areas where there are 
positive obligations on States Parties to address the activities of private persons 
or entities.112 For example, the privacy-related guarantees113 of Article 17 must 
be protected by law. It is also implicit in Article 7 that States Parties have to take 
positive measures to ensure that private persons or entities do not inflict torture 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on others within their 
power.114 In fields affecting basic aspects of ordinary life such as work or 
                                                 
111   Idem para 8. 
112    Ibid. 
113    Art 17 provides as follows: 
‘1.  No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
2.  Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.’ 
114    Art 7 states that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free 
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.  
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housing, individuals are to be protected from discrimination115 within the 
meaning of Article 26. 
 
Significantly, the requirement in terms of Article 2, paragraph 2, to take steps to 
give effect to the Covenant rights is unqualified and of immediate effect.116 A 
failure to comply with this obligation cannot be justified by reference to political, 
social, cultural or economic considerations within the State.  
 
Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of 
Covenant rights States Parties must ensure that individuals also have accessible 
and effective remedies to vindicate those rights. Such remedies should be 
appropriately adapted so as to take account of the special vulnerability of certain 
categories of person, including in particular children. The Committee attached 
importance to States Parties’ establishing appropriate judicial and administrative 
mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law.117  
 
Even when the legal systems of States Parties are formally endowed with the 
appropriate remedy, violations of Covenant rights still take place. This is 
presumably attributable to the failure of the remedies to function effectively in 
practice.118 Accordingly, States Parties are requested to provide information on 
the obstacles to the effectiveness of existing remedies in their periodic reports.  
 
                                                 
115    Art 26 provides that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit 
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
116   General Comment No. 31 op cit note 108 para 14.  
117   Idem para 15. 
118   Idem para 20.  
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Joseph et al further observe that linked to the Human Rights Committee’s 
uncovering of positive aspects to duties arising from civil and political rights has 
been its willingness to ‘permeate’ ICCPR rights with significant economic, social 
and cultural elements.119 For example, Article 6, the right to life, has been 
interpreted to incorporate a duty upon States to tackle infant mortality, 
epidemics, and to take measures to increase life expectancy.120 States are thus 
required to provide a certain minimum standard of health care, which is 
traditionally perceived as a social right.121 
 
This brief overview of the obligations imposed by the Human Rights Committee 
in respect of the ICCPR indicates a great extent of convergence with the five-part 
model of State obligations proposed by Steiner et al, and accordingly confirms 
that the latter typology is particularly suitable as a basis for analysis when it 
comes to a right such as the right to freedom from violence that is closely aligned 
to ICCPR rights.   
 
 
4.3 The ‘due diligence’ standard 
 
International law recognises the principle that States are under an obligation to 
act with ‘due diligence’ to prevent, investigate, punish and provide remedies for 
acts of violence regardless of whether these are committed by private or State 
actors. ‘Due diligence’ has a long history in international law, with references to 
this standard going back as far as the seventeenth century.122 While the due 
                                                 
119  S Joseph et al The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2 ed (2004) 34. 
120  Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 6: The Right to Life (Art 6) (dated 30 
April 1982) para 5. 
121    Joseph et al op cit note 119 at 35. 
122   For an in-depth discussion of this principle and its place in international law, see J 
Bourke-Martignoni ‘The history and development of the due diligence standard in 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2  Research Design and Framework of Analysis 
 
 
 54
diligence standard (or variants thereof) can be found across a range of different 
fields of international law, the application of this standard to human rights issues 
is relatively new.123 
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights established the importance of the 
due diligence standard in the context of human rights in its key judgment in 
Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras.124 In this case, which arose from the 
unexplained disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez, the Court held that Honduras 
had failed to fulfil its duties under Article 1(1) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights and concluded that -   
 
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially 
not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act 
of a private person or because the person responsible has not been 
identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not 
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence 
to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the 
Convention.125 
 
The Court further pointed out that the State has a legal duty to take ‘reasonable 
steps’ to prevent human rights violations, to use the means at its disposal to 
thoroughly investigate any violations occurring within its jurisdiction, to identify 
the perpetrators, impose appropriate punishment and to ensure that the victim 
receives adequate compensation.126 Regarding the duty to prevent human rights 
violations, the Court explained that this includes ‘all those means of a legal, 
political, administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of human 
                                                                                                                                    
international law and its role in the protection of women against violence’ in  
C Benninger-Budel (ed) Due Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women from 
Violence (2008) 48-49. 
123  Idem at 49. 
124  Inter-American Court of Human Rights Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Judgment 
dated 29 July 1988) Series C: Decisions and Judgments, No. 04.  
125  Idem para 172. 
126  Idem para 174. 
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rights and ensure that any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts’.127 
It was emphasised that the preventive measures would vary according to the 
legal, social and political environment of the State concerned.  
 
This judgment in Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras has formed the basis for 
subsequent jurisprudential developments not only in the Inter-American context, 
but also in the broader international environment, as will be discussed below.   
 
The European Court of Human Rights has developed its own line of 
jurisprudence relating to the positive obligations resting on States Parties to the 
European Convention on Human Rights to effectively prevent, investigate, 
prosecute, punish and provide remedies for acts of violence perpetrated by 
private persons.128 These standards are similar to the ‘due diligence’ principle, 
although the Court only recently started employing this term in respect of 
violence against women in the case of Opuz v Turkey.129 An important judgment 
in this regard is Osman v United Kingdom,130 where the ECrtHR held that 
Article 2 of the European Convention, which guarantees the right to life, enjoins 
the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but 
also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its 
jurisdiction.131  
 
The State’s obligation in this respect extends beyond its primary duty to secure 
the right to life by putting in place effective criminal law provisions to deter the 
                                                 
127  Idem para 175. 
128  Bourke-Martignoni op cit note 122 at 51. 
129  See discussion in Chapter 5, Part D, Section 4.5. It is interesting to note that the draft 
European Convention on Violence against Women and Domestic Violence contains a 
section entitled ‘due diligence’ – Chapter 5, Part D, Section 3.  
130  (2000) 29 EHHR 245. 
131  Paras 115-116. 
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commission of offences against the person backed up by law enforcement 
machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such 
provisions. Article 2 of the Convention may also imply in certain well-defined 
circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive 
operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the 
criminal acts of another individual.  
 
Bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the 
unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices that must be made 
in terms of priorities and resources, such an obligation must be interpreted in a 
way that does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the 
authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for the 
authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that 
risk from materialising. Another relevant consideration is the need to ensure that 
the police exercise their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner that 
fully respects the due process and other guarantees that legitimately place 
restraints on the scope of their action to investigate crime and bring offenders to 
justice, including the guarantees contained in Articles 5 and 8 of the European 
Convention.132  
 
Thus, where there is an allegation that the authorities have violated their positive 
obligation to protect the right to life in the context of their above-mentioned duty 
to prevent and suppress offences against the person, it must be established that 
the authorities knew (or ought to have known) at the time of the existence of a 
real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from 
the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the 
                                                 
132    These Articles guarantee the rights to liberty and security of the person and to respect 
for private and family life respectively.  
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scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to 
avoid that risk. This is a question which can only be answered in the light of all 
the circumstances of any particular case. 
 
Following the judgments in Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, the nature and 
scope of State duties to act with due diligence to prevent and respond to acts of 
violence against women have been set out in a number of instruments, which will 
be examined in more depth in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. In 2006, the United Nations 
(‘UN’) Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women further published a 
thematic report on the due diligence standard and its application in the context of 
violence against women.133  
 
 
4.4 Analytical framework 
 
Against this background, I therefore propose the following framework for 
analysing the normative documents in the international human rights systems in 
the following two chapters. Firstly, it will be important to consider the legal 
nature of the document, and what the legal implications of the document are for 
South Africa in terms of international law. For example, is the document 
potentially legally binding, has South Africa signed or ratified the document, and 
has the document been domesticated in any way.  
 
The next step will then be to look at the substantive provisions of the document, 
using the ‘template’ below. This template will consider the following questions: 
 
                                                 
133  Y Ertürk Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and 
Consequences: The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women UN Doc E/CN/2006/61 (dated 20 January 2006).   
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(a) What does the document say about violence against women/ gender-
 based violence generally? 
 
(b) What does the document say about women’s right to freedom from 
 violence? 
 
(c) What does the document say about the State’s obligations to –  
(i) Respect women’s right to freedom from violence 
(ii)  Create institutional machinery essential to realise women’s right 
to freedom from violence 
(iii) Protect women against violence 
(iv) Provide goods and services to satisfy women’s right to freedom 
from violence 
(v)  Promote women’s right to freedom from violence 
 
(d) What does the document say about the State’s duty to act with due 
diligence in respect of violence against women? 
 
(e) What does the document say about the State’s duty to report to the 
implementing body about violence against women? 
 
The purpose of ‘tracking’ these questions in respect of the international (global) 
and regional human rights systems is firstly, as Steiner et al put it, to attempt to 
clarify the significance and contents of women’s right to freedom from violence 
through this deconstruction of, inter alia, the related state duties, and secondly, to 
investigate whether there are any variations and developments in this regard over 
the period under review. These, in turn, will inform the analysis of the 
development of normative standards in South African constitutional law.  
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5. DELINEATION OF STUDY: THEMATIC EXPLORATION OF 
 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
5.1 Violence against women as torture 
 
5.1.1 Background 
 
In the early 1990s feminist commentators, concerned about the reluctance of 
international human rights and humanitarian law to recognise violence against 
women as a violation of human rights and provide its victims with adequate 
protection, developed the argument that certain instances of violence against 
women (particularly domestic violence) should be understood as torture.134  
 
Drawing this comparison was inherently bound up with an understanding of the 
private/ public dichotomy in international law, which has formed the subject of 
severe criticism by feminist scholars.135 The analogy drawn by Copelon between 
domestic violence and torture holds that the processes, purposes and 
consequences of ‘official’ torture and intimate violence are startlingly similar. 
The fact that domestic violence is privately, as opposed to officially inflicted, 
diminishes neither the atrocity of the violence nor the need for international 
sanction.136 By providing protection against excesses of State power in the form  
                                                 
134  See eg R Copelon ‘Recognizing the egregious in the everyday: Domestic violence as 
torture’ (1994) 25 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 291 at 295; CA MacKinnon 
‘On torture: A feminist perspective on human rights’ in KE Mahoney & P Mahoney 
(eds) Human Rights in the Twenty-first Century (1993) 21 at 25-31. 
135  See especially C Romany ‘Women as aliens: A feminist critique of the public/ private 
distinction in international human rights law’ (1993) 6 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
87 at 88, which constitutes a companion piece to the article by Copelon op cit note 134 
above.  
136  Copelon op cit note 134 at 298-299.  
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of ‘torture’, human rights law therefore protects the male experience in the public 
sphere, but fails to protect women from (essentially the same) violence that they 
experience at the hands – literally - of perpetrators in the private sphere.137 
 
Fortin explains that the prohibition of torture is widely recognised as a principle 
of ius cogens and no derogation is permitted from this peremptory norm of 
international law.138 This implies that where violence against women is viewed 
as torture, it can be brought under the ambit of one of the strongest protections 
that international law can offer.139 The main obstacle to this reconceptualisation, 
however, could be seen to lie in the definition of ‘torture’ as set out in the 
Convention against Torture:140 
 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or 
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination on any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation or of with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to unlawful sanctions.141 
 
 
                                                 
137  K Fortin ‘Rape as torture: An evaluation of the Committee against Torture’s attitude to 
sexual violence’ (2008) 4 Utrecht Law Review 145 at 145.  
138  Idem at 145-146. 
139  Ibid. 
140  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment  GA Res 39/46 UN Doc A/39/51 (1984), entered into force 26 June 1987 
[hereafter ‘the Torture Convention’]. 
141  Art 1.  
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This definition requires three elements for an act to constitute torture.142 First, 
there must be a physical or mental act that gives rise to a specified degree of pain 
or suffering. Second, the perpetrator must inflict the pain and suffering for a 
purpose or with an intent listed in the Article. Third, the perpetrator must be a 
public official or a person acting in an official capacity. 
 
It was initially anticipated that the third requirement above might present 
difficulties in terms of reconceptualising acts of violence against women as 
torture.143 Compared to other instruments such as the ICCPR, the definition of 
torture in the Convention against Torture is narrower because of its inclusion of 
the element of official involvement.144 However, the concepts of ‘consent or 
acquiescence’ allow for an interpretation of torture that is broad enough to 
include the failure of government to redress domestic violence, even if the 
drafters did not have domestic violence in mind.145 
 
The Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women in 1996 underwrote the 
argument (as put forward by Copelon) for domestic violence to be viewed as 
torture,146 and discussed how the three elements constituting torture similarly 
apply to domestic violence.147  
                                                 
142  D Blatt ‘Recognizing rape as a method of torture’ (1992) 19 Review of Law and Social 
Change 821 at 828. A fourth element, i.e. intention, can be identified here – M Nowak 
(2008) Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment UN Doc A/HRC/7/3 (dated 15 January 2008) para 
27.  
143  Fortin op cit note 137 at 146. 
144  Copelon op cit note 134 at 355.  
145  Ibid. 
146  R Coomaraswamy Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/53 (6 February 1996) paras 42-50.  
147  Idem paras 46-49. 
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In respect of the third element of State involvement, she noted the following: 
 
Finally, where the State does not exercise due diligence and equal 
protection to prevent and punish domestic abuse, it, like official 
torture or independent paramilitary violence, occurs with at least 
the tacit involvement of the State. Where the State permits this 
violence or is passive or half-hearted, it abandons the battered 
woman to the dominion of the batterer and tacitly supports that 
dominion.148  
 
She therefore stated that the argument that domestic violence should be 
understood and treated as a form of torture (and, when less severe, ill-treatment), 
is one that deserves consideration by the rapporteurs and treaty bodies that 
investigate these violations.149  
 
This conceptualisation was however complicated by the fact that international 
law was traditionally notably slow to respond to rape and sexual violence of 
women committed by public officials. Blatt explains that prohibitions on the use 
of torture and prohibitions of rape by public officials historically developed 
independently of each other.150 Feminist commentators have argued that treating 
torture and sexual violence committed against women by public officials as a 
means of torture (whether in detention or under circumstances of control by 
                                                 
148  Idem para 48. 
149  Idem para 50. 
150  Blatt op cit note 142 at 823. She notes that torture, originally an accepted method of 
punishment and interrogation, was first condemned in the eighteenth century. Its 
prohibition under international law initially appeared in various treaties governing war. 
After World War II, torture was repeatedly prohibited in a succession of human rights 
declarations and covenants, culminating in the adoption of the Torture Convention in 
1984. In contrast, rape has been explicitly condemned under humanitarian law alone. 
See further Blatt op cit at 831, where she discusses the treatment of rape in the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949, Relative to the Protection of Civil Persons in Time of 
War. Art 27 calls for the protection of women against any ‘attacks on their honour’, 
which includes rape, enforced prostitution or any form of indecent assault. See also 
Section 5.2 below. 
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soldiers, police officers or other state agents) as separate phenomena constituted 
a misunderstanding of both.151  
 
An example of such failure to see rape as torture is found in the approach 
followed by the European Commission of Human Rights (‘European 
Commission’) in Cyprus v Turkey.152 This case originated from the invasion of 
Cyprus by Turkey in 1974, and Cyprus claimed (inter alia) that hundreds of 
women and girls had been indiscriminately and repeatedly raped by Turkish 
troops.153 The European Commission found that these acts were imputable to 
Turkey and constituted ‘inhuman treatment’ in contravention of Article 3 of the 
European Convention. The Committee did not however assess whether the rapes 
constituted torture.154  
 
5.1.2 Recent developments 
 
As briefly explained earlier, much has changed since the early 1990s. 
International human rights law has broadened its vision greatly in terms of the 
recognition of women’s rights generally as well as the specific acknowledgment 
that violence against women constitutes a human rights violation. The notion of 
state accountability for failure to adequately address violence against women has 
also taken on new dimensions with the refinement of the concept of ‘due 
                                                 
151  Blatt op cit note 142 at 843-850.  
152 European Commission on Human Rights Admissibility Decision: Cyprus v Turkey 
Application No 6780/74 & 690/75 (dated 26 May 1975).   
153  Women and girls from various villages were rounded up by the troops, placed in 
houses, and raped. Many rapes were accompanied by brutal abuse or were followed by 
the killing of the woman. 
154  At the time, the Torture Convention was admittedly not yet in force. However, the 
Declaration against Torture had already been adopted, and the Commission could have 
drawn on its provisions - Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being 
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
GA Res 3452 (XXX) UN Doc A/10034 (1975).  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2  Research Design and Framework of Analysis 
 
 
 64
diligence’. I would argue that a reconceptualisation of violence against women as 
torture in order to enlist the protection of international law has thus now become 
largely redundant.  
 
The armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia compelled international law to take 
a new look at its treatment of sexual violence against women.155 For example, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the formal Yugoslavia (‘the ICTY’) 
contributed to the understanding of rape as torture in the case of Kunarac, Kovač 
and Vuković,156 in that the Court held that the element of ‘severe physical or 
mental pain or suffering’ is per se satisfied by an act of rape.157 These shifts, 
together with the general developments in international human rights law, 
contributed to a greater awareness of the interplay between violence against 
women and torture. 
 
Regarding sexual violence by public officials, two regional bodies unequivocally 
confirmed that such acts constitute torture when carried out by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of public officials.158 More 
recently, the Committee against Torture published two decisions bearing out the 
view that sexual violence constitutes torture under Article 1 of the Convention 
against Torture.159 Both of these cases dealt with sexual violence committed by 
                                                 
155  See also Section 5.2 below.  
156  Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković Case No IT-96-23 & Case No IT-96-23/1-A 
(judgment dated 12 June 2002) para 150. 
157  See also Prosecutor v Delalic et al Case No IT-96-21-T (judgment dated 16 November 
1998) and Prosecutor v Furundzija Case No IT-95-17/1-T (judgment 10 December 
1998). 
158  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report No. 5/9: Case 10.970 Raquel 
Martín de Mejía, Peru (dated 1 March 1996); European Court of Human Rights Aydin v. 
Turkey No.57/1996/676/866 (judgment dated 25 September 1997). 
159  Committee against Torture CT and KM v Sweden Communication No 279/2005 (dated 
17 November 2006) UN Doc CAT/C/37/D/279/2005 (2007); Committee against 
Torture VL v Switzerland Communication No 262/2005 (dated 20 November 2006) UN 
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public officials (the former in the context of detention). The Committee 
expanded this understanding by stating in its General Comment on Article 2 of 
the Convention, adopted in 2007, that the contexts in which women are at risk 
include violence by private actors in communities and homes.160 
 
The Special Rapporteur on torture published a thematic report in 2009 addressing 
the protection of women from torture. He notes that the aim of this initiative is to 
ensure that ‘the torture protection framework’ is applied in a gender-inclusive 
manner, and explains as follows:   
 
While a variety of international instruments explicitly or 
implicitly provide for an extensive set of obligations with respect 
to violence against women or rape, classifying an act as “torture” 
carries a considerable additional stigma for the State and 
reinforces legal implications, which include the strong obligation 
to criminalise acts of torture, to bring perpetrators to justice and to 
provide reparation to victims.161 
 
However, typifying violence against women as torture serves more than just a 
symbolic or ideological purpose. In certain jurisdictions, it may also have 
practical implications, for example, in terms of asylum law.162  Article 3 of the 
                                                                                                                                    
Doc CAT/C/37/D/262/2005 (2007). The Committee had previously been criticised for 
its failure to engage with sexual violence – Fortin op cit note 137 at 147. 
160  Committee against Torture General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by 
States Parties UN Doc CAT/C/GC/2 (dated 24 January 2008) para 22. 
161  Nowak op cit note 142 para 26. 
162  Alexander recounts the case of Rodi Alvarado-Peña, a Guatemalan woman who fled to 
the US after more than ten years of severe domestic violence at the hands of her 
husband – BC Alexander ‘Convention against Torture: A viable alternative legal 
remedy for domestic violence victims’ (2000) 15 American University International 
Law Review 895 at 896-899. Her departure was prompted by the unwillingness of 
Guatemalan government officials to respond to her pleas for help; however, ultimately 
she fled to the US in 1995 because she believed that her only chances of escaping her 
husband were to flee or die. Although she was initially granted asylum in the US, in 
1999 the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed this grant of asylum on the basis that 
Ms Alvarado had not shown that she had suffered persecution ‘on account of either 
actual or imputed political opinion or membership in a particular social group’ as 
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Convention against Torture prohibits the expulsion, refoulement or extradition of 
any ‘person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture’. This is illustrated by the 
following example: a woman who has left Country A as a result of persistent and 
severe domestic violence committed by her husband (and who is unable to find 
recourse from the justice system in Country A) now seeks asylum in Country B, 
based on her belief that she would be subjected to torture in the form of 
continued domestic violence if returned to country A. Article 3 of the 
Convention against Torture provides her with relief in that it prevents Country B 
from returning her.163  
 
The linkages between violence against women and torture are clear and 
considerable, and it is apparent from the brief overview above that the crafting of 
international law standards on torture in order to include violence against women 
committed by public officials (and increasingly, by private actors) can add an 
extra dimension to an exploration of women’s right to freedom from (private) 
violence. It should however be noted that the ‘torture protection framework’ (as 
referred to by the Special Rapporteur) is in itself still in a process of 
                                                                                                                                    
required in terms of s 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 8 USCA - 
cited in Alexander op cit at 898. Ms Alvarado’s case became a cause celebre in the US 
for women’s rights advocates, and in November 2009 she was finally granted asylum. 
At the time of writing, the USA (Obama) administration is reportedly crafting 
regulations to allow entry by other victims of domestic violence who feel they have no 
choice but to flee their home country to protect themselves. See Anon (18 December 
2009) ‘Domestic violence victim granted asylum in US’ Associated Press 
[cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/photos%20-
%20Domestic%20Violence%20Victim%20Granted%20Asylum%20In%20US%20_%2
0NPR.pdf] (Accessed on 10 May 2010.); see also B Meyersfeld Domestic Violence and 
International Law (2010) 284-285.   
163   This hypothetical example, based on the case of Alvarado in note 162 above, assumes 
that Country B has ratified the Convention against Torture and incorporated its 
provisions into domestic law. It should be noted the woman in the example will not 
automatically ‘qualify’ for asylum (which brings with it permanent resident status) in 
terms of Article 3 of the Convention - see Alexander op cit note 162 at 913. 
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development, in that the State accountability for acts of torture against women, 
committed by private actors, has not been settled in the adjudicatory 
jurisprudence of the Committee against Torture.  
 
At the same time, the focus when viewing violence against women through the 
lens of torture is often on severe acts of physical and mental violence – given the 
elements of the definition of torture. This may imply that instances of less severe 
violence as well as violence other than physical violence (for example, economic 
abuse) may fall outside the ambit of what appears at first glance to be ‘torture’. 
This is not in itself problematic: one concedes readily that not all instances of 
violence against women will constitute torture. The difficulty may arise in that 
the standards to distinguish where violence amounts to torture and where it does 
not are not always clear.164 
 
 Because of these potential definitional constraints, as well as the fact that the 
international protection of women’s right to freedom from violence has learnt to 
‘walk on its own’165  (rather than receiving protection by analogy under the 
rubric of the right to freedom from torture), this study focuses solely on the 
former right.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
164  See in this regard Blatt op cit note 142 at 833.  
165  Romany commented in 1993 that the challenge awaiting a feminist critique is to ensure 
that the discourse of rights learns to walk on its own in the human rights field as applied 
to women – op cit note 135 at 97. 
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5.2 The right to freedom from violence in international criminal law and 
law of armed conflict  
 
A second area where a great deal of attention has in recently years been paid to 
violence against women is the intersection between international criminal law 
and humanitarian law. As a starting point, it is important to bear in mind that the 
issue of sexual violence against women in armed conflict was largely invisible 
until the mid-1990s.166 For example, following World War II both the 
Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals failed to adequately prosecute acts of sexual 
violence.167 Some normative development had admittedly taken place after 1945 
in that rape was included in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949168 as well as 
the 1977 Additional Protocols.169 However, this did not lead to the prosecution of 
sexual violence against women in subsequent conflict such as the Vietnam 
war.170 The stipulations that were in existence in international humanitarian law 
                                                 
166  Niarchos provides an overview of the history of sexual violence against women in 
armed conflict and its regulation – CN Niarchos ‘Women, war and rape: Challenges 
facing the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1995) 17 Human Rights 
Quarterly 649 at 659-668; see also R Copelon ‘Gender crimes as war crimes: 
Integrating crimes against women into international criminal law’ (2000) 46 McGill 
Law Journal 217 at 220-221. 
167  See Copelon op cit note 166 at 221-223, for a description of the situation of the 
‘comfort women’ and the fact that these war-time crimes were never prosecuted in the 
Tokyo tribunal. For a general overview, see also E Meier ‘Prosecuting sexual violence 
crimes during war and conflict: New possibilities for progress’ (2004) 10 International 
Legal Theory 83 at 87-88.  
168  Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 75 UNTS 287 
(entered into force 21 October 1950) Art 3. 
169  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) UNTS 1125/3 
(entered into force 7 December 1978) Art 76; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August  1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) UNTS 1125/609 (entered into force 7 
December 1978) Art 4; See Section 5.1.1 above.  
170  Niarchos op cit note 166 at 667-668; for an instructive overview see KD Askin 
‘Women and international humanitarian law’ in KD Askin and DM Koenig (eds) 
Women and International Human Rights Law (1999) 41-87; also A Cole ‘International 
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at the time have also been criticised for the fact that they mostly punished sexual 
violence as acts against the ‘honour and dignity’ of women, rather than as crimes 
of violence.171  
 
The ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda dramatically 
changed this and brought sexual violence in armed conflict into the sharp glare of 
international attention. In the key judgment in Akayesu, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’) recognised that acts of sexual violence 
(including rape) constituted genocide.172 The judgment is also noteworthy in 
other respects: the Tribunal held that forced nudity is a form of inhumane 
treatment,173 and recognised that rape could be a form of torture.174 It further 
formulated an inclusive definition of rape as a physical invasion of a sexual 
nature (committed under coercive circumstances).175  
 
The ICTY had also served as a site for normative development. As explained 
above, sexual assault was recognised as torture in the judgments of Delalic and 
                                                                                                                                    
criminal law and sexual violence: an overview’ in C McGlynn & VE Munro (eds) 
Rethinking Rape Law (2010) 47-60.  
171  Niarchos explains that by linking the prohibition of rape to women’s honour and 
dignity, the Geneva Convention not only overlooks the violent nature of rape, but 
attaches this prohibition to the ‘wrong category of rights’ –  op cit note 166 at 672, 674. 
172  Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu ICTR Trial Chamber Case No ICTR-96-4-I paras 731-
734.   
173  Idem para 697. 
174  However, as the Tribunal points out, in this instance the accused was not charged with 
torture in terms of Article 3(f) (torture) of the ICTR Statute or Article 4(a) (violence to 
life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as 
cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment) – see 
para 690 of the judgment. 
175  ‘The Tribunal considers that rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements 
of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body 
parts’ – para 687. See also para 688. As an aside, this latter recognition has played a 
crucial role in contemporary rape law reform on domestic (national) level. The Akayesu 
definition of sexual violence and its subsequent development in the ad hoc tribunals, 
will not be discussed at length here.       
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Furundžija.176 In its 2001 judgment in Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković,177 this 
Tribunal went beyond the Akayesu judgment by construing rape and sexual 
enslavement to be war crimes.178  The practice before these tribunals furthermore 
illuminated the need for gender-sensitive protective measures for women victims 
and witnesses and reliable support to minimise the risks and potential 
retraumatisation of testifying.179 Certain of these advances were already reflected 
in the early practices of the Special Court subsequently set up in Sierra Leone in 
2002.180  
 
More importantly, however, the jurisprudence emerging from the ad hoc 
tribunals provided a foundation for the codification of sexual violence as part of 
the substantive jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.181 The Statute of 
the International Criminal Court182 codifies a number of crimes of sexual 
violence as part of the Court’s jurisdiction and also makes provision for a range 
of structures and procedures to ensure that the victims of these crimes are 
‘properly treated in the process of justice’.183  
 
                                                 
176  See Section 5.1 (b) above. 
177  Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković Case No IT-96-23 & Case No IT-96-23/1- 
A (judgment dated 12 June 2002).  
178  Para 186.  
179  Copelon op cit note 166 at 231.  
180  The Special Court for Sierra Leone was created in 2002 as a joint international-
domestic effort to prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed during the conflict – see V Oosterveld ‘Lessons 
from the Special Court for Sierra Leone on the prosecution of gender-based crimes’ 
(2009) 17 Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 407 at 408. 
181  Copelon loc cit. The gender-related jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals has been 
subjected to criticism – see eg PV Sellers ‘Gender strategy is not a luxury for 
international courts’ (2009) 17 Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 301 at 
316-317 (relating to the ICTR subsequent to Akayesu); Oosterveld op cit note 180 at 
414-420, 424-429 (relating to the Special Court for Sierra Leone).  
182  UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 (dated 17 July 1998), entered into force on 1 July 2002 
[hereafter ‘the Rome Statute’]. 
183  Copelon op cit note 166 at 233. 
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Article 5 of the Rome Statute notes that the jurisdiction of the Court includes the 
‘most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’. 
These crimes are genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; and the crime 
of aggression.184 Articles 6 to 8 set out the definitions of the offences of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes respectively. 
 
It is apparent from these definitions that the context in which these acts are 
committed are a determining factor in each instance. ‘Genocide’, for example, 
consists of certain acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group.185 This implies that the prosecution 
has to prove not only that the accused committed the acts in question, but that the 
acts were committed with a specific intent and under particular circumstances.186   
 
                                                 
184  Art 5(2) provides that the Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime 
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with 
respect to this crime. Such a provision must be consistent with the relevant provisions 
of the UN Charter.  
On 11 June 2010, the Review Conference of the Rome Statute concluded in Kampala, 
Uganda. This Conference adopted a resolution by which it amended the Rome Statute 
so as to include a definition of the crime of aggression. This definition is based on  UN 
General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, and in this context 
the Conference agreed to qualify as aggression, a crime committed by a political or 
military leader which, by its character, gravity and scale constituted a manifest violation 
of the Charter. As regards the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, the Conference agreed 
that a situation in which an act of aggression appeared to have occurred could be 
referred to the Court by the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter, irrespective as to whether it involved States Parties or non-States 
Parties. See [www.kampala.icc-cpi.info]. (Accessed on 16 June 2010.) 
185  Art 6 lists these acts as the following: killing members of the group; causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.  
186  The analysis of the Trial Chamber in respect of Counts 13 and 14 in the Akayesu case 
provides an example of how these aspects are interlinked.  
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‘Crimes against humanity’ consist of a number of listed acts when committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack direct against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack.187 The listed acts relating to sexual violence 
include rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilisation, or any other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity.188 The 
Court furthermore has jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large scale commission of 
such crimes.189   
 
It is therefore evident that much of the accent in the emergent jurisprudence has 
fallen on the scrutiny of this context in order to place the criminal acts (for 
example, of sexual violence) in the appropriate crime category, such as ‘crimes 
against humanity’ or ‘genocide’,190  and then consider the liability of the accused 
accordingly. While this approach has been essential to overcome the previous 
invisibility of sexual violence in this area, it has also had the unintended 
                                                 
187  Art 7. 
188  Art 7(1)(g). 
189  The exposition of ‘war crimes’ in Art 8 is extensive. It lists four broad categories of war 
crimes, i.e. grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; other serious violations 
of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict (within the 
established framework of international law); in the case of an armed conflict not of an 
international character serious violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949; and other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
armed conflicts not of an international character. The Statute provides specific instances 
under each of these categories. Sexual violence is either mentioned explicitly as part of 
these subcategories (see Art 8(2)(b)(xxii)) or could implicitly resort under others (eg 
Art 8(2)(a), which lists ‘wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or 
health’). 
190  As pointed out above, ‘sexual violence’ can be charged under any of Articles 6 to 8 of 
the Rome Statute, depending on the context. The ICTY Tribunal confirmed a similar 
position, in relation to the ICTY Statute, in Furundžija (note 154): ‘The prosecution of 
rape is explicitly provided for in Article 5 of the Statute… as a crime against humanity. 
Rape may also amount to a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, a violation of the 
laws or customs of war or an act of genocide, if the requisite elements are met, and may 
be prosecuted accordingly.’ – para 172. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2  Research Design and Framework of Analysis 
 
 
 73
consequence of under-playing the rights to bodily and mental integrity and to 
sexual autonomy (amongst others) of the individual victims.191  
 
Richey makes the argument that a crime against humanity, for example, is 
viewed by international humanitarian law as more than a serious crime against 
one person or one body:192 crimes against humanity (or acts of ethnic cleansing) 
consist of bringing together attacks on the body and rights of one person with 
attacks on the body of a people (or body politic). She then poses the question 
whether this fusion of the bodily rights of women with the rights of the polity 
signals a strengthened commitment to the rights of women under international 
law,193  and makes the following statement:  
 
Judgments and statutes regarding war rape must begin to speak 
literally about the right of women to be free from violations of 
bodily integrity and limitations on their sexual autonomy.194 
 
 
Although I concur that this is clearly a conversation that should take place and a 
question that deserves further investigation, an exhaustive appraisal of the corpus 
of humanitarian law and international criminal law addressing sexual violence in 
armed conflict, with specific reference to the role of the right to women to 
                                                 
191 KC Richey ‘Several steps sideways: International legal developments concerning war 
rape and the human rights of women’ (2007) 17 Texas Journal of Women and the Law 
109 at 110-111.  
192  Idem at 112.  
193  Richey is of the opinion that this is not necessarily the case. She makes her argument 
with reference to the issue of sexual violence committed against women by soldiers for 
purposes of ‘recreation’, i.e. when they are off duty and not under orders. Rape as 
recreation does not qualify as a crime against humanity and is not used as a weapon of 
‘ethnic cleansing’, but it is committed during and after wars with frequency and 
impunity. It currently occupies a marginal space in international law. Interestingly, she 
proposes that conceiving of rape in war as a form of torture, rather than a crime against 
humanity, is the best way to ensure the protection of women's human rights – idem at 
114-119.  
194  Idem at 119-120.  
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freedom from violence, would have taken this study well beyond its limits in 
terms of length and breadth.  
 
A second argument against the inclusion of this consideration here is the 
potentially destabilised architecture of the State in times of armed conflict. It has 
been noted that social regulatory mechanisms (which should be understood to go 
beyond State mechanisms) generally work to keep peacetime rates of sexual 
violence at a lower level than during war.195 Thus incidences of sexual violence 
in armed conflict generally represent a weakening of these regulatory 
mechanisms.196 At the risk of generalisation, the law of armed conflict generally 
suggests that the State institutions (or regulatory mechanisms) most closely 
associated with addressing violence against women (including the legislature, 
police, prosecution and judiciary) are not operating according to ‘ordinary’ or 
accepted standards.197 Given that a major part of the research question here is to 
determine what these standards are, in terms of international human rights law, 
and how they should apply to South African jurisprudence, one notes the 
dissonance between this question and those arising more particularly in respect 
of armed conflict and political and other instability. This, then, is the second 
motivation for omitting this theme from this study.  
 
                                                 
195  Ibid. ‘Armed conflict’ may admittedly include a broad range of situations where State 
institutions are intact and functioning to a greater or lesser extent; the principles of 
international criminal law are further applicable to situations where there is no 
‘conflict’ strictu senso, such as political unrest or instability.   
196  See also T Winkler ‘Violence against women in armed conflict’ in C Benninger-Budel 
(ed) Due Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence (2008) 265 at 
266-267. 
197  In the case of political unrest or instability falling short of armed conflict but where the 
principles of international criminal law apply, one may find that State institutions are 
functioning, but not in such a way as to provide women with adequate recourse against 
acts of violence.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WOMEN’S RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM 
VIOLENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
THE WOMEN’S CONVENTION 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter constitutes the first of two examining the development of women’s 
right to freedom from violence in international1 human rights law.2 In this first part, 
particular attention is paid to the major instrument in international law addressing 
women’s rights, i.e. the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women.3 By means of introduction, the chapter briefly 
considers the historic background to the drafting of this Convention and looks into 
the legal nature of the document in international law.  
                                                 
1  The term ‘international’ is used here to refer to the human rights system operating at global 
(predominantly UN) level. While it is acknowledged that international human rights law 
also finds expression in the so-called ‘regional’ human rights systems and that the latter is 
therefore not conceptually a separate ‘category’ or subset of legal norms, a distinction is 
drawn between ‘international’ and ‘regional’ (including subregional) human rights law for 
purposes of this thesis, mainly in Chapters 3 to 5, in order to set out the contents of 
instruments and explain the operation of the relevant implementation mechanisms. 
2   This examination has been set over two chapters for ease of reading. Certain of the themes 
explored here and in Chapter 4 have also been addressed in an earlier article published as 
 H Combrinck ‘State duties to protect women from violence: Recent South African 
developments’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 666-690. 
3   Adopted 18 Dec 1979, GA Res 34/180, UN GAOR 34th Session UN DOC A/34/ 46 (1980) 
(entered into force 3 September 1981) [hereafter ‘the Women’s Convention’]. (Although 
‘CEDAW’ is often used to denote the Convention itself, it is also employed to refer to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – as it is used for purposes 
of this thesis. See in this regard eg E Stamatopoulou ‘Women’s rights and the United 
Nations’ in J Peters & A Wolper (eds) Women’s Rights: Human Rights (1995) 36 at 38).  
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The contents of the Women’s Convention are subsequently examined, with 
reference to both general provisions (including the definition of ‘discrimination’, the  
obligations imposed on States Parties and certain aspects relating to the 
implementation of the Convention such as the activities of the monitoring 
committee) and its provisions relating to violence against women. I then briefly look 
at the position of South Africa in relation to the Convention. 
 
An important question, for purposes of this study, is how the monitoring body has 
interpreted the Convention. The chapter accordingly investigates four 
communications brought before the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (‘CEDAW’) in terms of the Optional Protocol (adopted in 1999),4 as 
well as the inquiry conducted by the Committee into gender-based violence 
committed against women in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico.5 Finally, I evaluate how the 
interpretation by the CEDAW in these matters has contributed to the normative 
development of women’s right to freedom from violence.  
 
Chapter 4 similarly considers the emergence of standards relating to the protection 
of women’s right to freedom from violence from the early 1990s to date by 
examining international documents other than the Women’s Convention. 
 
 
                                                 
4  Adopted on 6 October 1999, GA Res A/RES/54/4 UN Doc A/RES/54/4 (dated 15 October 
1999), entered into force on 22 December 2000 [hereafter ‘the Optional Protocol’]. 
5  CEDAW Report on Mexico produced by the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention, 
and reply from the Government of Mexico UN Doc CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO (dated 
27 January 2005). 
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2.  CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 
 
2.1 Background to drafting of the Convention  
 
In the early 1970s the Commission on the Status of Women6 (‘CSW’) embarked on 
the elaboration of what was to become the Women’s Convention.7 There had been 
statements in various international instruments promising equality and non-
discrimination based on sex – some in binding instruments,8 others in non-binding 
declarations.  
 
For example, Article 1(3) of the UN Charter describes one of the purposes of the 
formation of the UN as ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion’.9 In Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,10 signatories 
                                                 
6  The UN Commission on the Status of Women was instituted in 1946 as a permanent body 
under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council (’ECOSOC’) to deal with women’s 
rights – see E Evatt ‘Finding a voice for women’s rights: The early days of CEDAW’ 
(2002) 34 George Washington International Law Review 515 at 515; S Wright ‘Human 
rights and women’s rights: An analysis of the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ in KE Mahoney & P Mahoney 
(eds) Human Rights in the Twenty-first Century (1993) 75 at 76. 
7   A Byrnes ‘The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women’ in W Benedek et al (eds) Human Rights of Women (2002) 119 at 119; Wright loc 
cit. 
8  For example, Convention on the Political Rights of Women GA Res 640 (VII) dated 20 
December 1952; Convention on the Nationality of Married Women GA Res 1040 (XI) 
dated 29 January 1957; Convention on Consent to Marriage GA Res 1763 A (XVII) dated 7 
November 1962.  
9  Charter of the United Nations, adopted 26 June 26 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945 Art 1 § 3. 
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pledge to recognise that all ‘human beings’ are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. According to Article 2, everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth in the Declaration, ‘without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property or 
other status’. The UDHR confirms that every individual has the right to life, liberty 
and the security of the person;11 the document further guarantees women and men 
equal rights to physical and mental health.12 Both the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights13 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights14 guarantee the right to be free from gender discrimination.  The 
Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (adopted in 1967) 
had been a broad, non-binding statement of women’s rights to equality and non-
discrimination.15  
 
One notes, therefore, that there was no single detailed ‘charter of equality’ for 
women under international law. For this reason, supporters of a Women’s 
Convention believed that the time had come for a ‘comprehensive statement of 
women’s entitlements to equality’ in a form that would be legally binding on 
                                                                                                                                         
10  Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res 217A (III) UN GAOR 3rd Session UN Doc 
A/810 (1948) [hereafter ‘UDHR’]. The UDHR is not a legally binding document; however, 
some commentators have argued that the UDHR has a legally binding effect on all UN 
members since it is an authoritative interpretation of the general human rights commitments 
in the UN Charter- See A Vesa ‘International and regional standards for protecting victims 
of domestic violence’ (2004) 12 American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and 
the Law 309 at 320.  
11  Art 3. 
12  Art 25 § 1.  
13  Adopted 16 December 1966, GA Res 2200A (XXI) UN Doc A/6316 (1966), entered into 
force 23 March 1976 [hereafter ‘the ICCPR’] 
14  Adopted 16 December 1966, GA Res 2200 (XXII) UN UN Doc A/6316 (1966), entered 
into force 3 January 1976) [hereafter ‘the ICESCR’]. 
15  GA Res 2263 (XXII), adopted on 7 November 1967. See Byrnes op cit note 7 at 119.  
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governments.16 The Women’s Convention was subsequently adopted by the UN 
General Assembly on 18 December 1979 and entered into force on 3 September 
1981. At the time of writing, the Convention had 98 signatories and 186 ratifications 
or accessions.17  
 
 
2.2 Nature of the document  
 
The Women’s Convention is often referred to as the ‘definitive international legal 
instrument requiring respect for and observance of the human rights of women’.18 
Byrnes explains that the Convention can be viewed from a number of perspectives.19 
It is a political manifesto, clearly declaring the right of women to equality and non-
discrimination; it is also an international legal instrument (a treaty), as well as 
providing a framework or point of reference for policy-making, lobbying and social 
activism. It is primarily the second aspect that is of interest here: the fact that the 
Women’s Convention constitutes a multi-lateral international treaty implies that its 
provisions are binding on ratifying States Parties in terms of international law, 
subject to reservations.20 In addition to the direct implications of ratification of the 
Convention (i.e. the fact that ratifying states are bound by the obligations created by 
                                                 
16  Ibid. 
17  See [treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en]. (Accessed on 17 March 
2010.)  
18   RJ Cook ‘Reservations to the Convention on the elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women’ (1990) 30 Virginia Journal of International Law 643 at 
643.   
19  Byrnes op cit note 7 at 120. 
20  See discussion of reservations to the Convention below in Section 2.3.1 (g) below.   
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the Convention), the provisions of treaties may under certain circumstances 
constitute evidence of international custom.21 
 
2.3 Contents of the Women’s Convention 
 
2.3.1 General provisions 
 
(a) Overview 
 
Part I (Articles 1-6) sets out the ‘general’ provisions of the Convention, consisting of 
definitions and obligations of a general nature to eliminate discrimination.22 Part II 
sets out the following political rights:  rights associated with political and public life, 
such as the rights to vote, to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies and 
to participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation 
thereof (Article 7), the right of women to represent their governments at 
international level and to participate in the work of international organisations 
(Article 8) and nationality rights (Article 9). In Part III, certain social and economic 
rights are covered: education (Article 10), employment (Article 11), health care 
(Article 12) and other areas of economic and social life, including the right to bank 
loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit (Article 13).  
 
Article 14 pays specific attention to the problems faced by rural women, and 
recognises the significant roles that rural women play in the economic survival of 
                                                 
21  HJ Steiner et al International Human Rights in Context 3 ed (2007) 74-75. 
22  Art 6, which addresses a specific substantive issue, is somewhat oddly placed here in Part I, 
which deals with general introductory matters applicable to the whole Convention.   
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their families, including their work ‘in the non-monetised sectors of the economy’.23 
States Parties are required to take appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in rural areas to ensure that they participate in and benefit from rural 
development and ensure to such women the right (inter alia) to participate in 
development planning at all levels;24 to have access to adequate health care facilities, 
including information, counseling and services in family planning;25 and to enjoy 
adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity 
and water supply, transport and communications.26 
 
Part IV addresses civil law issues: Article 15 deals with women’s equality with men 
before the law, and Article 16 covers matters relating to marriage and family 
relations.  
 
Part V, consisting of Articles 17 to 22, provides for the establishment of a 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the monitoring 
mechanism for the Convention, and describes its method of operation.27 It also 
makes provision for a system of state reporting.28   
 
The rest of the Convention, consisting of Articles 23 to 30, make up Part VI and 
contain ‘formal’ provisions relating to, for example, the Convention’s entry into 
force and dispute resolution between States Parties.   
 
                                                 
23  Art 14 § 1. 
24  Art 14 § 2(a). 
25  Art 14 § 2(b). 
26  Art 14 § 2(h). 
27  See Articles 19-22. 
28  Art 18. 
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(b) Definition of discrimination against women 
 
Article 1 of the Convention defines discrimination against women as any distinction, 
exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex that has the effect or purpose of 
impairing the enjoyment by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. 
 
The framers of the Convention drew on the definition of ‘racial discrimination’ in 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination,29 and the definition of ‘discrimination against women’ is 
accordingly similar to that set out in the former document in respect of race.30 
However, one important difference is that whereas the definition in the Race 
Convention is limited to ‘public life’, the Women’s Convention extends to include 
discrimination in the private sphere.31 This is evident from the definition of 
discrimination itself, as well as the provisions of (amongst others) Articles 2(e), 15 
and 16 of the document.32 
 
 
 
                                                 
29  Adopted 21 December 1965, GA Res 21061 (XX), entered into force 4 January 1969 
[hereafter ‘the Race Convention’]. 
30  Art 1 defines ‘racial discrimination’ to mean ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose 
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of public life’. 
31  Cook op cit note 18 at 666-668. 
32  See also discussion by Cook op cit note 18 at 667, 669-670. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3   International Law: Women’s Convention  
 
 
 83
Byrnes points out that the problem addressed by the Convention is that of 
discrimination against women, rather than discrimination on the basis of sex.33 Both 
direct and indirect discrimination are covered by the definition in Article 1. This 
means that not only discrimination that it is explicitly based on sex, but also 
apparently neutral practices or policies that have the effect of disproportionately 
excluding women from the enjoyment of opportunities (if not objectively 
justifiable), will amount to discrimination.34 This aspect is linked to Article 4, which 
makes provision for positive measures to promote women’s equality.  
 
The CEDAW, which is tasked with monitoring the implementation of the 
Convention, has adopted a General Recommendation aimed at clarifying the nature 
and meaning of Article 4, paragraph 1.35 This Recommendation also provides 
constructive guidelines on the scope and import of the notion of ‘discrimination’ 
more broadly.  The Committee explains that the Convention goes beyond the 
concept of discrimination used in many national and international legal standards 
and norms.36 While such standard and norms prohibit discrimination on the grounds 
of sex and protect both women and men from treatment based on arbitrary, unfair 
and/ or unjustifiable distinctions, the Convention focuses on discrimination against 
women, emphasising that women have suffered, and continue to suffer from various 
forms of discrimination because they are women.  
                                                 
33  Byrnes op cit note 7 at 124; SE Merry Human Rights and Gender Violence (2006) 74. See 
also A Edwards ‘Violence against women as sex discrimination: Judging the jurisprudence 
of the United Nations human rights treaty bodies’ (2008) 18 Texas Journal of Women and 
the Law 1 at 22, who notes that this was the subject of one of the main discussions during 
the drafting process.  
34  Byrnes loc cit. 
35  CEDAW General Recommendation No. 25: Temporary Special Measures UN Doc A/59/38 
(2004) [hereafter ‘CEDAW General Recommendation No 25’]. 
36  Idem para 5. 
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The Committee further provides important interpretative guidance to States Parties 
when it points out that a joint reading of Articles 1 to 5 and 24, which form the 
general interpretative framework for all the Convention’s substantive articles, 
indicates that three obligations are central to State’s Parties efforts to eliminate 
discrimination against women.37 These obligations should extend beyond a purely 
formal legal obligation of equal treatment of women with men.  
 
Firstly, States Parties’ obligation is to ensure that there is no direct or indirect38 
discrimination against women in their laws and that women are protected against 
discrimination (committed by public authorities, the judiciary, organisations, 
enterprises or private individuals) in the public as well as the private spheres by 
competent tribunals as well as through sanctions and other remedies.39 Secondly, 
States Parties’ obligation is to improve the de facto position of women through 
concrete and effective policies and programmes. Thirdly, States Parties’ obligation is 
to address prevailing gender relations40 and the persistence of gender-based  
 
 
                                                 
37  Idem para 6. 
38  ‘Indirect discrimination’ is defined by CEDAW as occurring when laws, policies and 
programmes are based on seemingly gender-neutral criteria that in their actual effect have a 
detrimental effect on women – CEDAW op cit note 35 endnote 1.  
39  CEDAW op cit note 35 para 7. 
40  The Committee defines ‘gender’ as the social meanings given to biological sex differences. 
It is an ideological and cultural construct, but it is also reproduced within the realm of 
material practices; in turn it influences the outcomes of such practices. It affects the 
distribution of resources, wealth, work, decision-making and political power, and 
enjoyment of rights and entitlements within the family as well as public life. Despite 
variations across cultures and over time, gender relations throughout the world entail 
asymmetry of power between men and women as a pervasive trait – CEDAW op cit note 35 
endnote 2. 
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stereotypes that affect women not only through acts by individuals, but also in law, 
and legal and societal structures and institutions. 
   
Linking discrimination and gender stereotypes,41 Cook and Howard explain that a 
State’s decision to deny benefits to or impose burdens on women in reliance on 
gender stereotypes amounts to gender discrimination.42 Women’s equality requires 
both the acknowledgment and accommodation of women’s actual differences, as 
well as the elimination of discriminatory treatment of gender stereotypes. Both 
efforts are required light of the overall object and purpose of the Convention.43 
 
The Convention further covers discrimination on the basis of marital status. This 
would include both discrimination against married women as compared with married 
men,44 as well as discrimination against women who are single in comparison with 
married women (or vice versa).45 
 
 
                                                 
41   Stereotypes generalise certain attitudes to an entire class of persons and preclude 
assessment of individual needs and circumstances. Accordingly, they suggest limits to 
individual autonomy in a manner that is arbitrary and unfair. The use of stereotypes is 
discriminatory when the generalisation implies that those persons subject to the stereotype 
are in some way inferior as persons – RJ Cook & S Howard ‘Accommodating women’s 
differences under the Women’s Anti-Discrimination Convention’ (2007) 56 Emory LJ at 
1043-1044; see also M O’Sullivan ‘Stereotyping and male identification: “Keeping women 
in their place”’ in C Murray (ed) Gender and the New South African Legal Order (1994) 
185 at 186-189.  
42  Cook & Howard op cit note 41 at 1043.  
43  Idem at 1044. 
44  Byrnes observes (correctly) that this is really nothing more than discrimination based on 
sex – op cit note 7 at124.  
45  Ibid. 
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An important aspect of the definition is that it covers inequality in the enjoyment of 
‘human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, 
civil or any other field’.46 The Convention explicitly refers to many of the rights 
guaranteed by other international instruments such as the two Covenants; however, it 
does not include all of these rights. For example, there is no express mention in the 
Convention of the obligation of a State Party to eliminate discrimination in women’s 
enjoyment of the right to privacy. These rights are nevertheless incorporated by 
reference as a result of the terms of Article 1.47  
 
A related point is that some violations of women’s rights are not covered by a 
specific article of the Convention, but are nevertheless covered by the Convention as 
a whole.48 One example of this is violence against women, which the Committee has 
interpreted as constituting discrimination against women within the meaning of the 
Convention and therefore being covered by a number of articles.49  
 
 
 
                                                 
46  Idem at 125. 
47  This means that although there may be no specific provision obliging a State Party not to 
discriminate in relation to these rights, the general obligations in the Convention (especially 
in Art 2) in effect impose such obligation.  
48  Byrnes loc cit.  
49  See discussion of General Recommendation No. 19 in Section 2.3.2 below. Commentators 
have similarly pointed out that certain articles of the Convention do contain implicit 
guarantees against violence – see J Fitzpatrick ‘The use of international human rights norms 
to combat violence against women’ in RJ Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women (1994) 532 at 
532; ML Liebeskind ‘Preventing gender-based violence: From marginalisation to 
mainstream in international human rights’ (1994) 63 Revista Juridica Universidad de 
Puerto Rico 645 at 664.  
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(c)  Obligations  
 
Article 2 sets out the general obligations undertaken by States Parties. They agree to 
condemn discrimination against women in all its forms and to pursue ‘by all 
appropriate means and without delay’ a policy of eliminating discrimination against 
women and, to this end, to undertake certain activities. These commitments include, 
firstly, to embody the principle of equality of women and men in national 
constitutions (if not yet incorporated therein) and to ensure, through law and other 
appropriate means, the practical realisation of this principle.50 Secondly, they agree 
to adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions, prohibiting 
all discrimination against women.51 States Parties further commit to establish legal 
protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through 
competent national tribunals (and other public institutions) the effective protection 
of women against acts of discrimination.52 They will also refrain from engaging in 
any act of discrimination against women and ensure that public authorities act in 
conformity with this obligation.53     
 
States furthermore agree to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women by any person, organisation or enterprise.54 They will take all 
appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws,  
 
 
                                                 
50  Art 2(a).  
51  Art 2(b).  
52  Art 2(c).  
53  Art 2(d).  
54  Art 2(e). 
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regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination against women;55 as 
well as repeal all national penal provisions constituting discrimination against 
women.56  
 
Importantly, certain of these obligations are expressed in terms that incorporate 
limitations.57 For example, when States Parties undertake to pursue ‘by all 
appropriate measures and without delay’ a policy of eliminating discrimination 
against women’, it does not necessarily follow that every time an act of 
discrimination occurs, the state will have breached this obligation. It will be a matter 
of interpretation and judgment whether the State Party has taken ‘all appropriate 
means’. In assessing whether the measures taken by the State Party are appropriate, 
sufficient and timely, the Committee may take into account, for example, the extent 
of the obstacles faced by the State Party and the extent of the ‘good faith’ efforts 
made by the State Party to overcome them.58 
 
Article 3 contains a more general obligation to ensure the full development and 
advancement of women, for the purpose of ‘guaranteeing them the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on the basis of equality with 
men’.  
 
In terms of Article 4, States Parties may adopt temporary special measures aimed at 
accelerating de facto equality between men and women; this will not be considered 
                                                 
55  Art 2(f). This provision has been referred to as the ‘core’ of the Convention – see Merry op 
cit note 33 at75.   
56  Art 2(g).  
57  AF Bayefsky How to Complain to the UN Human Rights Treaty System (2002) 31.  
58  Idem at 32.  
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discrimination as defined in this Convention.59 However, such measures should not 
entail the maintenance of unequal or separate standards: these temporary special 
measures must be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and 
treatment have been achieved. Furthermore, special measures aimed at protecting 
maternity will not be considered as discriminatory.60 
 
Article 5 requires States Parties to take all appropriate measures to modify the social 
and cultural patterns of conduct of women and women, with a view to achieving the 
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on 
the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped 
roles for men and women.61 This provision can be regarded as one of the more 
important ones, since it requires States Parties to attack the very causes of 
discrimination.62  
 
Cook and Cusack point out that the critical question is what constitutes ‘appropriate 
measures’ in a particular context.63 They suggest that some guidance could be 
gained from the jurisprudence that has emerged from the concept of ‘due diligence’ 
in human rights law,64 although in certain circumstances, the standard of 
appropriateness may be higher than the standard of conduct required by ‘due 
diligence’. They further propose that the jurisprudence that has developed in relation 
                                                 
59  Art 4 § 1. 
60  Art 4 § 2. See also discussion of CEDAW General Recommendation No. 25 above.  
61  Art 5(a). See also discussion on link between discrimination and gender stereotypes above. 
62  F Kathree ‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ 
(1995) 11 SAJHR 421 at 423-424. 
63  RJ Cook & S Cusack Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives (2010) 91. 
64  See introductory discussion of the ‘due diligence’ standard in Chapter 2, Section 4.3. 
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to the obligation to protect dimensions of rights may also provide additional 
guidance for interpretation of this phrase.65       
 
Article 5(b) requires States Parties to ensure that family education includes a proper 
understanding of ‘maternity as a social function’ and the recognition of the common 
responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of their 
children, it being understood that the interest of the children is the primary66 
consideration in all cases.  
 
Part I concludes with Article 6, which imposes a duty on States Parties to take all 
appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women 
and exploitation of prostitution of women.  
 
(d) Monitoring Committee 
 
The primary function of the twenty-three67 member monitoring committee is to 
receive and consider reports from State Parties, setting out what they have done to 
give effect to give effect to the Convention, and indicating the difficulties they have 
encountered in fulfilling their obligations.68 Evatt explains that the CEDAW was 
modelled on the monitoring bodies established by other UN human rights treaties 
                                                 
65  Cook & Cusack loc cit. See also discussion of the CEDAW’s interpretation of the 
Convention in respect of violence against women in Section 2.6 below, given that Article 5 
was raised in certain of the communications before the CEDAW.  
66  The text of the Convention uses ‘primordial’. 
67  Art 17 § 1. At its 44rd session, held from 20 July to 7 August 2009, the Committee formally 
noted that South Africa had not yet nominated a member to replace Hazel Gumede Shelton, 
who had resigned from the Committee in 2007 – CEDAW Draft Report: Forty-fourth 
Session UN Doc CEDAW/C/2009/II/L.1 (dated 7 August 2009) para 11. (At the time of 
writing, this is the most recent Committee report available.)  
68  Articles 17 § 1, 18 and 20 § 1; see also Evatt op cit note 6 at 518. 
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and has similar functions.69 However, this Committee has been subject to its own 
particular limitations. Unlike the Race Convention and the ICCPR, the Women’s 
Convention originally made no provision for an individual complaints procedure, 
thus limiting access by women and opportunities for CEDAW to develop 
jurisprudence.70 Another limitation was that CEDAW would ‘normally’ meet for 
only two weeks annually,71 which put enormous pressure on the Committee as the 
number of States Parties and reports to be considered increased. Furthermore, the 
CEDAW was initially based in Vienna, (forming part of the Division for the 
Advancement of Women).72 It subsequently moved to the UN Headquarters in New 
York; 73 in 2008 it relocated to Geneva, Switzerland, finally ending its geographical 
and programmatic isolation from the other human rights treaty bodies.   
 
The functions of CEDAW, in addition to considering the reports of States Parties, 
include reporting annually, through the ECOSOC, to the UN General Assembly on 
its activities; making suggestions and general recommendations based on the 
examination of reports and information received from the States Parties; and inviting 
                                                 
69  Ibid.  
70  See discussion on introduction of the Optional Protocol in Section 2.4 below.  
71  Art 20. Meron notes that this provision reflected an ‘overzealous effort to reduce 
expenditure’; no other human rights treaty organs have been subjected to such constraints - 
T Meron ‘Enhancing the effectiveness of the prohibition of discrimination against women’ 
(1990) 84 American Journal of International Law 213 at 214. The meeting time of the 
Committee has however repeatedly been extended as a ‘temporary measure’. Although an 
amendment to Art 20 was adopted in 1995, which would extend the meeting time of the 
Committee, this amendment has not yet attracted the required number of ratifications (i.e. 
two thirds of States Parties) to enter into force – GA Res 50/202 UN Doc A/RES/50/202 
(dated 22 December 1995). 
72  Meron op cit note 71 at 215.  
73  JA Minor ‘An analysis of the structural weaknesses in the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ (1994) 24 Georgia Journal International & 
Comparative Law 137 at 149.  
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the specialised agencies to submit reports on the implementation of the Convention 
in areas falling within the scope of their activities.  
 
(e) State reporting  
 
Article 18 requires States Parties to submit regular reports on the ‘legislative, 
judicial, administrative or other measures’ that they have adopted to give effect to 
the provisions of the Convention and on the progress they have made. The first 
report must be submitted within one year after the entry into force of the Convention 
for the State concerned, and thereafter every four years or whenever the Committee 
so requests.  
 
Byrnes refers to the reporting procedure as the ‘central feature’ of the Convention’s 
system of international supervision.74 He also points out that it provides an important 
occasion for non-governmental organisations to focus debate at the national level on 
the extent to which the government has given effect to its obligations under the 
Convention. Nowak is of the view that the open and constructive attitude of 
members of the CEDAW and state delegations during the state reporting procedure 
was highly conducive to setting a number of relevant legal standards and practical 
steps to improve the status of women.75 
 
                                                 
74  Byrnes op cit note 7 at 131. See further LA Hoq ‘The Women’s Convention and its 
Optional Protocol: Empowering women to claim their internationally protected rights’ 
(2001) 32 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 677 at 686-688 for a discussion of 
problematic aspects of CEDAW’s enforcement of the Convention through state reporting.  
75  M Nowak Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime (2003) 87. See however 
Evatt’s account of the early years of the Committee’s operation for a description of the 
difficulties experienced in working together (she was one of the initial CEDAW members) 
– Evatt op cit note 6 at 529-534.  
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The same unfortunate situation prevails under the Convention as under the other UN 
human rights instruments: many States Parties have fallen behind in their reporting 
obligations and are overdue in their submission of reports – in many cases owing 
more than one report.76 The purpose and objectives of the system of state reporting 
are frustrated if States do not submit their reports on time (or indeed, at all). For this 
reason, the CEDAW has taken measures to facilitate the submission of State reports; 
for example, States Parties are permitted to combine reports.77  
 
While this is not an ideal solution, in that it may not encourage States Parties to 
submit their reports more timeously, the other side of the picture is that the 
Committee currently has a backlog in the form of reports that have been received, 
but have not yet been reviewed due to time constraints on the part of the 
Committee.78 This means that even if a State Party does submit its report on time, it 
is highly likely that such a report will only be considered after some delay. This 
situation does not in itself contribute to encourage States to report on time.  
 
In line with recent developments in the broader treaty monitoring system, the 
Committee has adopted Convention-specific reporting guidelines to assist States 
Parties in compiling their country reports.79 These guidelines must be applied in 
                                                 
76  Byrnes op cit note 7 at 133. See also discussion of South Africa’s position in Section 2.5 
below.  
77  Byrnes loc cit. 
78  Meron op cit note 71 at 214. 
79  CEDAW Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: 
Fortieth Session (14 January – 1 February 2008) UN Doc A/63/38 (2008) Decision 40/I. 
The guidelines are set out in Annex I to the report.   
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conjunction with the harmonised reporting guidelines on a common core 
document.80 
 
An important aspect of the system of State reporting is the concluding observations 
or concluding comments compiled by the Committee in response to country 
reports.81 These observations consist of an introduction, a section on positive aspects 
and then a section setting out the Committee’s principal concerns and 
recommendations. These concluding observations are significant firstly because they 
set out the Committee’s recommendations for action in respect of implementation; 
secondly, the State Party will subsequently be evaluated in respect of its response to 
the observations.82  
 
(f) General Recommendations 
 
In terms of Article 21 of the Convention, the CEDAW may make ‘suggestions and 
general recommendations’ to the States Parties. Since the early 1990s, the 
Committee has made use of this power to adopt General Recommendations to set 
out its understanding of particular articles of the Convention, or of how the 
Convention applies to thematic issues (such as violence against women).83 This has 
been an important development in the work of the Committee.84 
                                                 
80  The harmonised guidelines have been developed by the Human Rights Council – see UN 
Doc HRI/GEN/2/Rev.5. The common core document constitutes the first part of any report 
prepared for the CEDAW in accordance with the harmonised reporting guidelines.  
81  Byrnes op cit at 136-137. 
82  This may occur either in the context of a subsequent country report, or where the CEDAW 
has occasion to examine the State’s response as a result of a communication or inquiry 
brought under the Optional Protocol – see discussion in Section 2.6. below.  
83  Byrnes op cit note 7 at 138. See also discussion below.  
84  Ibid. 
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The General Recommendations are not binding interpretations of the Convention, 
but are considered as influential interpretations of it.85 As a formal matter of 
international law, General Recommendations are not binding on States Parties. 
Nevertheless they are considered as particularly persuasive interpretations of 
international law and they have been invoked before domestic courts and tribunals.86 
 
(g) Reservations 
 
Article 28 makes provision for States Parties to enter reservations to the Convention. 
This practice has proved to be a major weakness in the case of the Women’s 
Convention. Byrnes observes that these reservations have ranged from specific 
reservations to individual provisions (that have subsequently been withdrawn once 
the inconsistent law or practice has been removed), to sweeping, sometimes vague 
reservations that appear to extensively limit the State Party’s obligations.87  
 
 
                                                 
85  P Alston ‘The historical origins of the concept of “General Comments” in Human Rights 
Law’ in LB de Chazournes & VG Debbas (eds) The International Legal System in Quest of 
Equity and Universality: Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab (2001) 763 cited in Steiner et 
al op cit note 21 at 873-876; see also  Byrnes op cit note 7 at 138-139.  
86  See also discussion of South African jurisprudence in Chapter 5 below.  
87  Byrnes op cit note 7 at 126-127. For example, the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco 
noted the following reservation to Art 16:  
 ‘The Government of the Kingdom of Morocco makes a reservation with regard to the 
provisions of this article, particularly those relating to the equality of men and women, in 
respect of rights and responsibilities on entry into and at dissolution of marriage. Equality 
of this kind is considered incompatible with the Islamic Shariah, which guarantees to each 
of the spouses rights and responsibilities within a framework of equilibrium and 
complementary [sic] in order to preserve the sacred bond of matrimony.’  
 Available at [treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en] (Accessed on 
27 May 2010.)   
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3   International Law: Women’s Convention  
 
 
 96
 
Although Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Convention states that reservations 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention are impermissible,88 the 
document does not make provision for a mechanism to determine incompatibility.89 
This means that although some of the reservations entered are ‘almost certainly’ 
incompatible with the spirit and purpose of the Convention, the issue has to be 
resolved by individual State Parties, the meeting of States Parties and the CEDAW.90  
 
The CEDAW has raised the concern that noting reservations in respect of Article 2 
constitutes a failure to adopt the spirit of the Convention.91 On the other hand, a 
long-standing member of the Committee, Ms. Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling,92 
recounts that even States Parties that have registered significant reservations present 
their reports and engage in dialogue with the Committee members, which is a 
potentially constructive practice.93 In the past, the Women’s Convention had more 
reservations than any other;94 however, a number of States Parties have in recent 
years withdrawn reservations, with the result that this Convention is no longer the 
‘most heavily reserved’ international instrument of this nature.95  
 
 
                                                 
88  This is a re-statement of the general international law standard – Byrnes op cit note 7 at 
127.  
89  Cf the Race Convention, which provides that a reservation is considered to be incompatible 
if two-thirds of States Parties object to it – Art 20 § 2. 
90  Byrnes loc cit.  
91  Merry op cit note 33 at 81.  
92  Ms. Schöpp-Schilling was a member of the CEDAW for twelve years – Merry op cit note 
33 at 80.  
93  Merry op cit note 33 at 81; see also Hoq op cit note 74 at 688-691. 
94  Cook op cit note 18 at 644; Stamatopoulou op cit note 3 at 38.  
95  Merry op cit note 33 at 81. See also Chapter 4, Section 7. 
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2.3.2 Provisions on violence against women 
 
Although there was already at the time a growing concern about violence against 
women, the Convention, drafted in the 1970s,96 does not contain any express 
provisions mentioning violence either as a form of discrimination, or as an obstacle 
to the equal enjoyment of rights by women.97 Members of the CEDAW nevertheless 
regularly asked reporting States about the incidence of violence against women, and 
about the measures they had taken to prevent violence or to deal with its 
occurrence.98 From the Committee’s third session onwards, violence against women 
was frequently raised as an issue, regardless of whether it was covered by a State 
Party’s report.  
 
In 1985, General Recommendation No. 12 was adopted to encourage States Parties 
to report on violence against women.99 In this Recommendation, the Committee 
already makes the important statement that Articles 2, 5, 11, 12 and 16 of the 
Convention require States Parties to ‘act to protect women against violence of any 
kind occurring within the family, at the work place or in any other area of social 
life’.   
 
 
                                                 
96  Merry also ascribes the omission of violence against women to the era in which the 
Convention was drafted – idem at 76.  
97 Depending on the position taken regarding sex work/ prostitution, Art 6 could be seen as an 
exception – see eg Evatt op cit note 6 at 544. See also discussion in Chapter 1, Section 3.1 
about sex work/ prostitution as ‘violence against women’. 
98   Evatt loc cit.  
99   CEDAW General Recommendation No. 12: Violence against Women  
UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.148.120n (dated 2 March 1989).  
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Because of pressure exerted by women’s organisations,100 the Committee in 1992 
adopted a detailed General Recommendation setting out how the Convention should 
be interpreted to cover violence against women and explain the nature of state 
obligations.101 General Recommendation No. 19 states that the general prohibition of 
gender discrimination includes ‘gender-based violence – that is, violence that is 
directed at a woman because she is a woman or that affects women 
disproportionately’.102 It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or 
suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.103 Gender-
based violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of 
whether those provisions expressly mention violence.104 
 
General Recommendation No. 19 does not make express mention of the right to 
freedom from violence as such; it does state that gender-based violence, which 
impairs or nullifies women’s enjoyment of their rights under general international 
law or human rights conventions, including the right to life, the right to liberty and 
security of the person and the right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, is discrimination within the meaning of 
Article 1 of the Convention.105  
 
                                                 
100   See Kathree op cit note 62 at 426. 
101   CEDAW General Recommendation No.19 UN GAOR 11th Session UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add.15 (1992) [hereafter ‘CEDAW General Recommendation No. 
19’].  Evatt describes the process leading up to the adoption of the General 
Recommendation in some detail – op cit note 6 at 545-548. 
102   CEDAW General Recommendation No 19 para 1. 
103  Idem para 6.  
104  Ibid. 
105   Idem para 7.  
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The effect of these introductory provisions is to bring gender-based violence firmly 
within the ambit of the equality/ non-discrimination paradigm of the Women’s 
Convention as a whole. Commentators have considered the wisdom of this 
approach;106 however, as Edwards points out, characterising violence against women 
as sex discrimination has filled an important gap in international human rights law, 
i.e. the absence of an explicit binding provision on violence against women.107 She 
notes that it nevertheless carries its own set of problems for women.108 
 
This Recommendation also confirms that violence against women constitutes a 
violation of women’s human rights irrespective of whether the perpetrators are state 
officials or private individuals, and reiterates the principle of ‘due diligence’: 
 
States may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with 
due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and 
punish acts of violence, and to provide compensation.109  
 
It explains how gender-based violence fits under each relevant Article of the 
Convention, and then sets out a number of specific recommendations for state 
action.110  
 
                                                 
106  See eg J Goldscheid ‘Domestic and sexual violence as sex discrimination: Comparing 
American and international approaches’ Thomas Jefferson Law Review (2006) 355 at 356 et 
seq. 
107  Edwards op cit note 33 at 46. 
108  See discussion of the CEDAW’s decision in Ms NSF v United Kingdom in Section 2.6.4 
below.  
109   CEDAW General Recommendation No 19 para 10.  
110  CEDAW General Recommendation No 19 paras 24(a) – (t).  
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Making use of the framework for analysis proposed for this study,111 I have 
categorised these recommendations according to the five types of State obligations 
engendered by the protection or guarantee of a specific right. This categorisation is 
set out in Table 1, Annexure A. It should be noted that the classification process is 
not an exact one; certain duties could conceivably resort into more than one 
category.   
 
One observation that immediately comes to the fore when looking at Table 1 is that 
the obligations set out here are for the most part clustered around the duty to protect; 
no mention is made of the duty on the part of States Parties to respect the right (in 
other words to refrain from violating this right themselves). Furthermore, there is 
also emphasis on the duties to realise rights (i.e. to create institutional machinery) 
and satisfy (i.e. to provide services and goods). The duty to promote also receives 
attention, but not in very strong terms. Additional duties may be read into the 
reporting obligations of States Parties.  
 
Given the nature of the document,112 it is important to note that the language here is 
weaker (‘States Parties should…’) than in the Convention itself.   
 
 
2.4 The Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention  
 
In the initial years after its introduction, one of the identified weaknesses of the 
Women’s Convention was its limited implementation structures and specifically, the 
                                                 
111     See Chapter 2 above.  
112  That is, as an interpretative guideline. 
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fact that it lacked a complaints mechanism.113 For this reason, calls were made, 
particularly from within the NGO community, to strengthen the Women’s 
Convention through the addition of such a complaints mechanism in the form of an 
optional protocol, which would allow individual women to bring complaints before 
the CEDAW, alleging that their countries had failed to comply with their obligations 
under the Convention.114 Proponents claimed that such a procedure would not only 
place the Convention and the CEDAW on an equal footing with other UN human 
rights treaties and treaty monitoring bodies, but also that a complaints procedure 
would ensure more effective implementation of the rights guaranteed in the 
Convention.115  
 
After some years of debate and consideration, the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention was adopted on 6 October 1999.116 At the time of writing, it had 
acquired 99 ratifications/ accessions and 79 signatories.117   
 
The Optional Protocol makes provision for a communication procedure (set out in 
Article 2) and an inquiry procedure (Article 8). Communications may be submitted 
by or on behalf of individuals (or groups of individuals) claiming to be victims of a 
                                                 
113  A Byrnes & J Connors ‘Enforcing the human rights of women: A complaints procedure for 
the Women’s Convention?’ (1996) 21 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 679 at 682-
684; Meron op cit note 71 at 216; FG Isa ‘The Optional Protocol for the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women: Strengthening the protection 
mechanisms of women’s human rights’ (2003) 20 Arizona Journal of International & 
Comparative Law 291 at 303-304. 
114  Hoq op cit note 74 at 693. 
115  Byrnes and Connors op cit note 113 at 682-684. 
116  Optional Protocol op cit note 4. 
117  See [treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8-
b&chapter=4&lang=en]. (Accessed on 19 March 2010.) 
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violation of any of the rights set out in the Convention.118 A number of requirements 
apply: for example, the communication must be in writing and must not be 
anonymous,119 and the author must have exhausted all domestic remedies.120 The 
Protocol also provides that the Committee may request a State Party, at any time 
after receipt of a communication and before making a determination on the merits, to 
urgently take interim measures to avoid possible irreparable damage to the victim of 
the alleged violation.121  
 
The Committee may initiate an inquiry if it receives reliable information indicating 
‘grave or systematic violations’ by a State Party of rights set forth in the 
Convention.122 The Committee designates one or more its members to conduct the 
inquiry and report back urgently. Where warranted, the inquiry may include a visit 
to the territory of the State Party.123 Such inquiries are conducted confidentially and 
the cooperation of the State Party must be sought at all stages of the proceedings.124 
 
The fact that the Protocol is ‘optional’ implies that it applies only to States Parties 
that ratify or accede to its terms. Furthermore, Article 10 contains an ‘opt-out’ clause 
in respect of the inquiry procedure as set out in Article 8 and 9.125  
                                                 
118  Where a communication is submitted on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, this 
must be with their consent unless the author can justify acting on their behalf without such 
consent. 
119  Optional Protocol op cit note 4 Art 3. 
120  Unless the application of such remedies is unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to bring 
effective relief - Art 4 § 1. 
121  Art 5.  
122  Art 8 § 1. 
123  Art 8 § 2. 
124  Art 8 § 5. 
125  See Isa op cit note 113 at 316-317 for a discussion of the background to this clause. (Isa 
was the Spanish representative to the Working Group for the elaboration of the Optional 
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2.5 Position of South Africa 
 
South Africa ratified the Convention on 15 December 1995, and is therefore bound 
by the obligations created by the Convention. It submitted its first country report in 
1997,126 and a combined second, third and fourth report in 2009.127 The Government 
unfortunately does not advance any reasons for the long delay between the 
submission of its first report and this combined 2009 report.   
 
In its concluding comments on South Africa’s initial report, the CEDAW expressed 
its concern at the high level of violence against women, including the high incidence 
of rape, particularly of young girls.128 It noted in particular that, given the persistent 
overall high levels of crime and violence in the country, there was a danger that 
efforts to address violence against women, although identified as a priority area in 
the National Crime Prevention Strategy, may become submerged in the larger 
struggle against violence in society. 
 
The Committee recommended that efforts to prevent and combat violence against 
women continue to receive the priority attention they require, with a view to 
                                                                                                                                         
Protocol.) Bangladesh, Benin, Columbia and Cuba are among the States Parties that have 
declared that they do not accept the provisions of Articles 8 and 9.  
126  CEDAW/C/ZAF/1 (dated 25 February 1998), available at 
[www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports.htm#s]. (Accessed on 24 March 2010.)  
127  CEDAW/C/ZAF/2-4 (dated 18 December 2009), available at 
[www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/cedaws48.htm]. (Accessed on 24 March 2010.)    
128  UN General Assembly Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (18th and 19th Sessions) UN Doc A/53/38/Rev.1 (dated 14 May 1998) para 
121. 
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ensuring a comprehensive approach.129 Steps should be taken, including through 
education, awareness-raising and sensitisation of the public, to deal with 
stereotypical attitudes that are amongst the root causes of violence against women 
and to emphasise the unacceptability of such violence.  
 
The Committee encouraged the Government to reinforce its existing strong 
collaboration with civil society and non-governmental organisations on violence 
against women with budgetary allocations commensurate with the priority attached 
to combating such violence.130 The Committee recommended that the seriousness of 
rape, including marital rape, be emphasised and the law fully enforced. It also urged 
the Government to undertake research into the causes of the high incidence of rape 
so that effective preventive measures could be developed. 
 
A group of NGO’s prepared and submitted a shadow report to the CEDAW on South 
Africa’s initial report, focusing specifically on the question of violence against 
women.131 The report included a specific section emphasising the South African 
government’s failure to properly grasp its obligations in respect of violence against 
women under international human rights law.132 It was argued that this lack of 
awareness of the duty to protect and promote women’s right to freedom from 
                                                 
129  Idem para 122. 
130  Idem paras 123-124. 
131  Masimanyane Women’s Support Centre NGO Shadow Report to CEDAW (South Africa): 
Violence against Women (June 1998).  The candidate was one of the contributors to the 
report. 
132  See Masimanyane Women’s Support Centre op cit note 129 Appendix A, entitled 
‘International Human Rights Law and Constitutional provisions Relating to Violence 
Against Women’.  
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violence was apparent inter alia from the description of piecemeal, unstructured 
government responses to violence against women.133  
 
The 2009 report has been the subject of some NGO criticism as well. At the time of 
writing, a shadow report is in the final stages of completion; this shadow report 
focuses on the entire Government report.  
 
The South African report has been scheduled for examination at the Committee’s 
48th Session, which will take place from 17 January to 4 February 2011 in 
Geneva.134   
 
 
2.6 Interpretation of the Women’s Convention by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
 
The CEDAW has to date considered three communications brought under the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention relating to violence against women.135 It has 
also conducted an inquiry into allegations of systemic violence against women. The 
Committee’s views (in the case of the communications) and its conclusions and 
recommendations in respect of the inquiry are examined here. A fourth 
communication, which the Committee held to be inadmissible, is also discussed; the 
                                                 
133  Idem at 17.  
134  See official CEDAW website, available at 
[www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/sessions.htm]. (Accessed on 24 March 2010.)  
135  Two of these communications (5/2005 and 6/2005), brought against Austria, are very 
similar and are accordingly discussed together – see discussion in Section 2.6.2 below.  
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motivation for its inclusion is that domestic violence played a central role in the 
events leading to the complaint against the State Party.136  
 
I examine the Committee’s views and conclusions in some detail, for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the Optional Protocol, as explained above, is a relatively new 
mechanism, and the Committee has not had much opportunity to develop 
jurisprudence in relation to the Protocol. Linked to this is the consideration that 
because of the novelty of this area, it is important to scrutinise the Committee’s 
interpretation of key concepts such as ‘due diligence’. Finally, it is important to gain 
an understanding of the factual sequence of events in each case in order to grasp the 
findings of the Committee. The selection of the communications was done on the 
basis of information available on the Committee’s Internet website(s).137       
 
In each of the communications examined below, the set of facts is relatively lengthy. 
However, it was considered important to provide the reader with access to the 
factual circumstances of each case, in order to fully appreciate the Committee’s 
Views, for example, relating to the State Party’s compliance with the standard of 
‘due diligence’. For this reason, a short précis of the facts is given in the text, and a 
longer version is set out in Annexure B to the thesis.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
136  Ms NSF v United Kingdom (CEDAW Communication No 10/2005). See discussion in 
Section 2.6.3 below.  
137  [www2.ohchr.org/english/law/jurisprudence.htm]; 
[www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/index.html]. (Accessed 19 March 2010.) 
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2.6.1 A.T. v Hungary138 
 
(a) Background139 
 
The author in A.T. v Hungary had been the victim of domestic violence committed 
over a four-year period by one L.F., her (former) common-law husband and father of 
her two children, one of whom was severely intellectually disabled.140 Despite 
threats by L.F. to kill the author, she had not gone to a shelter, reportedly because no 
shelter in the country was equipped to accommodate a severely disabled child 
together with his mother and sister. The author also stated that there were at the time 
no protection orders or restraining orders available under Hungarian law. Her efforts 
to bar L.F. from the family apartment through civil proceedings had proved fruitless 
and the two criminal procedures arising from charges she had laid against L.F. were 
both still pending at the time of submitting her communication to CEDAW.141 
 
She further pointed out that L.F. had not been detained at any time in connection 
with these criminal proceedings; the Hungarian authorities had not taken any actions 
to protect her from him.   
 
 
                                                 
138  CEDAW Communication No 2/2003 Ms. A. T. v. Hungary (Views adopted on 26 January 
2005, Thirty-second session).  
139  The factual background to the communication is set out in more detail in Annexure B. 
140  The facts are set out in paras 2.1 – 2.7 of CEDAW Communication No 2/2003 op cit note 
138. 
141   CEDAW op cit note 138 para 2.6. One of the criminal trials began in 1999, the other in July 
2001.  
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(b) The author’s complaint 
 
Ms. A.T. alleged that she was a victim of violations by Hungary142 of Articles 2(a), 
(b) and (e), 5(a) and 16 of the Women’s Convention for its failure to provide 
effective protection from her former common law husband.143 She claimed that the 
State Party passively neglected its ‘positive’ obligations under the Convention and 
supported the continuation of a situation of domestic violence against her. She 
alleged inter alia that the irrationally lengthy criminal procedures against L. F., the 
lack of protection orders or restraining orders under current Hungarian law and the 
fact that L. F. had not spent any time in custody constituted violations of her rights 
under the Convention as well as General Recommendation No. 19. She also urgently 
requested effective interim measures of protection in accordance with Article 5, 
paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol, at the same time that she submitted her 
communication, because she feared for her life.144 The author maintained that she 
had exhausted all available domestic remedies.145  
 
                                                 
142  The Convention and its Optional Protocol entered into force in the State Party on  
3 September 1981 and 22 March 2001, respectively. 
143   The author’s complaint is detailed in paras 3.1 – 3.6 of CEDAW op cit note 138. 
144  Idem para 1.2. 
145  The author did concede that there was still a petition pending to the Supreme Court 
requesting a review of the decision of the Budapest Regional Court relating to the exclusion 
of L.F. from the apartment. (The Budapest Regional Court had previously issued a final 
decision authorising L.F. to return and use the apartment.) -  CEDAW op cit note 138 para 
3.5. This remedy is an exceptional one that is only available in case of a violation of the law 
by lower court; the author believed that it was highly unlikely that that the Supreme Court 
would find a violation of the law. This was because Hungarian courts do not regard the 
Women’s Convention as law to be applied by them. This pending review therefore did not 
mean that she had failed to exhaust domestic remedies.  
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A potential hindrance to the admissibility of the communication was the fact that 
most of the incidents complained of had taken place prior to March 2001 when the 
Optional Protocol entered into force for Hungary. The author however contended 
that these incidents constituted ‘elements of a clear continuum of regular domestic 
violence’ and that her life continued to be in danger. She argued that Hungary had in 
effect assisted in the continuation of violence through protracted proceedings, the 
failure to take protective measures, including timely conviction of the perpetrator 
and the issuance of a restraining order, and the Regional Court decision authorising 
L.F. to return and use the apartment.   
 
(c)  Submissions on admissibility and merits 
 
Significantly, the State Party maintained it did not wish to raise any preliminary 
objections as to the admissibility of the communication.146 It also admitted that the 
available domestic remedies were not capable of providing immediate protection to 
the author from ill-treatment by her former partner. 
 
The State Party outlined a range of measures that it had undertaken to address 
violence against women, having realised that the system of remedies against 
domestic violence was incomplete in Hungarian law and that the effectiveness of the 
existing procedures was not sufficient.147 These included the institution of a 
comprehensive action programme against domestic violence in 2003,148 and the 
adoption of a resolution on the national strategy for the prevention and effective 
                                                 
146  CEDAW op cit note 138 para 5.6. 
147  Idem paras 5.6-5.10. 
148  Idem para 5.7. 
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treatment of violence within the family by the Hungarian parliament on 16 April 
2003. This resolution set out a number of legislative and other actions to be taken.149   
 
The author stated that in spite of these government undertakings, her personal 
situation had not changed and she still lived in constant fear as regards her former 
partner.150 From time to time L. F. had harassed her and threatened to move back 
into the apartment.  
 
She reported that the criminal proceedings against L. F. were still ongoing as at 23 
June 2004.151 A hearing scheduled for April 2004 was postponed to May 2004 and, 
as the judge was reportedly ‘too busy’ to hear the case, the criminal proceedings 
were again postponed until 25 June 2004. The author believed that, whatever the 
outcome, the criminal proceedings had been so lengthy and her safety so severely 
neglected that she had not received the timely and effective protection and the 
remedy to which she was entitled under the Women’s Convention and General 
Recommendation No. 19.152  
 
                                                 
149  These measures would include (amongst others), the following: introducing a restraining 
order into legislation; ensuring that proceedings before the Courts or other authorities in 
domestic violence cases are given priority; elaborating clear protocols for the police, 
childcare organs and social and medical institutions; extending and modernising the 
network of shelters and setting up victim protection crisis centres; providing free legal aid 
in certain circumstances; and training of professionals.  
150  CEDAW op cit note 138 para 6.3. 
151  Idem para 6.5. 
152  In a subsequent submission dated October 2004, the author reported that L.F. had been 
convicted in the District Court of two counts of causing grievous bodily harm to her and 
had been fined the equivalent of approximately US$ 365 – CEDAW op cit note 138 para 
6.11. 
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In August 2004, Hungary made a number of crucial concessions that effectively 
settled the matter. It conceded that domestic violence cases did not enjoy high 
priority in court proceedings, and that the legal and institutional system in Hungary 
was not yet ready to ensure the internationally expected, coordinated, comprehensive 
and effective protection and support for the victims of domestic violence. 
 
(d) Consideration of admissibility and merits  
 
As noted, the State Party chose not to raise any preliminary objections to the 
admissibility of the communication and furthermore conceded that the remedies 
existing in Hungary at the time were not capable of providing the author with 
immediate protection against abuse by L.F.153 Although the Committee agreed with 
this assessment, it nevertheless chose to make some observations.  
 
It inter alia took note of the two sets of criminal proceedings against L.F. on charges 
of assault and battery.154 The Committee expressed the view that the delay in 
finalising these proceedings of over three years from the dates of the incidents in 
question would amount to ‘an unreasonably prolonged delay’ within the meaning of 
Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol, particularly considering that the 
author had been at risk of irreparable harm and threats to her life during that period. 
Additionally, the Committee took account of the fact that she had no possibility of 
obtaining temporary protection while criminal proceedings were in progress and that 
the defendant had at no time been detained. 
 
                                                 
153  Idem paras 8.3-8.4. 
154  Idem para 8.4. These charges related to assault and battery allegedly committed in January 
2000 and July 2001; the cases had been joined (see above).  
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As to the timing of the events that formed the subject of the communication, the 
Committee was persuaded by the author’s argument regarding a ‘clear continuum of 
regular domestic violence’ and that her life was still in danger, as evidenced by the 
battering which took place in July 2001, that is after the Optional Protocol came into 
force in Hungary.155 The Committee therefore found that it was competent ratione 
temporis to consider the communication in its entirety, because the facts that were 
the subject of the communication covered the alleged lack of protection/alleged 
culpable inaction on the part of the State Party for the series of severe incidents of 
battering and threats of further violence that had uninterruptedly characterised the 
period beginning in 1998 to the time of the communication. The communication was 
accordingly found admissible.  
 
In considering the merits of the communication,156 the Committee first recalled its 
General Recommendation No. 19, with specific reference to the statements that the 
definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence and that gender-based 
violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether 
those provisions expressly mention violence. Furthermore, the General 
Recommendation addresses the question of whether States Parties can be held 
accountable for the conduct of non-State actors by confirming that discrimination 
under the Convention is not restricted to action by or on behalf of governments and 
that States may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due 
diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, 
and for providing compensation.  
 
                                                 
155  Idem para 8.5.   
156  The Committee’s views on the merits are set out in CEDAW op cit note 138 paras 9.1-9.6.  
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Against this backdrop, the immediate issue facing the Committee was whether the 
author of the communication was the victim of a violation of Articles 2(a), (b) and 
(e), 5(a) and 16 of the Convention because, as she alleged, for the previous four 
years the State Party had failed in its duty to provide her with effective protection 
from the serious risk to her physical integrity, physical and mental health and her life 
from her former common law husband. 
 
With regard to Article 2(a), (b), and (e), the Committee observed that the State Party 
had admitted that the remedies pursued by the author were not capable of providing 
immediate protection to her against ill-treatment by her former partner. Furthermore, 
legal and institutional arrangements in the State Party were not yet ready to ensure 
the internationally expected, coordinated, comprehensive and effective protection 
and support for victims of domestic violence. While appreciating the State Party’s 
efforts at instituting a comprehensive action programme against domestic violence 
and the legal and other measures envisioned, the Committee believed that these had 
yet to benefit the author and address her persistent situation of insecurity.  
 
The Committee further noted the State Party’s general assessment that domestic 
violence cases as such did not enjoy high priority in court proceedings. The 
Committee was of the opinion that the description provided of the proceedings 
resorted to in the present case, both the civil and criminal proceedings, coincided 
with this general assessment. It made the following important statement: 
 
Women’s human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity 
cannot be superseded by other rights, including the right to property 
and the right to privacy.157  
                                                 
157  Idem para 9.3. 
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The Committee also noted that the State Party did not offer information as to the 
existence of alternative avenues that the author might have pursued that would have 
provided sufficient protection or security from the danger of continued violence. In 
this connection, the Committee recalled its concluding comments from August 2002 
on the State Party’s combined fourth and fifth periodic report, where the Committee 
expressed its concern about the prevalence of violence against women and girls, 
including domestic violence. It was particularly concerned that no specific 
legislation had been enacted to combat domestic violence and sexual harassment and 
that no protection or exclusion orders or shelters existed for the immediate 
protection of women victims of domestic violence.  
 
Bearing this in mind, the Committee concluded that the obligations of the State Party 
set out in Article 2(a), (b) and (e) of the Convention extend to the prevention of and 
protection from violence against women, which obligations in the present case 
remained unfulfilled and constituted a violation of the author’s human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, particularly her right to security of person. 
 
The Committee had addressed Articles 5 and 16 of the Convention together in its 
General Recommendation No. 19 in dealing with family violence. In its General 
Recommendation No. 21,158 the Committee stressed that the provisions of General 
Recommendation No. 19 concerning violence against women have great 
significance for women’s abilities to enjoy rights and freedoms on an equal basis 
with men. It has stated on many occasions that traditional attitudes by which women 
are regarded as subordinate to men contribute to violence against them. The 
                                                 
158  This General Recommendation deals with equality in marriage and family relations. 
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Committee recognised those very attitudes when it considered the combined fourth 
and fifth periodic report of Hungary in 2002. At that time it was concerned about the 
persistence of entrenched traditional stereotypes regarding the role and 
responsibilities of women and men in the family.  
 
In respect of the instant case, the facts of the communication revealed aspects of the 
relationships between the sexes and attitudes towards women that the Committee 
had recognised in respect of the country as a whole.159 None of these facts were 
disputed by the State Party and, considered together, they indicated that the rights of 
the author under Articles 5(a) and 16 of the Convention had been violated. The 
Committee also noted that the lack of effective legal and other measures prevented 
the State Party from dealing in a satisfactory manner with the Committee’s request 
for interim protective measures.160 
 
The Committee accordingly found that the State Party had failed to fulfil its 
obligations and thereby violated the rights of the author under Article 2(a), (b) and 
(e) and Article 5 (a) in conjunction with Article 16 with the Convention.161 It 
                                                 
159  These aspects as enumerated by the Committee included the fact that for four years and 
continuing to the time of consideration of the communication, the author had felt threatened 
by her former common law husband, the father of her two children. The author has been 
battered by this same man, her former common law husband. She had been unsuccessful, 
either through civil or criminal proceedings, to temporarily or permanently bar L. F. from 
the apartment where she and her children have continued to reside. The author could not 
have asked for a restraining or protection order since neither option existed in Hungary. She 
was unable to flee to a shelter because none was equipped to accept her together with her 
children, one of whom is disabled – CEDAW op cit note 138 para 9.4. 
160  Idem para 9.5. The author had requested interim measures of protection in accordance with 
Art 5 § 1 of the Optional Protocol. This request did not meet with a speedy or effective 
response from the Hungarian authorities, even when the CEDAW intervened on behalf of 
the author – see CEDAW op cit note 138 paras 4.1-4.8. 
161  Idem para 9.6. 
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formulated a number of recommendations to the Hungarian Government, both 
concerning the author specifically and more generally.  
 
In respect of the author, the Committee recommended that the State Party take 
immediate and effective measures to guarantee the physical and mental integrity of 
Ms. A.T. and her family; and ensure that she is given a safe home in which to live 
with her children, receives appropriate child support and legal assistance as well as 
reparation proportionate to the physical and mental harm undergone and to the 
gravity of the violations of her rights.162 
 
The Committee’s general recommendations were for the State Party to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil women’s human rights, including ‘their right to be free 
from all forms of domestic violence, including intimidation and threats of violence’ 
and to assure victims of domestic violence the maximum protection of the law by 
acting with due diligence to prevent and respond to such violence against women.163  
 
The State Party was further enjoined to - 
(i)    Take all necessary measures to ensure that the national strategy for the 
prevention and effective treatment of violence within the family is 
promptly implemented and evaluated;  
(ii)  Take all necessary measures to provide regular training on the Women’s 
Convention and the Optional Protocol to judges, lawyers and law 
enforcement officials; 
                                                 
162  Idem para 9.6. 
163  Idem paras 9.6.II (a) and (b).  
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(iii)  Implement expeditiously and without delay the Committee’s concluding 
comments of August 2002 on the combined fourth and fifth periodic 
report of Hungary in respect of violence against women and girls, in 
particular the Committee’s recommendation that a specific law be 
introduced prohibiting domestic violence against women, which would 
provide for protection and exclusion orders as well as support services, 
including shelters; 
(iv)  Investigate promptly, thoroughly, impartially and seriously all allegations 
of domestic violence and bring the offenders to justice in accordance with 
international standards; 
(v)  Provide victims of domestic violence with safe and prompt access to 
justice, including free legal aid where necessary, in order to ensure them 
available, effective and sufficient remedies and rehabilitation; and 
(vi)  Provide offenders with rehabilitation programmes and programmes on 
non-violent conflict resolution methods. 
 
(e) Comments on the Committee’s Views 
 
As the first instance where the CEDAW had an opportunity to interpret the 
Women’s Convention in respect of violence against women, this communication is 
of considerable significance. The first aspect that compels attention is the fact that 
the Committee agreed with the author’s argument that the history of violence she 
experienced constituted a ‘clear continuum of domestic violence’. This importantly 
brought all the incidents across the period of four years within the ambit of the 
Committee’s scrutiny – whereas a strict ‘piecemeal’ application of the dates of 
commission of the violent incidents would have excluded most of these incidents, 
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given the date of ratification by the Optional Protocol of Hungary. The Committee’s 
willingness to accept this argument indicates an understanding of the fact that 
multiple acts of domestic violence should be judged as an interlinked history rather 
than as individual, isolated incidents; an issue that has long plagued the prosecutors 
of domestic violence in criminal proceedings.164  
 
It is also significant to note that the Committee was prepared to accept that even 
though the criminal proceedings against L.F. had not been concluded at the time that 
the author initiated the communication, the fact that these proceedings had already 
been underway for a period of approximately three years constituted ‘unreasonably 
prolonged delay’ for purposes of admissibility under the Optional Protocol. This was 
exacerbated by the fact that the author did not have access to any form of protection 
in respect of her right to security during this time.  
 
When it comes to the merits, the capitulation of the Hungarian Government (in the 
face of overwhelming evidence) was inevitable. It is useful that the CEDAW 
nevertheless made certain statements to emphasise its findings that the rights of the 
author under the Convention had been violated. One of the most important of these 
statements of principle relate to the primacy of women’s rights to life and physical 
integrity. This becomes a recurrent theme, as is apparent from the cases below.  
 
From a formal perspective, it is interesting to note that the Committee draws very 
strongly on its concluding observations to a previous state report in finding that the 
State Party had failed to comply with its obligations. This indicates that States 
Parties will do well to take their reporting obligations more seriously, and also to 
                                                 
164  Based on candidate’s personal experience of working as public prosecutor.  
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note the substance of the Committee’s concluding observations as more than a 
passing matter of form.  
 
The Committee’s recommendations to Hungary are also significant. Firstly, the 
recommendations specific to the author take the state obligation to respond to 
domestic violence further than envisaged in General Recommendation No. 19 by 
including the provision of a safe home in which to live with her children as well as 
appropriate child support with the other measures such as legal representation. (One 
of the distinctive facets of the Committee’s views here is its sensitivity to the 
linkages between women’s lack of access to adequate housing and their vulnerability 
to domestic violence.) 
 
Even more important for purposes of this study, however, is the fact that the 
Committee’s general recommendations include for the State Party to ‘respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil women’s human rights, including their right to be free 
from all forms of domestic violence, including intimidation and threats of 
violence’.165 Given the fact that the right to be free from violence is not explicitly 
mentioned in either the Women’s Convention or General Recommendation No. 19, 
this is a crucial statement.  
 
One final observation regarding the Committee’s recommendations to the Hungarian 
Government is that these range from a broad structural level (such as the drafting of 
legal measures such as protection orders, improvement of investigation in domestic 
violence cases) to more individualised level (for example, training for judges and 
lawyers) to the very specific individual case of the author.  
                                                 
165  Emphasis added.  
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2.6.2 Şahide Goekce (deceased) v Austria;166 Fatma Yildirim (deceased) v 
Austria167 
 
The Committee subsequently dealt with two cases emanating from Austria where the 
facts resembled each other fairly closely. Both communications were brought on 
behalf of the deceased women by the Vienna Intervention Centre against Domestic 
Violence and the Association for Women’s Access to Justice, two organisations in 
Vienna, Austria, that protect and support women victims of gender-based violence. 
They claimed that the deceased women, both Austrian nationals of Turkish origin 
and former clients of the Vienna Intervention Centre against Domestic Violence, 
were victims of a violation by the State Party of Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the 
Women’s Convention.168 Due to the similarities, the two communications will be 
discussed jointly here.  
 
(a) Background169 
 
The first matter arose from a history of domestic violence perpetrated against Şahide 
Goekce by her husband, Mustafa Goekce.170 The police were on repeated occasions 
summoned to the couple’s home, where Şahide Goekce would report assault and 
                                                 
166  CEDAW Communication No. 5/2005: Şahide Goekce (deceased) v Austria (Views adopted 
on 6 August 2007, 39th Session) UN Doc CEDAW/ C/39/D/5/2005 (dated 6 August 2007).  
167  CEDAW Communication No 6/2005: Fatma Yildirim (deceased) v Austria (Views adopted 
on 6 August 2007, 39th Session) UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (dated 1 October 2007).  
168  The Convention and its Optional Protocol entered into force for Austria on 30 April 1982 
and 22 December 2000, respectively. 
169  The factual background is set out in more detail in Annexure B. 
170  The facts are set out in CEDAW op cit note 166 paras 2.1 – 2.12. 
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threats to harm her by Mustafa Goekce. The police issued issued ‘expulsion and 
prohibition to return’ orders against Mr. Goekce but found it difficult to obtain the  
 
cooperation required from Ms. Goekce to institute criminal prosecutions for serious 
charges. Requests directed at the Public Prosecutor for Mr. Goekce to be detained 
were denied. An interim injunction was subsequently issued against Mr. Goekce, 
prohibiting him from returning to the couple’s apartment. However, there were 
indications that he was still living there. Despite the fact that his threats against Ms. 
Goekce, and the fact that he owned a handgun, were reported to the police, no action 
was taken. The matter culminated in Mr. Goekce shooting his wife with a handgun 
in their apartment in front of their two daughters.  
 
Fatma Yildirim married Irfan Yildirim on 24 July 2001.171 His threats to kill her 
reportedly started two years later. She wanted to divorce him, but he would not agree 
and threatened to kill her and her children should she go ahead. She moved out of 
their apartment, and when she was subsequently assaulted by Mr. Yildirim, she laid 
criminal charges and obtained an ‘expulsion and prohibition to return’ order against 
him. The police applied to the Public Prosecutor for Mr. Yildirim to be detained; this 
was denied. Ms. Yildirim also later applied for, and obtained, an interim injunction 
against him. When he continued threatening and harassing her, she enlisted the aid 
of the police, who again requested detention. This requested was once more denied. 
Ms. Yildirim filed for divorce, and as part of the proceedings, obtained an interim 
injunction against her husband. Eleven days later, Mr. Yildirim followed her home 
from work and fatally stabbed her on in the street near the family’s apartment.  
 
                                                 
171  The factual background is set out in CEDAW op cit note 167 paras 2.1-2.14. 
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(b) The authors’ complaints 
 
The authors’ complaint in respect of Şahide Goekce was accordingly that she was a 
victim of a violation by the State Party of Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the Women’s 
Convention172 because the State Party did not actively take all appropriate measures 
to protect her right to personal security and life.173 This failure consisted of the 
following: 
(i)  The State Party failed to treat Mustafa Goekce as an extremely violent and 
dangerous offender in accordance with criminal law.  
(ii)  The authors claimed that the Federal Act for the Protection against 
Violence within the Family does not provide the means to protect women 
from highly violent persons, especially in cases of repeated, severe 
violence and death threats. Instead, the authors insist that detention is 
necessary.  
(iii)  The authors also alleged that had the communication between the police 
and Public Prosecutor been better and faster, the Public Prosecutor would 
have known about the ongoing violence and death threats and may have 
found that he had sufficient reason to prosecute Mustafa Goekce. 
 
                                                 
172  The authors further contended that the State Party had also failed to fulfil its obligations 
stipulated in General Recommendations Nos. 12, 19 and 21 of the CEDAW, the UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, the concluding comments of 
the CEDAW (dated June 2000) on the combined third and fourth periodic report and the 
fifth periodic report of Austria, the UN Resolution on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Measures to Eliminate Violence against Women, several provisions of the Outcome 
Document of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly, Art 3 of the UDHR, 
Articles 6 and 9 of the ICCPR, several provisions of other international instruments, and the 
Austrian Constitution (CEDAW op cit note 166 para 3.2). 
173  CEDAW op cit note 166 para 3.1. 
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With regard to Article 1 of the Convention, the authors contended that women are 
far more affected than men by the failure of public prosecutors to take domestic 
violence seriously as a real threat to life and their failure to request detention of 
alleged offenders as a matter of principle in such cases.174 Women are also 
disproportionately affected by the practice of not prosecuting and punishing 
offenders in domestic violence cases appropriately. Furthermore, women are 
disproportionately affected by the lack of coordination of law enforcement and 
judicial personnel, the failure to educate law enforcement and judicial personnel 
about domestic violence and the failure to collect data and maintain statistics on 
domestic violence. 
 
The authors maintained with regard to Article 1 together with Articles 2(a), (c), (d) 
and (f) and Article 3 of the Convention that the lack of detention of alleged 
offenders in domestic violence cases, inadequate prosecution and lack of 
coordination among law enforcement and judicial officials and the failure to collect 
data and maintain statistics of incidences of domestic violence resulted in inequality 
in practice and the denial of Şahide Goekce’s enjoyment of her human rights. She 
was exposed to violent assault, battery, coercion and death threats and when Mustafa 
Goekce was not detained, she was murdered.175  
 
Regarding Article 1 together with Article 2(e) of the Convention, the authors stated 
that the Austrian criminal justice personnel failed to act with due diligence to 
                                                 
174  CEDAW op cit note 166 para 3.3. 
175  Idem para 3.4. 
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investigate and prosecute acts of violence and protect Şahide Goekce’s human rights 
to life and personal security.176 
 
The authors claimed concerning Article 1 together with Article 5 of the Convention 
that the murder of Şahide Goekce was a tragic example of the prevailing lack of 
seriousness with which violence against women is taken by the public and by the 
Austrian authorities.177 The criminal justice system, particularly public prosecutors 
and judges, consider the issue a social or domestic problem, a minor or petty offence 
that happens in certain social classes. They do not apply criminal law to such 
violence because they do not take the danger seriously and view women’s fears and 
concerns with a lack of gravity. 
 
The authors alleged that Fatma Yildirim was a victim of a violation by the State 
Party Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the Women’s Convention178 because of the failure of 
the State Party to take all appropriate positive measures to protect her right to life 
and personal security.179 In particular, the authors alleged that communication 
between the police and Public Prosecutor did not adequately allow the Public 
Prosecutor to assess the danger posed by Irfan Yildirim and that on two occasions 
the Public Prosecutor should have requested the investigating judge to order the 
detention of Irfan Yildirim under the Code of Criminal Procedure.  
 
 
                                                 
176  Idem para 3.5. 
177  Idem para 3.6. 
178  Similar to Communication No 5/2005, the authors also contended that the State Party had 
failed to fulfil its obligations stipulated in a number of other documents – CEDAW op cit 
note 167 para 3.2 (see above).  
179  Idem para 3.1.  
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In both communications, much of the dispute between the authors and the State 
Party turned on the question of the admissibility of the communication, and 
particularly the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies.180 In this regard, the 
authors maintained that there were no other domestic remedies that could have been 
used to protect the women’s personal safety and to prevent them being killed.  
 
In respect of Communication 5/2005, the State Party outlined its version of the 
events leading up to Şahide Goekce’s death, placing a heavy emphasis on her 
reluctance to cooperate with the authorities in each instance after she had initially 
enlisted their assistance. It also stated that she had not availed herself of all the legal 
options that existed.181 Against this background, a decision to detain Mustafa 
Goekce at the time was not justified.  
 
(c) CEDAW’s decision on admissibility182   
 
Dealing with the State Party’s argument relating to Article 140, paragraph 1, of the 
Federal Constitution (i.e. that the failure of the deceased to make use of the 
procedure available under this provision barred the admissibility of the  
                                                 
180    See CEDAW op cit note 166 paras 3.10-3.11; CEDAW op cit note 167 paras 3.10-3.11. 
181  The State Party relied very strongly on the proposition that Şahide Goekce had the option of 
addressing the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) with a complaint in 
accordance with Article 140 § 1 of the Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassungsgesetz) that 
would challenge the provision that did not allow her to appeal against the decisions of the 
Public Prosecutor not to issue a warrant for the arrest of Mustafa Goekce. Assuming that 
they could show a current and direct interest in the preventive effect of the repeal of the 
pertinent provision for the benefit of victims of domestic violence, such as Şahide Goekce, 
it could still be possible for her surviving heirs to address the Constitutional Court on this 
question – see CEDAW op cit note 166 paras 4.15, 6.2-6.6. The State Party raised the same 
argument in respect of Fatma Yildirim - CEDAW op cit note 167 paras 4.3, 4.6, 6.3-6.10.   
182  CEDAW op cit note 166 paras 7.1-7.6; CEDAW op cit note 167 paras 7.1-7.7. 
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communication), the Committee expressed the view that this procedure could not be 
regarded as a remedy that was likely to bring effective relief to a woman whose life 
was under threat. Neither did the Committee regard this domestic remedy as being 
likely to bring effective relief in the case of the deceased’s descendants in light of 
the abstract nature of such a constitutional remedy. The communication was 
declared admissible. (The same applied to Communication 6/2005.) 
 
The State Party subsequently brought a request for a review of admissibility,183  
which also contained detailed information about its measures to address domestic 
violence and its responses to the authors’ claims.184 However, the Committee was 
not persuaded that the State Party had introduced new arguments that would alter the 
Committee’s view.185  
 
(d) Consideration of the merits186 
 
In addressing the merits of the communications, the CEDAW firstly recalled its 
General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women, which deals with the 
question of whether States Parties can be held accountable for the conduct of non-
State actors in stating that ‘… discrimination under the Convention is not restricted 
to action by or on behalf of Governments …’ and that ‘[u]nder general international 
                                                 
183  The Austrian Government reiterated that the descendants of Şahide Goekce should avail 
themselves of the procedure under Art 140 § 1 of the Federal Constitution – CEDAW op cit 
note 166 para 8.1. It also argued that she would have been free to bring an action known as 
‘associated prosecution’ after the Public Prosecutor dropped the charged against Mustafa. 
(An ‘associated prosecution’ is a form of private prosecution –  idem para 8.2.).  
184  CEDAW op cit note 166 paras 8.1 – 8.21; CEDAW op cit note 167 paras 8.1 – 8.17. 
185  CEDAW op cit note 166 paras 11.1-11.5; CEDAW op cit note 167 paras 11.1-11.4. 
186  The Committee’s consideration of the merits is set out in CEDAW op cit note 166 paras 
12.1.1-12.4; CEDAW op cit note 167 paras 12.1.1-12.4.  
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law and specific human rights covenants, States may also be responsible for private 
acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to 
investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation’.  
 
The Committee noted with approval that the State Party had established a 
comprehensive model to address domestic violence that included legislation, 
criminal and civil law remedies, awareness-raising, education and training, shelters, 
counseling for victims of violence and work with perpetrators. However, in order for 
individual woman victims of domestic violence to enjoy the practical realisation of 
the principle of equality of men and women and of her human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, the Austrian Government must be supported by State actors 
who adhere to the State Party’s due diligence obligations.  
 
The Committee recounted the history of escalating violence committed against 
Şahide Goekce by her husband over a three-year period, with the frequency of calls 
to the police increasing; the police issuing orders against him on three separate 
occasions and twice requesting the Public Prosecutor to detain him; and a three-
month interim injunction that was in place against Mustafa Goekce at the time of 
Ms. Goekce’s death. She was shot to death with a handgun that he had purchased 
three weeks earlier, despite a weapons prohibition against him as well as an 
uncontested contention that the police had received information about the weapon 
from the brother of Mustafa Goekce. In addition, Şahide Goekce had called the 
emergency call service a few hours before she was killed, yet no patrol car was sent 
to the scene of the crime. 
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Given this combination of factors, the Committee considered that the police knew or 
should have known that Şahide Goekce was in serious danger and they should have 
treated the last call from her as an emergency (in particular because Mustafa had 
shown that he had the potential to be a very dangerous and violent criminal). In light 
of the long record of earlier disturbances and battering, by not responding to the call 
immediately, the police were accountable for failing to exercise due diligence to 
protect Şahide Goekce. 
 
The Committee makes the important statement that although the State Party 
correctly maintains that it is necessary in each case to determine whether detention 
would amount to a disproportionate interference in the basic rights and fundamental 
freedoms of a perpetrator of domestic violence (such as the right to freedom of 
movement and to a fair trial), the Committee is of the opinion, as expressed in its 
views on A.T. v Hungary,187 that the perpetrator’s rights cannot supersede women’s 
human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity. In the present case, the 
Committee considered that the behaviour (threats, intimidation and battering) of 
Mustafa Goekce crossed a ‘high threshold of violence’ of which the Public 
Prosecutor was aware. As such, the Public Prosecutor should not have denied the 
requests of the police to arrest Mustafa Goekce and detain him in connection with 
the incidents of August 2000 and October 2002.  
 
The Committee thus concluded that the State Party violated its obligations under 
Article 2(a) and (c) through (f), and Article 3 of the Convention read in conjunction 
with Article 1 of the Convention and General Recommendation No. 19 of the 
                                                 
187  A.T. v Hungary (see discussion above).  
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Committee and the corresponding rights of the deceased Şahide Goekce to life and 
physical and mental integrity.188 
 
In the case of Fatma Yildirim, the Committee took note of the (undisputed) sequence 
of events leading up to the fatal stabbing of Fatma Ildirim, in particular that Irfan 
Ildirim made continuous efforts to contact her and threatened by phone and in 
person to kill her. It also observed that Ms. Yildirim made positive and determined 
efforts to attempt to sever ties with her spouse and save her own life — by moving 
out of the apartment with her minor daughter, establishing ongoing contact with the 
police, seeking an injunction and giving her authorisation for the prosecution of 
Irfan Yildirim.  
 
The Committee considered that the facts disclosed a situation that was ‘extremely 
dangerous’ to Fatma Yildirim, of which the Austrian authorities knew or should 
have known, and as such, the Public Prosecutor should not have denied the requests 
of the police to arrest Irfan Yildirim and place him in detention. The Committee 
pointed out in this regard that Irfan Yildirim had a lot to lose should his marriage 
end in divorce (for example, his residence permit in Austria was dependent on his 
staying married) and that this fact had the potential to influence how dangerous he 
would become. This failure to detain Irfan Yildirin was in breach of the State Party’s 
due diligence obligation to protect Fatma Yildirim. The Committee reiterated its 
                                                 
188  CEDAW op cit note 166 para 12.1.6. The Committee noted that the authors also made 
claims that Articles 1 and 5 of the Convention were violated by the State Party. The 
Committee stated in its General Recommendation No. 19 that the definition of 
discrimination in Art 1 of the Convention includes gender-based violence. It has also 
recognised that there are linkages between traditional attitudes by which women are 
regarded as subordinate to men and domestic violence. At the same time, the Committee 
was of the view that the submissions of the authors of the communication and the State 
Party did not warrant further findings. 
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view (as set out in A.T. v Hungary) that although the State Party maintains that at 
that time an arrest warrant seemed disproportionately invasive, the perpetrator’s 
rights cannot supersede women’s human rights to life and to physical and mental 
integrity.189 
 
The Committee accordingly concluded that although Irfan Yildirim was prosecuted 
to the full extent of the law for killing Fatma, the State Party violated its obligations 
under Article 2 (a) and (c) through (f), and Article 3 of the Convention read in 
conjunction with Article 1 of the Convention and General Recommendation No. 19 
adopted by the Committee and the corresponding rights of the deceased Fatma 
Yildirim to life and to physical and mental integrity. 
 
The following recommendations were made to the State Party:190 
 
(i)  Strengthen implementation and monitoring of the Federal Act for the 
Protection against Violence within the Family and related criminal law, 
by acting with due diligence to prevent and respond to such violence 
against women and adequately providing for sanctions for the failure to 
do so;  
 
(ii)  Vigilantly and in a speedy manner prosecute perpetrators of domestic 
violence in order to convey to offenders and the public that society 
condemns domestic violence as well as ensure that criminal and civil 
remedies are utilised in cases where the perpetrator in a domestic violence 
                                                 
189  Idem para 12.1.5. See para 12.2 for the Committee’s observation regarding the authors’ 
claim of a violation of Articles 1 and 5 of the Convention.   
190  Acting in terms of Art 7 § 3 of the Optional Protocol - CEDAW op cit note 166 para 12.3. 
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situation poses a dangerous threat to the victim; and also ensure that in all 
action taken to protect women from violence, due consideration is given 
to the safety of women, emphasising that the perpetrator’s rights cannot 
supersede women’s human rights to life and to physical and mental 
integrity; 
 
(iii)  Ensure enhanced coordination among law enforcement and judicial 
officers and also ensure that all levels of the criminal justice system 
(police, public prosecutors, judges) routinely cooperate with non-
governmental organisations that work to protect and support women 
victims of gender-based violence; and 
 
(iv)  Strengthen training programmes and education on domestic violence for 
judges, lawyers and law enforcement officials, including on the Women’s 
Convention, General Recommendation No. 19, and the Optional Protocol. 
 
(e) Comments on the Committee’s Views 
 
Given the similarities between the Goekce and Yildirim cases, they will be discussed 
together there. These two communications differ from the first one examined by the 
Committee in the important respect that whereas the Hungarian Government 
conceded that its efforts to respond to violence against women did not yet meet 
international standards, the Austrian Government on the other hand has a fairly 
sophisticated legal system in place to respond to domestic violence, including 
protection orders, interim injunctions and various other measures. The focus of the 
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CEDAW’s inquiry was therefore directed at establishing whether these legal 
measures were supported by individual state actors acting with due diligence.  
 
In these two matters, one therefore gets a clearer sense of the Committee’s 
interpretation of the standard of ‘due diligence’ under these circumstances as well as 
its understanding of the proportionality principle that must be applied, for example, 
when considering whether or not to arrest and detain an alleged perpetrator of 
domestic violence as a preventive measure. This is where the statement regarding 
the supremacy of women’s rights to life and physical and mental integrity in A.T v 
Hungary (above) again becomes important, bearing in mind that the liberty of the 
perpetrator and his property rights are often accorded a higher priority than the rights 
of the victim, as demonstrated in the two communications brought against Austria.  
 
These two communications provide an interesting contrast in that the deceased 
victims present, to a certain extent, the two stereotypical extremes: on the one end, 
the ‘good’ victim Fatma Yildirim, who did everything ‘right’; on the other hand, the 
non-compliant victim Şahide Goekce who (at least on the State’s version) did not 
cooperate with the authorities, withdrew charges, allowed the perpetrator to move 
back into the home in spite of an interim injunction.191 Ironically, both victims were 
ultimately unable to escape from the perpetrators.  
 
The views expressed by the CEDAW to some extent represent a missed opportunity, 
in the sense that they did not address all the aspects raised in the authors’ claims. For 
example, it would have been helpful to have a response to the allegation that the 
                                                 
191   See eg LM Artz An Examination of the Attrition of Domestic Violence Cases within the 
Criminal Justice System in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2008) 294-195.  
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Austrian authorities were in violation of Article 1 of the Convention due to their 
prosecution policies, which had a disparate impact on women experiencing domestic 
violence. It would further have been instructive to have an express comment from 
the Committee regarding the way in which the Austrian Government attempted to 
place blame on Şahide Goekce for her perceived ‘failure’ to co-operate with the 
authorities, thus associating itself with stereotypical notions of how victims should 
ideally behave.192   
 
Again, as in the case of A.T. v Hungary, the recommendations to the Austrian 
government are noteworthy. Given the relief requested by the authors,193 the 
recommendations are mainly structural, i.e. for the State Party to ‘vigilantly and in a 
speedy manner prosecute’ perpetrators of domestic violence and to conduct training 
and education for judges and lawyers.  
 
 
2.6.3 Ms NSF v the United Kingdom194 
 
The CEDAW found this communication to be inadmissible. Nonetheless, it has been 
included here for discussion due to the fact that it raises the construction of ‘violence 
against women’ as a form of discrimination (rather than as a ‘free-standing’ 
violation) in a tangible way.195  
                                                 
192  These assumptions are rarely based on victims’ real experiences, and accordingly risk 
perpetuating discrimination.   
193  The authors did not request individual relief, such as compensation for the heirs of the 
deceased – see CEDAW op cit note 167 paras 3.7 – 3.9. 
194  CEDAW Communication 10/2005 UN Doc CEDAW/C/38/D/10/2005 (dated 12 June 
2007). 
195  See also discussion in Chapter 4, Section 7.  
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(a) Background196 
 
The author of this communication (dated 21 September 2005) was Ms. NSF, a 
Pakistani asylum seeker, at the time living in the United Kingdom with her two 
children.197 She claimed to fear for her life at the hands of her former husband in 
Pakistan and for her two sons’ future and education if the authorities of the United 
Kingdom deported her due to the domestic violence she had experienced at the 
hands of her former husband. (This violence had been the cause of her fleeing 
Pakistan with her children for the United Kingdom.) In her communication to the 
CEDAW, she did not invoke specific provisions of the Women’s Convention nor 
demonstrated how the Convention may have been violated, but her claims appeared 
to raise issues under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. The author represented 
herself.198  
 
Ms. NSF arrived in the United Kingdom on 14 January 2003 with her two children 
and applied for asylum on the same day. On 27 February 2003, the Immigration and 
Nationality Directorate of the Home Office rejected her asylum application. The 
author then went through an extended series of legal proceedings in her attempt to 
obtain asylum in the UK.199 In February 2005, the Immigration and Nationality 
Directorate informed the author that she had no further right of appeal; it reminded 
her that she had no basis to stay in the United Kingdom and should make 
                                                 
196  The factual background to the communication is set out in more detail in Annexure B. 
197  CEDAW op cit note 194 Introductory para. 
198  Ibid.  
199  These proceedings are detailed in Annexure B.  
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arrangements to leave the United Kingdom without delay. She was apprised of 
where to call for help and advice on returning home.  
  
The author’s efforts to avoid deportation included an application to the European 
Court of Human Rights alleging a violation by the United Kingdom of her rights 
under Article 3 (prohibition of torture) and Article 8 (right to respect for private and 
family life). In November 2005, this Court declared the communication inadmissible 
on the basis that it ‘did not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and 
freedoms set out in the [European] Convention or its Protocols’.  
 
In May 2006, the Home Office refused the author’s request for discretionary leave 
on humanitarian grounds. The decision indicated that the author had no basis to stay 
in the United Kingdom and should make arrangement to leave the country without 
delay. If she failed to do so, the Home Department would take steps to ensure her 
removal to Pakistan. No deadline was given.  
 
Ms. NSF claimed that she came to the United Kingdom to save her life and her 
children’s future and education.200 She alleged that as a single woman with two 
children, she would not be safe outside of the United Kingdom. She asserted that if 
she is deported back to Pakistan, she would no longer be protected and would be 
killed by her ex-husband and her children’s future and education would be put at 
risk. She therefore asked that she and her two children be allowed to live in the 
United Kingdom and be granted temporary protection.  
 
 
                                                 
200  CEDAW op cit note 194 paras 3.1.-3.2. 
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(b) Submission regarding admissibility 
 
The United Kingdom challenged the admissibility of the communication, arguing 
that the author had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, that the same matter had 
been examined by the European Court of Human Rights, and that the 
communication was not sufficiently substantiated and/or was manifestly ill-
founded.201  
 
Regarding exhaustion of domestic remedies, the State Party alleged that there were 
effective remedies against the decision of 8 May 2006 by the Home Office refusing 
the author’s request for discretionary leave on humanitarian grounds.202 However, it 
was still open to the author to seek permission to apply for judicial review by the 
High Court.203 Importantly, the State Party noted that the author had never 
formulated any allegation based on discrimination as a woman before the domestic 
authorities and/or courts and that, as a consequence, the domestic authorities and/or 
courts had not yet had an opportunity to deal with the author’s assertion that the 
decisions involved sex discrimination. The State Party further noted that such an 
allegation would be relevant for bearing in mind by the Home Office when 
considering the author’s case and, in due course, could therefore form part of the 
arguments in support of an application for permission to apply to the High Court for 
judicial review.  
                                                 
201  Idem para 4.1. Only the first of these three challenges will be addressed here.  
202  Idem para 4.2. 
203  The State Party admittedly considered the granting of such permission very unlikely, in the 
light of the history of the case and the fact that such a request would be based upon the 
same factual and legal arguments developed previously before the national authorities (and 
the European Court of Human Rights). 
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(c) CEDAW’s decision on admissibility204  
 
The CEDAW observed that this communication raised the issue of the situation in 
which women who have fled their country because of fear of domestic violence 
often find themselves.205 Recalling General Recommendation No. 19 on violence 
against women, it stated that the definition of discrimination against women in 
Article 1 of the Convention includes gender-based violence, i.e. violence that is 
directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women 
disproportionately. It considered the State Party’s challenge to the admissibility of 
the author’s claim under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol because the 
author did not avail herself of the possibility of seeking permission to apply for a 
judicial review by the High Court of the refusal to grant her discretionary leave to 
remain in the country on humanitarian grounds.  
 
In this regard, the Committee took account of the State Party’s view that the granting 
of permission to the author to apply for a judicial review was uncertain.206 It further 
noted the State Party’s contention that the author had never formulated an allegation 
of sex discrimination and, as a consequence, the domestic authorities and/or courts 
had not yet had an opportunity to deal with such an assertion, which, in the opinion 
of the Committee, needed to be considered in the light of the State Party’s 
obligations under the Convention. As a consequence, and in the light of the State 
Party’s view that an allegation of sex discrimination would be relevant for 
consideration by the Home Office when again considering the author’s case and, in 
                                                 
204  See CEDAW op cit note 194 paras 7.1-7.5. 
205  Idem para 7.3. 
206  Idem para 7.3. 
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due course, could form part of the arguments in support of an application for 
permission to apply to the High Court for a judicial review, the Committee found 
that the author should avail herself of this remedy. For this reason, the Committee 
found the communication inadmissible under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Optional 
Protocol, i.e. on the basis that all available domestic remedies had not yet been 
exhausted.  
 
(d) Comments on the Committee’s decision 
 
In this instance, the Committee’s decision is unfortunately not very clear. It is 
apparent that the basis of the inadmissibility finding is the fact that the author had 
not exhausted all the available domestic remedies, and this in turn rested on the fact 
that she had not yet framed an argument of sex discrimination for consideration by 
the Home Office. The Committee places this finding against the background of 
General Recommendation No 19, and the fact that gender-based violence is included 
in the definition of discrimination against women in Article 1 of the Convention.  
 
This juxtaposition suggests that the Committee’s interpretation of ‘sex 
discrimination’ against the author in this instance consists of the fact that she had 
been the subject of such discrimination (in the form of gender-based violence) in her 
home country Pakistan, and that this could constitute the basis of her renewed 
asylum claim.207 The fact that she chose to frame her communication in terms of 
gender-based discrimination and approach the CEDAW (instead of, for example, the 
                                                 
207  An alternative interpretation is that the author could argue that she was discriminated 
against as a woman by the UK authorities in their refusal of her asylum request. This does 
not however fit in as readily with the Committee’s referral to General Recommendation No. 
19.  
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Human Rights Council or Committee against Torture, on the basis that her rights in 
terms of the ICCPR or CAT had been violated) meant in this instance that the 
gender-based violence she had experienced would, of necessity, be viewed through 
the lens of sex-based discrimination. As it happened, this translated into another 
‘opportunity’ for the author at exploring domestic remedies due to inadmissibility of 
the communication.  
 
2.6.4 The murdered women of Ciudad Juárez 
 
At its 31st Session in July 2004, the CEDAW concluded its first inquiry in terms of 
Article 8 of the Optional Protocol. This inquiry related to the abduction, rape and 
murder of women in the city of Ciudad Juárez in the state of Chihuahua, Mexico. 
The report relating to this inquiry, which also included the observations received 
from the Government of Mexico, was published in January 2005.208  
 
(a) Origin of the inquiry 
 
From 1993 onwards, approximately four hundred209 young women were brutally 
murdered in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico;210 many more disappeared and remained 
                                                 
208  CEDAW op cit note 5. 
209  The number of murdered women was the subject of much controversy, with estimates 
ranging from 230 to 470.  
210  Simmons notes that overall, the murder rates for men in Ciudad Juárez still far exceeded 
those for women. However, from 1993 the murder rates for women increased much faster 
than the murder rates for men in Juárez, and were much higher than in comparable cities – 
WP Simmons ‘Liability of secondary actors under the Alien Tort Statute: Aiding and 
abetting and acquiescence to torture in the context of the femicides of Ciudad Juárez’ 
(2007) 10 Yale Human Rights & Dev LJ 88 at 92. See also DM Weissman ‘The political 
economy of violence: Toward an understanding of the gender-based murders of Ciudad 
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missing.211  About a quarter of the discovered bodies displayed signs of serial sexual 
torture prior to death. For a period of about 10 years from 1993-2003, the Mexican 
authorities failed to conduct adequate investigations or bring an end to the 
murders.212 Gradually, local and international interest in the matter intensified, as did 
the pressure on the Mexican Government to frame an appropriate response.  
 
In a letter dated 2 October 2002, the non-governmental organisations Equality Now 
and Casa Amiga213 requested the CEDAW to conduct an inquiry under Article 8 of 
the Optional Protocol into the abduction, rape and murder of women in and around 
Ciudad Juárez, in order to reinforce the support it had already given to the case 
following its examination of Mexico’s fifth periodic report, submitted in August 
2002.214  
 
In its concluding observations, the Committee had expressed particular concern at 
the apparent lack of results of the investigations into the causes of the numerous 
murders of women and the failure to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of 
such crimes.215 It had called on the State Party to accelerate compliance with  
                                                                                                                                         
Juárez’ (2005) 30 North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation 
795 at 802.  
211  Simmons loc cit; JH Robinson ‘Another woman’s body found outside Juárez – Applying 
Velásquez Rodríguez for women’s human rights’ (2005) 20 Wisconsin Women’s Law 
Journal 167 at 167-168. 
212  Based on available information, it appears that the murders are still continuing to date (see 
Section 2.6.4 (g) below). However, this account focuses on the period up to 2003, since this 
is when the CEDAW inquiry was held.  
213  Located in New York, USA, and Ciudad Juárez, respectively. 
214  Mexico ratified the Optional Protocol on 15 March 2002.  
215  General Assembly Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women  Exceptional Session (5-23 August 2002) UN Doc A/57/38 para 439. The 
CEDAW’s concluding observations are set out in paras 420-502. 
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Recommendation No. 44/98 of the Mexican National Human Rights Commission in 
relation to the investigation and punishment of the Ciudad Juárez murders.216  
 
In July 2003, after having examined the information submitted in reply by the 
Mexican Government, the Committee decided to conduct a confidential inquiry 
under Article 8(2) of the Optional Protocol.217 It nominated two of its members, Ms. 
María Yolanda Ferrer Gómez and Ms. Maria Regina Tavares da Silva, to conduct 
the inquiry and report back to the Committee. Lastly, the Committee requested the 
Government of Mexico to consent to a visit by the two members; the Government 
agreed and the two experts, accompanied by two UN officials, carried out the visit 
during October 2003.  
 
(b) Background 
 
Ciudad Juárez is situated in the northern part of the State of Chihuahua, on the 
border with the USA.218 With a population of 1.5 million persons (including the 
transient population) at the time of the CEDAW inquiry, it is the largest centre in the 
State of Chihuahua, accounting for 40 per cent of the state’s overall population. It 
includes an industrial sector that had seen explosive growth, especially over the 
previous decade (the 1980s), due to the expansion of the maquiladora219 industry, 
                                                 
216  Idem para 440.  
217  CEDAW op cit note 5 para 8. 
218  Idem para 22.  
219  Also referred to as ‘maquilas’, these factories, typically owned by European, American and 
Japanese multinational corporations, manufacture items such as cell phones, televisions, 
computers, electrical appliances and toys – ER Arriola ‘Accountability for murder in the 
maquiladoras: Linking corporate indifference to gender violence at US-Mexico border’ 
(2007) 5 Seattle Journal for Social Justice 603 at 604, 605; see also Weissman op cit note 
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which had brought an increase in the flow of migrants from other parts of Mexico, 
compounded by the presence of foreign migrants. Regarded as an ‘open door’ to 
employment prospects and better opportunities, Cuidad Juárez was also an ‘open 
door’ to illegal immigration and drug trafficking.220  
 
This accelerated population growth had not been accompanied by the creation of 
public services needed to respond to the basic needs of this population, such as 
health and education, housing, and sanitation and lighting infrastructure.221 This had 
contributed to the creation of serious situations of destitution and poverty, 
accompanied by tensions within individual families and within society as a whole. 
During a visit to the city’s western district, the CEDAW delegation witnessed the 
extreme poverty of the local families; most of those households were headed by 
women and lived in extreme destitution.  
 
Arriola paints a vivid picture of Ciudad Juarez at this time. She describes thousands 
of maquiladora workers eking out ‘sad lives in shantytowns without water, 
electricity or public lighting’.222 New arrivals to the northern Mexican border area 
would find cities unable to meet their housing needs; dozens of families would 
accordingly stake out plots of land near public utilities where they pirate essential 
public services and lived in shacks made of sticks, cardboard, rags or discarded 
                                                                                                                                         
210 at 801 fn 27.  The companies were reportedly attracted to the area by low wage 
standards and lax labour and environmental regulations – Simmons op cit note 210 at 92. 
220  See also Simmons loc cit; Weissman op cit note 210 at 824; Robinson op cit note 211 at 
169. 
221  CEDAW op cit note 5 para 23.  
222  Arriola op cit note 219 at 604. 
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construction platforms.223 Some people, she reports, even made their homes next to 
trash dumps.224  
 
The CEDAW delegation was furthermore informed by various sources that in 
Ciudad Juárez there was a marked social class stratification, with the existence of a 
minority of wealthy, powerful families, who owned the land on which the marginal 
maquiladoras and urban districts were located, making structural change difficult.225 
The overall situation had led to a range of criminal behaviours, including organised 
crime, drug trafficking, trafficking in women, undocumented migration, money-
laundering, procuring, and the exploitation of prostitution.226  
 
All authorities consulted by the delegation recognised that the city’s erratic growth, 
together with a combination of social, economic and criminal factors, had resulted in 
a complex situation characterised by the rupture of the social fabric.227 One of its 
most significant aspects was the increase in violence in various forms, affecting the 
whole population - men, women and children. This rupture was also reflected in the 
acceptance of violence against women, which was regarded as a ‘normal’ 
phenomenon within the context of systematic and generalised gender-based 
discrimination. Weissman points out that during the period of sharp increase in the 
                                                 
223  See also Weissman op cit note 210 at 819-820, who observes that housing squalor has been 
accompanied by pervasive environmental degradation.  
224  If one looks at the reasons for the social disintegration and concomitant increase in violent 
and organised crime experienced in Ciudad Juárez at this time, it is not coincidental that the 
settlement of informal housing described by Arriola and the specific patterns of gender-
based violence recounted by the CEDAW delegation and others are so startlingly 
reminiscent of the current South African situation, especially in large urban centres such as 
Cape Town and Johannesburg.  
225  CEDAW op cit note 5 para 23.  
226  See also Weissman op cit note 210 at 824-825. 
227  CEDAW op cit note 5 para 24.  
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number of femicides in Ciudad Juarez (i.e. leading up to the end of the 1990s), the 
city also experienced the highest levels of reported domestic violence in Mexico.228 
    
In addition, the situation created by the establishment of the maquiladoras and the 
creation of jobs mainly for women, without the creation of enough alternatives for 
men, had changed the traditional dynamic of relations between the sexes, which was 
characterised by gender inequality.229 This gave rise to a situation of conflict 
towards the women - especially the youngest - employed in the maquiladoras. This 
social change in women’s roles was not accompanied by a change in traditionally 
patriarchal attitudes and mentalities, and thus the stereotyped view of men’s and 
women’s social roles was perpetuated.  
 
Within this context, a culture of impunity had taken root that facilitated and 
encouraged ‘terrible violations of human rights’.230 Violence against women also 
took root, and developed specific characteristics marked by hatred and misogyny. 
There had been widespread kidnappings, disappearances, rapes, mutilations and 
murders, especially during 1993-2003.  
 
(c) The murders 
 
Although murders of women had occurred in Ciudad Juárez in previous years, it was 
in 1993 that the phenomenon intensified and started to become noticeable.231 For the 
                                                 
228  Weissman op cit note 210 at 797. 
229  CEDAW op cit note 5 para 25. 
230  Idem para 26. 
231  Idem para 27. 
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first ten years or so after the femicides began, the Mexican authorities did little to 
investigate or prevent them.232  
 
The majority of the victims were young (between fifteen and twenty-five), similar in 
appearance and mostly migrants from southern Mexico who had come north in 
search of employment.233  Many of the victims were maquiladora workers who were 
killed or who disappeared en route to or from work; others were students.  
 
The evidence of sexual torture found on certain of the bodies ranged from beatings 
to bite-marks, mutilation and dismemberment, which made some of the bodies 
difficult to identify.234 The nature of this violence added to the numerical evidence 
of the gendered aspect of the murders.235  
 
As noted above, the response of the Mexican authorities was inadequate in various 
respects. Typical complaints of victims’ families, NGO’s and international 
organisations included:236 little investigation, especially in ‘missing persons’ cases, 
evidence missing from case files, chronic delays in launching investigating into 
disappeared women, careless autopsies, delays in conducting DNA testing, and 
contamination and confusion of DNA evidence. Other complaints related to failures 
to follow up leads, to gather evidence from crime scenes, and to seal off crime 
scenes. Investigations were irrevocably and inexplicably botched by leaking 
information to the press, and in numerous cases of sexual assault there was no 
                                                 
232  Simmons provides a useful summary of the difficulties experienced by the families of the 
deceased women: op cit note 210 at 94-95. 
233  Weissman op cit note 210 at 801-802; Robinson op cit note 211 at 168-169. 
234  Ibid; Weissman op cit note 210 at 800 fn 12. 
235  Robinson op cit note 211 at 174. 
236  See Simmons op cit note 210 at 94-95.  
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forensic analysis. Family members of murdered women reported returning to crime 
scenes several months after the initial police investigation and finding clothing and 
other evidence that the police had not collected.237  
 
The investigations were also plagued by claims of cover-ups by government 
authorities and claims that the police planted or falsified evidence to implicate 
specific individuals.238 Several members of the investigative teams resigned, and 
they later discussed pressure to plant evidence and even alleged complicity between 
police and the murderers.239 Reluctance to transfer cases to investigators at the 
federal level, even after members of the Mexican Congress urged it, slowed 
investigations, especially into allegations of complicity of local authorities in the 
murders.  
 
The lack of attentiveness on the part of the Mexican authorities towards stopping the 
murders were blamed on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
income generated from the maquiladoras, and possible connections to elite rich 
families.240 Interestingly, Weissman points out that the murder rate of women began 
to soar shortly after the signing of the NAFTA in December 1992.241 
  
                                                 
237  Idem at 95. 
238  Ibid. 
239  Weissman op cit note 210 at 804. 
240  Robinson op cit note 211 at 168. On the NAFTA and Ciudad Juárez, see generally G Vega 
‘Maquiladora’s lost women: The killing fields of Mexico – Are NAFTA and NAALC 
providing the needed protection?’ (2000) 4 Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 137-158.    
241  Weissman op cit note 210 at 796-797, 809. 
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The Mexican authorities did make arrests in some of the cases, and several of the 
alleged perpetrators were prosecuted.242 Most of the local activists working to end 
the femicides however believed that few, if any, of these men were connected to the 
murders, in part because of allegations that those arrested confessed only after being 
subjected to systematic torture.243 A number of theories were developed to explain 
the murders. These included organ trafficking, production of ‘snuff films’ and ritual 
murders by satanic cults.244 The murders were also explained as the killing of 
women for sport by sons of wealthy elites, including the owners of maquiladoras. 
Experts proposed the possibility of serial killers (possibly from the USA) who 
crossed the border and thus avoided detection. Others suggested that police officers 
were involved in the killing of women to avoid prosecution after raping them.  
 
The Mexican authorities spent some effort creating ‘alternative discourses’ to 
attempt to explain away the murders. These included blaming the victims through 
claims that the murders could be ‘justified’ because the victims were prostitutes, 
because of their manner of dress, or because they frequented specific bars of areas of 
the cities.245 They also attempted to claim that a large number of the murders had 
been solved.  
 
 
 
                                                 
242  Simmons op cit note 210 at 98-99. 
243  Moreover, a number of those involved in the prosecutions met suspicious ends: two of the 
attorneys working on the cases were gunned down in nearly identical fashion three years 
apart. One of two bus drivers charged with certain of the murders, Gustavo Gonzalez Mesa, 
was found dead under suspicious circumstances in his prison cell while the conviction of 
the other, Victor Garcia Uribe, was eventually overturned - Simmons op cit note 210 at 99. 
244  Weissman op cit note 210 at 805-806. 
245  Simmons op cit note 210 at 96-97. 
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(d) Increasing national and international attention 
 
In 1998, the Office of the Special Prosecutor for the investigation of the murders of 
women in Ciudad Juárez was established.246 Moreover, the National Human Rights 
Commission investigated 36 of the murder cases and issued Recommendation 44/98, 
which found that the investigations conducted had included actions violating the 
human rights of the women victims and their relatives. It also stated that 
international regulations and instruments had been violated, ‘to the detriment of the 
aggrieved persons’.  
 
During 1999, the international community began to take notice of the events taking 
place in Ciudad Juárez.247 In this year, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions visited Mexico 
and alerted the authorities to the insecurity and impunity reigning in the city and to 
the sexist nature of the crimes committed. In addition, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women interviewed the Government concerning the murders of 
women that had occurred in Ciudad Juárez. In 2001 the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers visited Mexico and addressed, among 
other matters, the question of the murders of women and the climate of impunity 
surrounding them.  
 
                                                 
246  CEDAW op cit note 5 para 28. 
247  Idem para 30.  
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Public debate on the murders intensified after the 2002 release of a documentary 
film entitled ‘Señorita Extraviada’.248 During this year, in response to requests made 
by numerous individuals and NGO’s to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR) and its Special Rapporteur on Women’s Rights, the Federal 
Government of Mexico invited the latter to visit the country — a visit that took place 
in February 2002.249 The following year, the IACHR adopted and published its 
report.250  
 
As noted above, in 2002 the CEDAW also made a recommendation concerning the 
murders and disappearances in Ciudad Juárez, within the context of its consideration 
of the fifth periodic report of Mexico on the Women’s Convention.251  
 
(e) The CEDAW inquiry: Findings on Mexico’s responsibility in terms of the 
Women’s Convention 
 
Reviewing the international commitments of the Mexican State in the field of 
women’s rights, the CEDAW observed that the primary progress in the situation lay 
in the Government’s recognition that the problem existed.252 However, an effective 
response, appropriate to ‘the magnitude of the tragedy’ and to the obligations 
assumed by the Mexican Government with regard to the protection of women’s 
rights, had to be found. The promotion and protection of human rights was one of 
                                                 
248  Arriola op cit note 219 at 605.  
249  CEDAW op cit note 5 para 31. See also discussion in Chapter 5, Section 3.3.2. 
250  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights The Situation of the Rights of Women in 
Ciudad Juárez, Mexico: The Right to be Free from Violence and Discrimination 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117 doc44 (dated 7 March 2003).  
251  CEDAW op cit note 5 para 32.  
252  Idem para 48. 
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the obligations that had been actively assumed by the current administration.253 
Mexico had signed and ratified the principal international human rights 
instruments;254 it was also bound by relevant regional instruments.  
 
In the context of  these obligations and, in particular, of the Women’s Convention, 
the Committee found that there had been serious lapses on the part of the Mexican 
State, specifically concerning Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 15 of the Convention.255 It 
recounted the definition of ‘discrimination against women’ in Article 1 of the 
Convention and confirmed that gender-based violence, as defined the Committee’s 
Recommendation No. 19, is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s 
ability to enjoy rights and freedoms. It further made reference to the definition of 
‘violence against women’ in the 1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women.256  
 
Based on the Committee’s findings, the situation in Ciudad Juárez - gender-based 
violence and the resulting impunity - amounted to a clear violation of the provisions 
of the Convention.257 The Committee recalled the responsibilities undertaken by 
States Parties in terms of Article 2,258 and observed that it was clear that there had 
been lapses and violations in the State’s fulfilment of its obligations in those areas. 
While there was at the time of the inquiry a greater political will, especially on the 
part of Federal agencies, to deal with discrimination and violence against women, 
                                                 
253  Idem para 49.  
254  These included the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the ICCPR and its Optional 
Protocol; the ICESCR; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and, specifically in the 
area of women’s rights, the Women’s Convention. 
255  CEDAW op cit note 5 paras 50-52. 
256  See Chapter 4, Section 3. 
257  CEDAW op cit note 5 paras 53-54. 
258  See Section 2.3.1 (c) above.  
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the policies adopted and the measures taken since 1993 in the areas of prevention, 
investigation and punishment of crimes of violence against women had been 
ineffective and had fostered a climate of impunity and lack of confidence in the 
justice system that were incompatible with the duties of the State.259  
 
The Committee pointed out that under Article 5 of the Convention, States Parties are 
required to take appropriate measures ‘to modify the social and cultural patterns of 
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices 
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority 
or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women’. 
This obligation of the State had not been duly fulfilled; even the campaigns aimed at 
preventing violence in Ciudad Juárez focused not on promoting social responsibility, 
change in social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women and women’s 
dignity, but on making potential victims responsible for their own protection by 
maintaining traditional cultural stereotypes.260  
 
Similar observations could be made regarding Article 6, which establishes the 
obligation ‘to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution 
of women’ - a possible motive for the murders and disappearances that had been 
neither confirmed nor denied - and Article 15, which provides that ‘States Parties 
shall accord to women equality with men before the law’ in all aspects of life and, 
specifically, establishes the right to the free ‘movement of persons’.261 This was not 
the case in Ciudad Juárez and Chihuahua City, where a climate of fear and danger 
prevented many women, especially young women and women from the lower social 
                                                 
259  CEDAW op cit note 5 para 55. 
260  Idem paras 56-57. 
261  Idem para 58. 
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classes, from freely leading normal lives.262 Furthermore, although the right to 
equality before the law is guaranteed in Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution, it had 
not been, and was at the time not being, guaranteed to women in the relevant 
proceedings carried out in Ciudad Juárez and Chihuahua City. All of these factors 
showed that there were serious lapses, which urgently needed to be remedied, in the 
Mexican Government’s fulfilment of its responsibilities as a State Party to the 
Women’s Convention.  
 
(f) The Committee’s conclusions and recommendations 
 
The CEDAW found that the facts alleged in the communications of Equality Now 
and Casa Amiga, in association with the Mexican Committee for the Defence and 
Promotion of Human Rights, constituted ‘grave and systematic violations’ of the 
provisions of the Women’s Convention, as well as of General Recommendation No. 
19 and the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women.263 The 
Committee expressed great concern at the fact that these serious and systematic 
violations of women’s rights had continued for over 10 years and noted ‘with 
consternation’ that it had not been possible to eradicate them, to punish the guilty 
and to provide the families of the victims with the necessary assistance.264  
 
The Committee believed that there had been serious lapses in compliance with the 
commitments that Mexico had made through its ratification of the Women’s 
Convention as evidenced by the persistence and tolerance of violations of women’s  
 
                                                 
262  Idem para 58. 
263  Idem para 259. 
264  Idem para 260.  
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human rights.265 This was indicated by the continuation of very widespread and 
systematic violence against women and by the crimes of murder and disappearance 
of women as one of its most brutal manifestations. The Committee accordingly 
formulated a number of recommendations along three broad themes, i.e. general 
recommendations, those concerning the investigation of the crimes and punishment 
of the perpetrators and recommendations aimed at preventing violence, 
guaranteeing security and promoting and protecting the human rights of women.  
 
The Committee recommended that Mexico comply with all obligations assumed 
under the Women’s Convention.266 It reminded the State Party in particular that the 
obligation to eliminate discrimination against women refers not only to actions or 
omissions by the State at all levels, but also to the need to take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organisation or 
enterprise.  
 
The CEDAW’s general recommendations included amongst others the improvement 
of the cooperation and participation among the three branches of Government 
(federal, state and municipal) with respect both to their mutual relations and to their 
relations with civil society.267 It emphasised the responsibility of all authorities at all 
levels to prevent violence against women and to protect their human rights.  
 
 
 
                                                 
265  Idem para 263. 
266  Idem para 264.  
267  Idem paras 265-266. 
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The Committee further recommended that a gender perspective268 should be 
incorporated into all investigations, policies to prevent and combat violence, and 
programmes to restore the social fabric, bearing in mind the specific characteristics 
of gender-based violence against women, its causes and consequences, and the 
specific social responses that the situation required.269  
 
Regarding recommendations concerning the investigation of the crimes and 
punishment of the perpetrators, the Committee expressed its concern that, with 
respect to the murders and disappearances, there had been no serious and thorough 
investigation of each case and that complaints by relatives had even been ignored 
and evidence and proof destroyed.270 The Committee therefore recommended the 
thorough investigation and punishment of the negligence and complicity of public 
authorities in the disappearances and murders of women and the fabrication of 
confessions under torture; as well as the investigation and punishment of public 
officials for their complicity in or tolerance of persecution or harassment or threats 
directed against victims’ relatives or members of organisations representing them.271  
 
It made the following important statement: 
The Committee is gravely concerned at the lack of due diligence 
shown by the state and municipal authorities in cases involving 
disappearances of women, the inconsistencies in their data, and the 
distinction made between women who are considered at “high risk” 
and those who are not when deciding whether to launch an immediate 
search or determination of their whereabouts. Such a practice 
                                                 
268  That is, that consideration has not been given to the impact of such policies on women and 
men, bearing in mind their socially constructed roles and the power relations between them.  
269  CEDAW op cit note 5 paras 267-268. 
270  Idem para 273. 
271  Idem para 274. 
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discriminates against women whose conduct may not conform to the 
accepted “moral code”, but who have an equal right to life. The 
Committee is also concerned at the lack of sufficient resources and 
staff trained to act on complaints, and the fact that days sometimes 
pass before an investigation is opened.272  
 
 
It recommended the establishment of early warning and emergency search 
mechanisms for cases involving missing women and girls in Ciudad Juárez and 
Chihuahua state, bearing in mind the close connection between disappearances and 
murders and hence the extreme danger that every disappearance represented.273 The 
Committee also considered it essential to provide the competent authorities with the 
training and the human and material resources needed to act with due diligence.  
 
Regarding the third theme of preventing violence, guaranteeing security and 
promoting and protecting the human rights of women, the Committee noted that a 
number of measures had been taken to prevent the violence against women that 
prevailed in Ciudad Juárez.274 It emphasised that, because what was involved was a 
structural situation and a social and cultural phenomenon deeply rooted in the 
consciousness and customs of the population, it required a global and integrated 
response, a strategy aimed at transforming existing socio-cultural patterns, especially 
with regard to eradicating the notion that gender violence was inevitable.  
 
From this standpoint it made certain immediate, medium-term and long-term 
recommendations. The Committee further proposed (inter alia) the promotion of 
                                                 
272  Idem para 275. 
273  Idem para 276. The Committee explained that all cases of a similar pattern should be 
considered as high-risk disappearances and not simply cases of missing persons. 
274  Idem paras 287-288. 
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training and capacity-building for public officials in general, and judges and judicial 
personnel in particular, in the area of gender violence and human rights and the need 
to take the gender dimension into account in their actions, procedures and 
judgements.  
 
The Committee expressed concern at the situation of discrimination and insecurity 
that prevailed in the maquiladoras, where nearly all women in the work force were 
employed. It also noted that most of the female population lived in poverty and 
extreme poverty, with no assurances of meeting its basic needs - work, education, 
health care, housing, sanitation infrastructure and lighting.275 Accordingly, it 
recommended for the Mexican Government to step up violence prevention 
programmes and policies, including early warning mechanisms, the reinforcement of 
security in dangerous or isolated areas, monitoring programmes and systematic 
information on security measures. The government was further advised to adopt and 
promote all measures to restore the social fabric and create conditions ‘to guarantee 
that women in Ciudad Juárez were able to exercise the rights established in the 
Women’s Convention’.276  
 
(g) Subsequent developments  
 
The published CEDAW report also contained observations from the Mexican 
Government, presented at the Committee’s session in July 2004. This response 
comprised an extensive account of progress, obstacles and challenges facing the 
Government in respect of murders and disappearances of women in Ciudad 
                                                 
275  Idem paras 289-290. 
276  Idem para 290. 
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Juárez.277 As Sokhi-Bulley observes, the tone of the Government’s reply is one of 
‘helplessness and inevitability’.278 Mexico emphasised that the subordination of 
women was a social and cultural phenomenon, deeply rooted in customs and 
mindsets; this situation had been exacerbated by a lack of human and financial 
resources on the part of authorities. There was nothing to suggest that the State was 
pursuing a deliberate policy of discrimination.279 
 
Writing in 2007, Simmons reported that the situation on the ground in Ciudad Juárez 
had not improved significantly.280 A more recent report prepared by Amnesty 
International for purposes of Mexico’s Universal Periodic Review process confirms 
that despite ‘welcome measures’ to prevent and punish violence against women in 
Ciudad Juárez and Chihuahua City, Chihuahua State, women and young girls 
continue to be murdered.281  Legislation introduced in 2007 to prevent and punish 
violence against women has yet to be converted into practical tools for combating 
gender-based violence. 
 
In 2009, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights considered the liability of the 
Mexican Government in respect of the disappearances and murders of three young 
women whose bodies were found in Ciudad Juárez in November 2001, and 
                                                 
277  Idem at 55 et seq. 
278  B Sokhi-Bulley ‘The Optional Protocol to CEDAW: First steps’ (2006) 6 Human Rights 
Law Review 143 at 155. 
279  Ibid. 
280  Simmons op cit note 210 at 99-100. 
281  Amnesty International Mexico: Submission to the Universal Periodic Review (February 
2009) 6. 
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judgment was handed down in November 2009. I return to a discussion of the 
Court’s findings in Chapter 5.282  
 
 
3. EVALUATION  
 
When examining women’s right to freedom from violence in the context of the 
Women’s Convention, the first observation that should be noted is the absence of 
this right from the original body of the document. The CEDAW subsequently 
brought violence against women within the ambit of the Convention through 
‘constructive’ interpretation, and specifically, through stating that ‘gender-based 
violence’ constitutes a form of discrimination against women. This implies that the 
consideration of violence against women under this Convention, at least initially, 
mainly resorted under the right to equality or to non-discrimination (rather than 
under an explicit guarantee of women’s right to freedom from violence). While this 
approach is understandable (and, to a large extent unavoidable), given the basis of 
the Women’s Convention in ‘elimination of discrimination’, it raises the question 
whether a predominantly ‘equality’ approach to violence against women is 
necessarily the preferable one.283  
 
The CEDAW’s General Recommendation No. 19 is noteworthy in that it not only 
confirms that violence against women constitutes a violation of women’s rights 
irrespective of whether the perpetrators are State officials or private actors, but also 
                                                 
282  Chapter 5, Section 3.3. 
283   I do not attempt to answer this question immediately, but rather reserve it for further 
attention at the end of Chapter 4, the second part of the examination of international law. 
This is because of the fact that Chapter 4 also looks at certain equality-based provisions.  
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reiterated the application of the ‘due diligence’ standard for determination of State 
responsibility for private acts.285  
 
The initial period of implementation of the Women’s Convention was characterised 
by limited resources and concomitantly, circumscribed opportunities for normative 
development by the CEDAW. However, the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention brought with it new prospects for such development. This is seen from 
the communications relating to violence against women that have already been 
brought before the CEDAW, as well as the inquiry into gender-based violence in 
Mexico undertaken by the Committee.  
 
The Committee’s Views in A.T. v Hungary are particularly significant in that 
women’s right to be free from all forms of domestic violence is given express 
recognition in this instance. This is an important advance, given the background as 
outlined above.  
 
Cook & Cusack argue that while the Committee is to be celebrated for identifying 
the link between gender stereotyping and gender-based violence in this case, it 
missed an opportunity to more fully address the gender stereotyping in Hungary as it 
operates in respect of violence against women.286 They propose that the Committee 
could have strengthened its analysis by being more explicit about the sex stereotype 
of Hungarian women as men’s subordinates, describing how it required Ms. A.T. to 
obey L.F. and to be disciplined by the use of violence if she did not obey him.287 
Similarly, the CEDAW could also have described more clearly the nature of 
                                                 
285  See discussion in Section 2.3.2 above.  
286  Cook & Cusack op cit note 63 at 156-157. 
287  Idem at 157.  
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Hungary’s obligations to eliminate the gender stereotypes that facilitated domestic 
violence against Ms. A.T.288  
 
The Committee’s approach in the two communications289 against Austria is quite 
different, given the different nature of the State’s response to violence against 
women. Unlike Hungary, which had conceded before the Committee that its 
response to violence against women did not meet the expected international 
standards, the Austrian Government was clearly well-invested in being seen to be 
compliant with these standards. This is evident from the State Party’s response to the 
Committee’s finding of admissibility, and its request for a review in each case.  
 
What is therefore at issue in the Goekce and Yildirim communications, more than in 
the case of Ms. A.T. v Hungary, is the standard of ‘due diligence’. In both these 
instances, the State response, while perhaps adequate and responsive on legislative 
and policy level, fell down on individual level when State actors failed to adhere to 
the State’s due diligence obligations. In the Goekce case, this failure took the form 
of the police not responding to the victim’s last call as an emergency, given the long 
history of violence and threats against her by the perpetrator. In the case of Yildirim, 
the failure to exercise due diligence took the form of the refusal to detain the 
perpetrator, again with a background of repeated acts violence and threats against 
the victim.  
 
Read with the findings of the Committee in the inquiry relating to the murders of the 
women in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, one notes that certain interpretative themes, for 
                                                 
288  Idem at 158. 
289  CEDAW op cit note 166; CEDAW op cit note 167.  
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example, on the standard of due diligence in relation to investigations (Ciudad 
Juárez) and on the obligation to provide training to judges and law enforcement 
officials (A.T. v Hungary, Şahide Goekce (deceased) v Austria; Fatma Yildirim 
(deceased) v Austria ) are beginning to emerge.   
 
The inquiry relating to Ciudad Juárez has correctly been referred to as a ‘significant 
development in international human rights law’.290 In spite of the ground covered by 
the CEDAW in its report, I concur with commentators who have observed that the 
Committee could have gone further in articulating the Mexican Government’s 
obligations to address gender stereotyping under Articles 2(f), 5(a) and 15(1) of the 
Women’s Convention.291 It would also, for example, have been helpful for the 
Committee to include recommendations on how to address the structural nature of 
the problem of gender stereotyping.292 Significantly, certain of these issues are also 
raised in the judgment handed down by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
and I therefore return to this discussion in Chapter 5.  
 
Having followed the progress of the Women’s Convention, the inclusion of 
‘violence against women’ through General Recommendation No. 19 and the 
incipient jurisprudence that has begun to emerge from communications before the 
Committee, the next chapter will look at other developments in the international 
arena (from around the time of the adoption of this General Recommendation).  
 
                                                 
290  Cook & Cusack op cit note 63 at 167. 
291  Idem at 170. 
292  Idem at 171-172.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WOMEN’S RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM  
VIOLENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM VIENNA  
TO BEIJING AND BEYOND 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter constitutes the second of two in which the development of women’s 
right to freedom from violence in international law is investigated. The first part 
of this examination, set out in Chapter 3, covered the Women’s Convention; the 
second part looks at a number of international documents adopted subsequent to 
the introduction of CEDAW’s General Recommendation No. 19 in 1992.1    
 
The chapter starts with an assessment of the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action. Although this is a ‘general’ human rights instrument, which does not 
have a specific focus on women’s rights, the document represented an important 
breakthrough for women at the time, as will be explained below. I then proceed 
to an in-depth consideration of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women, which has proven to be a key standard-setting document. The 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action are subsequently investigated, 
together with the three follow-up reviews conducted at five-year intervals since 
1995 to evaluate the implementation of the Beijing Platform. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with an outline of the thematic reports of the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, focusing specifically on 
                                                 
1  CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 UN GAOR 11th Session UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add.15 (1992) [hereafter ‘CEDAW General Recommendation 
No. 19’].   
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how the right to freedom from violence has been addressed in these reports, as 
well as an overall evaluation.   
 
As indicated before, this evaluation at the end of this chapter will pay attention to 
the question of whether a predominantly ‘equality’ approach to violence against 
women is necessarily the preferable one.2  
 
 
2. THE VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGAMME OF ACTION 
 
2.1 Background: Events prior to the Vienna Conference 
 
Although international law had seen some gradual progress in the formal 
recognition of women’s rights in the early decades after World War II (in the 
form of, inter alia, the various Conventions and Declarations initiated by the 
Commission on the Status of Women from its establishment in 1946),3 these 
advances grew exponentially from the mid-1970s. This expansion was sparked 
by the UN declaring 1975 to 1985 to be the ‘UN Decade for Women’ as well as 
by the three UN World Conferences held during this period in Mexico City 
(1975), Copenhagen (1980) and Nairobi (1985) respectively.4  
 
                                                 
2   See Chapter 3, Section 3.   
3  See discussion in Chapter 3, Section 2.1.  
4  S Wright ‘Human rights and women’s rights: An analysis of the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ in KE 
Mahoney & P Mahoney (eds) Human Rights in the Twenty-first Century (1993)75 at 
76; BE Hernández-Truyol ‘Human rights through a gendered lens: Emergence, 
evolution, revolution’ in KD Askin & DM Koenig (eds) Women and International 
Human Rights Law (1999) 3 at 31. 
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The Decade for Women proved to be a defining period both in terms of 
providing women with opportunities to participate in official government 
delegations at the three UN Women’s Conferences and allowing women’s 
concerns to be placed on the international intergovernmental agenda.5 Fitzpatrick 
recounts that after the Copenhagen Conference in 1980, for example, the issue of 
violence against women was considered in different UN bodies, such as the 
Commission on the Status of Women (‘CSW’) and its parent body (the 
ECOSOC) as well as the Commission on Crime Prevention and Control.6 
Importantly, the ECOSOC adopted Resolution 1982/22, labeling domestic 
violence and rape as offences against the dignity of the person and calling for 
steps to combat these violations. Following the Nairobi Conference (1985), the 
UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 40/36, which requested Member 
States to take urgent action to prevent domestic violence, to assist victims and to 
make criminal justice systems more sensitive.7  
 
In 1986, an Expert Group Meeting on Violence in the Family with Special 
Emphasis on its Effects on Women was established.8 In 1989, it will be recalled, 
the CEDAW for the first time addressed the question of violence against women 
                                                 
5  E Friedman ‘Women’s human rights: The emergence of a movement’ in J Peters & A 
Wolper (eds) Women’s Rights, Human Rights (1995) 18 at 23. Just as significantly, 
parallel NGO Forums were held alongside each of the three Conferences; at these 
meetings, women from different countries (and continents) met and were able to 
exchange strategies and consolidate ongoing working relationships (ibid). These 
alliances were to prove crucial in the advocacy campaigns leading to the Vienna 
Conference in 1993. 
6  See J Fitzpatrick ‘The use of international human rights norms to combat violence 
against women’ in RJ Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women (1994) 532 at 536-537 for an 
overview of these events.  
7  Idem at 536, citing ECOSOC Resolution 1982/22 and UN General Assembly Resolution 
40/36. 
8  UA O’Hare ‘Realizing human rights for women’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 
364 at 372.   
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by adopting General Recommendation No. 12.9 In 1992, the same Committee 
adopted General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women. Shortly 
thereafter, the third World Conference on Human Rights was held in Vienna in 
1993.10  
 
This conference represented an important milestone for women’s rights in 
several respects, most notably in relation to violence against women.11 The 
significance of the Conference should be understood against the background of 
the criticism leveled against international law by feminist commentators in the 
early 1990s for its failure to adequately take account of women’s rights.12 
Copelon, for example, notes that in 1990, women’s human rights were ‘barely on 
the international human rights agenda’.13 Bearing this in mind, the sense of 
achievement generated by the Vienna Conference moves into perspective. For 
instance, Mertus and Goldberg observe that prior to this Conference, the very 
notion that women could claim to have distinct and legally recognised human 
rights had been virtually unheard of in mainstream international dialogue.14 With 
the benefit of hindsight, the Conference may not have proved the watershed 
                                                 
9  See Chapter 3, Section 2.3.2. 
10  For a description of the general background to the Conference see K Davidse ‘The 
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights: Bridge to nowhere or bridge over trouble 
waters?’ (1995) 6 Touro International Law Review 239 at 242-246. The previous World 
Conference on Human Rights was held in Teheran, Iran in 1968.   
11  Sullivan observes that the area of women’s human rights was perhaps the only one in 
which the World Conference can be said to have met the challenge of defining a 
‘forward-looking agenda’ – DJ Sullivan ‘Women’s human rights and the 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights’ (1994) 88 American Journal of International Law 152 at 
152; see also Davidse op cit note 10 at 254. 
12  See discussion in Chapter 1, Section 4.  
13  R Copelon ‘International human rights dimensions of intimate violence: Another strand 
in the dialectic of feminist lawmaking’ (2003) 11 American University Journal of 
Gender, Social Policy and the Law 865 at 866.  
14  J Mertus & P Goldberg ‘A perspective on women and international human rights after 
the Vienna Declaration: The inside/ outside construct’ (1994) 26 NYU Journal of 
International Law & Politics 201 at 202.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4   International Law: From Vienna to Beijing and Beyond 
 
 
 
 
 166
moment it was hoped to be; at the very least, as will be shown below, it did pave 
the way for a number of significant subsequent developments.  
 
 
2.2 The Third World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993) 
 
Prior to the World Conference, an international NGO coalition had organised 
itself into a ‘Global Campaign for Women’s Rights’, with the aim of ensuring 
the inclusion of women’s right on the agenda of the Vienna Conference.15 One of 
the central strategies organised prior to the Conference by the Global Campaign 
was a worldwide petition drive. The petition stated that as the UDHR protects 
women, the World Conference should ‘comprehensively address women’s 
human rights at every level of its proceedings’ and recognise gender-based 
violence ‘as a violation of human rights requiring immediate action’.16 The 
petition drive, coordinated by the Centre for Women’s Global Leadership, was 
an unprecedented success.17 
 
The World Conference was preceded by official preparatory meetings in Africa, 
Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia, as well as several NGO caucuses.18 
                                                 
15  Idem at 204-206. For a detailed account of the work of the Global Campaign, see  
C Bunch et al ‘Making the global local: International networking for women’s human 
rights’ in KD Askin & DM Koenig (eds) Women and International Human Rights Law 
(1999) 91 at 92-101.  
16  Friedman op cit note 4 at 27-28. 
17  The petition had gathered a total of 300,000 signatures from 123 countries in 20 
languages when it was eventually delivered to the UN - Friedman op cit note 4 at 28;  
L Heise ‘Violence against women: Translating international advocacy into concrete 
change’ (1995) 44 American University Law Review 1207 at 1208-1209. 
18  See Sullivan for an in-depth discussion of these preparatory meetings – op cit note 11 at 
152 - 155; also Mertus & Goldberg op cit note 14 at 205n14; Friedman op cit note 4 at 
28-30.  
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A great deal of work was done in advance by women’s rights advocates at the 
level of the preliminary national and regional meetings, and the scene was set ‘to 
secure a political commitment from the international community to end 
violations of women’s human rights’.19 This commitment was eventually 
embodied in the conference document, entitled the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action.20  
 
The Declaration, which sets out certain general principles, explains that the 
human rights of women and of the girl-child are an ‘inalienable, integral and 
indivisible part of universal human rights’.21 It confirms that the full and equal 
participation of women in political, civil, economic, social and cultural life, at 
the national, regional and international levels, and the eradication of all forms of 
discrimination on grounds of sex are priority objectives of the international 
community.  
 
Significantly, the Declaration states that gender-based violence and all forms of 
sexual harassment and exploitation, including those ‘resulting from cultural 
prejudice and international trafficking’, are incompatible with the dignity and 
                                                 
19  Sullivan op cit note 11 at 155. The coordinated efforts of women’s rights groups 
continued at the Conference itself, where the women’s caucus was by far the most 
organised and vocal of the NGO participants – Friedman op cit note 4 at 30. The Global 
Campaign organised a pivotal event, entitled the ‘Global Tribunal on Violations of 
Women’s Human Rights’, with the purpose of presenting cases that documented human 
rights abuses against women and demonstrating the failure of existing human rights 
mechanisms to protect and promote women’s human rights – Friedman op cit note 4 at 
30; Bunch et al op cit note 15 at 95.  
20  Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993 UN Doc 
A/Conf.157/23 (dated 12 July 1993). The contents of the Declaration and Programme 
of Action are numbered separately; to distinguish between the two sections for 
purposes of referencing, they will be referred to as ‘Vienna Declaration’ and ‘Vienna 
Programme for Action’ respectively.  
21  Vienna Declaration op cit note 20 para 18. See Sullivan for an overview of the debate 
on universality of human rights at the Conference – op cit note 11 at 157-158. 
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worth of the human person, and must be eliminated.22 This can be achieved by 
legal measures and through national action and international cooperation in such 
fields as economic and social development, education, safe maternity and health 
care, and social support. 
 
The Vienna Programme of Action, which contains specific measures aimed at 
achieving the broad goals set out in the Declaration, urges the full and equal 
enjoyment by women of all human rights and calls for this to be a priority for 
Governments and for the UN.23 The equal status of women and the human rights 
of women should be integrated into the mainstream24 of the UN.25 The document 
also underlines the importance of women’s full participation as both agents and 
beneficiaries in the development process,26 and reiterates the objectives 
established on global action for women towards sustainable and equitable 
development set out in (amongst others) the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development.27 This recognition of women’s role in development is important 
from the perspective of African women (and others in so-called ‘developing’ 
countries). 
 
                                                 
22  Vienna Declaration loc cit.  
23  Vienna Programme for Action op cit note 20 para 36. 
24  O’Hare explains that the ‘mainstream’ is generally taken to refer to the treaty-based 
bodies and investigative bodies that operate under the auspices of the Geneva-based 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights – op cit note 8 368 fn 15. 
25  Vienna Programme for Action op cit note 20 para 37. However, as Sullivan correctly 
points out, women’s rights are not integrated or ‘mainstreamed’ in the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action as such, but treated as a separate category of 
rights - Sullivan op cit note 11 at 159.  
26  Vienna Programme for Action op cit note 20 para 36.  
27  This Declaration was adopted by the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3-14 June 1992. For a discussion of the 
Vienna Conference and the right to development, see Sullivan op cit note 11 at 162-
163.  
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In particular, the Conference stressed the importance of working towards the 
elimination of violence against women in public and private life, the elimination 
of all forms of sexual harassment, exploitation and trafficking in women, the 
elimination of gender bias in the administration of justice and the eradication of 
any conflicts which may arise between the rights of women and the harmful 
effects of certain traditional or customary practices, cultural prejudices and 
religious extremism.28  
 
The inclusion of both ‘public and private life’ in this formulation is of 
importance, again in the context of feminist criticism of the failure of 
international law to recognise and address the dichotomy between the public/ 
private spheres.29 It is also important in that violence against women, as 
previously explained, is usually committed by private (non-state) actors. A 
second significant aspect of this formulation, as Sullivan points out, is that by 
calling for the elimination of the conflicts that may arise between women’s rights 
and the harmful effects of customary practices (rather than the ‘harmful effects’ 
themselves), the Conference evaded the difficult question of how to resolve 
conflicts between women’s rights and cultural practices – even those considered 
to be harmful.30  
 
An important measure proposed by the Conference on Human Rights was the 
adoption by the UN General Assembly of the draft Declaration on violence 
against women.31 The Conference further urged the eradication of all forms of 
                                                 
28  Vienna Programme for Action op cit note 20 para 38. 
29  Mertus and Goldberg op cit note 14 at 203.  
30  Sullivan op cit note 11 at 158.  
31  Vienna Programme for Action op cit note 20 para 38. This recommendation was carried 
out in December 1993, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women – see Section 3 below.  
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discrimination against women, ‘both hidden and overt’.32 To this end, it was 
recommended that the UN should encourage the goal of universal ratification by 
all States of the Women’s Convention by the year 2000.33 The Programme for 
Action recommended that ‘ways and means’ of addressing the large number of 
reservations to the Women’s Convention should be encouraged, and States were 
urged to withdraw reservations that were contrary to the object and purpose of 
the Convention or otherwise incompatible with international treaty law.34 
 
Treaty bodies were encouraged to disseminate necessary information to enable 
women to make more effective use of existing implementation procedures in 
their pursuits of full and equal enjoyment of human rights and non-
discrimination. Notably, the Programme for Action recommends that the CSW 
and CEDAW should quickly examine the possibility of introducing the right of 
individual petition through the preparation of an optional protocol to the 
Women’s Convention.35 The decision of the Commission on Human Rights to 
consider the appointment of a special rapporteur on violence against women was 
also welcomed.36 Finally, the document welcomed the World Conference on  
 
 
                                                 
32  Vienna Programme for Action op cit note 20 para 39. 
33  Ibid.  
34  The problem of reservations to the Women’s Convention is discussed in Ch 3, Section 
2.3.1 (g).   
35  Vienna Programme for Action op cit note 20 para 40. This recommendation came to 
fruition in 1999, when the Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention was adopted 
– see Chapter 3, Section 2.4.  
36  See discussion of the work of the Special Rapporteur in Section 5 below.  
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Women to be held in Beijing in 1995 and urged that human rights of women 
should play an important role in its deliberations.37 
 
Sullivan points out that the recommendations for strengthening the operation of 
the Women’s Convention did not include measures to assist the CEDAW in 
carrying out its mandate (as it did, for example, in the case of the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child).38 Such measures could have included the extension of 
the CEDAW’s meeting period (beyond the two-week period specified in the 
Convention)39 or the improvement of secretariat support.40 
 
Reflecting on the impact of the Vienna Conference, Mertus and Goldberg make 
the following observation:  
 
The principal accomplishment of Vienna was the establishment of 
a firm foothold which allows for issues of violence against 
women to be treated as human rights violations in the mainstream 
international arena.41 
 
 
The authors noted that in particular, the breakdown of the public/ private 
dichotomy in examining violence against women represents a ‘formidable 
accomplishment’.42 There was, however a downside to the decision of the pre-
conference organising women’s coalition to focus on violence against women for  
 
                                                 
37  Vienna Programme for Action op cit note 20 para 44. See discussion of the Beijing 
Conference and its Outcome Document in Section 4 below.  
38  Sullivan op cit note 11 at 160. 
39  Art 20 of the Women’s Convention; see also discussion in Chapter 3, Section 2.3.1.  
40  Sullivan op cit note 11 at 160.  
41  Mertus & Goldberg op cit note 14 at 213. See also Hernandez-Truyol op cit note 3 at 
33; Copelon op cit note 13 at 867.   
42  Mertus & Goldberg op cit note 14 at 214.  
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raising women’s rights issues:43 this choice meant that the Vienna Conference 
cast a ‘blinding spotlight’ on issues of violence while ignoring other pressing 
issues, such as literacy, poverty (and linked to this, development) and 
discriminatory laws.44     
 
Davidse observes that the World Conference on Human Rights did not produce a 
solemn result that immediately affected the state of human rights in the world.45 
However, considering the circumstances, a miracle was achieved: some 170 
countries, many of which were not present as independent states when the 
UDHR or the two Covenants were adopted, finalised a document reaffirming 
universal human rights after an initial process that did not seem to bode well for 
this result. And from the perspective of women’s rights advocates, the outcome 
of the Conference was an undeniable success.46  
 
                                                 
43  Mertus & Goldberg provide a useful overview of the historical background as well as 
events at the conference itself - op cit note 14 at 207- 214. 
44  Idem at 214. See also Sullivan, who expresses concern about the lack of attention to 
more effective implementation of women’s socio-economic rights - op cit note 11 at 
160-161. Admittedly, the Programme of Action does address women’s right to health – 
Vienna Programme for Action op cit note 20 para 41.  
45  He explains that the text is too long, covers a broad range of issues, and is often not 
specific - Davidse op cit note 10 at 257. 
46  See eg Mertus & Goldberg op cit note 14 at 202; Bunch et al op cit note 15 at 96.  
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3. THE DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN47 
 
3.1 After Vienna 
 
The 1985 Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women 
included a set of measures aimed at combating violence against women.48 
However, the implementation of these measures proved problematic, and in 1991 
the ECOSOC recommended the development of an international framework that 
would explicitly address this issue.49  
 
At the time, different strategies were suggested, including the drafting of a new 
(legally binding) international instrument. Arguments against this proposal were 
that a wholly new instrument could create confusion over the relevance of 
existing human rights instruments, the risk of limited ratification and the expense 
of implementation.50 Furthermore, a new instrument could open up controversial 
debate about how to define such violence. The strategy eventually consisted of 
the drafting of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, 
                                                 
47   Adopted 20 December 1993, GA Res 48/104 (1994) [hereafter ‘the Violence 
Declaration’]. 
48  United Nations Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the 
Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and 
Peace, Nairobi, 15-26 July 1985 (1985) UN Doc A/Conf.116/28/Rev.1 (1986) Part A 
Paras 76, 258, 288. 
49  ECOSOC Res 1991/18 Violence against Women in All its Forms (dated 30 May 1991) 
para 5.  
50  A Edwards ‘Violence against women as sex discrimination: Judging the jurisprudence 
of the United Nations human rights treaty bodies’ (2008) 18 Texas Journal of Women 
and the Law 1 at 44.  
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which was adopted in 1993, as well as General Recommendation No. 19 
introduced by the CEDAW.51  
 
An initial draft of the Declaration was prepared at an expert group meeting in 
November 1991.52 The CSW revised this experts’ draft in August 1992, and 
accepted the revised draft in March 1993. The CSW’s draft met no serious 
opposition at the July 1993 session of the ECOSOC Council, where it was 
adopted without changes to the text. The UN General Assembly adopted the 
Declaration in December 1993. 
 
3.2 Nature of the document 
 
A resolution or declaration of the UN General Assembly is not a treaty, which 
states may ratify and by which they are then bound. However, when these 
resolutions relate to general norms of international law, then acceptance by a 
majority vote constitutes evidence of the opinions of governments in ‘the widest 
forum for the expression of such opinions’.53 Even when they are framed as 
general principles, resolutions of this kind are said to provide a basis for the 
progressive development of the law and the speedy consolidation of customary 
rules.54 Commentators have argued that the Declaration has the ‘moral force of 
world consensus’ because of its unanimous adoption by the General Assembly.55 
 
 
                                                 
51  CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 op cit note 1.   
52  Sullivan op cit note 11 at 164. 
53  I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 7 ed (2008) 15.  
54  Ibid.  
55  R Coomaraswamy & LM Kois ‘Violence against women’ in KD Askin & DM Koenig 
(eds) Women and International Human Rights Law (1999) 177 at 182.  
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3.3 Provisions relating to violence against women 
 
3.3.1 Overall framework 
 
The Preamble to the Declaration contextualises the document in a number of 
important ways. It firstly situates the Declaration in the general framework of 
international human rights standards. It recognises that there is an urgent need for 
the universal application to women of the rights and principles with regard to 
equality, security, liberty, integrity and dignity of all human beings. These rights 
and principles are enshrined in international instruments, including the UDHR, 
ICCPR, ICESCR, the Women’s Convention and the Convention against Torture.  
 
It then proceeds to affirm that violence against women constitutes a violation of 
the rights and fundamental freedoms of women and impairs or nullifies their 
enjoyment of those rights and freedoms. Concern is expressed about the long-
standing failure to protect and promote those rights and freedoms in the case of 
violence against women. Opportunities for women to achieve legal, social, 
political and economic equality in society are limited, inter alia, by continuing 
and endemic violence. 
 
Secondly, the Declaration acknowledges that violence against women is a 
‘manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, 
which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men 
and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence 
against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are 
forced into a subordinate position compared with men’. This recognition of the 
causes of violence against women, which is unprecedented in international law, 
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clearly accepts the systemic nature of violence against women (as opposed to 
isolated acts committed by individual actors).56 An understanding of violence 
against women as a manifestation of ‘unequal power relations’, leading to 
domination over women, is also an important advance from a feminist 
perspective.57  
 
In addition, the Preamble locates violence against women in terms of 
development, peace and equality, with specific reference to the Nairobi Forward-
Looking Strategies. This also contextualises the issue in a development 
framework.58 
 
The Preamble further emphasises that certain groups of women are especially 
vulnerable to violence, such as women belonging to minority groups, indigenous 
women, refugee women, migrant women, women living in rural or remote 
communities, destitute women, women in institutions or in detention, female 
children, women with disabilities, elderly women and women in situations of 
armed conflict. 
 
                                                 
56  O’Hare op cit note 8 at 374-375. 
57  To the extent that such a theoretical identification is required (and possible, based on 
such a relatively limited text), the feminist approach in question here would be closest 
to so-called ‘dominance’ feminism, also known as radical feminism. See also RC 
Preston & RZ Ahrens ‘United Nations Conventions documents in light of feminist 
theory’ (2001) 8 Michigan Journal of Gender & Law 1 at 21. 
58  See Coomaraswamy and Kois op cit note 55 at 182. It has been pointed out that 
violence prevents women from contributing to, and benefiting from, development by 
restricting their choices and limiting their ability to act. The resulting consequences for 
economic growth and poverty reduction should be of central concern to Governments. 
See UN Secretary General In-Depth Study on Violence against Women (2006) UN Doc 
A/61/122/Add.1 (dated 6 July 2006) para 54. 
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Regarding the relationship between the Women’s Convention and the 
Declaration, the Preamble explains that it is recognised that effective 
implementation of the Women’s Convention would contribute to the elimination 
of violence against women and that the Declaration will strengthen and 
complement that process.   
 
 
3.3.2 Definition of violence against women 
 
The Declaration defines the term ‘violence against women’ as follows: 
 
[A]ny act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to 
result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to 
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private 
life. 59  
 
This definition is firstly significant for its use of ‘violence against women’ as an 
operational concept rather than ‘gender-based violence’, as is the case in the 
CEDAW’s General Recommendation No 19. The reason for this difference is to 
be found in the equality-based approach necessitated by the Women’s 
Convention: the focus in the Convention (and General Recommendation No. 19) 
is on the broader category of gender-based violence, i.e. violence committed 
‘against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women 
disproportionately’.60 Because the drafters of the Declaration did not work 
exclusively within the paradigm of sex/ gender discrimination, it was possible to 
                                                 
59  Violence Declaration op cit note 47 Art 1.  
60  CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 op cit note 1 para 6. See also A Vesa 
‘International and regional standards for protecting victims of domestic violence’ 
(2004) 12 American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 309 at 330.  
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focus on the narrower category (within gender-based violence) of ‘violence 
against women’. 
 
The definition is further important in that it emphasises that violence against 
women is not limited to acts of physical violence, but includes acts resulting in 
psychological harm or suffering as well. In this sense, it confirms the definition 
set out in General Recommendation No 19.61  
 
Article 2 further expands on the definition by setting out a non-exhaustive list of 
acts of violence against women occurring at three levels: in the family, in the 
community and the State. Examples of violence occurring in the family include 
sexual abuse of female children in the household, marital rape and female genital 
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women.62 Violence 
occurring within the general community includes rape, sexual harassment and 
intimidation at work, and trafficking in women.63 At the third level, the 
Declaration lists physical, sexual and psychological violence ‘perpetrated or 
condoned by the State’, wherever it occurs.64 Coomaraswamy and Kois observe 
that this three-tiered categorisation allows for a comprehensive understanding of 
the pervasive nature of violence, which affects every sector of personal, social 
and public life.65  
 
 
                                                 
61  See Chapter 3, Section 2.3.2. 
62  Violence Declaration op cit note 47 Art 2(a). 
63  Idem Art 2(b). 
64  Idem Art 2(c). It has been noted that the lack of clarification here of the level of State 
involvement that would amount to condonation makes it difficult to establish the 
parameters of state responsibility - O’Hare op cit note 8 at 378. 
65  Coomaraswamy & Kois op cit note 55 at 183. 
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3.3.3 Statements of principle 
 
The Declaration confirms that women are entitled to the equal enjoyment and 
protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.66 These rights include, 
amongst others, the right to life; the right to equality; the right to liberty and 
security of person; the right to equal protection under the law; the right to the 
highest standard attainable of physical and mental health; and the right not to be 
subjected to torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Each of the rights stipulated in Article 3 is footnoted with a 
reference to the relevant instrument.67  
 
Article 3 should be read with the statements in the Preamble (discussed above) 
firstly locating the Declaration within the framework of international human 
rights instruments68 and secondly confirming that violence against women 
constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women, which 
impairs or nullifies their enjoyment of those rights and freedoms. Significantly, 
however, the Declaration stops short of pronouncing freedom from violence as a 
right as such.69  
 
                                                 
66  Violence Declaration op cit note 47 Art 3.  
67  For example, the reference provided for the right to equality in Art 3(b) is Art 26 of the 
ICCPR, and the references for the right to liberty and security of the person (Art 3(c)) 
are Art 3 of the UDHR and Art 9 of the ICCPR.  
68  Liebeskind points out that the allusion in Art 3 to the ‘traditional’ human rights 
instruments aims to include the Declaration in the  existing human rights framework, 
thus avoiding marginalization  - ML Liebeskind ‘Preventing gender-based violence: 
From marginalisation to mainstream in international human rights’ (1994) 63 Revista 
Juridica Universidad de Puerto Rico 645 at 650. 
69  See also O’Hare op cit note 8 at 377. 
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One notes here that the Declaration places the issue of violence against women 
both in an equality/ non-discrimination framework as well as within a general 
‘rights violation’ framework.   
 
 
3.3.4 State obligations 
 
The Declaration addresses the question of state responsibility in Article 4. The 
article starts with an overarching introduction reading as follows: 
 
States should condemn violence against women and should not 
invoke any custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid 
their obligations with respect to its elimination. States should 
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of 
eliminating violence against women…70 
 
 
Given the broad background of reservations to the Women’s Convention carving 
out deviations for customary and religious systems within States Parties, this 
statement is an important one.71 The language used here is interesting: on the one 
hand the phrase states ‘without delay’; on the other hand, this appeared to be 
balanced by the use of an ‘obligation of means’72 in the form of ‘all appropriate 
means’.73  
                                                 
70  Emphasis added.  
71  See O’Hare loc cit. 
72  The term is not used in the technical legal sense, given the non-binding legal nature of 
the document.   
73  Byrnes and Connors explain, in relation to the obligations to ‘take all appropriate 
measures’ set out in the Women’s Convention, that it may be argued that States Parties 
have been left with considerable discretion to determine the means appropriate to 
eliminate discrimination in the specific fields covered by those articles - A Byrnes & J 
Connors ‘Enforcing the human rights of women: A complaints procedure for the 
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Drawing on the framework of analysis developed for purposes of this study, the 
obligations imposed on States by the Declarations are set out in Table 2, 
Annexure A. The linkages between the Declaration and the Women’s 
Convention are apparent, with states being urged to ratify the Convention and to 
reconsider their reservations.74  
 
A significant difference between the Declaration and General Recommendation 
No. 19 lies in the ‘due diligence’ provision. In the former document, the duty to 
exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, and punish acts to violence against 
women is made subject to the phrase ‘in accordance with national legislation’. 
According to commentators such as Sullivan, this qualifying reference to 
national legislation undermines the normative force of the provision;75 O’Hare 
further explains that by permitting states to operate within the scope of their own 
legal system, with all its limitations, these provisions detract from the possibility  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Women’s Convention?’ (1996) 21 Brooklyn J International Law 679 at 726. The 
obligation to take appropriate measures to achieve a particular goal has been 
characterised as an ‘obligation of result’ rather than an ‘obligation of means’ or 
conduct. However, this characterisation does not mean that steps taken by the State to 
achieve the specified goal are wholly within the discretion of that State . I argue that the 
comments by Byrnes and Connors also apply mutatis mutandis to the ‘obligations’ set 
out in the Violence Declaration. (See Cook for a discussion of the distinction 
traditionally drawn in international law between ‘obligations of means’ and ‘obligations 
of ends’–  RJ Cook ‘State accountability under the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ in RJ Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women 
(1994) 228 at 231-232.) 
74  O’Hare loc cit. 
75  Sullivan op cit note 11 at 166. 
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of any serious international scrutiny of domestic provisions.76 The duty to 
compensate for acts of violence is also omitted from the Declaration.  
 
Looking at Article 4 generally, it is noteworthy that the language is generally 
more tentative than one would expect from a provision aiming to impose State 
duties. For example: States should -  
(a) Consider ratifying the Women’s Convention;77 
(b) Consider the possibility of developing national plans of action to promote 
the protection of women against any form of violence;78 
(c) Work to ensure, to the maximum extent feasible in the light of their 
available resources that women subjected to violence have specialized 
assistance;79 and 
(d) Encourage the development of appropriate guidelines.80 
 
Sullivan provides an interesting explanation for this. She notes that the 
‘programmatic and policy emphasis’ of the Declaration81 is a reflection of a 
debate at the time over the relationship between the role of the CSW in 
promoting women’s rights and the role of the UN Commission on Human Rights 
(‘CHR’) in promoting and protecting women’s rights.82 During discussions of 
                                                 
76  O’Hare op cit note 8 at 378. The same qualifier is included in Article 4(d), which 
enjoins States to develop penal, civil, labour and administrative sanctions in domestic 
legislation to punish and redress the wrongs caused to women who are subjected to 
violence. Women who are subjected to violence should be provided with access to the 
mechanisms of justice and, as provided for by national legislation, to just and effective 
remedies for the harm that they have suffered. 
77  Violence Declaration op cit note 47 Art 5(a). 
78  Idem Art 5(e). 
79  Idem Art 5(g). 
80  Idem Art 5(n). 
81  Although Sullivan refers to a draft version of the Declaration, the same considerations 
apply.  
82  Sullivan op cit note 11 at 166.  
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the draft Declaration at the March 1993 session of the CSW, representatives 
implicitly contrasted a programmatic response to an approach ‘within the context 
of human rights violations’. Sullivan expresses the opinion (with which I concur) 
that a suggestion that measures such as education campaigns or shelters for 
victims are ‘policy’ (rather than ‘rights-based’) initiatives reflects an inadequate 
understanding of the extent to which States have affirmative, as well as negative, 
duties under human rights instruments to eliminate gender-based violence. 
 
4. BEIJING DECLARATION AND PLATFORM OF ACTION 
 
4.1 Background 
 
Following the success of women’s advocacy at the Vienna Conference,83 many 
of the groups and networks that became active during this period continued to 
organise in preparation for the Fourth World Women’s Conference to be held in 
Beijing, China.84  
 
The Beijing Conference was preceded by the International Conference on 
Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo in September 1994. 
According to Zulficar, the ensuing ICPD Programme of Action is more action-
oriented than the Declarations and Programmes of Action adopted by other 
international conferences. The Programme of Action is also more detailed than 
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and attempts to identify 
quantitative and qualitative goals that are attainable and measurable.85  
                                                 
83  See Section 2.2 above.   
84  Friedman op cit note 4 at 31.  
85  M Zulficar ‘From human rights to program reality: Vienna, Cairo, and Beijing in 
perspective’ (1995) 44 American University Law Review 1017 at 1022. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4   International Law: From Vienna to Beijing and Beyond 
 
 
 
 
 184
 
Noteworthy aspects of the ICPD Programme of Action include the recognition of 
gender equality, empowerment of women, the elimination of all kinds of 
violence against women, and women’s reproductive rights through the document 
as cornerstones of population and development-related programmes.86 The 
human rights of women and girls are reaffirmed as integral parts of human rights. 
The right to development is also recognised as a fundamental right. Violence 
against women, including domestic violence and rape, is specifically recognised 
as one cause of the rising number of women at risk of sustaining HIV and other 
sexually transmitted infections.87 
 
The negotiations over certain chapters (most notably Chapters VII88 and VIII89) 
were rendered sensitive and complicated because of the view taken by 
conservative religious institutions (such as the Vatican) that the draft Programme 
of Action was contrary to religious and ethical values.90 These concerns mostly 
related to the right to choice in respect of abortion. Furthermore, both the Vatican 
and certain Islamic groups opposed proposals in the draft that would recognise 
various forms of the family, such as single-parent households. They also 
criticised language that would recognise the right of adolescents to family 
planning services and sex education. The negotiators spent most of their time and 
energy on these two chapters.91  
                                                 
86  Idem at 1023. 
87  Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development 
A/CONF.171/13 (dated 18 October 1994) para 7.35.  
88  Entitled ‘Reproductive Rights and Reproductive Health’.  
89  Entitled ‘Health, Morbidity and Mortality’.  
90  Zulficar op cit note 85 at 1025. 
91  Zulficar reports that it took five days to resolve the clause on abortion – op cit note 85 
at 1028. The final version, set out in para 8.25 of the Programme of Action, in effect 
leaves any measures or changes related to abortion within the health system to be 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4   International Law: From Vienna to Beijing and Beyond 
 
 
 
 
 185
 
Otto explains that by 1995, the ‘women’s rights are human rights’ strategy 
developed in anticipation of the Vienna Conference confronted a complex and 
multi-faceted set of forces and ideologies.92 For example, the cracks that had 
started showing at the Population Conference in Cairo around issues of abortion, 
sexual orientation and constructions of ‘family’ developed into fully-fledged 
fault lines at Beijing.  
 
The Fourth World Conference on Women took place in Beijing from 4-15 
September 1995.93 The document ensuing from the Conference is the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, which was the culmination of a number of 
processes, including regional consultations, reports from export groups, and the 
39th session of the CSW, which served as the preparatory meeting for the 
Conference.94 At the end of this session, 40% of the draft document was in 
brackets, which indicated that agreement had not yet been reached on these 
sections. As Otto points out, this revealed the highly contested nature of 
women’s issues globally. During the preparatory consultations, the fact that 
certain states were ready to reopen questions that had only recently been agreed 
at the earlier world conferences was significant. Issues related to women’s 
                                                                                                                                    
determined only ‘at the national or local level according to the national legislative 
process’.   
92  D Otto ‘A post-Beijing reflection on the limitations and potential of human rights 
discourse for women’ in KD Askin & DM Koenig (eds) Women and International 
Human Rights Law (1999) 115 at 126. 
93  Over 50,000 people (mostly women) participated in the official intergovernmental 
Conference and the parallel NGO Forum, which was held from 30 August to 8 
September 1995 in Huairou, situated about 50 km from Beijing. Participants came from 
189 States, and in addition to the 400 NGO’s with permanent consultative status with 
the ECOSOC, approximately 2,500 other NGO’s were accredited to attend – D Otto 
‘Holding up half the sky, but for whose benefit? A critical analysis of the Fourth World 
Conference on Women’ (1996) 8 Australian Feminist Law Journal 7 at 7, 10-11.   
94  See Otto op cit note 93 at 10-11. 
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reproductive rights and religious and cultural relativity found their way back onto 
the official agenda at every opportunity.95  
 
 
4.2 Nature of the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action96 
 
According to Brownlie, the statement of conclusions of a conference of States 
may be a form of multilateral treaty, but even if it is only an instrument recording 
decisions not adopted unanimously, the result may constitute cogent evidence of 
the state of customary law on the subject concerned.97  
 
One may thus conclude that although the Declaration and Platform of Action are 
not legally binding per se, they may provide evidence of emerging norms of 
international custom.98 At minimum, the Declaration and Platform of Action do 
embody solemn political commitments by states.  
 
 
 
                                                 
95  Otto recounts that the most ominous instance was perhaps the belated objection by 
certain States, at the CSW session, to the use of the word ‘gender’ in the draft Platform. 
This objection was aimed at ensuring that the term should not be understood as socially 
constructed, and particularly, to eliminate any suggestion that the Platform might be 
inclusive of homosexuals, bisexuals or transsexuals – idem at 11. The term was 
eventually retained in the document, with the understanding that no new meaning or 
connotation of the term was intended.  
96  A/Conf.177/20 and A/Conf.177/20/Add.1 (15 September 1995). The Declaration and 
Platform for Action was subsequently endorsed by the UN General Assembly on 8 
December 1995 (A/RES/50/42). 
97   Brownlie op cit note 53 at 14-15.  
98  See also Vesa op cit note 60 at 318.  
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4.3 Contents of the document99 
 
4.3.1 General 
 
One of the Beijing Platform’s main themes is that there are areas of particular 
urgency that stand out as priorities for action. These special concerns emerged 
from a review of progress since the Nairobi World Conference in 1985.100 For 
each of the twelve ‘critical areas of concern’ set out in the Platform,101 the 
problem is diagnosed and strategic objectives are proposed with concrete actions 
to be taken by various actors in order to achieve these objectives. The Platform 
proposes that all actors should focus action and resources on these strategic 
objectives.  
 
South Africa participated officially in the Beijing Conference through a 
delegation led by (then) Minister of Health Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and the 
South African government adopted all parts of the Platform without reservations. 
In a speech to the conference, Dr Dlamini-Zuma stated that the South African 
government ‘pledges itself to the full implementation of this programme as a 
major step to achieve the non-sexist South Africa, which is our ultimate goal’.102 
                                                 
99  The Declaration and the Platform for Action are set out in separate Annexes and the 
paragraphs of each section are numbered independently. They are accordingly treated 
as separate texts for purposes of this discussion. Paragraph references are to the 
Platform for Action, unless specifically stated otherwise.  
100    Beijing Platform op cit note 96 para 45.  
101  These twelve critical areas of concern are the following: women and poverty; education 
and training of women; women and health; violence against women; women and armed 
conflict; women and the economy; women in power and decision-making; institutional 
mechanisms for the advancement of women; human rights of women; women and the 
media; women and the environment; and the girl child. 
102    Department of Welfare Report of the South African Government’s Commitments 
Arising of the Fourth UN Women’s Conference, Bejing (1995) 3 (copy on file with 
candidate).  
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 4.3.2 Provisions relating to violence against women103 
 
Section D of the Beijing Platform, which deals with violence against women, 
notably elaborates on the Violence Declaration,104 but also introduces a number 
of new themes. The introductory paragraph reiterates the Preamble to the 
Violence Declaration in that it confirms violence against women as an obstacle 
to the achievement of the objectives of equality, development and peace.105 It 
also reaffirms that violence against women both violates and impairs or nullifies 
the enjoyment by women of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
The Platform explains that knowledge about the causes and consequences of 
violence against women, as well as its incidence and measures to combat it, have 
been greatly expanded since the Nairobi Conference.106 In all societies, to a 
greater or lesser degree, women and girls are subjected to physical, sexual and 
psychological abuse that cuts across lines of income, class and culture. The low  
social and economic status of women can be both a cause and a consequence of 
violence against women. 
                                                 
103  This discussion focuses on two of the twelve critical areas of concern, i.e. violence 
against women and human rights of women. This limited focus runs the risk of 
presenting a one-dimensional view of the Platform of Action, which should be read as a 
whole to gain insight into broader issues such as the macro-economic framework of the 
document. For brief comments on this aspect, see J Hunt ‘Reflections on Beijing’ 
(1996) 6 Australian Feminist Law Journal 39 at 40; C Bulbeck ‘Less than 
overwhelmed by Beijing: Problems concerning women’s commonality and diversity’ 
(1996) 6 Australian Feminist Law Journal 31 at 32-33.   
104  See Section 3 above.  Otto notes that as this section of the Platform builds on the 
language and approach of the Violence Declaration, the draft text was not heavily 
bracketed – which means that there was consensus on this section of the draft text going 
into the Conference – op cit note 93 at 17. 
105  Beijing Platform op cit note 96 para 112.  
106  Ibid. 
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(a) Definition of violence against women 
 
In this respect, the Beijing Platform also draws on the Violence Declaration. It 
makes use of the basic formulation set out in Article 1 of the Violence 
Declaration,107 with the listing of examples of violence occurring on each of the 
three ‘tiers’ (in the family, in the general community and violence perpetrated or 
condoned by the State). The Beijing Platform adds further instances of violence 
against women: violation of the human rights of women in situations of armed 
conflict, in particular murder, systematic rape, sexual slavery and forced 
pregnancy.108 It notes that acts of violence against women also include forced 
sterilisation and forced abortion, coercive/forced use of contraceptives, female 
infanticide and prenatal sex selection.109 
 
 
(b) Women particularly vulnerable to violence 
 
The groups of women who are particularly vulnerable to violence as recognised 
in the Violence Declaration,110 are expanded in the Beijing Platform. Additions 
include the following: women migrant workers, displaced women, repatriated  
women, women living in poverty, in foreign occupation, wars of aggression, civil 
wars, and terrorism, including hostage-taking.111 
 
 
                                                 
107  Idem para 113. 
108  Idem para 114.  
109  Idem para 115.  
110  See Violence Declaration op cit note 47 Preamble.  
111  Beijing Platform op cit note 96 para 116. 
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The Platform further explains that women may be vulnerable to violence 
perpetrated by persons in positions of authority in both conflict and non-conflict 
situations.112 For this reason, training of all officials in humanitarian and human 
rights law and the punishment of perpetrators of violent acts against women 
would help to ensure that such violence does not take place at the hands of public 
officials in whom women should be able to place trust, including police and 
prison officials and security forces. 
 
(c) Consequences of violence against women 
 
Importantly, the Beijing Platform acknowledges the far-reaching consequences 
of violence against women, which range from limiting women’s access to 
resources and basic activities to serious health and economic costs to the 
individual and society more broadly.113 In line with the general pattern emerging 
here, the Beijing Platform repeats the key principle set out in the Violence 
Declaration, viz that violence against women is one of the crucial social 
mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared 
with men; however, the Platform expands on the particular theme by adding 
further information or broadening the theme.  
 
(d) Causes of violence against women 
 
The diagnostic section repeats the key statement in the Violence Declaration that 
violence against women is a manifestation of the historically unequal power 
relations between men and women, but also goes further to link violence against 
                                                 
112  Idem para 121.  
113  Idem para 117. 
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women to the effect of cultural patterns. This was significant in a context where 
cultural relativity was gaining increasing influence.114 The Beijing Platform 
explains that violence against women throughout the life cycle derives 
essentially from cultural patterns, in particular the harmful effects of certain 
traditional or customary practices and ‘all acts of extremism’ linked to race, sex, 
language or religion that perpetuate the lower status accorded to women in the 
family, the workplace, the community and society.115 It further states that 
violence against women is exacerbated by social pressures, notably the shame of 
denouncing certain acts that have been perpetrated against women; women’s lack 
of access to legal information, aid or protection; the lack of laws that effectively 
prohibit violence against women; failure to reform existing laws; inadequate 
efforts on the part of public authorities to promote awareness of and enforce 
existing laws; and the absence of educational and other means to address the 
causes and consequences of violence. 
 
(e) General policy approach 
 
Certain broad recommendations on how to approach violence against women are 
already to be found in the introductory section that precedes the ‘Strategic 
Objectives’ containing specific recommendations to States and other bodies. For 
example, this introductory section states that in addressing violence against 
women, Governments and other actors should promote an ‘active and visible’ 
                                                 
114  Otto explains that a serious debate over cultural relativity carried on throughout the 
Conference. It was only resolved, in the closing hours of the Conference, through a 
‘“trade-off” in diversities’ that saw all references to ‘sexual preferences’ in the Platform 
removed – op cit note 93 at 19. In exchange, language was included (adopted in 
Vienna) to the effect that while States much promote and protect all human rights, 
‘cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind’ - para 9 of the Platform.  
115  Beijing Platform op cit note 96 para 118. 
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policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies and programmes so 
that before decisions are taken, an analysis may be made of their effects on 
women and men, respectively.116 In addition, the Platform explains that the 
absence of adequate gender-disaggregated data and statistics on the incidence of 
violence makes the elaboration of programmes and monitoring of changes 
difficult.117 Lack of or inadequate documentation and research on domestic 
violence, sexual harassment and violence against women and girls in private and 
in public, including the workplace, impede efforts to design specific intervention 
strategies. 
 
(f) Violence against women as a violation of women’s rights 
 
A theme that appears to be under-stated in the diagnostic section is that of 
violence against women as a violation of women’s rights. The introductory 
paragraph does confirm that violence against women ‘both violates and impairs 
or nullifies the enjoyment by women of their human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’.118 However, this theme is not taken any further in this section.  
 
Reference to violence against women as a rights violation is, on the other hand, 
found in another of the twelve critical areas of concern, i.e. ‘Human Rights of 
Women’.119 The diagnostic section here reaffirms a number of general 
propositions relating to, for example, the universal, indivisible, inter-dependent 
and inter-related nature of all rights, as set out in the Vienna Declaration.120 The 
obligation of Governments to not only refrain from violating the human rights of 
                                                 
116  Idem para 123.  
117  Idem para 120.  
118  Idem para 112. See also discussion of the Violence Declaration in Section 3 above.  
119  Beijing Platform op cit note 96 Section I para 210 et seq.  
120  Idem para 213. 
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all women, but also work actively to promote and protect these rights is 
reiterated.121 
 
In respect of violence against women, the Platform repeats the earlier statement 
that such violence both violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women 
of their human rights and freedoms. It then explains that -  
 
[G]ender-based violence, such as battering and other domestic 
violence, sexual abuse, sexual slavery and exploitation, and 
international trafficking in women and children, forced 
prostitution and sexual harassment, as well as violence against 
women, resulting from cultural prejudice, racism and racial 
discrimination, xenophobia, pornography, ethnic cleansing, armed 
conflict, foreign occupation, religious and anti-religious 
extremism and terrorism are incompatible with the dignity and the 
worth of the human person and must be combated and 
eliminated.122  
 
The distinction here between ‘gender-based violence’ and ‘violence against 
women’ is difficult to understand, given that the document appears to use 
‘violence against women’ as its operational concept.123 The term ‘gender-based 
violence’ is used four times elsewhere in the Platform,124 and, except for the 
definition of ‘violence against women’,125 there is only one among these 
instances where the context could possibly justify the use of this term rather than 
‘violence against women’.126 
                                                 
121  Idem para 215. 
122  Idem Para 224. 
123  See Beijing Platform op cit note 96 para 113.   
124  Idem paras 99, 113, 125(b), 129(d).  
125  Idem para 113. 
126  Beijing Platform op cit note 96 para 129(d), which reads as follows: ‘Encourage the 
media to examine the impact of gender role stereotypes, including those perpetuated by 
commercial advertisements which foster gender-based violence and inequalities, and 
how they are transmitted during the life cycle, and take measures to eliminate these 
negative images with a view to promoting a violence-free society.’ 
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The statement is nevertheless significant for its introduction of the notion of 
‘dignity’ into the motivation for the elimination of violence against women – 
again, a progression from the Violence Declaration, which does not refer to 
dignity in this particular sense.127  
 
(g) Strategic Objectives and state obligations 
The Platform identifies three strategic objectives in relation to violence against 
women:128 
(i) To take integrated measures to prevent and eliminate violence against 
women;  
(ii) To study the causes and consequences of violence against women and the 
effectiveness of preventive measures; and 
(iii) To eliminate trafficking in women and assist victims of violence due to 
prostitution and trafficking. 
 
Under each of these objectives, a list of ‘actions to be taken’ is set out. The 
actors range from Governments to the UN, including local government, trade 
unions, NGO’s, international organisations, and so forth. Compared to Articles 4 
and 5 of the Violence Declaration, there is again a progression to be seen in the 
Beijing Platform, both in terms of the number and level of specificity of ‘state 
                                                 
127  The Preamble to the Violence Declaration contains the following introductory 
paragraph: 
 ‘Recognising the urgent need for the universal application to women of the rights and 
principles with regard to equality, security, liberty, integrity and dignity of all human 
beings…’ (Emphasis added.) See also discussion of the right to dignity in the African 
Women’s Protocol in Chapter 5, Part D, Section 2.2.2. 
128  Listed in as Strategic Objectives D1, D2 and D3 respectively in the Beijing Platform.  
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duties’ as well as the more compelling nature of the language used in the 
Platform.    
 
 
The actions under the first two Strategic Objectives listed above, to the extent 
that they comply with the model being developed, are set out in Table 3, 
Annexure A.129 Comparing this table with the previous two, compiled in respect 
of General Recommendation No. 19 (Table 1) and the Violence Declaration 
(Table 2), one notes that the ‘actions to be taken’ by Governments (and others, 
such as NGO’s, the private sector and the media) are considerably more 
extensive than those stipulated in the other two documents.  
 
The Beijing Platform envisages a three-tiered intergovernmental mechanism, 
consisting of the General Assembly, the ECOSOC and the CSW, to play the 
primary role in coordinating the implementation and monitoring of the Platform 
for Action.130 The General Assembly adopted the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform of Action on 8 December 1995. 
 
It has been pointed out that the language of the Platform itself provides little 
guidance on the development of time-bound targets for implementation, with 
specific targets identified in only three areas.131 
 
 
                                                 
129  Trafficking and exploitation of prostitution are excluded from this study – see Chapter 
1, Section 3.1. For this reason, Strategic Objective D.3 falls outside the ambit of the 
study.  
130  Beijing Platform op cit note 96 paras 312-320.   
131  Bulbeck op cit note 103 at 32. None of these identified targets relate to violence against 
women.  
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4.3.3 The Implementation Review Process 
 
(a) The Beijing +5 Review (2000) 
 
Five years after the conference in Beijing, a review of progress in the 
implementation of the Beijing Platform was undertaken by the UN General 
Assembly meeting in Special Session in June 2000. Around 180 government 
delegates and 1,200 NGO representatives convened in New York for this session, 
known as ‘Beijing+5’.132 
 
The CSW acted as preparatory body for the review, entitled ‘Women 2000: 
Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century’. The 
process culminated in a Political Declaration133 and an Outcome Document,134 in 
which Member States reaffirmed their commitment to the Beijing Platform and 
adopted further actions for its implementation.135 The Outcome Document, 
                                                 
132  E Herzer ‘Beijing+5: The uphill struggle continues’ (2000) 86 Women Lawyers Journal 
23 at 23.  
133   General Assembly Resolution S-23/2. Political Declaration, adopted on 10 June 2000. 
UN Doc A/RES/S-23/2 (dated 16 November 2000).   
134  General Assembly Resolution S-23/3. Further actions and initiatives to implement the 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted on 10 June 2000. UN Doc 
A/RES/S-23/3 (dated 16 November 2000) [hereafter ‘the Outcome Document’]. 
135  Herzer recounts that although the CSW had recommended to the General Assembly 
that the Beijing Platform itself should not be opened up for discussion, in order to 
concentrate on the task of setting specific targets and benchmarks for ongoing obstacles 
faced by women, the opposite happened. Government delegates spent most of their 
time in ideological discussion. Much of the debate focused on reproductive freedom, 
with the Vatican and its allies attempting to reverse the achievements of the Beijing 
Platform. This attempt, which lasted into the early hours of the last night’s discussion, 
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which was prepared on the basis of national reports, reports of the UN Secretary 
General and regional meetings held in preparation of the Special Session of the 
General Assembly,136 reviewed each of the twelve critical areas of concern 
contained in the Beijing Platform and examined the achievements and obstacles 
to implementation in each instance. 
 
In the case of violence against women, the achievements listed include the wide 
recognition that violence against women and girls, whether occurring in public or 
private life, is a human rights issue.137 The Outcome Document further reported 
that it has been broadly accepted that violence against women, where perpetrated 
or condoned by the State or its agents, constitutes a human rights violation. It has 
also been accepted that States have an obligation to exercise due diligence to 
prevent, investigate and punish acts of violence, whether those acts are 
perpetrated by the State or by private persons, and to provide protection to 
victims.138  
 
The Outcome Document noted that governments have increasingly become 
aware of and committed to preventing and combating violence against women 
and girls, including domestic violence through, inter alia, improved legislation, 
policies and programmes.139 There is a growing recognition that all forms of 
                                                                                                                                    
was unsuccessful – op cit note 132 at 25. See also Amnesty International Beijing+15: 
Realizing Women’s Rights (2010) 2. 
136  Outcome Document op cit note 134 para 6.  
137  Idem para 13.  
138  Ibid.  
139  Governments have initiated policy reforms and mechanisms, such as interdepartmental 
committees, guidelines and protocols, national, multidisciplinary and coordinated 
programmes to address violence. Some Governments have also introduced or reformed 
laws to protect women and girls from all forms of violence and laws to prosecute the 
perpetrators. 
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violence against women seriously affect their health, and healthcare providers are 
seen to have a significant role to play this regard.  
 
Some progress has been made in the provision of services for abused women and 
children, including legal services, shelters, special health services and 
counselling, hotlines and police units with special training. Education for law 
enforcement personnel, members of the judiciary, health-care providers and 
welfare workers was being promoted. Educational materials for women and 
public awareness campaigns have been developed as well as research on the root 
causes of violence. 
 
Efforts towards the eradication of harmful traditional practices, including female 
genital mutilation, have received national, regional and international policy 
support. Many Governments have introduced educational and outreach 
programmes, as well as legislative measures criminalising these practices.  
 
On the side of obstacles, the fact that women continue to be victims of various 
forms of violence was noted.140 An inadequate understanding of the root causes 
of all forms of violence against women and girls hindered efforts to eliminate 
violence against women and girls. Socio-cultural attitudes that are discriminatory 
and economic inequalities reinforced women’s subordinate place in society; this 
rendered women and girls vulnerable to various forms of violence. 
 
                                                 
140   Idem para 14.  
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In many countries, a coordinated multi-disciplinary approach141 to responding to 
violence was still limited. Domestic violence, including sexual violence in 
marriage, was still treated as a private matter in some countries. Insufficient 
awareness of the consequences of domestic violence, how to prevent it and the 
rights of victims still existed.  
 
Looking at the achievements in the critical area of concern of human rights of 
women, the Outcome Documents noted (inter alia) that legal reforms have been 
undertaken to prohibit all forms of discrimination and discriminatory provisions 
have been eliminated in civil, penal and personal status law governing marriage 
and family relations and all forms of violence in many states.142 The adoption of 
the Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention was also (rightly) listed as an 
achievement.143 The role of women’s NGO’s in raising awareness that women’s 
rights are human rights was acknowledged, as well as their generating support 
for the inclusion of a gender perspective in the elaboration of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court.144 
 
Under obstacles here, the failure to achieve the goal of universal ratification of 
the Women’s Convention by the year 2000 was included, as well as the fact that 
there continued to be a large number of reservations to the Convention. 
 
The Outcome Document listed a number of actions to be taken by States at 
national level. These actions are not explicitly divided according to the critical 
areas of concern, although they do appear to be clustered together thematically. 
                                                 
141  Such an approach would include the health system, the workplace, the media, the 
education system as well as the justice system – ibid.  
142  Idem at para 26.  
143  See Chapter 3, Section 2.4. 
144  See Chapter 2, Section 5.2. 
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A comparison between the original actions to be taken set out in the Beijing 
Platform and the actions as listed in the Outcome Document indicate certain 
meaningful additions to the latter (although there are also some nearly verbatim 
repetitions).145  
 
For example, the Beijing Platform requires Governments to - 
 
… [a]dopt and/or implement and periodically review and analyse 
legislation to ensure its effectiveness in eliminating violence 
against women, emphasising the prevention of violence and the 
prosecution of offenders; take measures to ensure the protection 
of women subjected to violence, access to just and effective 
remedies, including compensation and indemnification and 
healing of victims, and rehabilitation of perpetrators;146 
 
The Outcome Document expands this into two composite ‘duties’147 addressing 
the review of legislation and prosecution and sentencing of perpetrators:148  
 
(a)  Governments should, as a matter of priority, review and revise 
legislation, where appropriate, with a view to introducing effective 
legislation, including on violence against women, and take other 
necessary measures to ensure that all women and girls are protected 
against all forms of physical, psychological and sexual violence, and are 
provided recourse to justice; and 
 
(b)  Prosecute the perpetrators of all forms of violence against women and 
girls and sentence them appropriately, and introduce actions aimed at 
                                                 
145  Cf para 69(i) of the Outcome Document – and para 106(q) of the Beijing Platform.  
146  Beijing Platform op cit note 96 para 124(d). 
147  The term is used here in the broad sense.   
148  Outcome Document op cit note 134 para 69.  
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helping and motivating perpetrators to break the cycle of violence and 
take measures to provide avenues for redress to victims; 
 
One notes that the language here is more compelling and specific: whereas the 
Beijing Platform refers to ‘adopt and/or implement and periodically review and 
analyse legislation’, the Outcome Document requires Governments to ‘as a 
matter of priority, review and revise legislation’.149 The Beijing Platform 
requires Governments to emphasise ‘the prevention of violence and the 
prosecution of offenders’ (in legislation); the Outcome Document expands on 
this by stating that they should ‘prosecute the perpetrators of all forms of 
violence against women and girls and sentence them appropriately’. The latter is 
again more directed.  
 
An additional shift can be discerned in ‘take measures to ensure… the 
rehabilitation of perpetrators’ (as stated in the Beijing Platform) and the 
instruction to ‘introduce actions aimed at helping and motivating perpetrators to 
break the cycle of violence’ (as seen in the Outcome Document).  
 
The Outcome Document also introduces a number of additional themes in the 
area of violence against women. Firstly, it states that Governments should adopt 
and fully implement laws and other measures to eradicate harmful customary or 
traditional practices, including female genital mutilation, early and forced 
marriage and so-called honour crimes.150 Herzer notes that this is the first time 
                                                 
149  Emphasis added. Governments are also, in a subsequent paragraph, enjoined to ensure 
that cases of domestic violence are brought to justice ‘swiftly’ – Outcome Document op 
cit note 134 para 69(d).  
150  Idem para 69(e). 
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that the UN in a consensus document calls for national legislation outlawing 
honour killings and forced marriage.151 
 
Secondly, Government should take measures to address racism and racially 
motivated violence against women and girls.152 In this way, the Outcome 
Document addresses the important aspect of intersecting discrimination(s) – 
although I argue that race is not the only ground that should have been 
enumerated here.153 
 
The Outcome Document further called on Governments to treat all forms of 
violence against women and girls of all ages as a criminal offence punishable by 
law, including violence based on all forms of discrimination.154 This is an 
important development if one bears in mind that domestic violence is often not 
treated as a criminal offence in and of itself: victims have to bring charges under 
generic offences such as assault, rape or attempted murder.155 
 
                                                 
151  Herzer op cit note 132 at 25. See also Y Ertürk ‘The due diligence standard: What does 
it entail for women’s rights?’ in C Benninger-Budel (ed) (2008) Due Diligence and Its 
Application to Protect Women from Violence 27 at 30. 
152  Outcome Document op cit note 134 para 69(g). 
153  The sexual assault and murder of black lesbians in South Africa in recent years, by all 
indications based on their sexual orientation, is a stark example – see A Martin et al 
Hate Crimes: The Rise of Corrective Rape in South Africa (2009) 8-9.   
154  Outcome Document op cit note 134 para 69(c). 
155  South Africa is a case in point - at least in part.  The only offence that specifically refers 
to domestic violence is contravention of s 17(1) of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 
1998 (‘the DVA’) – breach of a domestic violence protection order. Assault committed 
against a domestic partner where there is no protection order in place against the 
perpetrator would simply be a charge of assault, as if committed by a stranger. There 
are certain acts of domestic violence as defined in s 1 of the DVA that are not, at the 
time of writing, recognised as criminal offences; these include emotional and 
psychological abuse, economic abuse (depending on the facts), harassment and 
stalking.  
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The Outcome Document displays a growing awareness of the need for holistic 
coordination mechanisms. It therefore calls for Governments to consider setting 
up or strengthening a national coordinating mechanism, for example, a national 
rapporteur or an inter-agency body, with the participation of civil society, to 
encourage the exchange of information and to report on data, root causes, factors 
and trends in violence against women, in particular trafficking.156 It also looks at 
over-arching mechanisms at international level, for example, the development, 
with the full participation of all countries, of an international consensus on 
indicators and ways to measure violence against women,157 and establishment of 
a readily accessible database on statistics, legislation, training models, good 
practices, lessons learned and other resources with regard to all forms of violence 
against women.158 
 
(b) The Beijing +10 Review (2005) 
 
At its 49th session in 2005, the CSW carried out the 10-year review and appraisal 
of implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the 
outcomes of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly. The 
reviews conducted in 2005 and 2010, ten and fifteen years respectively after the 
Fourth World Conference in Beijing, were both based inter alia on surveys 
conducted among Member States to assess their progress in implementation. 
Questionnaires were distributed to Member States and Observer States, and the 
responses were used in preparing comprehensive reports.159 Similar to the 5-year 
                                                 
156  Outcome Document op cit note 134 para 70(d). 
157  See also discussion on the work of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women 
in Section 5 below.  
158  Outcome Document op cit note 134 para 92(b). 
159  By 31 October 2004, 134 Member States and one Observer State had responded to the 
2005 questionnaire. In the case of the 2010 review, 139 Member States and one 
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review, the five regional commissions of the UN held preparatory 
intergovernmental meetings; NGO’s in all regions held meetings in conjunction 
with those organised with those by the commissions. 
 
The extensive Beijing+10 Review report sets out by providing an overview of 
the major trends in the implementation of the Beijing Platform, with reference to 
general achievements and obstacles and challenges.160 It then discusses progress 
in each of the twelve critical areas of concern, again noting achievements, 
obstacles and challenges specific to each area, and also covers a number of 
additional issues that were identified as particularly important.161 Part IV deals 
with institutional arrangements and mechanisms for the advancement of women, 
which include national mechanisms, gender mainstreaming, statistics and 
indicators, capacity building, resources, and importantly, monitoring and 
accountability.162 The review report concludes by identifying priority areas for 
future action.163 
 
Examining the critical area of concern of violence against women, the report 
states that violence against women has become a priority on the national and 
international agenda.164 In their replies to the questionnaire, 129 countries 
                                                                                                                                    
Observer State had responded to the questionnaire by 30 November 2009. South Africa 
participated in both surveys.  
160  Report of the Secretary-General Review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform 
for Action and the outcome documents of the special session of the General Assembly 
entitled ‘Women 2000: gender equality, development and peace for the twenty-first 
century’ UN Doc E/CN.6/2005/2 (dated 6 December 2004) [hereafter ‘Beijing+10 
Report’] Part II para 41 et seq.  
161  Part III para 82 et seq. These additional issues are trafficking in women and girls, 
women and HIV/AIDS, indigenous women, information and communication 
technologies, the Millennium Development Goals, and men and boys.  
162  Beijing+10 Report op cit note 160 para 670 et seq.  
163  Idem Part V para 738 et seq. 
164  Idem para 197. 
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reported on measures taken to eliminate violence against women and girls. 
Governments recognised that violence against women in all its forms must be 
combated through ‘effective and comprehensive’ action.165 
 
The review report addressed achievements at international and national level 
separately. At international level, the listed achievements included actions taken 
by the General Assembly and the functional commissions of the ECOSOC, such 
as the CSW, CHR and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice, which have regularly adopted resolutions on violence against women.166 
The need to combat violence against women has also been recognised in various 
other international fora.167 Among the special procedures of the CHR, the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, is singled 
out as having made significant contributions through her analytical work and 
country visits.168  
 
Regarding achievements at national level, the review report provides an 
overview of the status of legislation relating to violence against women, 
incorporating reference to ‘good practices’. These ‘good practices’ relate both to 
                                                 
165  Ibid.  
166  The General Assembly specifically has adopted resolutions on domestic violence 
against women, trafficking in women and girls, traditional or customary practices 
affecting the health of women and girls, crimes committed against women in the name 
of honour and the elimination of all forms of violence against women - Beijing+10 
Report op cit note 160 para 199. 
167  For example, in the Millennium Declaration, Heads of State and Government resolved 
to combat all forms of violence against women. In 2001, the twenty-sixth special 
session of the General Assembly on HIV/AIDS recognized the need to eliminate all 
forms of violence against women and girls as a way to reduce their vulnerability to 
HIV/AIDS. The World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in 2002, also 
acknowledged the importance of eliminating all forms of violence and discrimination 
against women - Beijing+10 Report op cit note 160 para 201.  
168  Idem para 203.  
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substantive criminal law as well as the law of evidence and procedure.169 The 
report further provides details of programmatic measures such as ‘national action 
plans’ to address violence against women and public information, education and 
awareness-raising campaigns.170 Countries have also set up or expanded shelters, 
temporary accommodation, crisis centres, telephone hotlines or a combination of 
services for victims.171  
 
In terms of obstacles to implementation, the report notes that among the most 
frequently mentioned challenges is the lack of reliable and comparable sex-
disaggregated statistical data and information, compounded by insufficient 
research and studies.172 Several countries reported lack of resources:173 
Government decisions have often failed to translate into budget appropriations. 
The report further indicates numerous ‘structural’ shortcomings in respect of 
especially the criminal justice system.174 
 
                                                 
169  Idem paras 208-212. 
170  Idem paras 214, 218 and 225. 
171  Idem para 226. 
172  Idem para 227. 
173  Idem para 234. 
174  In many countries, law enforcement systems are not gender-sensitive, and police and 
criminal justice officials often fail to recognize the serious nature of violence against 
women - Beijing+10 Report op cit note 160 para 231. The complexity of court 
procedures and the lack of family courts or other competent tribunals can impede 
women’s access to justice – para 232. Women, especially if they are poor, do not know 
their rights, and have difficulty starting legal proceedings because they have no legal 
assistance. Women can be reluctant to report incidents and seek help, as the result of 
social stigma, mistrust of the criminal justice system or a hostile environment, or 
because women believe that a man has a right to beat a woman, especially for 
disobedience to husbands, fathers or brothers. Professionals working on violence 
against women may be poorly trained, and several countries lack support measures such 
as shelters, hotlines, referral centres, and witness protection. Only a few States try to 
rehabilitate perpetrators. 
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A number of responses reported that male authority and women’s subordination 
are deeply rooted in society, including legislative bodies and the judiciary.175 
Women’s economic and financial dependence on the income of their husband 
was also considered to be a challenge to the effective eradication of domestic 
violence. 
 
The Beijing+10 report concluded with ‘priority areas for future actions’. These 
relate to each of the critical areas of concern, and consist of the areas outlined by 
respondents to the questionnaire as their priorities for future action. The report 
therefore noted what respondent countries intend or plan to do. For example, it 
noted that many countries indicated that effectively addressing the complex 
causes and consequences of violence against women and girls remained a 
priority. Numerous Governments planned to introduce new or strengthen existing 
legislation. Particular emphasis would be placed on enhancing provisions for 
victim protection, strengthening law enforcement and improving responsiveness 
of the criminal justice system. National strategies or plans of action would be 
major instruments for combating violence against women. Governments also 
intended to ensure a coordinated and comprehensive response to violence against 
women, including cooperation with NGO’s.176 The following is another example: 
 
Several countries intend to develop indicators, improve data 
collection or conduct research. Research in Ireland will assess 
why victims choose not to report violence to the police and why 
only a small percentage of reported cases result in a court hearing. 
Belgium will study early marriage and female genital mutilation/ 
cutting.177 
 
                                                 
175  Beijing+10 Report op cit note 160 para 235. 
176  Idem para 753. 
177  Idem para 754. 
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This phrasing constitutes a clear shift from the hortatory (or even peremptory) 
language employed in earlier documents, which raises the questions of whether 
this section of the report (or indeed, the report as a whole) constitutes any more 
than a catalogue of ‘good practices’.  
 
 (c) The Beijing +15 Review (2010) 
 
During 1-13 March 2010, the 15-year review of the Beijing Platform took place 
during the 54th session of the CSW. As explained above, the review was based on 
the results of a survey conducted among UN Member States as well as the 
outcomes of regional consultative processes.178 This review report included a 
particular focus on the linkages between the implementation of the Beijing 
Platform and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.179  
 
The review report notes that since the 2005 review, violence against women has 
become a priority issue at the global, regional and national levels.180 In October 
2006, the Secretary-General issued an in-depth study on all forms and 
manifestations of violence against women. Following the completion of the 
study, the General Assembly adopted a series of comprehensive and ‘action-
                                                 
178  Report of the Secretary-General Review of the implementation of the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, the outcomes of the twenty-third special session 
of the General Assembly and its contribution to shaping a gender perspective towards 
the full realization of the Millennium Development Goals. UN Doc E/2010/4–
E/CN.6/2010/2 (dated 8 February 2010) [hereafter ‘Beijing+15 Report’] paras 11-12. 
179  See Beijing +15 Report op cit note 178 para 4. These linkages are discussed in paras 
423-471. Since these linkages or intersections focus to a large extent on implementation 
of the Beijing Platform on national level, with a strong emphasis on programmatic 
rather than normative development, they will not be addressed in detail here. See in this 
regard also generally UN Division on the Advancement of Women Report of Expert 
Group Meeting: The Impact of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action on 
the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (2009). 
180  Beijing+15 Report op cit note 178 para 117.  
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oriented’ resolutions calling on all stakeholders to intensify their efforts to 
eliminate violence against women.181 
  
In terms of trends in implementation at national level, the review report noted 
that the number and type of measures undertaken by Member States to prevent 
and address violence against women had significantly increased since 2005.182 
An assessment of these measures revealed the following trends: strengthened and 
more comprehensive legal, policy and institutional frameworks;183 increased 
availability and quality of services for victims/survivors of violence;184 
engagement of multiple stakeholders to prevent violence against women;185 and 
improvements in data collection and analysis.186  
 
In addition to challenges and areas needing action, the Beijing+15 review report 
identifies a number of cross-cutting issues relating to all critical areas of 
concern.187 Violence against women was consistently addressed as an obstacle to 
implementation in many areas and the need for significant further action across 
sectors, including health, education, employment and law enforcement, was 
highlighted.188  
 
The report concludes with strategies and proposed actions for each of the critical 
areas of concern. In the case of violence against women, these strategies (set out 
                                                 
181  Ibid, citing General Assembly Resolutions 61/143, 62/133 and 63/155.  
182  Idem para 121.  
183  See Beijing +15 Report op cit note 178 paras 122-131. 
184  Idem paras 132-135. 
185  Idem paras 136-140. 
186  Idem paras 141-145. 
187  Idem para 482. 
188  Idem para 485. 
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in five relatively brief paragraphs) are generally a broad restatement of the State 
actions already set out in the preceding documents.189 
 
 
5.  REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 
 
5.1 Background 
 
On 4 March 1994, the Commission on Human Rights, adopting a resolution for 
‘integrating the rights of women into the human rights mechanisms of the United 
Nations and the elimination of violence against women’, appointed a Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, including its causes and 
consequences.190 Two experts have since held the office of the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence against Women: Radhika Coomaraswamy, a Sri Lankan 
lawyer, who served three terms of office (three years each), from June 1994-July 
2003; and Yakin Ertürk, a Turkish sociologist, who served two terms (August 
2003-August 2009). The new mandate holder, Rashida Manjoo, a South African 
lawyer, has recently taken office.191  
 
                                                 
189  Idem paras 523-527. For example: ‘In addition to establishing provisions for penalizing 
and punishing perpetrators, legislative frameworks on violence against women should 
mandate support and protection for victims/survivors, prevention measures, training for 
relevant officials, funding and the creation of mechanisms to monitor implementation.’ 
– para 523. 
190  Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1994/45 UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/1994/45.  
191  The mandate was established by the Commission on Human Rights in 1994 (Resolution 
1994/45) and was extended in 1997, 2000 and 2003 (Resolutions 1997/44, 2000/45 and 
2003/45). The most recent extension was in 2008: Human Right Council Resolution 
7/24 Elimination of violence against women (dated 28 March 2008) para 5.   
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The two previous incumbents both produced review reports at the end of their 
mandate periods, i.e. in 2003 and 2009 respectively. Compiled after periods of 
ten and again fifteen years, these reports provide a valuable overview not only of 
the work of the Special Rapporteurs, but also of progress made since the 
institution of the mandate. The fifteen-year review report especially represents a 
useful measurement of various developments since 1994 to date.192  
 
The introduction (and scope)193 of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, 
following soon after the call for this mechanism in the Vienna Declaration,194 
was regarded as a victory for the women’s rights movement. However, as Ertürk 
observes, this victory also brought with it –  
  
… the onerous responsibility upon the [Special Rapporteur] for 
covering a vastly neglected and obstacle-ridden legal terrain - that 
of developing legal doctrines for distinct forms of gender-based 
violence faced by women, including those that are cognizant of 
the multilayered violations of women, to examine 
communications and make recommendations for eliminating 
violence as well as its root causes.195  
    
 
The methods of work set out in the mandate are (a) to seek and receive 
information on violence against women, its causes and consequences, from 
governments,  intergovernmental bodies, women’s groups, and UN agencies, 
                                                 
192  During their period in office, the first two Special Rapporteurs produced an impressive 
corpus of work consisting of 16 thematic reports and numerous country mission reports 
and communication reports (comprising communications to and from governments).   
193  This refers to the fact that the mandate included not only violence against women, but 
also its causes and consequences.  
194  See discussion in Section 2 above.  
195  Y Ertürk 15 Years of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its 
Causes and Consequences (1994-2009) - A Critical Review UN Doc 
A/HRC/11/6/Add.5 (dated 27 May 2009) para 2.  
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mechanisms and treaty bodies, and to respond effectively to such information; 
(b) to recommend measures, ways and means at national, regional and 
international levels towards the elimination of violence against women and its 
causes, and to remedy its consequences; and (c) to work closely with other 
special mechanisms created by the CHR (and since 2006 by the Human Rights 
Council), and bodies within the UN.196 
 
The mandate holder interacts with a wide range of stakeholders engaged with 
eliminating violence against women, including governments, UN bodies, 
agencies and special mechanisms, civil society organizations and academia; 
receives communications and complaints; conducts and reports on country 
missions; and produces annual reports. These activities allow the Special 
Rapporteur to identify and, where necessary, express concerns over trends in 
women’s human rights violations and develop legal standards and doctrines.197 
 
The themes of the annual reports are: preliminary report (1995); violence against 
women in the family (1996); violence against women in the community (1997); 
violence perpetrated or condoned by the State (1998); a follow-up report on 
violence against women in the family (1999); trafficking in women, women’s 
migration and violence against women (2000); violence against women 
perpetrated or condoned by the State during times of armed conflict (2001); 
cultural practices in the family that are violent towards women (2002); 
international, regional and national developments in the area of violence against 
women, 1994-2002 (2003); towards an effective implementation of international 
norms to end violence against women (2004); intersections of violence against 
                                                 
196  Idem para 17.  
197  Idem para 18.  
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women and HIV/AIDS (2005); the due diligence standards a tool for elimination 
of violence against women (2006); intersections between culture and violence 
against women (2007); indicators on violence against women (2008); political 
economy and violence against women (2009); and reparations (2010).   
 
The country mission reports aim to provide an analysis of violence against 
women in relation to a specific country, illustrating the particular aspects of the 
problems and the nature of risks arising in the context. The reports identify gaps 
in protection and provide detailed recommendations.198 Importantly, the Special 
Rapporteur also receives individual complaints, responding to all reliable and 
credible information regarding alleged cases of violence against women.199 Such 
communication is premised on the obligation of the State to prevent, protect, 
compensate and punish violence against women in the family, in the community 
and by the State.200 In this way, the mandate serves as a mechanism of ‘last 
resort’ for accountability or protection for many women worldwide, particularly 
because access to this special mechanism is not contingent on ratification by the 
State of any treaty law or reservations in respect thereto, nor is its role activated 
upon a periodic reporting cycle.201  
 
For purposes of this study, the thematic report on due diligence standards has 
been particularly instructive, although the contents of other reports such as the 
preliminary report of 1995, the two reports on violence against women in the 
                                                 
198  Idem para 22.  
199  Idem para 24. A standard reporting format is available on the website of the office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (‘OHCHR’) to facilitate submission of 
individual complaints: [www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/rapporteur/form.htm]. 
(Accessed on 10 March 2010.)  
200  Ertürk op cit note 195 para 22.   
201  Idem para 24.  
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family (1996 and 1999) and the recent report on political economy and violence 
are also essential for an understanding of the development of international and 
regional norms relating to the right to freedom from violence. The Special 
Rapporteur conducted a country visit to South Africa in 1996, and while her 
resulting country report has since become somewhat dated in the light of 
subsequent developments on legal and policy level, it is nevertheless informative 
to refer back to this report, especially for purposes of a comparison between the 
situation as it stood then and the current status quo.202  
 
 
5.2 Nature of the Special Rapporteurs’ reports 
 
Although the findings and recommendations set out in the annual thematic 
reports of Special Rapporteurs are not legally binding in international law, these 
reports are nevertheless influential in that the mandate holders generally make 
use of these annual reports to develop interpretations of the norms in question.203 
In this way, the reports may generate ‘soft law’ principles.204 
 
The Special Rapporteur has observed (correctly) that the thematic annual reports 
are particularly good resources in providing a normative framework for 
addressing distinct forms of gender-based violence, an analysis of the causes and 
consequences of violence, and an elaboration of the role of the State as well as 
regional and international stakeholders in combating violence in the public and 
private domains. They are also important for informing policy and shaping the 
                                                 
202  R Coomaraswamy Report on the mission of the Special Rapporteur to South Africa on 
the issue of rape in the community (11-18 October 1996) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1997/47/Add.3 (dated 24 February 1997). 
203  See HJ Steiner et al International Human Rights in Context 3 ed (2007) 767. 
204  Ibid.  
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advancement of women’s human rights standards in international law.205 In the 
case of South Africa, the reports of the Special Rapporteur were, for example, 
relied on in the drafting of the Bill that was enacted as the present Domestic 
Violence Act.206  
 
 
5.3 Contents of the Special Rapporteurs’ reports   
 
5.3.1 Overview 
 
Two phases can be distinguished in the work of the Special Rapporteur, broadly 
commensurate with the periods in office of the first two mandate holders. 
Coomaraswamy dedicated her annual thematic reports to discussing in detail the 
three broad categories of violence against women in the family, in the 
community, and perpetrated or condoned by the State, in addition to violence in 
specific contexts.207 In addition to securing recognition for distinct forms of 
violence against women and their causes, the focus in this period was on 
outlining legal doctrines and State obligations in relation to them.208 These have 
been critical inter alia to granting visibility to the broad spectrum of acts that 
constitute ‘violence against women’ occurring in both the public and private 
spheres and linking violence against women with power structures, including 
macroeconomic policies. Coomaraswamy indicated in her last report that the first 
                                                 
205  Ertürk op cit note 195 para 20. See also discussion of right to freedom from violence 
below.   
206  See South African Law (Reform) Commission Research Paper on Domestic Violence 
(1999) para 4.5.2, noting that the model framework for domestic violence legislation 
proposed by the Special Rapporteur was extensively consulted in preparing the 
Domestic Violence Bill.   
207  Ertürk op cit note 195 para 21.  
208  Idem para 62.  
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decade of the mandate emphasised standard-setting and awareness, and that the 
next decade should accordingly focus on strategies for a more effective 
implementation.209  
 
In many ways, the first decade of this mandate was an exploratory 
one. As the issue of [violence against women] was new on the 
human rights agenda, it was necessary to develop definitions and 
standards. This has been done by many relevant mechanisms, 
including CEDAW. While the first decade emphasised the need 
for conceptual clarity and standard-setting, the second decade 
must focus on compliance and monitoring. The first decade 
involved persuading States to accept international standards, to 
pass appropriate legislation and to set mechanisms in place to 
combat [violence against women]. The second decade must test 
the practice and implementation of these standards by focusing on 
a set of indicators.210 
 
 
The first report submitted by Ertürk in 2004 emphasised implementation and 
accountability as priority areas of the mandate, particularly in relation to non-
State actors. This focus has accordingly included tools and frameworks to 
facilitate implementation, such as the expansion of the ‘due diligence’ standard 
in relation to violence against women and the elaboration of indicators for 
measuring State progress in addressing violence against women.211  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
209  Idem para 21; R Coomaraswamy Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the 
Gender Perspective: Violence against Women UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/75 (dated 6 
January 2003) para 78. 
210  Idem para 79. 
211  Ertürk op cit note 195 para 62. See also Sections 5.3.2 (b) and (c) below.   
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5.3.2 Key themes emerging from the work of the Special Rapporteur 
 
(a) Definition of ‘violence against women’ 
 
The Violence Declaration introduced a three-tiered understanding of violence 
against women, consisting of violence in the family, violence in the community 
and violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, with examples at each 
level.212 In their thematic reports, the Special Rapporteurs have elaborated upon 
these forms of violence as follows:213 
 
(a)  Violence in the family - such as domestic violence; incest; forced 
prostitution by the family; violence against domestic workers and the girl-
child; sex-selective abortion and infanticide; and religious/customary laws;  
 
(b)  Violence in the community - such as violence within institutions; violence 
against women migrant workers; and pornography; and 
 
(c)  Violence perpetrated or condoned by the State - such as gender-based 
violence during armed conflict; custodial violence; violence against 
refugees and internally displaced persons; and violence against women 
from indigenous and minority groups.   
 
                                                 
212  See discussion in Section 3 above.  
213  Ertürk op cit note 195 para 12 
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Ertürk also suggested adding a fourth level, i.e. the ‘transnational arena’, which, 
due to globalisation and increased transnational processes, has emerged as 
another site where women ‘are encountering new vulnerabilities’.214  
 
Although expansion can be observed at all three levels, it is especially at the 
level of violence perpetrated or condoned by the State that the work done by the 
Special Rapporteur has served to further illuminate the definition as set out in the 
Violence Declaration.215  
 
(b) The due diligence standard 
 
The due diligence standard, which imposes on the State the duty to prevent, 
investigate, punish and provide compensation for all acts of violence against 
women wherever they occur, has been crucial in developing State responsibility 
for violence perpetrated by private actors.216 Under this standard, States are 
required to ‘exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance 
with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those 
acts are perpetrated by the State or private persons’.217  
                                                 
214  Idem para 13. In her 2004 report, Ertürk explains that the term ‘transnationalism’ is 
used to refer to a ‘continuum of life experience’ across conventional state boundaries, 
and may therefore include women who enter the transnational arena as refugees, 
migrant workers or trafficked prostitutes – Y Ertürk  Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences: Towards an Effective 
Implementation of International Norms to End Violence against Women UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2004/66 (dated 26 December 2003) paras 42-44, 47.  
215  See also O’Hare’s comment in note 64 above.  
216  Ertürk op cit note 195 para 66.  See discussion in Chapter 2, Section 4.3.  
217    J Bourke-Martignoni ‘The history and development of the due diligence standard in 
international law and its role in the protection of women against violence’ in C 
Benninger-Budel (ed) Due Diligence and its Application to Protect Women from 
Violence (2008) 47 at 47, with reference to art 4(c) of the Violence Declaration (see 
Section 3.3 above).  
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The Special Rapporteur has been instrumental in analysing what ‘due diligence’ 
entails in respect of prevention, investigation, punishment and compensation, 
thus providing States with crucial practical guidance in terms of compliance with 
their obligations. As early as her first thematic report in 1995, Coomaraswamy 
made the following compelling statement regarding due diligence: 
 
In the context of norms recently established by the international 
community, a State that does not act against crimes of violence 
against women is as guilty as the perpetrators. States are under a 
positive duty to prevent, investigate and punish crimes associated 
with violence against women.218  
 
As noted above, Ertürk undertook an investigation into the due diligence 
standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women as part of her 
focus on the implementation of existing human rights standards.219 In her 2006 
report, the Special Rapporteur traced the development of this standard in 
international law from its early origins to its application by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras.220 Having looked at 
certain international and regional instruments and the application of the due 
diligence standard by human rights bodies,221 she concluded on the basis of 
practice and opinio juris that a rule of customary international law has developed 
                                                 
218     R Coomaraswamy Preliminary Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women, its Causes  and Consequences UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/42 
(dated 22 November 1994) para 72.  
219  Y Ertürk The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence against 
Women UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/61 (dated 20 January 2006). 
220  Inter-American Court of Human Rights Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Judgment 
dated 29 July 1988) Series C: Decisions and Judgments, No. 04.  
221  Ertürk op cit note 219 paras 19-29. 
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that ‘obliges States to prevent and respond to acts of violence against women 
with due diligence’.222  
 
She then noted that what is less clear is the content of generalised obligations of 
due diligence - those that go beyond specific (identifiable) individuals or groups 
of women at known risk of violence, and the manner in which compliance with 
these obligations may be assessed and monitored.223 In more recent reports, her 
work has accordingly focused on developing the tangible ‘contents’ of these due 
diligence obligations.  
 
It has been observed that although each case has to be assessed on its merits, 
there are certain ‘basic’ obligations that should be implemented with due 
diligence in all contexts. Bourke-Martignoni explains that these different 
elements can be broken down into a ‘checklist’ of obligations or State duties.224 
For example, in her 1999 review report, Coomaraswamy developed such a list of 
considerations against which State compliance with due diligence obligations 
may be assessed. These included: ratification of international human rights 
instruments; constitutional guarantees of equality for women; the existence of 
national legislation and/ or administrative sanctions providing adequate redress 
for women victims of violence; executive policies or plans of action to deal with 
the issue of violence against women; the gender-sensitivity of the criminal justice 
system and police; accessibility and availability of support services; and 
collection of data and statistics concerning violence against women.225  
                                                 
222   Idem paras 28-29.  
223   Idem para 30.  
224  Bourke-Martignoni op cit note 217 at 56.  
225  R Coomaraswamy Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences: Violence against women in the family UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1999/68 (dated 10 March 1999) para 25. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4   International Law: From Vienna to Beijing and Beyond 
 
 
 
 
 221
 
The Special Rapporteur has made an important contribution to two previously 
neglected aspects of the due diligence standard: the State duty to prevent 
violence against women and to compensate its victims. The latter is of particular 
relevance given that the duty to ‘compensate’ or provide reparation to victims 
has not been included in the formulation of the Violence Declaration or the 
Beijing Platform, as well as in the context of recent South African 
developments.226 
 
Ertürk observes that the responsibility to ‘prevent’ has the potential of involving 
the State in actively intervening in and transforming social and material 
structures that are at the root of violence against women. In this context, the 
Special Rapporteur has emphasised the value of altering the intrinsic nature of 
the State to make it less patriarchal. 227 This may be accomplished, for example, 
through strong statements condemning violence against women made on behalf 
of society through the judiciary or the prosecutorial services.228  
 
In addition, the Special Rapporteur has emphasised the duty of the State to 
compensate for the consequence of violence. Ertürk notes that this not only 
includes, but goes beyond access to legal remedies and rehabilitative and support 
services, possibly involving ‘financial damages for any physical and 
psychological injuries suffered, for loss of employment and educational 
                                                 
226  See Chapter 6, Section 4.5. 
227  Ertürk op cit note 195 para. 70. 
228  The Special Rapporteur explains that State action, symbolised through judicial or 
prosecutorial action, embodies both ‘consequential effects’ in that condemnation of 
patriarchy can lead to changes in socio-cultural norms, as well as ‘intrinsic effects’ in 
that prosecutors or judges can be considered to be the ‘mouthpieces’ of society – op cit 
note 195 para 70.  
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opportunities, for loss of social benefits, for harm to reputation and dignity as 
well as any legal, medical or social costs incurred as a consequence of the 
violence’.229 She points out that the State must provide reparations to compensate 
financial and other forms of loss so as to fulfill the demands of restorative 
justice. 
 
In the most recent thematic report, the Special Rapporteur elaborates further on 
the theme of reparations.230 She notes that although a ‘coherent theory and 
practice’ for remedies for victims of human rights violations does not yet exist 
under international law, the right of individuals to reparation  for the violation of 
their human rights has been increasingly recognised.231 The content of the 
obligation to provide reparation to the individual whose rights have been violated 
remains unclear.  All human rights treaties use rather vague language when 
referring to the remedies ensuing after violation of a right.232  
 
The Women’s Convention, for example, is not particularly explicit regarding 
women’s right to remedies, reparation or compensation.233 The Violence 
Declaration spells out the obligation to provide reparations to women subjected 
to violence much more clearly: it places a duty on the State to develop penal, 
civil, labour and administrative sanctions in domestic legislation to punish and 
redress the wrongs caused to women who are subjected to violence. Regional 
instruments such as the Convention of Belém do Pará and the African Women’s 
Protocol are also more specific about States’ obligations to provide women with 
                                                 
229  Ibid. 
230  R Manjoo Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences UN Doc A/HRC/14/22 (dated 23 April 2010). 
231  Idem para 13.  
232  Idem para 14.  
233  Idem para 22, citing Art 2(c) of the Women’s Convention.  
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access to legal measures or to reparations.234 However, in spite of these advances 
this aspect of due diligence remains grossly underdeveloped.  
 
Manjoo accordingly makes a number of recommendations for exploring the 
notion of ‘reparations’ in different contexts, including the development of a 
gender-sensitive understanding of ‘harm’ and alternative means of victim 
compensation. Specific attention is paid to the reparations order made by the 
inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of González et al v Mexico235 
as an example of ‘gender-sensitive reparations with a transformative 
aspiration’.236 The Special Rapporteur comments as follows: 
 
The Court’s sensitivity in capturing the systemic nature of the 
problem of violence against women is also reflected in its 
reparations approach. It recognized for the first time that in a 
situation of structural discrimination reparations should aim at 
transforming such situation, thus aspiring not only to restitution 
but also to correction.237 
 
 
It is particularly this transformative potential of reparations that compels interest. 
The Special Rapporteur suggests that reparations for women cannot be just about 
returning them to the situation in which they were found before the violence 
occurred – but should strive to have this transformative potential. In other words, 
reparations should aspire, to the extent possible, to subvert instead of reinforce 
                                                 
234  Idem para 23.  
235  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Unreported judgment dated 16 November 
2009.  
236  See Chapter 5, Part B, Section 3.3.2 for discussion of this case.  
237  Manjoo op cit note 230 para 78. Cf also the Special Rapporteur’s criticism of the 
European Court of Human rights’s judgment in Opuz v Turkey (2009) – para 81. See 
Chapter 5, Part C, Section 4.5  for discussion of the Opuz case.  
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pre-existing structural subordination and inequalities that may be the root cause 
of the violence that women experience.238  
 
(c) Indicators, data collection and research studies 
 
An area where the Special Rapporteur has done particularly interesting (and 
important) work is that of developing indicators for measuring State progress in 
addressing violence against women.239  
 
This report on indicators on violence against women and State response views 
indicators as part of the State’s human rights obligations, as they ensure that 
interventions aimed at combating violence against women are based on accurate 
empirical data, and as a consequence are effective and responsive to prevailing 
patterns of violence.240 The Special Rapporteur further notes that indicators help 
make data accessible for non-specialist decision makers and enable interventions 
and their impact to be open to public scrutiny.241 Ertürk observes that uninformed 
legislative activity or ‘tokenistic responses’ cannot amount to compliance with 
                                                 
238  Manjoo op cit note 230 para 85. 
239  It is instructive to briefly recount how this focus came about. In order to assess State 
compliance in relation to violence in the family, Coomaraswamy sought information 
from Governments inter alia on national plans and statistics on domestic violence - 
Ertürk op cit note 195 para 78. She accordingly noted that States were erroneously 
making linkages between domestic violence, alcoholism and drugs, instead of 
connecting such violence with patriarchal ideology, resulting in misdirected responses 
and resources. In 2004 the CHR called on the Special Rapporteur to formulate 
proposals for indicators on violence against women and on measures taken by States to 
eliminate it – idem para 80. Extensive research was undertaken on trans-national 
indicators and the 2008 annual thematic report reflected the findings of that research. 
240  Y Ertürk The Next Step: Developing Transnational Indicators on Violence against 
Women UN Doc A/HRC/7/6/Add.5 (dated 25 February 2008) paras 52-55. 
241  Ertürk op cit note 195 para 82. 
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the due diligence obligation of the State to prevent, investigate and punish 
violence against women.242 
 
The report calls for formulating common indicators on violence against women, 
and proposes a set of indicators to measure violence against women (outcome 
indicators) and State responses to it.243 The report further recommends that the 
proposal be carried forward within the UN by an expert working group through 
technical manuals, pilots, and revisions, with concurrent steps and assistance on 
management of data systems at the national level.  
 
The relevance of indicators, sex-disaggregated data and gender impact studies is 
part of the obligation to comply with human rights standards, and is the basis for 
formulating State responses and monitoring the extent of State compliance.244  
 
(d) Conceptual gains 
 
The fifteen-year review report describes a number of conceptual shifts that have 
taken place since the inception of the mandate in 1994. These shifts have not 
only broadened the understanding of violence against women, but have 
‘compelled revisiting international and domestic laws and State 
responsibility’.245 Prominent among these have been contributions to a paradigm 
                                                 
242  Idem para 79. 
243  Idem para 84. These consist of institutional or structural indicators, which pertain to 
States’ international commitments, including ratification of CEDAW and plans of 
action on violence against women; and process indicators, which pertain to access to 
justice and reporting, including victims’ protection, prevention and training. 
244  Ertürk op cit note 195 para 78. 
245  Idem para 85. 
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shift in the way cultural246 discourses are considered within a human rights 
framework,247 and an increased awareness of multiple layers of discrimination 
that combine to heighten the vulnerability of marginalised women and their 
experience of violence.248   
 
The fifteen-year review report recounts further shifts in the work of the Special 
Rapporteurs. The first is that of taking an approach of ‘empowerment’ rather 
than ‘victimisation’ to women experiencing violence, an issue that Ertürk 
discusses in some detail in this report.249 The mandate holders have also shown 
how the control of female sexuality is central to the normative systems at the 
social, cultural and State levels, thereby reinforcing and reproducing unequal 
power relations that justify violence against women.250 
 
(e) Political economy and violence against women 
 
The Special Rapporteur’s 2009 thematic report addresses the important question 
of political economy and violence against women.251 This report, which follows 
from the previous reports on the due diligence standard and intersections 
                                                 
246  Idem para 101. In her 2007 report, Ertürk defined ‘culture’ as the set of shared spiritual, 
material, intellectual and emotional features of human experience that is created and 
constructed within social habits or custom. As such, culture is intimately connected 
with the diverse ways in which social groups produce their daily existence 
economically, socially and politically - Y Ertürk Intersections between Culture and 
Violence against Women UN Doc A/HRC/4/34 (dated 17 January 2007) para 17. 
247  Ertürk op cit note 195 paras 101-106. 
248    Idem paras 107-111. See in this regard also the key article by K Crenshaw ‘Mapping 
the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color’ 
(1990) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241-1299. 
249  Ertürk op cit note 195 paras 89-94. 
250  Idem paras 95-100.  
251  Y Ertürk Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences: Political economy and violence against women UN Doc 
A/HRC/11/6/Add.6 (dated 23 June 2009). 
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between culture and violence against women, notes that a viable strategy in 
addressing the issue of culture and violence against women must include a 
political economy perspective.252 This allows one to understand the material 
foundation and the underlying vested interests of cultural norms and practices. A 
political economy approach to violence against women is especially relevant in 
the context of the global recession, which is predicted to have a disproportionate 
effect on women and girls’ education, employment and livelihood. The report 
shows that these factors are all linked to violence against women, due in part to 
men’s responses to economic displacement and disempowerment.253 
 
In this crucial report, Ertürk argues that economic destabilisation brought about 
by competitive globalisation processes and neoliberal policies maintained by 
states and international economic institutions are heightening the conditions for, 
and increasing the extent of, violence against women.254 She observes that 
persistent and egregious violence against women is intertwined with the 
feminisation of poverty, transnational labor exploitation, limitations on women’s 
sexual and reproductive rights and ongoing control of women’s mobility.  
 
The report accordingly examines the connections between violence against 
women and women’s enjoyment (or lack thereof) of specific socio-economic 
rights, including adequate housing, ownership or control over land and property, 
access to food and water, enjoyment of education and health, and access to paid 
employment and social security.255  This analysis reveals that violence against 
women acts as a barrier to women’s realisation of their socio-economic rights, 
                                                 
252  Idem para 1.  
253  Idem para 1. 
254  Idem para 5. 
255  See Ertürk op cit note 251 paras 78-79. 
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but also that, in turn, the lack of access to these rights renders women inherently 
vulnerable to violence. This emphasises the interconnectedness of socio-
economic rights and the need for an integrated approach to their realisation, 
especially for the ‘poorest and most marginalised women’ who are subjected to 
ongoing violence.  
 
The report finds that violence against women is a violation of the right to life and 
to personal security but also of a whole range of basic economic and social 
rights. Yet the differential treatment and implementation of the twin Covenants 
of rights remains a major barrier greatly limiting the efforts of government and 
non-state actors to achieve the full and equal realisation of women’s human 
rights in order to prevent violence against women from occurring in the first 
place.256 The conclusion is that an integrated approach to human rights, 
combining the obligations set out in the twin Covenants on civil and political 
rights and economic, social and cultural rights is crucial for the realisation of 
women’s human rights and the elimination of violence against women.  
 
 
5.3.3 The right to freedom from violence? 
 
Although the Special Rapporteur does not include this aspect in the fifteen-year 
review of the mandate, it should be noted that the work of the Rapporteur has 
also made a contribution to the recognition of women’s right to freedom from 
violence. 
 
                                                 
256  Ertürk op cit note 251 para 112.  
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During the first ten years of the mandate, Coomaraswamy on occasion makes 
reference to women’s right to freedom from violence, without in-depth analysis 
or discussion of this right or its implications, but with a clear acknowledgment of 
its existence in international law.257 In the ten-year review of her mandate, she 
provides the following important summary of progress: 
 
A decade ago, [violence against women] was a completely 
invisible issue. Today the right of women to be free from violence 
is recognised as an international human right and standards and 
mechanisms are in place. It is therefore our future duty to ensure 
access, compliance and monitoring so that the right to be free 
from violence is the fundamental right of all women no matter 
where they live. Finally, the success of women’s rights will only 
be realised if human rights in general are preserved and protected. 
The struggle for women’s right to be free from violence must 
always take place within the framework of human rights practice 
and protection.’258  
 
 
A similar pattern emerges from the reports of the second incumbent, who also 
makes passing reference to women’s right to freedom from violence in certain of 
her annual thematic reports.259 In her 2007 thematic report on culture and 
violence against women, Ertürk sets out to trace the development of the 
international normative framework on violence against women in relation to 
culture that culminated in the recognition of the primacy of women’s right to live 
a life free of gender-based violence over any cultural considerations.260 These 
norms establish the primacy of women’s right to live a life free of gender-based 
                                                 
257  See Coomaraswamy op cit note 218 paras 82, 115; Coomaraswamy op cit note 225 para 
221; R Coomaraswamy International, Regional and National Developments in the Area 
of Violence against Women 1994-2003 UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/75/Add.1 (dated 27 
February 2003) paras 3, 1253, 1264.  
258  Coomaraswamy op cit note 225 paras 82-83. 
259  See Ertürk op cit note 214 para 34; Ertürk op cit note 219 Executive Summary; para 51;  
260  Ertürk op cit note 246 para 21.  
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violence and provide that States cannot invoke any cultural discourses, including 
notions of custom, tradition or religion, to justify or condone any act of 
violence.261 This also means that they may not deny, trivialise or otherwise play 
down the harm caused by such violence by referring to these notions. Instead, 
States are expressly required to condemn such violence, which entails 
denouncing any cultural discourse put forward to justify it.262 In the course of 
this discussion, the Special Rapporteur thus makes it clear that she not only 
regards the right to freedom from violence as an independent right, but one that 
implies clear obligations for States.   
 
She finally proposes a number of broad guidelines for a viable strategy in 
addressing the issue of culture and violence against women, which should 
include (but not be limited to) approaching all forms of violence against women 
as a continuum and intersectional with other forms of inequality.263 One of the 
components of this aspect is ensuring that diverse women’s voices within 
specific communities are heard and that their claim for a right to a life free of 
violence is not ‘sacrificed’ in the name of culture.264 
 
In her fifteen-year review report, the Special Rapporteur further confirms 
progress, when she observes that applying a human rights perspective to violence 
against women has created a momentum for breaking the silence around 
violence.265 She observes that today, a ‘life free of violence’ is increasingly 
accepted as an entitlement rather than merely a humanitarian concern.  
 
                                                 
261  Idem paras 21, 30. 
262  Idem para 30.  
263  Idem para 72(c). 
264  Idem subpara (iv).  
265  Ertürk op cit note 195 para 90.  
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6. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Two instruments recently introduced in the international human rights system 
present further evidence of the acceptance of a right to freedom from violence (or 
the notion of a life free from violence). The first of these is the UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’), adopted by the General 
Assembly in 2006.266  
 
Article 16, which bears the heading ‘freedom from exploitation, violence and 
abuse’, provides as follows:  
 
States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, 
social, educational and other measures to protect persons with 
disabilities, both within and outside the home, from all forms of 
exploitation, violence and abuse, including their gender-based 
aspects.267 
 
Furthermore, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Persons268 states 
that indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and 
security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or 
any other act of violence.269 
 
Although it could be argued that the right to freedom from violence is not 
necessarily stated in explicit terms, the phrasing and environment of the 
surrounding text should be taken into consideration. I argue that these provisions 
                                                 
266   Adopted 6 December 2006, GA Res 61/106 Annex I UN Doc A/61/49 (2006), entered 
into force 3 May 2008. 
267  Para 1. Emphasis added.  
268  Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 61/295 on 13 September 2007.  
269  Art 7 § 2. Art 7 § 1 provides that indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical 
and mental integrity, liberty and security of the person.  
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both provide evidence of the recognition of this norm; in the case of the CRPD, it 
is notable that gender differentiations are indicated.   
 
Beyond these two instruments, it is noteworthy that the issue of violence against 
women has gained a great deal of importance in the UN. In 2006, the UN 
Secretary General issued the findings of a comprehensive, in-depth study on all 
forms of violence against women.270  
 
Since 2006, the General Assembly has adopted a series of resolutions aimed at 
addressing violence against women.271 In the most recent of these the General 
Assembly reiterates the principle that States have the obligation to promote and 
protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, including women and 
girls, and must exercise due diligence to prevent and investigate acts of violence 
against women and girls and punish the perpetrators, to eliminate impunity and 
to provide protection to the victims, and that failure to do so violates and impairs 
or nullifies the enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.272  
 
The UN Secretary-General is now requested, on an annual basis, to report to the 
General Assembly on measures taken by entities of the United Nations system to 
intensify their efforts to eliminate violence against women.273 In the most recent  
 
 
                                                 
270  Op cit note 58. 
271  See eg General Assembly Resolutions 61/143 (dated 19 December 2006), 62/133 
(dated 18 December 2007) and 63/155 (dated 18 December 2008).  
272  General Assembly Resolution 64/137: Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of 
violence against women Un Doc A/RES/64/137 (dated 11 February 2010). 
273  Including through increased coordination and collaboration among UN entities and 
enhanced support for national efforts to address violence against women. 
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of these reports,274 the Secretary General relates progress inter alia in respect of 
initiatives such as the ‘UNiTE to End Violence Against Women’ (2008-2015) 
campaign275 and the Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality 
Task Force on Violence against Women.276 While the report for the most part 
deals with programmatic measures, it is important to note for purposes of this 
thesis that violence against women, described in the Secretary General’s report 
as a ‘pervasive violation of the human rights of women’, has become a ‘highly 
visible issue for attention by the entities of the United Nations system’.277 
 
This is further reflected in the approach of the Human Rights Council, which 
adopted a resolution on violence against women in 2009.278 The Human Rights 
Council inter alia notes with appreciation the work of the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women;279 it also stresses that challenges and obstacles remain 
in the implementation of international standards and norms to address the 
inequality between men and women, and violence against women in particular, 
and pledges to intensify action to ensure their full and accelerated 
implementation.280 
 
                                                 
274  Report of the Secretary General Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of 
violence against women UN Doc A/64/151 (dated 17 July 2009).   
275  Idem paras 5-9. 
276  Idem paras 10-11. 
277  Idem para 55. 
278  Human Rights Council Resolution 11/2: Accelerating efforts to eliminate all forms of 
violence against women (dated 17 June 2009).  
279  Idem para 9. 
280  Idem para 14. The Resolution recounts a number of these standards, including the 
obligation to promote and protect all human rights and to exercise due diligence to 
prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of violence against women 
and girls – para 3. 
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7. EVALUATION  
 
7.1 General overview 
 
The period reviewed in this chapter spans approximately seventeen years, from 
1993 to the time of writing (2010). When one considers the extent of the 
development in international women’s rights during this period as outlined in this 
chapter and the previous one, with specific reference to women’s right to 
freedom from violence, it is evident that a great deal of normative expansion has 
taken place. 
 
The starting point of this expansion, from a formal perspective,281 was the third 
World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993. The gains made by 
women’s rights advocates at this event provided a ‘firm foothold’ for violence 
against women to be placed on the human rights agenda.282  
 
The adoption of the Violence Declaration Women in 1993 was a further advance, 
both from a symbolic perspective (this was the first international instrument 
addressing violence against women, unanimously accepted by the UN General 
Assembly) and from the perspective of its contents.  
 
                                                 
281  I refer here to ‘formal perspective’ in the sense of the explicit enumeration of women’s 
rights in a ‘mainstream’ human rights instrument. Progress in the form of the Women’s 
Decade and the initial World Conferences should also be acknowledged, but on a 
different level.  
282  Copelon op cit note 13 at 867. 
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In spite of the shortcomings identified in respect of this document,283 the 
Declaration constituted an important rung in the ladder of normative 
development of women’s right to freedom from violence. Although the 
document stops short of explicit enunciation of the right itself, the fact that it 
combines the equality/ non-discrimination framework of the Women’s 
Convention with a broader rights approach paves the way for subsequent 
progress in the recognition of the right to freedom from violence as such. The 
importance of key principles such as States’ obligations to include in government 
budgets adequate resources for their activities related to the elimination of 
violence against women is self-evident.  
 
The difficulty, unfortunately, is firstly that the Declaration is not a binding 
document. Secondly, neither the document itself, nor any other instrument 
explicitly makes provision for a mechanism for enforcing or monitoring 
compliance.284 The Declaration’s force therefore mainly lies in its potential 
contribution to the consolidation of international standards. Nevertheless, it has 
been said (correctly, I would argue), that the Declaration ‘offers a vocabulary for 
women to assert their needs in the language of the powerful’.285 
 
Commentators reflecting on the Beijing Conference pointed out that it 
represented considerable achievements, in spite of the divisions appearing among 
delegations. For example, Hunt observed that at the 1985 Third World 
Conference, domestic violence was not something that Governments were eager 
                                                 
283  See Section 3 above.  
284  O’Hare expresses the opinion that because of the approach followed in the Declaration 
to understand violence against women as a form of discrimination, responsibility for 
monitoring state compliance with the Declaration vests with the CEDAW – op cit note 
8 at 379.  
285  Idem at 380. 
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to discuss and acknowledge; at Beijing ‘it was taken as a fact of life which had to 
be addressed’.286  
 
Looking at the Beijing Platform, Neuwirth argues that the Platform gave new 
impetus to the reform of laws that discriminated on the basis of sex and to the 
implementation of the Women’s Convention.287 She notes that despite the legally 
binding nature of the Convention and its potential enforceability through 
domestic law, the Beijing Conference in 1995 and its follow-up processes may 
have had more of an impact at the national level than the Convention on the 
elimination of de jure discrimination that fundamentally violates State 
obligations under the Convention.  
 
According to Neuwirth, the positive impact of the Beijing process on the 
implementation of the Women’s Convention can be seen in part from a review of 
the pattern of objections made by States Parties to the reservations made to the 
Convention by other States, which notably increased in number around and 
following the time of the Beijing Conference.288 Another important manifestation 
of the impact of the Beijing process, following domestic law reforms in the 
1990’s, was that a number of States Parties withdrew reservations that they had 
made to the Convention upon ratification.289 At the domestic level, the national 
                                                 
286  Hunt op cit note 103 at 42. 
287  J Neuwirth ‘Inequality before the law: Holding states accountable for sex 
discriminatory laws under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women and through the Beijing Platform for Action’ (2005) 18 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 19 at 40.  
288  Idem at 43. 
289  Idem at 44. 
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machinery established following the Beijing Conference, and the impact of the 
Beijing Platform, have often overshadowed the Women’s Convention.290  
 
The Beijing Platform expands the definition and understanding of violence 
against women and also broadens especially the ‘promotional’ obligation resting 
on States Parties. The Outcome Document that emanated from the first Beijing 
review process further contains key reinforcements of the State duties set out in 
the original conference document. However, although the second (Beijing+10) 
and third (Beijing+15) review reports contain helpful accounts of current ‘good’ 
practices being implemented by States in the area of violence against women, 
these reports appear to have taken a step away from the more hortatory tone 
adopted in the earlier documents to a more neutral descriptive one.   
 
A progression is further apparent when one compares the scope of State 
‘obligations’ or undertakings set out in the documents discussed in this chapter 
and the preceding one. Taking as an example ‘the duty to provide services’ (one 
of the key State obligations set out under the five-part typology identified as part 
of the framework of analysis for this study),291 one notices that General 
Recommendation No. 19 requires States inter alia to establish or support 
services for victims of gender-based violence, including ‘refuges’.292  
 
The Violence Declaration is less specific in this respect, providing broadly that 
States should work to ensure, to the maximum extent feasible in the light of their 
available resources, that women subjected to violence have specialised 
assistance, as well as support structures, and should take all other appropriate 
                                                 
290  Idem at 45.  
291  Chapter 2, Section 4.2.1. 
292  CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 op cit note 1 para 24(k).  
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measures to promote their safety and physical and psychological 
rehabilitation.293 The document does not make explicit mention of a State 
obligation to establish, or fund, refuges or shelters for victims of violence against 
women (and is in this respect more modest than General Recommendation No. 
19). 
 
The Beijing Platform, however, expands on the standard by including among the 
actions to be taken by governments - ‘provide well-funded shelters and relief 
support for girls and women subjected to violence…’294    
 
Finally, there is the work of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women. 
The appointment of a Special Rapporteur on violence against women under the 
special procedures of the CHR has been described as a recognition by the 
international community of the need to address violence against women within a 
human rights framework.295  
 
The reports of the first two incumbents provide a rich source of information, and 
it is surprising that more academic analysis of these reports has not yet been 
undertaken. For purposes of this thesis, it is particularly the Special Rapporteur’s 
treatment of the right to freedom from violence that compels attention. Notably, 
the first Special Rapporteur takes the existence of this right as a given virtually 
                                                 
293  Violence Declaration op cit note 45 Art 4(g). 
294  Beijing Platform para 125(a) (emphasis added). This is only one instance; the 
development of various State obligations (for example, to undertake law reform, to 
provide counseling services to victims of violence, and so forth), can be tracked across 
the three instruments in question by means of the tables in Annexure A.  
295  C Benninger-Budel ‘Introduction’ in C Benninger-Budel (ed) Due Diligence and Its 
Application to Protect Women from Violence (2008) 1 at 8. 
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from the beginning of her mandate.296 The second mandate holder also freely 
makes reference to the right, and specifically elaborates on the link between the 
right to freedom from violence and culture in her 2007 thematic report on the 
intersections between culture and violence against women.297 
 
Another issue that receives a great deal of attention in the work of the Special 
Rapporteur that is also of relevance to this study, is that of the ‘due diligence’ 
standard and its application to violence against women. The conclusion reached 
by the Special Rapporteur, as part of her detailed 2006 thematic report, that a 
rule of customary international law has developed that obliges States to prevent 
and respond to acts of violence against women with due diligence, is particularly 
noteworthy, given the relatively short period of time since this issue first 
managed to get a ‘foot in the door’ of the international human rights arena.298  
 
Guidance on where the margins lie of this duty to prevent and respond with due 
diligence has already been provided by the CEDAW, specifically in the two 
communications brought against Austria, as set out in Chapter 3.299 The work 
done by the Special Rapporteur, both in the 2006 thematic report as well as in 
subsequent reports, contributes to these guidelines, and as will become clear 
from Chapter 5, further direction can be found in the interpretation by regional 
human rights bodies.  
                                                 
296  It must be borne in mind that the Special Rapporteur assumed office in 1994; at the 
same time, women’s right to freedom from violence was formally recognised in the 
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
against Women (see Chapter 5, Section 2.3).   
297   Op cit note 246. 
298  I argue that the re-statement of this rule in the resolutions of the General Assembly and 
Human Rights Council, as noted above, further confirms the conclusion reached by the 
Special Rapporteur.  
299  See Chapter 3, Section 2.6. 
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7.2 Violence against women and equality/ non-discrimination  
 
For much of the period under consideration violence against women was 
characterised predominantly as a form of sex-based discrimination. While this 
understanding was necessitated by the framework in place in international law 
(initiated by the discrimination-based definition of violence against women in the 
Women’s Convention) feminist commentators have questioned the utility of an 
equality/ discrimination approach to violence against women. For example, 
Goldscheid observes that the connection between sex discrimination and 
domestic and sexual violence is not easily, nor precisely, described.300 Edwards 
furthermore notes that by equating violence against women to sex-based 
discrimination, the former notion is subject to understandings of discrimination 
based on sex, which have proven to be ‘complex and unsettled’.301 This 
approach, by requiring women to characterise the violence they experience as 
sex-based discrimination rather than violence per se, implies that they are treated 
unequally under law – thus reinforcing an international legal system that 
disadvantages women by subjecting them to additional, different or unequal 
criteria.302 She further argues that the rhetoric of equality is also weaker than the 
‘language of violence’. 
 
Edwards conducts an instructive review of international instruments and 
jurisprudence on equality, and finds that the dominant paradigm of equality 
remains centered around ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’.303  This is driven by an 
                                                 
300  J Goldscheid ‘Domestic and sexual violence as sex discrimination: Comparing 
American and international approaches’ (2006) 28 Thomas Jefferson Law Review 355 
at 360.  
301  Edwards op cit note 50 at 5. 
302  Ibid.  
303  Idem at 40.  
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emphasis on non-discrimination, rather than equality, with the male sex still set 
as the standard for equality.  
 
These concerns echo those expressed by Fitzpatrick shortly after the adoption of 
General Recommendation No. 19 in 1992, who posited that the application of an 
equality paradigm has a ‘certain logic and force’, given that many of the 
problems experienced by women in relation to domestic violence originate from 
a denial of the fundamental principles of equality before the law.304 At the same 
time, a simplistic ‘equal treatment’ approach to domestic violence, which does 
not allow for dedicated measures (such as shelters for battered women or 
specialist police units to investigate domestic violence) will not ameliorate 
domestic violence.305   
 
One of the advantages of adopting an equality/ non-discrimination approach to 
violence against women is that this interpretation draws on the normative 
framework that has developed in international law with reference to sex equality. 
As noted earlier, the major international human rights instruments include a 
prohibition of discrimination based inter alia on sex,306 and it is important to 
note how the treaty-interpreting bodies have expanded the understanding of this 
prohibition to include notions of State duties in respect of violence against 
women. For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(‘CESCR’) has adopted General Comment No. 16,307 which deals with the equal 
                                                 
304  Fitzpatrick op cit note 6 at 538. 
305  Idem at 539-540.  
306  See Chapter 3, Section 2.1.  
307    CESCR General Comment No. 16: Article 3: The Equal Right of Men and Women to 
the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights UN Doc E/C.12/2005/3 
(2005) [hereafter ‘General Comment No. 16’].  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4   International Law: From Vienna to Beijing and Beyond 
 
 
 
 
 242
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural 
rights, as set out in Article 3 of the ICESCR.  
 
The CESCR points out that Article 3 is a cross-cutting provision, which applies 
to all the rights contained in articles 6 to 15 of the Covenant,308 and provides 
specific examples of States Parties’ obligations. The Committee observes that 
implementing Article 3, in relation to Article 10,309 requires States Parties inter 
alia to provide victims of domestic violence, who are primarily female, with 
access to safe housing, remedies and redress for physical, mental and emotional 
damage.310  
 
The CESCR also addresses State obligations to deal with gender-based violence 
under the intersection between Articles 3 and 10.311 It points out that gender-
based violence is a form of discrimination that inhibits the ability to enjoy rights 
and freedoms, including economic, social and cultural rights, on a basis of 
equality. States Parties must therefore take appropriate measures to eliminate 
violence against men and women and act with due diligence to prevent, 
investigate, mediate, punish and redress acts of violence against them by private 
actors. One therefore notes that there is an alignment between the standards that 
have evolved as part of an explicit ‘equality’ framework (for example, as 
expressed by the CESCR), and those that have developed as part of a framework 
consisting of ‘equality/ non-discrimination’ together with a rights approach  
                                                 
308     Idem para 22.  
309    Art 10 § 1 of the ICESCR requires States parties to recognise that the widest possible 
protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, and that marriage must be 
entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses.  
310    General Comment No. 16 op cit note 305 para 27.  
311    Idem para 27.  
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(such as that found in the Violence Declaration and the Beijing Platform). I argue 
that the solution lies in an approach that combines a view of violence against 
women ‘as discrimination’ with violence against women ‘as a human rights 
violation per se’ – rather than having to choose between the two as opposing 
approaches.312  This links up with the following aspect for discussion, i.e. 
whether women’s right to freedom from violence has acquired ‘independent’ 
status in international law. 
 
 
7.3 A right to freedom from violence eo nomine 
 
It will be recalled that one of the central research questions formulated for 
purposes of this thesis is whether it can be said that women’s right to freedom 
from violence has achieved full recognition under international law.313 
Meyersfeld,314 for instance, observes that the combination of instruments, cases 
and commentaries in international law makes a compelling argument that the 
right to be free from systematic315 intimate violence is an international human 
right for which states can be held liable.316 She notes that although it is ‘probably 
                                                 
312  This argument is discussed further when I examine the definition of ‘violence against 
women’ in the Convention of Belém do Pará – Chapter 5, Part 1, Section 2.3 (b).  
 313     See Chapter 2, Section 3. 
314  B Meyersfeld Domestic Violence and International Law (2010) 106.  
315  Meyersfeld is of the opinion that not all forms of domestic violence are appropriate for 
regulation by international law – idem at 110. While conceding that categorising 
violence is uncomfortable (but necessary), she accordingly excludes ‘abuse that is 
intermittent and involves only minor and/or one-off incidents’. I do not agree with this 
approach: it constitutes a failure to understand ‘the fluid and cyclical pattern of 
domestic violence’ that Meyersfeld herself describes  – idem at 122. 
316  This appears to be an expansion of her earlier, slightly more conservative view – see B 
Meyersfeld ‘Domestic violence, health, and international law’ (2008) 22 Emory 
International Law Review 61 at 76. 
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impossible’ to argue that there is no international norm prohibiting domestic 
violence, the question is ‘whether this is part of international law’.317  
 
She argues that the ‘array of instruments addressing domestic violence’ are not 
conclusive evidence of customary international law if one adopts a ‘black letter’ 
traditional approach to customary international law. However, the increasing 
precision in many international instruments and the adoption of domestic 
violence within the rubric of mainstream treaty monitoring bodies indications ‘a 
trend towards the internationalization of domestic violence’.318  
 
I disagree with Meyersfeld in the sense that it is clear, from a careful reading of 
the Women’s Convention in conjunction with the ‘soft law’ set out above, that 
certain State obligations to respond to violence against women have crystallised 
in international law. As demonstrated, these obligations can be categorised based 
on the typology of the duties to respect rights, create institutional machinery, 
protect rights, provide services and promote rights, and the standard of State 
compliance can be tested against the principle of ‘due diligence’. Whether the 
cumulative effect of the articulation of these State obligations is to contribute to a 
recognition that women have a right to freedom from violence in terms of 
customary international law, is perhaps a matter of argument; however, it is my 
contention that at worst, international law has already traversed a great deal of 
distance towards this recognition.     
 
                                                 
317  Meyersfeld op cit note 314 at 106. The juxtaposition of ‘an international norm prohibiting 
domestic violence’ with ‘part of international law’ is that of Meyersfeld.  
318  Ibid.  
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However, the question here goes broader than what Halley identifies as ‘the 
politics of recognition’.319 It lies not so much in the acknowledgment of a right to 
freedom from violence for women as such (although this aspect is important), but 
rather in the whole of the normative framework supporting this right. This 
framework consists of, inter alia, the various sets of State duties to respond to 
violence against women as set out in the international instruments (which 
includes the duty to act with due diligence in response to such violence). I argue 
that this framework also includes the increasing sense of urgency with which the 
international community has in recent years regarded violence against women, 
and the resulting prioritisation of this issue.320 On a more practical level, this 
framework is also in the process of developing concrete guidelines in respect of 
the standards that are expected of State actors, for example, in respect of 
conducting investigations into allegations of violence against women.321 In this 
way, it is crucial to look at ‘the whole picture’ to understand both the right to 
freedom from violence and accompanying entitlements (framed in the form of 
State obligations).322   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
319  In other words, ‘making explicit and visible’ – J Halley ‘Rape at Rome: Feminist 
interventions in the criminalization of sex-related violence in positive international 
criminal law’ (2008) 30 Michigan Journal of Gender and Law 1 at 55. 
320  Section 6 above.  
321  See Gonzales v Mexico (Cotton Field) (Chapter 5, Part B, Chapter 3.3.2).  
322    This is where I part company with Meyersfeld again: the central focus of her work is 
not so much on women’s right to freedom from violence per se, but the somewhat 
amorphous question of whether ‘there is an international legal principle prohibiting 
domestic violence’ – see Meyersfeld op cit note 314 at 1.   
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WOMEN’S RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM 
VIOLENCE IN REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
 
PART A: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the development of women’s right to freedom from 
violence in the three regional1 human rights systems, i.e. the European, the Inter-
American, and the African systems. The consideration of each system 
commences with an examination of the applicable human rights instruments, 
with specific emphasis on documents addressing the right to freedom from 
violence, with a brief overview of the implementation mechanisms for these 
instruments. The main focus of each section is how the relevant provisions have 
been interpreted by the regional human rights bodies. (The exception here is the 
African system, which has not yet seen such interpretation of the documents in 
question.) Each Part concludes with an evaluation of the current position, and the 
chapter as a whole is rounded off by means of an overall assessment of the 
regional human rights systems. 
 
PART B: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The Inter-American regional body, the Organisation of American States (‘OAS’), 
is the oldest of its kind internationally, dating back to 1889-1890.2 The thirty-five 
                                                 
1  For an explanation of the terms ‘international’ and ‘regional’ human rights law as used 
in this thesis, see Chapter 3, Section 3.1. 
2  M Nowak Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime (2003) 189. See  
VR Rescia & MD Seitles ‘The development of the Inter-American human rights 
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Member States3 of the OAS constitute a diverse grouping, ranging from the 
richest industrialised countries (such as the United States of America and 
Canada) to the poorest (for example, Haiti).4 
 
Although the institutional structure and the normative provisions of the Inter-
American system are superficially similar to their counterparts in the European 
context, the conditions under which the two systems evolved differed 
dramatically.5 Due to the turbulent political history of the Americas, the human 
rights bodies of the region have been confronted with problems such as 
widespread poverty, military dictatorships, weak or corrupt domestic judiciaries 
and the systematic torture and enforced disappearances of political dissidents.6 In 
response, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (‘IACHR’) and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘IACrtHR’) have developed a body of 
case law7 from which much guidance can be drawn. It will for instance be 
recalled that the judgment regarded as the guiding light when it comes to the 
                                                                                                                                    
system: A historical perspective and a modern-day critique’ (2000) 16 New York Law 
School Journal of Human Rights 593 at 596 et seq for an interesting synopsis of the 
history of the American human rights system. 
3  The membership status of Cuba, which had been excluded from participation in the 
OAS system in 1962, was recently restored: on 3 June 2009 the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of the Americas adopted resolution AG/RES 2438 (XXXIX-O/09), rescinding 
the 1962 resolution that excluded the Government of Cuba from its participation in the 
Inter-American system. On 5 July 2009, the OAS unanimously resolved to suspend 
Honduras. This decision was adopted as a result of the coup d’état on 28 June 2009 that 
expelled President José Manuel Zelaya from office - see official OAS website at 
[www.oas.org/en/about/member_states.asp]. (Accessed 29 May 2010.) 
4  Nowak op cit note 2 at 190. 
5  HJ Steiner et al International Human Rights in Context 3 ed (2007) 1021.  
6  Idem at 1020-1021; Nowak loc cit. 
7  The term ‘case law’ is used here in the broad sense to include both judgments by the 
Court and reports published by the Commission. However, it is not intended to carry 
the implication that reports published by the Commission are legally binding. 
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standard of ‘due diligence’, i.e. Vélasquez Rodríquez v Honduras,8 was delivered 
by the IACrtHR.9  
 
It should be noted that the inter-American system is a complex one, mainly 
because it consists of two overlapping mechanisms with different foundational 
documents, i.e. the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man10 on 
the one hand, and the American Convention on Human Rights11 on the other.12 
The operation of these intersections is discussed in more detail below.  
 
In 1994, the OAS Member States adopted the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women – the 
Convention of Belém do Pará.13 This Convention is of great significance for 
purposes of this study, since it is the first instrument of this nature to explicitly 
recognise women’s right to freedom from violence. It is also the first document 
with legally binding effect to deal with violence against women, although it is 
admittedly only binding in the Inter-American region (and in respect of ratifying 
States).  
 
 
                                                 
8  Inter-American Court of Human Rights Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Judgment 
dated 29 July 1988) Series C: Decisions and Judgments No. 04. 
9  See Chapter 2, Section 4.3.  
10  OAS Res XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States 
(1948) [hereafter ‘the American Declaration’].  
11  American Convention on Human Rights OAS Treaty Series No. 36, entered in force on 
18 July 1978 – as amended [hereafter ‘the American Convention’].   
12  I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 7 ed (2008) 570; D Harris ‘Regional 
protection of human rights: The Inter-American achievement’ in D Harris & S 
Livingstone (eds) The Inter-American System of Human Rights (1998) 1 cited in Steiner 
et al op cit note 4 at 1027. 
13  OAS/Ser.L.V/II.92/doc31 rev.3 (1994) (signed on 9 June 1994, entered into force 3 
March 1995) [hereafter ‘Convention of Belém do Pará’]. 
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The IACHR in 2007 published a report on violence against women in the 
Americas.14 The report is noteworthy for purposes of this thesis because it sheds 
light on the crucial aspect of access to adequate and effective judicial remedies 
for women who have experienced gender-based violence. The report examines 
the major obstacles that women in the region encounter when they seek effective 
judicial protection to redress acts of violence, and disturbingly observes that most 
cases of violence against women are never formally investigated, prosecuted and 
punished by the administration of justice systems in the hemisphere. In some 
countries, the Commission has observed a pattern of systematic impunity.15  
 
The Inter-American region further provides a useful basis for comparison in 
respect of women’s rights and gender equality in the sense that religious norms 
are strongly influential across the region.16 This is analogous to the African 
region, where cultural and traditional norms interact with women’s rights as 
guaranteed in international human rights instruments, in practice often resulting 
in limitations of these rights.17 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14  IACHR Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence in the Americas 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.68 (dated 20 January 2007).   
15  See also NJ Velasco ‘The Guatamalan femicide: An epidemic of impunity’ (2008) 14 
Law and Business Review of the Americas 397 at 397 et seq; AW Reimann ‘Hope for 
the future? The asylum claims of women fleeing sexual violence in Guatamala’ (2009) 
157 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1199 at 1200, 1211-1213. 
16  See eg SR Hamilton ‘The status of women in Chile: Violations of human rights and 
recourse under international law’ (2004) 25 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 111 at 112-
113 for a discussion of the influence of the Catholic church on women’s rights in Chile.  
17  See also discussion in Part D, Section 1 below.  
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2. KEY INSTRUMENTS 
2.1 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) 
 
The first building block in the Inter-American human rights system is the 
American Declaration,18 which was adopted in Bogotá, Columbia, in 1948.19 
Although the American Declaration may appear like a (mere) declaration of 
principles, it has been recognised as the text that defines the human rights 
referred to in the OAS Charter and as constituting a source of international 
obligations related to the Charter for OAS Member States.20  
 
The American Declaration guarantees, in Article I, the right of ‘every human 
being’ to life, liberty and the security of ‘his’ person. It further states that all 
persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties established in the 
Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or any other 
factor.21 Interestingly, it provides for a right to protection for mothers and 
children: Article VII states that all women, during pregnancy and ‘the nursing 
period’, and all children have the right to special protection, care and aid.22 The 
                                                 
18  The adoption of this regional document preceded that of the UDHR by 7 months – 
Steiner et al op cit note 5 at 1021. 
19  The American Declaration was adopted at the Ninth International Conference of 
American States, which also created the OAS Charter - Rescia & Seitles op cit note 2 at 
598. 
20     This was noted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in an advisory opinion 
relating to the Declaration - IACrtHR Advisory Opinion No 10 Interpretation of the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of Article 
64 of the American Convention on Human Rights (1989) Ser A No 10 paras 40 - 47. 
See also IACHR Report No 52/07 Petition 1490-05 Admissibility: Jessica Gonzales and 
Others, United States OEA/Ser/L/V/II.28 Doc.19 (dated 24 July 2007) para 56.  
21  Art 2.  
22  See PP Zuloaga ‘The path to gender justice in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights’ (2008) 17 Texas Journal of Women and the Law 227 at 278-283 for a 
compelling discussion of the veneration of motherhood in Latin American culture, and 
how this has found expression in judgments of the IACrtHR such as Case of the Miguel 
Castro-Castro Prison v Peru (Judgment dated 25 November 2006) Ser C No 160. 
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Declaration also makes provision for certain economic, social and cultural 
rights.23  
 
The American Declaration also contains ten articles detailing the duties of the 
citizen. These include the duty to ‘aid, support, educate and protect his minor 
children’, to ‘acquire at least an elementary education’, to ‘obey the law and 
other legitimate commands of the authorities’ and to work. 
 
2.2 American Convention on Human Rights (1969) 
2.2.1 Provisions  
 
The American Convention (also known as the Pact of San José) is modelled on 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms24 and the ICCPR.25 The Convention sets out a number of rights, to be 
protected by States Parties, and provides for implementation by the IACHR and 
the IACrtHR. At the time of writing, the Convention had 25 ratifications.26  
 
                                                 
23  For example, Art XI (right to the preservation of health and to well-being), Art XII 
(right to education), Art XIII (right to work and to fair remuneration), and Art XVI 
(right to social security).  Steiner et al observe that when it comes to rights, the 
American Declaration is similar in content to the UDHR- Steiner et al op cit note 5 at 
1022.  
24  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
213 UNTS 222, entered into force 3 September 1953. 
25  AP Ewing ‘Establishing state responsibility for private acts of violence against women 
under the American Convention on Human Rights’ (1995) 26 Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review 751 at 755; Steiner et al op cit note 5 at 1022. 
26  See official OAS website [www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-32.html]. (Accessed on 
21 March 2010.)  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5   Regional Human Rights Law 
 
 
 
 252
The Convention protects, inter alia, the right to life,27 the right of every person28 
to have their physical, mental and moral integrity respected (under the heading 
‘the right to humane treatment’),29 the right to personal liberty and security,30 the 
right to a fair trial,31 the right of every person to have their honour protected and 
their dignity recognised,32 the right to equal protection of the law,33 and the right 
to judicial protection, which includes ‘simple and prompt recourse, to a 
competent court or tribunal’ for violations of the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention.34  
 
In terms of Article 1, States Parties undertake to respect the rights and freedoms 
recognised in the Convention and to ensure to all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction the free and full exercise of these rights, without any discrimination 
based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, economic status, birth, or ‘any other social condition’. In 
contrast to the American Declaration, the Convention does not explicitly 
guarantee socio-economic rights; instead, in terms of Article 26, States Parties 
agree to adopt measures to achieve progressively the full realisation of the rights 
‘implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural standards’ 
set forth in the Charter of the OAS.35  
                                                 
27  Art 4 § 1 reads that this right shall be protected by law and ‘in general, from the 
moment of conception’.  
28  Art 1 § 2 stipulates that for the purposes of this Convention, ‘person’ means every 
human being.  
29  Art 5.  
30  Art 7.  
31  Art 8. 
32  Art 11 § 1. 
33  Art 24. 
34  Art 25. 
35  An Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (‘the Protocol of San Salvador’) was adopted in 1988 within the framework of 
the OAS – OAS Treaty Series No. 69 (1988), entered into force 16 November 1999. 
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The acceptance of the American Convention was subsequently followed by the 
introduction of additional instruments, such as the Protocol to Abolish the Death 
Penalty. Furthermore, self-standing instruments aimed at the protection of human 
rights were also later adopted, such as the Convention of Belém do Pará.  
 
2.2.2 Implementation mechanisms  
 
(a) The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
 
When the American Convention came into operation in 1978, a dual human 
rights protection structure slotted into place.36 One system encompasses the OAS 
Member States that have not yet ratified the American Convention but recognise 
the American Declaration.37 A second system involves Member States that are 
party to the American Convention and are thus governed by two protective 
mechanisms: the IACHR, which already existed at the time,38 but whose 
functions were redefined in the American Convention, as well as the IACrtHR. 
The functions of the IACHR are set out in Article 41 of the American 
Convention, and include investigatory, advisory, promotional and protective 
tasks.39   
                                                                                                                                    
This Protocol recognises certain rights (similar to those in the ICESR) and enjoins 
parties to adopt measures ‘to the extent allowed by their available resources, and taking 
into account their degree of development’ for the progressive achievement of the listed 
rights. The Protocol had 25 States Parties at the time of writing - see OAS website op 
cit note 25. (Accessed on 22 May 2010.)  
36  Rescia & Seitles op cit note 2 at 599.  
37  The United States of America (‘USA’) feature prominently among these States - see 
Steiner et al op cit note 4 at 1029. In respect of these States, the IACHR acts under the 
authority of the OAS Charter and the IACHR Statute.  
38  See Rescia & Seitles regarding the origin of the Commission in 1959 – op cit note 2 at 
598. 
39  The role and operation of the IACHR are set out in Chapter VII (Articles 34 to 51) of 
the American Convention; see also C Medina ‘The Inter-American Commission on 
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The IACHR may examine petitions alleging human rights violations in 
contravention of the American Convention from an individual, groups of 
individuals or an NGO legal recognised in an OAS Member State.40 (The 
Commission may also begin an examination mero motu.41) The Commission will 
first determine the admissibility of a petition, with reference to Articles 46 and 
47 of the Convention; it then considers the merits of the complaint.42  
 
Where no friendly settlement is reached, the Commission is required to compile 
a report setting out the facts and its conclusions.43 This initial report, which is not 
published but transmitted to the State, is the first in a two-phase process; if the 
matter is not resolved or submitted to the Court by the Commission or the State 
within a period of three months from the date of the transmittal of the report of 
the Commission to the State concerned, the IACHR may write a second report.44 
This second report will contain the Commission’s opinion and conclusions, the 
measures recommended by the Commission, and a time limit for the State to 
comply with these measures. When the time limit expires, the IACHR decides 
whether the State has responded adequately and whether to publish the report.  
 
                                                                                                                                    
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a joint 
venture’ (1990) 12 Human Rights Quarterly 439 at 443. 
40  Art 44 of the Convention. 
41  Medina op cit note 39 at 445, citing Art 26(2) of the IACHR Regulations.  
42  The procedure and powers of the Commission are set out in Articles 48 and 49 of the 
Convention. Provision is made for a friendly settlement between the parties.  
43  Art 50.  
44  Art 51.  
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The opinion of the Commission, as expressed in this published report, is not 
legally binding, but may be useful to draw attention to an issue and to put 
pressure on governments to take action.45  
 
An important development under the methods of work of the Commission has 
been the introduction of a Special Rapporteurship on the Rights of Women. The 
IACHR established this mechanism in 1994 with an initial mandate to analyse 
the extent to which the legislation and practices of Member States affecting the 
rights of women comply with the broad obligations of equality and non-
discrimination guaranteed in the American Declaration and the American 
Convention.46 The mandate serves to raise awareness of the need for further 
action to ensure that women are able to fully exercise their basic rights; issues 
specific recommendations aimed at enhancing ompliance by Member States with 
their priority obligations of equality and non-discrimination; promotes the 
mechanisms that the Inter-American human rights system provides to protect the 
rights of women; conducts specialised studies and prepares reports in this area; 
and assists the Commission in responding to petitions and other reports of 
violations of these rights in the region.47 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45  JH Robinson ‘Another woman’s body found outside Juárez – Applying Velásquez 
Rodríguez for women’s human rights’ (2005) 20 Wisconsin Women’s Law Journal 167 
at 181.  
46  See official IACHR website at [www.cidh.org/women/mandate.htm]. (Accessed on 15 
June 2010.) 
47  For example, the visit of the Special Rapporteur to Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, in 2002 and 
the resulting report of the IACHR - see Chapter 3, Section 2.6.4 (d) and Section 3.3.1 
below.  
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 (b) The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
 
The IACrtHR, based in Costa Rica, is composed of seven members.48 In order 
for a matter to be considered by the Court, the State Party in question must have 
ratified both the American Convention and have accepted the contentious 
(‘adjudicatory’) jurisdiction of the Court.49 In addition to its contentious 
jurisdiction, the IACrtHR also has advisory jurisdiction over questions of 
interpretation of the American Convention and other treaties relating to the 
protection of human rights in the American States.50 In terms of Article 61, only 
States Parties and the IACHR may submit cases to the Court.51 Since 2001, the 
victim is entitled to present independent legal counsel in addition to the 
Commission.52 
 
Where a State does not comply with a judgment, the Court may inform and make 
recommendations to the OAS General Assembly.53 The Convention does not 
make reference to any action that the General Assembly may take; being a 
political body, the Assembly may take any political action it deems necessary to 
persuade the State to comply with its obligations.54  
 
The fact that only a limited number of States Parties to the American Convention 
have recognised the contentious jurisdiction of the IACrtHR clearly weakens the 
                                                 
48  Chapter VIII (Articles 52-69) of the American Convention deals with the composition, 
jurisdiction and functioning of the Court. 
49  Art 62.  
50  Art 64 § 1. The Court may also, at the request of a Member State of the OAS, provide 
that State with opinions regarding the compatibility of any of its domestic laws with the 
aforesaid international instruments – Art 64 § 2. 
51  Art 61 § 1. 
52  The Commission presents the case against the State Party in an adversarial fashion.   
53  Art 65. 
54  Medina op cit note 39 at 447. 
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impact of this body. This is exacerbated by the lack of a separate political 
mechanism to effectively enforce its judgments.55    
 
2.3 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women – Convention of Belém do 
Pará (1994) 
 
(a) Origin of the Convention 
 
In 1990, the Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM)56 convened a 
Consultation on Women and Violence to study this issue.57 The Consultation 
found that a high level and intensity of violence against women, including 
violence committed by domestic partners, existed in the region.58 The 
Consultation recommended that international human rights norms be utilised ‘to 
establish effective measures as a means of international denunciation of states for 
their shortcomings’ in failing to investigating, prevent, and punish violence 
                                                 
55  Furthermore, a number of OAS member states (such as the United States of America) 
continue to avoid international supervision under the American Convention through 
their failure to ratify this instrument – Nowak op cit note 2 at 198. In contrast, the 
Council of Europe conferred to its Committee of Ministers the supervision of the 
domestic implementation of the Court’s judgments – idem at 199.  
56  The Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM), a specialised organisation of the 
OAS, is the principal forum for generating hemispheric policy to advance women's 
rights and gender equality. Established in 1928 at the Sixth International Conference of 
American States in Havana, Cuba, the CIM was the first official intergovernmental 
agency in the world created expressly to ensure recognition of the civil and political 
rights of women. The CIM is made up of 34 Principal Delegates, one for each Member 
State, who are designated by their respective governments. See official CIM website at 
[www.oas.org/CIM/English/History8.htm] (Accessed on 25 April 2010.) 
57  KM Culliton ‘Finding a mechanism to enforce women’s right to state protection from 
domestic violence in the Americas’ (1993) 34 Harvard International Law Journal 507 
at 508; P Goldberg & N Kelly ‘International human rights and violence against women’ 
(1993) 6 Harvard Human Rights Journal 195 at 201.  
58  Cullliton op cit note 57 at 508.  
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against women.59 It was further noted that the universal prevalence of the various 
forms and manifestations of violence against women justified a series of 
remedial actions, including the development of an Inter-American convention on 
women and violence.60 
 
A follow-up meeting of experts was held in Caracas, Venezuela, in August 1991 
to consider the viability of such an Inter-American Convention.61 The work of 
this group of exports concluded in April 1994, when a Special Assembly of CIM 
delegates approved a draft text of the Convention for submission to the OAS 
General Assembly. Adopted by the Twenty-fourth Regular General Assembly of 
the OAS, which was held in Belém do Pará, Brazil, in June 1994, the Convention 
was immediately signed by several OAS member governments. To date, the 
Convention has been ratified or acceded to by 32 Member States.62 
 
(b)  Understanding of violence against women 
 
The Preamble to the Convention is relatively brief, compared to similar 
instruments, but it contains a number of statements that are of significance in 
terms of contextualising its provisions. It firstly refers to the American 
Declaration as well as the UDHR, recognising that full respect for human rights 
                                                 
59  Idem at 509.  
60  Goldberg & Kelly op cit note 57 at 201. 
61  Idem at 201. Abi-Mershed notes that the vast majority of delegates and experts who 
participated in the decisive drafting meetings were women – EAH Abi-Mershed, ‘Due 
diligence and the fight against gender-based violence in the inter-American system’ in 
Benninger-Budel, C (ed) Due Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women from 
Violence (2008) 127 at 130 fn 13. For a more detailed drafting history, see 
[www.oas.org/CIM/English/History8.htm]. (Accessed on 25 April 2010.) 
62  See official IACHR website at 
[www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic14.Conv%20of%20Belem%20Do%20Para%
20Ratif.htm]. (Accessed on 26 April 2010.) 
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has been enshrined in those documents. It confirms that violence against women 
constitutes a violation of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
impairs or nullifies the observance, enjoyment and exercise of such rights and 
freedoms. In addition, the Preamble states that violence against women is an 
offence against human dignity, and reiterates the important statement, set out in 
earlier documents,63 that such violence is a manifestation of the historically 
unequal power relations between women and men.  
 
The Preamble furthers expressly draws on the Violence Declaration, noting that 
this Declaration had been adopted by the 25th Assembly of the CIM. Again, 
similar to earlier instruments, the Preamble incorporates a reference to a 
developmental aspect: it notes that ‘the elimination of violence against women is 
essential for their individual and social development and their full and equal 
participation in all walks of life’.64  
 
Article 1 of the Convention provides that violence against women must be 
understood as ‘any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or 
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the 
public or the private sphere’.65  
 
Setting out the same three-tier typology as other documents,66 Article 2 confirms 
that violence against women consists of physical, sexual and psychological 
violence -  
                                                 
63  For example, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence [‘the Violence 
Declaration’] and the Beijing Platform of Action – see Chapter 4, Sections 3 and 4.  
64  See also Chapter 4, Section 3. 
65  See in this regard Ewing op cit note 25 at 759-763. 
66  See discussion in Chapter 4, Sections 3 and 4.  
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(i)  that occurs within the family or domestic unit or within any other 
interpersonal relationship, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has 
shared the same residence with the woman, including, among others, rape, 
battery and sexual abuse; 
(ii)  that occurs in the community and is perpetrated by any person, including, 
among others, rape, sexual abuse, torture, trafficking in persons, forced 
prostitution, kidnapping and sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as 
in educational institutions, health facilities or any other place; and 
(iii)  that is perpetrated or condoned by the state or its agents regardless of where 
it occurs. 
 
(c) Rights protected by the Convention 
 
Article 3 of the Convention states, clearly and simply, that ‘every woman has the 
right to be free from violence in both the public and free spheres’. Article 4 
extends this statement by noting that every woman has the right to the 
recognition, enjoyment, exercise, and protection of all human rights and 
freedoms embodied in regional and international human rights instruments. The 
rights listed here include, amongst others, the right to have her life respected; the 
right to have her physical, mental and moral integrity respected; the right to 
personal liberty and security; the right not to be subject to torture; the right to 
have the inherent dignity of her person respected and her family protected; the 
right to be equal before the law and of the law; and the right to simple and 
prompt recourse to a competent court for protection again acts that violate her 
rights.67 
 
                                                 
67  Art 4(a) – (g). 
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These provisions have been the subject of some interpretation by the IACHR and 
IACrtHR, will be discussed below. Significantly, the IACHR found that the 
provisions of this Convention could be applicable in a petition relating to the 
death of a woman resulting from forced sterilisation, which illustrates the 
potentially broad application of the document. In Chávez v Peru,68 the petitioners 
relied on the provisions of the Convention of Belém do Pará as part of their claim 
that the Government of Peru had violated the rights of Ms. Chávez by forcing her 
to undergo a surgical sterilisation, which ultimately resulted in her death.69 The 
Commission found the petition admissible with respect to the alleged violations 
of the American Convention and Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do 
Pará.70     
 
The Convention also specifies that every woman is entitled to the free and full 
exercise of her civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and may rely 
on the full protection of those rights as embodied in regional and international 
instruments on human rights.71 States Parties recognise that violence against 
women prevents and nullified the exercise of these rights.  
 
 
                                                 
68  IACHR Report No 66/00 Case 12.191 Admissibility: Maria Mamérita Mestanza 
Chávez, Peru (dated 3 October 2000).  
69  Idem para 1. 
70  Idem para 13. On 10 October 2003 the Commission approved a friendly settlement 
agreement in the case. This means that the Commission did not address the merits of 
the petition, including whether the Convention of Belém do Pará was in fact in this 
instance applicable - IACHR Report No. 71/03 Petition 12.191 Friendly Settlement: 
María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez, Peru (dated 22 October 2003).  
71  Art 5. While this provision may on the face of it appear tautologous, it is important to 
bear in mind that the American Convention does not per se include social and economic 
and rights, but rather addresses these rights in an additional Protocol: see Art 26 of the 
American Convention and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘the Protocol of San Salvador’) - note 35 above.   
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Article 6 explains that the right of every woman to be free from violence 
includes, amongst others, the right of women to be free from all forms of 
discrimination, and the right of women to be valued and educated free of 
stereotyped patterns of behaviour and social and cultural practices based on 
inferiority and subordination.  
 
This elucidation of the right to freedom from violence is of great importance 
against the background of the debate, discussed above,72 as to whether the 
appropriate approach to violence against women in international law should be 
primarily based on violence as sex-based discrimination (as followed in General 
Recommendation No. 19, adopted by CEDAW) or instead on violence as such. 
In my view, the inclusion of women’s rights to be free from discrimination (and 
to be valued free of stereotyped patterns and practices based on subordination) 
into a broad over-arching right to freedom from violence is not only 
jurisprudentially sound, but also immediately resolves the dilemmas posed by the 
construction of a binary choice between a right to freedom from violence and a 
right to freedom from discrimination as has been suggested by certain authors.73   
 
 
(d) State obligations under the Convention 
 
Articles 7 and 8 stipulate the duties of States Parties in respect of addressing 
violence against women. In terms of Article 7, States Parties must condemn all 
                                                 
72  See Chapter 4, Section 7.2.   
73  See eg A Edwards ‘Violence against women as sex discrimination: Judging the 
jurisprudence of the United Nations human rights treaty bodies’ (2008) 18 Texas 
Journal of Women and the Law 1 at 47-58. 
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forms of violence against women and agree to pursue, ‘by all appropriate means 
and without delay’, policies to prevent, punish and eradicate such violence. They 
accordingly agree to undertake a range of measures specified in the article, 
including to apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for 
violence against women.74 These measures are set out in Table 4 in Annexure A. 
 
Under Article 8, States Parties agree to undertake specific measures, including 
programmes to promote awareness and observance of the right of women to be 
free from violence, and the right of women to have their human rights respected 
and protected,75 and to provide appropriate specialised services for women who 
have been subjected to violence, such as shelters, counseling services for all 
family members where appropriate, and care and custody of the affected 
children.76 Significantly, these programmatic duties are subject to the 
qualification of ‘progressive’ implementation.  Article 9 requires States Parties to 
take special account of the vulnerability of women to violence by reason of, 
among others, their race or ethnic background or their status as migrants, 
refugees or displaced persons.  
 
(e)  Implementation measures 
 
The Convention provides for different aspects of implementation. Article 10 
requires States Parties to include in their national reports to the CIM information 
                                                 
74  Art 7(b).  Abi-Mershed points out that the Convention drew on the evolution of the 
principles relating to due diligence set out in Velásquez Rodriquez. However, it is 
interesting to note that initial versions of Article 7 did not expressly include the due 
diligence standard – Abi-Mershed op cit note 61 at 130-131.  
75  Art 8(a).  
76  Art 8(d). 
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on measures adopted to prevent and prohibit violence against women. They are 
also expected to report on the factors that contribute to violence against women. 
 
Article 12 states that any person or group of persons, or any non-governmental 
entity legally recognised in one or more member states of the OAS, may lodge 
petitions with the IACHR containing complaints of violations of Article 7 of this 
Convention by a State Party, and the Commission will consider such claims in 
accordance with the established norms and procedures relating to petitions. 
 
Article 11, which notes that States Parties and the CIM may request advisory 
opinions of the IACrtHR on the interpretation of the Convention, has given rise 
to some uncertainty. This is due to the fact that the Article speaks to the Court’s 
advisory jurisdiction, but is silent on the question of its contentious jurisdiction 
in respect of the Convention. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that 
Article 12 only makes reference to petitions relation to violations of Article 7 
(omitting Articles 8 and 9).    
 
The Court recently dealt with this issue in its judgment in González et al (‘Cotton 
Field’) v Mexico.77 Finding that it had contentious jurisdiction in respect of 
Article 7 of the Convention,78 the Court however concluded it did not have 
jurisdiction to examine violations of Articles 8 and 9.79 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77  Unreported judgment dated 16 November 2009. See discussion in Section 3.3.2 below.  
78  Paras 31-77. 
79  Paras 78-79. 
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3. JURISPRUDENCE 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In this section, I examine two cases in which the IACHR and the IACrtHR 
respectively dealt with alleged violations of women’s right to freedom from 
violence.  
 
In selecting these two matters, guidance was found in the factual basis of cases, 
for example, whether the violence had been committed by State agents or private 
actors.80 This criterion led to the exclusion of the IACrtHR’s judgment in Case of 
the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v Peru,81 where a group of prison detainees 
(women and men) were attacked by government forces under the guise of dealing 
with a suspected prison uprising.82 Two admissibility reports published by the 
Commission in 2006, arising from the alleged rape of indigenous women by 
soldiers of the Mexican Army, were also excluded firstly on the basis that the 
perpetrators of the sexual violence were State agents and secondly because the 
                                                 
80  See Chapter 1 in this regard. 
81  Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v Peru op cit note 22.   
82  The Court acknowledged that the men and women detainees (allegedly members of the 
communist party or ‘Shining Path’) were targeted in different ways by the government 
forces.  The group of women inmates, which included a number of pregnant women, 
was attacked first. The attack was initiated on women’s visiting day and the women 
visitors who had gathered outside the prison were insulted, gassed and shot at. 
Furthermore, the timing of the attack (starting on 6 May and carrying on for four days) 
meant that the mothers of the victims were searching through the morgues on Peruvian 
Mother’s Day for their missing children. During the days following the attack, the 
surviving inmates were kept under appalling conditions, which included forced nudity 
and sexual violence committed against women detainees. However, commentators have 
questioned whether the denial of justice for human rights violations in this case was 
indeed based on the fact that the victims were women – see Zuloaga op cit note 22 at 
242. 
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admissibility proceedings do not raise any substantive issues pertinent to the 
objectives of this study.83 
 
At the time of writing, certain cases are pending before the Commission that 
have the potential for expansion of current principles, especially in relation to the 
standard of ‘due diligence’. These include the matters of M.Z. v Bolivia,84  
Franco v Guatemala,85 and Gonzales v The United States.86 The first two have 
not been included for discussion here, given that the admissibility reports do not 
raise any new substantive issues. While this is also strictly speaking true of the 
third case, I have added this case to the analysis because of its potential impact in 
developing the notion of ‘due diligence’.  
 
                                                 
83  IACHR Report No. 93/06 Petition 972-03 Admissibility: Valentina Rosendo Cantú et 
al, Mexico (21 October 2006); Report No. 94/06 Petition 540-04 Admissibility: Ines 
Fernandez Ortega et al, Mexico (dated 21 October 2006). The issue in dispute in both 
instances was whether or not the petitioners had exhausted domestic remedies as 
required in terms of Article 46 § 1(a) of the American Convention.  
84  IACHR Report No 73/01 Case 12.350 Admissibility: M.Z., Bolivia (dated 10 October 
2001). The petition dealt with a case of rape, where a woman who had allegedly been 
raped appealed against the unsatisfactory sentence imposed on the perpetrator; on 
appeal, the accused was acquitted. The Commission ruled the petition admissible; the 
matter is currently still pending.  
85  IACHR Report No 92/06 Petition 95-04 Admissibility: María Isabel Véliz Franco, 
Guatemala (dated 21 October 2006). This complaint related to gaps and irregularities in 
the investigation of the death of María Isabel Véliz Franco, 15 years of age, who 
disappeared on 17 December 2001 in Guatemala City and was found dead the next day. 
Brought by the mother of the deceased young woman, the complaint was found 
admissible by the IACHR on the above date and is still pending. The same 
considerations apply to the following petitions pending befote the IACHR, relating to 
the murders of women in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico: Report No 32/06 Petition 1173-03 
Admissibility: Paloma Angélica Escobar Ledezma, Mexico (dated 14 March 2006); 
Report No 31/06 Petition 1176-03 Admissibility: Silvia Arce, Mexico (dated 14 March 
2006). 
86  Op cit note 20. See discussion in Section 3.4 below.  
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In considering the cases dealing with violence against women, it is important to 
also take notice of the Court’s previous rulings relating to women’s equality, 
most notably the judgment in Morales de Sierra.  
 
3.2 Maria de Penha v Brazil87  
 
3.2.1 Petition before the Inter-American Commission 
 
The first case in which the IACHR dealt with the Convention of Belém do Pará 
was that brought by Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes against Brazil, which arose 
from a long-standing history of domestic violence committed against the victim 
and an equally enduring period of impunity for the perpetrator.  
 
In this matter, the petitioners88 alleged that on 29 May 1983, Maria da Penha 
Maia Fernandes89 was the victim of attempted murder by her then husband, 
Marco Antônio Heredia Viveiros, at their home in Fortaleza in the State of 
Ceará.90 He shot her in the back while she was asleep, bringing to a climax a 
series of acts of  violence committed over the course of their married life. As a 
result of this attack, Ms. Fernandes sustained serious injuries, had to undergo 
numerous operations and incurred permanent paraplegia and other physical and 
psychological trauma. Two weeks after the initial shooting incident, Ms. 
                                                 
87  IACHR Report No 54/01 Case 12.051 Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v Brazil (6 
April 2001) [hereafter ‘IACHR Fernandes Report’].  
88  The petition was jointly filed by Maria da Penha Fernandes, the Centre for Justice and 
International Law (CEJIL), and the Latin and Caribbean Committee for the Defence of 
Women’s Rights (CLADEM).  
89  The IACHR Fernandes Report refers to Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes 
interchangeably as ‘Mrs Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes’, ‘Mrs Fernandes’ and ‘Maria 
da Penha’. In the interest of brevity, I use ‘Ms. Fernandes’.   
90  The factual background as alleged by the petitioners is set out in IACHR Fernandes 
Report op cit note 87 paras 8-19. 
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Fernandes returned from the hospital and was recovering from the attempt on her 
life. Mr. Viveiros again attempted to kill her by allegedly trying to electrocute 
her while she was taking a bath.  
 
The Office of the Public Prosecutor filed charges against Mr Viveiros on 28 
September 1984, leading to public criminal proceedings. Despite the 
preponderance of the evidence, the case languished for several years before the 
jury found Mr. Viveiros guilty on 4 May 1991. He was sentenced to 15 years’ 
imprisonment for assault and attempted murder, which was reduced to 10 years 
because he had no previous convictions. The defence then embarked on a 
protracted series of appeals; at the time of submission of the petition to the 
Commission (in 1998), the most recent of these appeals had been pending since 
1997 without an outcome.   
 
The petitioners claimed that as of the date of the petition, the Brazilian justice 
system had dragged its feet for more than fifteen years without handing down a 
final ruling against the ex-husband of Ms. Fernandes, who had been free during 
that entire period, despite the serious nature of the charges. They maintained that 
the primary aim of the Brazilian State ought to have been to ensure compensation 
for the suffering of Ms. Fernandes, by guaranteeing her a fair trial within a 
reasonable time period. Importantly, the petitioners maintained that this 
complaint did not represent an isolated situation; rather, it was an example of a 
‘pattern of impunity’ in cases of domestic violence against women in Brazil, 
since the majority of complaints filed did not lead to criminal prosecution and in 
the few cases where they did, the perpetrators were convicted in only a small 
number of cases.91 
                                                 
91  Idem para 20.  
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The petition accordingly alleged the violation of Article 1(1) (the obligation to 
respect and ensure rights), Article 8 (the right to a fair trial), Article 24 (the right 
to equal protection), and Article 25 (the right to judicial protection) of the 
American Convention.92 For its part, the Brazilian State did not provide the 
Commission with a response regarding the admissibility or the merits of the 
petition, despite repeated requests of the Commission to the State.93  
 
In deciding whether the right to justice, right to fair trial and judicial 
protection94 had been violated, the IACHR observed that by then, more than 17 
years had elapsed since the launch of the investigation into the attack on the 
victim. At the time of the Commission’s consideration in 2001, the case against 
the accused remained open, a final ruling had not been handed down, and 
remedies had not been provided for the consequences of the attempted murder of 
Ms. Fernandes.95  
 
Making reference to existing jurisprudence of the IACrtHR, the Commission 
found that considerations such as the characteristics of the case, the personal 
situation of persons involved in the proceedings and the level of complexity 
could not explain the unwarranted delay in the administration of justice in this 
case. The Commission held the view that the domestic judicial decisions in this 
                                                 
92  Articles 1(1),  8, 24 and 25 of the American Convention, in relation to Articles II and 
XVIII of the American Declaration, as well as Articles 3, 4(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and 
(g), 5 and 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará.  
93  IACHR Fernandes Report op cit note 87 para 25.  
94  Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention stipulate that all persons are entitled to 
access to judicial remedies and to be heard by a competent authority or court when they 
think that their rights have been violated, which is reaffirmed in Article XVIII (right to 
justice) of the Declaration, all in relation to the obligation set forth in Article 1(1) of the 
Convention – IACHR Fernandes Report op cit note 87 para 37. 
95  Idem para 38.  
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case revealed inefficiency, negligence, and failure to act on the part of the 
Brazilian judicial authorities and unjustified delay in the prosecution of the 
accused.96 These shortcomings stood in the way of punishment of the accused 
and raised the spectre of impunity (and failure to compensate the victim) as a 
result of the operation of the statute of limitations.97 They demonstrated that the 
State was not capable of organising its entities in a manner that guaranteed those 
rights. As a whole, this situation constituted a violation of Articles 8 and 25 of 
the American Convention read with Article 1(1) thereof and the corresponding 
Articles of the Declaration. 
 
Regarding the alleged violation of the right to equality before the law,98 the 
Commission noted that it had followed with special interest developments related 
to respect for the rights of women, particularly those related to domestic 
violence.99 The Commission considered information from a broad range of 
sources relating, inter alia, to the high number of domestic attacks of women in 
Brazil,100 the fact that women are the victims of domestic violence in 
disproportionate numbers compared to men, discrimination against women who 
were attacked and the role of the inefficiency of the Brazilian judicial system in 
this discrimination.101 It also referred to the small number of reported cases that 
                                                 
96  Idem para 44. 
97  The prescribed limitation period here was twenty years.  
98  The petitioners alleged a violation of Art 24 of the American Convention in relation to 
the right to equality before the law and the right to justice enshrined in the American 
Declaration (Articles II and XVIII) – IACHR Fernandes Report op cit note 87 para 45. 
99  Idem para 46. 
100  Idem 46-49.  
101  The Commission refers to its 1997 report on the situation of human rights of women in 
Brazil – idem para 47. This includes, for example, persistent reliance by the courts on 
the so-called ‘honour defence’ despite its formal abolition by the Supreme Court of 
Brazil in 1991, as well as an undue focus on the conduct of the victim in sexual crimes 
– ibid. 
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are investigated, and those that eventually result in the conviction of the 
perpetrator.  
 
In this analysis examining the pattern shown by the State in responding to this 
kind of violation, the Commission did note that positive measures have also been 
taken in the legislative, judicial, and administrative spheres.102 However, these 
positive initiatives had been implemented on a limited basis in relation to the 
scope and urgency of the problem, as indicated earlier. In this case, ‘which stands 
as a symbol’, these initiatives had not had any effect whatsoever.103  
 
Finally, the petitioners sought a finding of violation by the State of Articles 3, 4, 
5 and 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará. They alleged that this case had to be 
analysed in a context of gender-based discrimination by Brazilian State organs, 
which served to reinforce the systematic pattern of violence against women and 
impunity in Brazil.104 The Commission, by means of introduction, observed that 
the Convention of Belém do Pará is an essential instrument that reflects the great 
efforts made to identify specific measures to protect the right of women to a life 
free of aggression and violence, both outside and within the family circle.105 
Recounting the definition of violence against women as set out in Article 2, and 
the duties of the State in Article 7, the Commission found that the impunity that 
the ex-husband of Ms. Fernandes had enjoyed (and, at the time, continued to 
                                                 
102  Three initiatives were directly relevant here: the establishment of special police stations  
to handle reports on violence against women; the establishment of shelters for battered 
women; and the 1991 decision of the Supreme Court to strike down the archaic concept 
of ‘honour defense’ as a justification for crimes against wives. 
103  IACHR Fernandes Report op cit note 87 para 50.  
104  Idem para 51. 
105  Idem para 53. 
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enjoy), was at odds with the international commitment voluntarily assumed by 
the State when it ratified the Convention of Belém do Pará.106  
 
The failure to prosecute and convict the perpetrator under these circumstances 
was an indication that the State condoned the violence suffered by Ms. 
Fernandes, and this failure by the Brazilian courts to take action was 
exacerbating the direct consequences of the aggression by her ex-husband.107 
Furthermore, this tolerance by the State organs was not limited to this case; 
rather, it was a pattern.108 The condoning of this situation by ‘the entire system’ 
only served to perpetuate the psychological, social and historical roots and 
factors that sustain and encourage violence against women. The Commission 
made the following important statement: 
 
Given the fact that the violence suffered by Maria da Penha is part 
of a general pattern of negligence and lack of effective action by 
the State in prosecuting and convicting aggressors, it is the view 
of the Commission that this case involves not only failure to fulfill 
the obligation with respect to prosecute and convict, but also the 
obligation to prevent these degrading practices. That general and 
discriminatory judicial ineffectiveness also creates a climate that 
is conducive to domestic violence, since society sees no evidence 
of willingness by the State, as the representative of the society, to 
take effective action to sanction such acts.109   
 
                                                 
106  Idem para 55. 
107  For example, the petition notes that because of the paraplegia incurred as a result of the 
shooting incident, Ms. Fernandes had to undergo extensive physical therapy, and 
because of her loss of independence, required constant assistance in order to move 
around – idem para 11. The ongoing need for medication and physical therapy was 
expensive and she received no financial assistance from her ex-husband to cover her 
expenses. 
108  Idem para 55.  
109  Idem para 56. Emphasis added.  
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The Commission explained that it must, in relation to Articles 7(c)110 and (h),111 
consider the measures taken by the State to eliminate the condoning of domestic 
violence.112 Noting the positive measures taken by the current administration, the 
Commission nonetheless found that in this case, which represented ‘the tip of the 
iceberg’, ineffective judicial action, impunity and the inability of victims to 
obtain compensation exemplified the State’s lack of commitment to take 
appropriate action to address domestic violence. The Commission accordingly 
held the view that the State was liable for failing to perform its duties set out in 
Articles 7(b), (d), (e), (f), (g) of the Convention of Belém do Pará in relation to 
rights protected therein, among them, the right to a life free of violence (Article 
3).113  
 
In conclusion, the Commission made a number of potentially far-reaching 
recommendations to the Brazilian State, including the rapid and effective 
completion of criminal proceedings against the person responsible for the assault 
and attempted murder of Ms. Fernandes, and in addition, conducting a serious 
and exhaustive investigation to determine responsibility for the irregularities or 
delays that prevented rapid and effective prosecution of the perpetrator. It also 
proposed a range of measures aimed at the continuation and expansion of the 
reform process that will put an end to the condonation by the State of domestic 
violence against women in Brazil and discrimination in the handling thereof. 
These included training and awareness-raising for the judiciary and specialised 
                                                 
110  Art 7(c) provides that States Parties undertake to include in their domestic legislation 
penal, civil, administrative and any other type of provisions that may be needed to 
prevent, punish and eradicate violence against women and to adopt appropriate 
administrative measures where necessary.  
111  Art 7(h) provides that States Parties undertake to adopt such legislative or other 
measures as may be necessary to give effect to this Convention. 
112  IACHR Fernandes Report op cit note 87 para 57. 
113  Idem para 58. 
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police; simplification of criminal justice proceedings to reduce the time taken for 
proceedings; the inclusion in teaching curriculums of units aimed at providing an 
understanding of the importance of respecting women and their rights recognized 
in the Belém do Pará. The State was also required to report to the Commission 
within sixty days on steps taken to implement these recommendations. 
 
 
 3.2.2 Follow-up to the IACHR report 
 
Santos explains that despite the importance of the case, the Brazilian government 
only began to pay attention to the situation of Ms. Fernandes in October 2002.114 
Pressure was reportedly exerted on the Superior Tribunal of Justice to finalise the 
appeal proceedings of the perpetrator, and the case was concluded soon after. 
(The original sentencing decision of the local jury was confirmed.) This decision 
was delivered just a few months before the deadline for the prescription of the 
crime.  
 
The other IACHR recommendations were also initially disregarded by the 
Brazilian government. However, due to increasing pressure from the women’s 
movement, the government began to partially comply with the IACHR’s 
recommendations. This resulted in a proposal by the government to National 
Congress for legislation on domestic violence against women - a proposal that 
had been demanded by the women’s movement since the 1980’s.115 The new 
                                                 
114 CM Santos ‘Transnational legal activism and the State: Reflections on cases against 
Brazil in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ (2007) 7 SUR 
International Journal on Human Rights 29 at 47. 
115  See Pitanguy for an overview of legal reform measures relating to violence against 
women introduced in Brazil since the mid-1990s – J Pitanguy (ed) Violence against 
Women in the International Context: Challenges and Responses (2007) 37-39. 
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legislation was signed on 7 August 2006 in a public ceremony widely publicised 
by the Brazilian media.116 As an act of symbolic reparation, the new legislation 
was named the ‘Maria da Penha Law’.117  
 
The main features of this legislation, which is based on the Convention of Belém 
do Pará, can be summarised as follows: the definition of domestic violence as 
physical, psychological, sexual, patrimonial and moral violence; the definition of 
responsibility of governments to promote policies of women’s social inclusion; 
the creation of specialised family and domestic violence courts, with civil and 
criminal jurisdiction; the creation of mechanisms aimed at the empowerment of 
women victims of violence; the creation of emergency protective measures to 
prevent new acts of violence; and the inclusion of victims with low incomes in 
the government’s social programmes.118  
 
Although recent reports indicate that the implementation of the ‘Maria da Penha 
Law’ has not been smooth,119 it is encouraging to note that the IACHR’s 
recommendations have had practical impact in the form of law reform at national 
level.  
 
 
                                                 
116  Santos op cit note 114 at 47.  
117  Law No. 11.340/2006 (dated 7 August 2006).  
118  Pitanguy op cit note 115 at 39.  See also Abi-Mershed op cit note 61 at 133; JG Roure 
‘Domestic violence in Brazil: Examining obstacles and approaches to promote 
obstacles and approaches to promote legislative reform’ (2009) 41 Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review 67 at 92.  
119  IACHR Annual Report (2009) para 127, available at official IACHR website at 
[www.cidh.org/annualrep/2009eng/Chap.III.h.eng.htm#12.051] (Accessed on 26 April   
2010.) Significantly, the State did not submit information on compliance with the 
recommendations of the IACHR; however, the petitioners provided the Commission 
with this information.  
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3.3 Returning to Ciudad Juárez 
3.3.1 Background 
 
It will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter 3 above that the CEDAW 
conducted an inquiry in 2003 in terms of the Optional Protocol to the Women’s 
Convention into the abduction, rape and murder of women in Ciudad Juárez, 
Mexico.120 In February 2002, prior to the CEDAW inquiry, the IACHR Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Women carried out a visit to the country.121 The 
IACHR subsequently adopted a report on the findings of the Special Rapporteur, 
which also offered recommendations to the State.122    
 
A number of petitions were consequently submitted to the IACHR arising from 
the circumstances of individual murder victims and alleged weaknesses in the 
response of Mexican authorities. Three of these petitions related to women 
whose bodies had been found on a cotton field outside Ciudad Juárez on 6 
November 2001. In 2005 the Commission dealt with the admissibility of the 
petitions, finding them all admissible.123 Considering that the cases may be 
                                                 
120  See Chapter 3, Section 2.6.4.  The CEDAW subsequently published its findings in 2005 
- CEDAW Report on Mexico produced by the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention, and reply from the Government of Mexico UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO (dated 27 January 2005). 
121  See Chapter 3, Section 2.6.4.   
122  Events following the Special Rapporteur’s visit and adoption of the Commission’s 
report, including the CEDAW inquiry, are detailed in Chapter 3, Section 2.6.4(d). The 
CEDAW report refers to the IACHR report at some length.  
123  IACHR Report No 16/05 Petition 281-02 Admissibility: Claudia Ivette González, 
Mexico (dated 24 February 2005); Report No 17/05 Petition 282-02 Admissibility: 
Esmeralda Herrera Monreal, Mexico (dated 24 February 2005); Report No 18/05 
Petition 283-02 Admissibility: Laura Berenice Ramos Monarrez, Mexico (dated 24 
February 2005). 
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linked, the Commission decided to join the three, and this combined case was 
eventually submitted to the Court.124  
 
Commentators had suggested that the liability of the Mexican Government in 
respect of the abduction and murders of women in Ciudad Juárez should be 
tested in the IACrtHR, with specific application of the principles laid down in 
Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras.125 The case of González et al (‘Cotton Field’) 
v. Mexico provided the Court with an opportunity to respond to this invitation.      
 
 
3.3.2 Case of González et al (‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico126 
 
The three victims in the instant case had been identified as Claudia Ivette 
González,127 Esmeralda Herrera Monreal128 and Laura Berenice Ramos 
                                                 
124  The bodies of another five women were found nearby in the same cotton field on the 
following day (7 November 2001). Although the representatives of the next of kin 
requested the Court to expand the number of victims to include these bodies, these five 
women were not considered alleged victims in this case, largely for technical reasons – 
paras 4, 209 of the judgment.  
125  See eg Robinson op cit note 45 at 185-187; WP Simmons ‘Remedies for the women of 
Ciudad Juárez through the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 4 
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 492 at 503-505. 
126  IACrtHR Case of González et al (‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico (Unreported judgment 
dated 16 November 2009.) [hereafter ‘González et al judgment’]    
127  Claudia Ivette González was 20 years old and worked for a maquila plant. According to 
a close friend, ‘when she went out, it was almost always for short periods, because she 
helped her sister take care of her daughter, and therefore sometimes arrived late’ at 
work. On 10 October 2001, she arrived at work two minutes late and, consequently, 
was not allowed in. She disappeared that day – González et al judgment op cit note 126 
para 166.   
128  Esmeralda Herrera Monreal was 15 years old and had completed ‘third year of 
secondary school’. She disappeared on Monday, 29 October 2001, after leaving the 
house where she worked as a domestic employee – idem para 167.  
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Monárrez129 (‘Mss. González, Herrera and Ramos’). The Commission asked the 
Court to hold the Mexican State liable for its failure to comply with its 
obligations to ensure certain of the rights of the victims.130 This overview of the 
judgment will focus on two specific aspects, i.e. the State’s obligations to 
guarantee the right to life of the victims, and the obligation to conduct an 
effective investigation.  
   
Despite acknowledging the serious nature of the murders, the Mexican State 
denied that it had committed any violation of the rights to life, humane treatment 
and personal liberty.131 The State distinguished two stages in the investigation: 
the first stage from 2001 to 2003, and the second from 2004 to 2009. It 
acknowledged responsibility for some irregularities during the first stage, but 
alleged that during the second stage, these deficiencies had been corrected.132 
The Mexican Government denied the assertion of impunity; it explained that the 
investigations into the cases were still open and measures were still being taken 
to identify those responsible for the earlier wrongdoings.133 
 
                                                 
129  Laura Berenice Ramos Monárrez was 17 years old and a fifth semester high school 
student. The last information about her was that she telephoned a girl friend on 
Saturday, 22 September 2001, to tell her that she was ready to go to a party. The report 
that was filed indicated that she disappeared on Tuesday, 25 September 2001, without 
giving any further details – idem para 165. 
130  These included the obligations to ensure the right to life of the victims ‘by adopting 
measures to prevent their murders’, the obligation to act diligently to prevent, 
investigate and punish the acts of violence suffered by the victims in violation of 
Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará, as well as the obligation to conduct an 
effective and adequate investigation into the disappearances and subsequent deaths of 
Mss. González, Herrera and Ramos, in violation of Articles 8, 25 and 1(1) of the 
American Convention. Further alleged violations related to the right to humane 
treatment in Art 5 (in respect of the victims’ next of kin) and the State’s obligations 
towards minors (arising from Art 19). 
131  González et al judgment op cit note 126 para 111. 
132  Idem paras 20, 296. 
133  Idem para 111.  
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As an introductory issue, the Mexican State contested the Court’s jurisdiction to 
determine violations of the Convention of Belém do Pará.134 The Court dealt 
with this point at some length,135 referring inter alia to its judgment in the Miguel 
Castro-Castro matter, where it had drawn on this Convention for interpretive 
guidance.136 It accordingly held that it had jurisdiction to examine violations of 
Article 7 of the Convention, but that this jurisdiction did not extend to alleged 
violation of Articles 8 and 9.137  
 
In a lucid and systematic judgment, the Court first examined the broad context 
within which the murders occurred. It set out to establish whether the violence 
suffered by the three victims constituted ‘violence against women’ as defined in 
the American Convention and the Convention of Belém do Pará.138 Considering 
factors such as the Mexican State’s acknowledgment of the general situation of 
violence against women in Ciudad Juárez as well as its statement that the 
murders of women in Ciudad Juárez ‘are influenced by a culture of 
                                                 
134  Idem para 31. 
135  See González et al judgment op cit note 126 paras 31-80. Although this exposition is 
instructive in terms of treaty interpretation broadly, it is not relevant to the specific 
focus of this study and will therefore not be discussed further.   
136  Idem paras 74-76. In the Miguel Castro-Castro case, the main judgment noted that with 
regard to the aspects specific to violence against women, the Court would take the 
relevant provisions of the Convention of Belém do Pará and the Women’s Convention 
into consideration as a ‘reference of interpretation’ in its application of Art 5 of the 
American Convention, since these instruments complement the international corpus 
iuris  in matters or protection of women’s right to humane treatment, of which the 
American Convention forms part – para 276. However, it is important to also take note 
of the individual judgment of Judge García Ramírez, which posits the direct 
applicability of the Convention of Belém do Pará. 
137  Section 2.3 (e) above.    
138  González et al judgment op cit note 126 para 224. See definition of ‘violence against 
women’ in Convention of Belém do Pará’ in Section 2.3(b) above. The Court noted that 
it had previously established that not all human right violations committed against a 
woman necessarily imply a violation of the provisions in the Convention of Belém do 
Pará – idem para 227 .  
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discrimination against women’,139 international reports140 indicating that many of 
the killings of women in Ciudad Juárez were manifestations of gender-based 
violence, and the specific circumstances of this case,141  the Court concluded that 
Mss. González, Herrera and Ramos had been victims of ‘violence against 
women’ for purposes of the American Convention and the Convention of Belém 
do Pará. On the same basis, the Court considered that the murders of the victims 
were gender-based and were perpetrated in an acknowledged context of violence 
against women in Ciudad Juárez.142  
 
The next question was whether the violence perpetrated against the victims could 
be attributed to the State. This question had to be determined with reference to 
Article 1(1) of the American Convention, which imposes the obligation on States 
to respect and ensure the rights (such as the rights to life, personal integrity and 
personal liberty) established therein.143  
  
Regarding the obligation to ‘respect’, the Court observed that both the IACHR 
and the representatives of the next-of-kin had alluded to the possible 
participation of public officials; however, they could not provide any 
corroborating evidence.144 The fact that the impunity in the present case made it 
impossible to know whether the perpetrators were public officials, or private 
individuals acting with the support and tolerance of such officials, did not imply 
                                                 
139  González et al judgment op cit note 126 paras 228-230.  
140  Such as those compiled by CEDAW, Amnesty International, and so forth.  
141  Thirdly, the three victims in this case were young, underprivileged women, workers or 
students, as were many of the victims of the murders in Ciudad Juárez. They were 
abducted and their bodies appeared in a deserted field. It had been accepted as proved 
that they suffered physical ill-treatment and very probably sexual abuse of some type 
before they died. 
142  González et al judgment op cit note 126 para 231.  
143  Idem para 234. 
144  The Court deals with this obligation at paras 238-242 of the judgment. 
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that the Court could assume that there were in fact public officials involved - and 
therefore automatically condemn the State for failing to comply with its 
obligation to respect.  
 
When it came to the obligation to ‘guarantee’, however, the Court reiterated that 
States should not merely abstain from violating rights, but must adopt positive 
measures, which are to be determined based on the specific needs of protection 
of the subject of law, either because of his or her personal situation or because of 
the specific circumstances in which he or she finds himself.145  
 
The Court accordingly had to analyse whether the State took adequate steps to 
prevent the disappearance, abuses and death suffered by the three victims, and 
whether it had  investigated these facts with due diligence.146 A second question 
to be considered was whether the State allowed access to justice to the next of 
kin of the three victims.147 The first question highlighted by the Court will be 
examined in some detail here due to its importance for this thesis. In particular, 
the obligation of prevention in this context as set out by the Court is noteworthy.  
 
(a) Obligation of prevention in relation to the right to personal liberty, to 
personal integrity and to life of the victims 
 
Noting that the obligation to prevent is one of means or conduct, and that a 
failure to comply with it is not proved merely because the right has been 
                                                 
145  These aspects are set out in paras 243-248 of the judgment.  
146  In other words, whether it complied with the obligation to guarantee Articles 4, 5 and 7 
of the American Convention (in relation to Art 1(1) thereof) and Art 7 of the 
Convention of Belém do Pará, which complements the international corpus juris as 
regards the prevention and punishment of violence against women. 
147  As stipulated in Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the American Convention (in relation to 
Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof). 
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violated,148 the Court firstly revisited the general principles relating to due 
‘diligence’ as these had developed in international law with reference to violence 
against women.149 This overview revealed that States should adopt 
comprehensive measures to comply with due diligence in cases of violence 
against women:  
 
In particular, they should have an appropriate legal framework for 
protection that is enforced effectively, and prevention policies and 
practices that allow effective measures to be taken in response to 
the respective complaints. The prevention strategy should also be 
comprehensive; in other words, it should prevent the risk factors 
and, at the same time, strengthen the institutions that can provide 
an effective response in cases of violence against women. 
Furthermore, the State should adopt preventive measures in 
specific cases in which it is evident that certain women and girls 
may be victims of violence.150    
 
The Court analysed a range of measures taken by the Mexican State to address 
violence against women, both in Ciudad Juárez and in the broader national 
context.151 Its conclusion was that even though the State was fully aware of the 
danger faced by women such as the three murdered women of being subjected to 
violence, it had not shown that, prior to November 2001, it had adopted useful 
preventive measures that would have reduced the risk factors for the women. 
While the measures taken by the Mexican State were necessary and revealed a 
                                                 
148  González et al judgment op cit note 126 para 252. 
149  The Court makes reference, inter alia, to CEDAW’s General Recommendation No. 19, 
the IACHR’s report in the case of Maria de Penha v Brazil and the guidelines on ‘due 
diligence’ developed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women - paras 
253-257. It is useful to read this exposition with the second concurring judgment in this 
case, delivered by Judge García-Sayán, which deals with the State’s obligation to 
prevent acts of (private) violence. This separate judgment specifically aims to draw a 
distinction between this obligation to prevent in the context of international 
responsibility and a more general responsibility to put in place public policy to address 
criminal acts. 
150  González et al judgment op cit note 126 para 258. 
151  Idem paras 262-279. 
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commitment on the part of the State,152 it had not been demonstrated that these 
measures were ‘sufficient and effective’ to prevent the serious manifestations of 
violence against women that were occurring in Ciudad Juárez at the relevant 
time.153 
  
Nevertheless, according to the jurisprudence developed by the Court, a State 
cannot be held responsible for all human rights violation committed by private 
actors within its jurisdiction.154 The State’s obligation to guarantee rights in 
terms of the American Convention does not imply an unlimited responsibility for 
any act or deed of private individuals. The State’s obligation to adopt measures 
of prevention and protection for private individuals in their relations with each 
other is firstly conditional on its awareness of a situation of real and imminent 
danger for a specific individual or group of individuals and secondly on the 
reasonable possibility of preventing or avoiding that danger.  
 
The Court accordingly identified two crucial moments in this case in which the 
obligation of prevention must be examined. The first is prior to the disappearance 
of the victims and the second is before the discovery of their bodies.155  
 
Regarding the first moment, i.e. before the disappearance of the victims, the 
Court found that the failure to prevent the disappearance does not per se result in 
                                                 
152  Such as the creation of an Office of the Special Prosecutor for the Investigation of the 
Murders of Women in Ciudad Juárez within the Office of the Attorney General of 
Chihuahua (see para 262) and certain additions to the legislative framework. 
153  González et al judgment op cit note 126 para 279. 
154  Idem para 280. The Court referred inter alia to its judgment in Case of the Massacre of 
Pueblo Bello v Columbia (Judgment dated 31 January 2006) Series C No. 140 para. 
123. Reference was also made to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, including Case of Osman v The United Kingdom (Judgment of 28 October 
1998) paras 115 and 116.  
155  González et al judgment op cit note 126 para 281.  
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the State’s international responsibility because, even though the State was aware 
of the situation of risk for women in Ciudad Juárez, it had not been established 
that it knew of a real and imminent danger for the particular victims in this 
case.156  
 
With regard to the second moment – before the discovery of the bodies – given 
the context of the case, the State was aware that there was a real and imminent 
risk that the three particular victims could be sexually abused, subjected to ill-
treatment and killed. The Court therefore found that, in this context, an 
obligation of ‘strict due diligence’ arose in regard to reports of missing women, 
with respect to search operations during the first hours and days. Since this 
obligation of means is more rigorous, it required that exhaustive search activities 
be conducted. The Court observed that it was above all essential for authorities to 
take prompt immediate action by ordering, without delay, the necessary measures 
to find the victims or the place where they may have been retained.157  
 
In this instance, Mexico did not prove that it had adopted reasonable measures, 
according to the prevailing circumstances, to find the victims alive. The actions 
of officials during the first hours and days following the reported disappearances 
revealed that the State did not act with the required due diligence to adequately 
prevent the death and abuse suffered by the victims and did not act, as could 
reasonably be expected, to end their deprivation of liberty.158 This failure to 
comply with the obligation to guarantee rights is particularly serious owing to the 
context of which the State was aware – which placed women in a particularly 
                                                 
156  The Court’s evaluation in respect of these two key moments is set out in paras 282-286. 
157  Idem para 283. 
158  Ibid.  
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vulnerable situation – and of the even greater obligations imposed in cases of 
violence against women by Article 7(b) of the Convention of Belém do Pará. 
 
Furthermore, the Court found that that the State did not prove that it had 
implemented the necessary measures, pursuant to Article 2 of the American 
Convention and Article 7(c) of the Convention of Belém do Pará, that would 
have allowed the authorities to provide an immediate and effective response to 
the reports of disappearance and to adequately prevent the violence against 
women. In addition, it did not prove that it had taken measures to ensure that the 
officials in charge of receiving the missing reports had the capacity and the 
sensitivity to understand the seriousness of the phenomenon of violence against 
women and the willingness to act immediately.159 
 
Based on these considerations, the Court found that the State had violated the 
rights to life, personal integrity and personal liberty of Mss. González, Herrera 
and Ramos.160 
 
(b) Obligation to investigate the facts effectively, in accordance with Articles 
8(1) and 25(1) of the Convention 
 
The Court explained that the obligation to investigate cases of the alleged 
violation of the rights to life, personal integrity and personal liberty arises from 
the general obligation to guarantee these rights: in other words, Article 1(1) of 
the Convention in conjunction with the substantive right that must be ensured, 
                                                 
159  Idem para 285. 
160  As recognised in Articles 4(1), 5(1), 5(2) and 7(1) of the American Convention, as well 
as the obligations established in Article 7(b) and 7(c) of the Convention of Belém do 
Pará, read with the general obligation to guarantee rights contained in Art 1(1) and the 
obligation to adopt domestic legal provisions contained in Art 2 of the Convention. 
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protected and guaranteed.161 In addition, Mexico must comply with the 
provisions of Article 7(b) and 7(c) of the Convention of Belém do Pará, which 
establish the obligation to act with due diligence, and to adopt the necessary laws 
to investigate and to punish violence against women.   
 
Recalling its judgment in the case of Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras,162 the 
Court repeated that, pursuant to the obligation to guarantee rights, the State is 
obliged to investigate every situation involving a violation of the rights protected 
by the Convention.163 The duty to investigate is an obligation of means and not 
of results, which must be assumed by the State as an inherent legal obligation 
and not as a mere formality pre-ordained to be ineffective. The State’s obligation 
to investigate must be complied with diligently in order to avoid impunity and 
the repetition of this type of act. In this regard, the Court recalled that impunity 
encourages the repetition of human rights violations.  
 
The Court noted that within the framework of the obligation to protect the right 
to life, the European Court of Human Rights has developed the concept of the 
‘procedural obligation’ to carry out an effective official investigation in cases of 
the violation of that right. The Inter-American Court has also applied this 
concept in several cases.164 
 
Importantly, the Court found that in terms of the standards it had established, the 
obligation to investigate effectively has a wider scope when dealing with the case 
                                                 
161  The general principles are outlined in paras 287-295 of the judgment. 
162  See note 7 above.   
163  See González et al judgment op cit note 126 paras 288-290. 
164  González et al judgment op cit note 126 para 292 fn 305 and authorities cited there.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5   Regional Human Rights Law 
 
 
 
 287
of a woman who is killed or ill-treated or whose personal liberty is affected 
within the framework of a general context of violence against women.165  
 
Applying these principles in the instant case, the Court accordingly analysed 
alleged irregularities relating to various aspects of the investigation, including 
(amongst others) the custody of the crime scenes, collection and handling of 
evidence, actions taken against those presumed to be responsible and alleged 
‘fabrication’ of suspects; and unjustified delay and absence of substantial 
progress in the investigations.166 Each of these aspects was meticulously 
scrutinised with reference to, inter alia, the previous jurisprudence of the 
IACrtHR167 and accepted international standards.168  
 
Based on this examination, and also on the acknowledgement of partial 
responsibility made by the State, the Court found that various irregularities had 
occurred. These irregularities violated the right of access to justice and to 
effective judicial protection, and the right of the next of kin and of society to 
know the truth about what happened. In addition, it revealed that the State had 
failed to comply with ensuring the rights to life, personal integrity and personal 
                                                 
165  Similarly, the European Court has said that where an ‘attack is racially motivated, it is 
particularly important that the investigation is pursued with vigor and impartiality, 
having regard to the need to reassert continuously society’s condemnation of racism 
and to maintain the confidence of minorities in the ability of the authorities to protect 
them from the threat of racist violence.’ - Case of Angelova and Iliev v Bulgaria 
(Judgment dated 26 July 2007) para 98, as cited in González et al judgment op cit note 
125 para 293. 
166  Idem paras 296-387. 
167  See eg para 300, where the Court referred to earlier judgments establishing that the 
obligation to investigate a death means that the effort to determine the truth with all 
diligence must be evident as of the very first procedures – with reference to inter alia 
Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v Peru op cit note 22 para 383.  
168  Such as those set out in the UN Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation 
of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, Doc E/ST/CSDHA/.12 (1991) – 
cited in González et al judgment op cit note 126 para 301 fn 310. 
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liberty of the three victims by conducting a ‘conscientious and competent’ 
investigation.  
 
These factors led the Court to conclude that impunity existed in the instant case 
and that the measures of domestic law adopted had been insufficient to deal with 
the serious human rights violations that occurred. The State did not prove that it 
had adopted the necessary norms or implemented the required measures, in 
accordance with Article 2 of the American Convention and Article 7(c) of the 
Convention of Belém do Pará, that would have permitted the authorities to 
conduct an investigation with due diligence.  
 
Based on the foregoing, the Court found that the State failed to comply with its 
obligation to investigate – and, consequently, with its obligation to guarantee – 
the rights of Mss. González, Herrera and Ramos.169  
 
(c)  The obligation not to discriminate: violence against women as 
discrimination 
  
The next duty considered by the Court was the obligation not to discriminate, in 
other words, violence against women as discrimination.170 In this regard, the 
Court  made reference to established norms such as the principles set out by the 
European Court,171 the definitions of ‘discrimination’ and  ‘violence against 
                                                 
169  As embodied in Articles 4(1), 5(1), 5(2) and 7(1) of the American Convention, in 
relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof and to Article 7(b) and 7(c) of the Convention of 
Belém do Pará, For the same reasons, it found that the State violated the rights of access 
to justice and to judicial protection, embodied in Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the 
American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof and to Articles 7(b) and 
7(c) of the Belém do Pará Convention, to the detriment of the three victims’ next of kin. 
170  This obligation is examined in paras 390-402 of the judgment.  
171  ECrtHR Case of Opuz v Turkey (Judgment of 9 June 2009) paras 180, 191 and 200. 
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women’ contained in the Women’s Convention and the Convention of Belém do 
Pará. It noted that the Mexican State itself had informed the CEDAW that a 
‘culture of discrimination’ against women influenced the fact that ‘the murders 
[of women in Ciudad Juárez] were not perceived at the outset as a significant 
problem requiring immediate and forceful action on the part of the relevant 
authorities’. In addition, the State also indicated that this culture of 
discrimination against women was ‘based on the erroneous idea that women are 
inferior’. 
 
In addition, it had been established that, when investigating this violence, some 
authorities mentioned that the victims were ‘flighty’ or that ‘they had run away 
with their boyfriends’. The Court noted that the subordination of women can be 
associated with persistent socially-dominant gender stereotypes (a preconception 
of personal attributes, characteristics or roles that correspond or should 
correspond to either men or women). This situation is exacerbated when the 
stereotypes are reflected, implicitly or explicitly, in policies and practices and, 
particularly, in the reasoning and language of the judicial police authorities, as in 
this case.172 
 
The Court therefore found that, in the instant case, the violence against women 
constituted a form of discrimination, and declared that the State violated the duty 
not to discriminate contained in Article 1(1) of the Convention.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
172  González et al judgment op cit note 126 para 401.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5   Regional Human Rights Law 
 
 
 
 290
(d) Other violations  
 
The Court further considered the obligations of the Mexican State regarding the 
two victims who were minors at the time of their murders, i.e. Esmeralda Herrera 
Monreal and Laura Berenice Ramos Monárrez, in other words the protective 
measures towards children required in terms of Article 19 of the American 
Convention.173  The State was also found to have been in violation of this 
obligation. Violations of the rights of the victims’ next of kin (specifically 
Article 5 of the American Convention) were furthermore found by the Court.  
 
(e) Reparations 
 
The Court ordered the Mexican State to make a range of reparations,174 including 
to finalise the investigation into the abductions and murders of Mss. González, 
Herrera and Ramos in an effective manner. The Court set out certain directives 
for this investigation, such as that it must be conducted by officials who are 
highly trained in dealing with victims of discrimination and gender-based 
violence. 
 
The reparation order further required the Mexican State to organise a public act 
or ceremony to acknowledge its international responsibility in order to honour 
the memory of Mss. González, Herrera, and Ramos, and to erect a monument in 
memory of the women victims of gender-based murders in Ciudad Juárez within 
one year of notification of the judgment. The monument should be unveiled at 
the above public ceremony.  
 
                                                 
173  See González et al judgment op cit note 126 paras 403-411. 
174  Idem para 446 et seq.  
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Other reparation measures related to the reform of criminal justice procedures, 
the payment of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages to the victims’ next of kin 
and the introduction of education and public awareness programmes. As with its 
other judgments, the Court also imposed reporting requirements on the State 
aimed at monitoring the implementation of the order.175  
 
 
3.4 Jessica Gonzales v United States of America176 
 
At the time of writing, this matter is pending before the IACHR, which found it 
admissible on 24 July 2007. Although the Commission has not yet made a 
finding on the merits,177 the matter has been included here due to the substantive 
issues it raises.  
 
Jessica Gonzales, of Hispanic and Native American origin,178 lived in Castle 
Rock, Colorado. In June 1999, she had obtained a domestic violence restraining 
order against her estranged husband, Simon Gonzales, ordering him to stay away 
from her and their children.179 Several weeks later, Mr Gonzales abducted their 
three daughters (Leslie, 7, Katheryn, 8 and Rebecca, 10) from their front yard at 
                                                 
175  Within one year of notification of the judgment, the State is required to provide the 
Court with a report on the measures adopted to comply with it – González et al 
judgment op cit note 126 para 26 of Part X (Operative Paragraphs).  
176  Op cit note 20 [hereafter ‘IACHR Gonzales Report’]. 
177  The merits hearing took place in October 2008 - C Bettinger-López (2008) 40 ‘Human 
rights at home: Domestic violence as a human rights violation’ Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review 19 at 49. Caroline Bettinger-López is lead counsel in the matter of 
Gonzales v United States. 
178  The facts are set out in the IACHR Gonzales Report op cit note 20 paras 10-17, as well 
as the judgment of the US Supreme Court (reported as Town of Castle Rock v Gonzales 
545 US 748). See also Bettinger-López op cit note 177 at 20.   
179  However, the order permitted him to visit the children on alternate weekends and for 
one dinner a week at a time prearranged between the parties. 
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around 18.00. Attempts by Ms Gonzales over the course of the next ten hours to 
enlist the assistance of the Castle Rock Police Department (‘CRPD’) in locating 
her children and arresting Mr Gonzales were met with disinterest and a lack of 
response, in spite of the ‘mandatory arrest’ law in operation in Colorado State.180  
 
Nearly ten hours after Ms Gonzales’s first call to the police, Mr Gonzales arrived 
at the police station with a gun he had purchased earlier that evening, got out of 
his truck and opened fire. Police officers returned fire and killed him, and then 
discovered the bodies of the three children inside the truck. The Colorado 
authorities conducted an investigation into the use of deadly force by the police 
officers, and summarily concluded, without supporting evidence, that the 
children had been murdered by their father with the gun that he had bought 
earlier. Despite repeated requests from Ms Gonzales, no subsequent investigation 
into the girls’ death took place.181  
 
Ms Gonzales filed a ‘§ 1983 claim’182 against the CRPD in federal court, alleging 
violations of the procedural and substantive components of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.183 This claim eventually made its way to the 
                                                 
180  Colorado Rev Stat § 18-6-803.5(3) (1999).  
181  Several questions relating to the deaths of the children remained unresolved. It 
appeared that the Colorado authorities never examined the truck or investigated 
whether police bullets had penetrated the truck’s interior and whether the fatal bullets 
found inside the girls’ bodies came from Simon Gonzales’s gun, the police officers’ 
guns, or both - Bettinger-López op cit note 177 at 24-25. 
182  Section 1983 creates a federal remedy against a state official for the violation of federal 
rights – 42 USC § 1983 (2000).   
183  Bettinger-López explains that the procedural due process claim rested on the assertion 
that the restraining order, coupled with Colorado’s mandatory arrest law, entitled her to 
a response from the police – in essence, a ‘property right’ that could not be denied her 
without fair procedure – op cit note 177 at 25. Ms. Gonzales argued that the police 
violated her children’s substantive due process rights when they failed to take 
reasonable steps to protect them from the real and immediate risk posed by their father. 
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US Supreme Court, where a majority184 held in June 2005 that Ms. Gonzales had 
no personal entitlement to police enforcement of her restraining order. This 
ruling revolved around the question of whether the Colorado legislation indeed 
made the enforcement of restraining orders mandatory. 
 
She accordingly filing a petition before the IACHR, alleging violation of rights 
protected by the American Declaration:185 the rights to life and freedom from 
inhumane treatment;186 equal protection/ non-discrimination;187 special 
protection for women and children;188 privacy, family unity, and safety in the 
home;189 and an adequate and effective remedy.190  
 
In addition to seeking an individual remedy in the form of financial 
compensation and equitable relief, Ms Gonzales’s petition urges legal and 
programmatic reform in respect of domestic violence in the US, in order to 
address the larger systemic problems that her case represents.191 
 
Ms. Gonzales highlighted that domestic violence is a widespread and tolerated 
phenomenon in the USA, with a disproportionate impact on women and negative 
repercussions for children.192 She further emphasised that even though the 
prevalence and gravity of such violence is recognised at the state and federal 
                                                 
184  The Court was divided 7-2. Scalia J wrote the judgment for the majority, with Stevens J 
and Ginsberg J dissenting.  
185  As noted earlier, the USA has neither ratified the American Convention, nor recognised 
the jurisdiction of the Court. It has not signed or ratified the Convention of Belém do 
Pará either.  
186  Art I. 
187  Art II. 
188  Art VII. 
189  Articles V, VI and IX. 
190  Articles XVIII and XXIV. 
191  Bettinger- López op cit note 177 at 20.  
192    IACHR Gonzales Report op cit note 20 para 20. 
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levels and legislative measures have been adopted to confront the problem, the 
response of police officers is to treat it as a ‘family’ and private matter of low 
priority as compared to other crimes. This perception influences negatively the 
response of the police in the implementation of protection orders. 
 
Regarding the right to equality before the law, Ms. Gonzales alleged that the lack 
of State response to her reports was based on negative stereotypes embraced by 
some police officers and a facially neutral police department police of assigning 
lower priority to reports of domestic violence incidents, a policy that affects 
women disproportionately since they constitute the majority of victims of 
domestic violence.193 According to the petitioners, these deficiencies in the state 
response allegedly have a particularly alarming effect on women that pertain to 
racial and ethnic minorities, and lower-income groups. 
 
She further emphasised that the interpretation of the US Supreme Court prevents 
victims of domestic violence from obtaining legal remedies, and from holding 
the police legally accountable for failure to protect victims from acts of domestic 
violence.194 She challenged the Supreme Court’s decision in DeShaney,195 which 
held that the USA Government has no constitutional duty to protect individuals 
from private acts of violence, and also questioned the Supreme Court’s decision 
in United States v Morrison,196 which struck down as unconstitutional a private 
                                                 
193  Idem para 21. 
194  Idem para 23.  
195  DeShaney v Winnebago City Department of Social Services 489 US 189 (1989), which 
is regarded as the local classicus regarding the State’s protective duties under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. For discussion of the judgment, see eg GK Miccio ‘Notes from 
the underground: Battered women, the state, and conceptions of accountability’ (2000) 
23 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 133 at 154-155. 
196  529 US 598, 602 (2000). 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5   Regional Human Rights Law 
 
 
 
 295
right of action for victims of gender-motivated crimes such as domestic and 
sexual violence against their abusers.197   
 
As noted before, the admissibility hearing did not raise any new issues: the USA 
government response firstly indicated a factual dispute as to the conduct of the 
CRPD, and secondly argued that the American Declaration does not impose an 
affirmative duty on States to actually prevent the commission of the crimes 
perpetrated by Mr Gonzales.198 (It alleged that no provision of the Declaration 
contained language that addressed implementation of the rights enumerated 
therein, in contrast to the American Convention.) Finally, it was also alleged that 
Ms Gonzales had not exhausted all domestic remedies.199  
 
The IACHR dispensed with these arguments fairly easily, and found the petition 
admissible. As noted above, the outcome of the merits hearing is currently 
awaited. This outcome will be of considerable interest, given firstly the strong 
statements by the IACrtHR in the Mexico case regarding the obligation to 
prevent violations of rights, as well as the obligation to conduct a diligent and 
effective investigation. Although the matter is before the Commission, rather 
than the Court, it has the potential to advance the current position regarding the 
connection between the right to freedom from violence and the right to freedom 
from discrimination (given the specific claims made by the petitioner) and to 
further shape the contours of the due diligence standard, with specific reference 
to the legal duty of police officials to respond to emergency calls in cases of 
                                                 
197  Bettinger- López op cit note 177 at 34. 
198  IACHR Gonzales Report op cit note 20 para 32.  This position taken by the USA is not 
a new one – see also Steiner et al op cit note 4 at 1029.  
199  This related to the possibility of litigation at state level.  
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domestic violence. Especially the latter aspect is of enormous practical relevance 
in many jurisdictions, including South Africa.    
 
 
4. EVALUATION: INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
 
Although the Inter-American system may not to date have yielded a great 
number of cases interpreting women’s right to freedom from violence and 
concomitant State obligations, I am of the view that the value of the analysis 
provided by both the IACHR and the IACrtHR is considerable. I briefly set out 
the reasons for this view here.    
 
With the introduction of the Convention of Belém do Pará in 1994, the Inter-
American system was the first to explicitly recognise women’s right to freedom 
from violence. Article 3 of the Convention, which guarantees this right, answers 
the question that has been left lingering in the context of international human 
rights instruments, i.e. whether this right has received full acknowledgment as an 
independent right.200 Equally important is the inclusion, within the ambit of the 
right to freedom from violence, of women’s right to be free from discrimination 
and to be valued and educated free of stereotyped patterns based on inferiority 
and subordination.  
 
Article 7, which specifically includes the State obligation to respond to violence 
against women with due diligence, is furthermore noteworthy. It is unfortunate 
that Article 8, which refers to the programmatic measures to be undertaken by 
States Parties, is subject to ‘progressive realisation’; it is also less than ideal that 
                                                 
200  See Chapter 4, Section 7. 
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violations of Articles 8 and 9 have been held to fall outside the ambit of the 
adjudicatory jurisdiction of the IACrtHR.  
 
The IACHR first applied the Convention of Belém do Pará in the petition of 
Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes against Brazil. This matter firstly demonstrates 
how the existing jurisprudence of the IACrtHR was applied, together with the 
norms introduced by the Convention of Belém do Pará, to arrive at a gender-
specific interpretation of the American Convention.  
 
The willingness of the IACHR to consider the broader context of violence 
against women in Brazil is particularly encouraging. Such a broader examination 
would be necessary in order to grasp both the domestic violence (and the 
deplorable State response) as structural phenomena – rather than isolated 
incidents affecting only an individual woman. This understanding on the part of 
the IACHR in turn led to recommendations aimed at addressing not only the 
position of Ms. Fernandes, but also at overcoming the larger shortcomings in the 
Brazilian legal and social systems. This contextual approach is similar to the one 
adopted by the CEDAW in dealing with the communications relating to domestic 
violence.201 
 
Of further importance is the link drawn by the Commission between the failure 
on the part of the State to comply with its obligation to prosecute and convict 
perpetrators of violence against women and its obligation to prevent such 
violence: it states that ‘general and discriminatory judicial ineffectiveness’ 
creates a climate that is conducive to domestic violence, in that society sees no 
                                                 
201  See Chapter 3.  
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evidence of the State, as representative of society, taking effective action to 
sanction such acts.202  
 
One of the practical outcomes of this matter was the enactment of the ‘Maria da 
Penha Law’ in 2006. It is fairly encouraging to note that the Brazilian State, 
which was not apparently heavily invested in being seen to comply with the 
recommendations of the IACHR, introduced this legislation as early as 2006. 
(Bearing in mind that the Commission’s report was published in 2001, this was 
relatively soon, given one’s experience with the length of time that law reform 
initiatives may take.) In this way, the standards encapsulated in the Convention 
of Belém do Pará found their way into the domestic legal system of Brazil in a 
tangible way.  
 
With its judgment in the ‘Cotton Field’ case, the IACrtHR to a large extent 
completed the process started in 2002 when the Special Rapporteur of the 
IACHR conducted the inquiry into the abduction and murders of women in 
Ciudad Juárez. It can be predicted that this judgment, and the standards laid 
down here in respect of State obligations to prevent violence against women, will 
have considerable influence in future.  
 
As noted in respect of the Commission above, one of the noteworthy aspects of 
the judgment is the Court’s careful inquiry into the context in which the 
abduction and murders of the three women occurred. In this instance, this 
contextual investigation becomes necessary in order to establish whether the 
                                                 
202  This theme is developed further by the IACrtHR in its judgment in González et al v 
Mexico: see para 388, where the Court comments that ‘judicial ineffectiveness when 
dealing with individual cases of violence against women’ encourages an environment 
of impunity, which sends a message that violence against women is tolerated and 
accepted as part of daily life.   
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violence constitutes ‘violence against women’ (and, accordingly, whether the 
Convention of Belém do Pará finds application in casu).  
 
In assessing the State’s positive obligations (i.e. the duty to ‘guarantee’ in terms 
of Article 2 of the American Convention), the Court’s evaluation of the 
obligation to prevent violence against women is particularly compelling. Similar 
to the approach adopted by the IACHR in the Fernandes case, the Court sets out 
the general principles, but then adapts them to the specific circumstances of 
violence against women. An example here is the Court’s finding of an obligation 
of ‘strict due diligence’, which arose after the women had been reported missing, 
but before discovery of the bodies.  
 
Regarding the obligation to investigate, the Court similarly recounted the general 
principles, including the ‘procedural obligation’ to carry out an effective 
investigation, and then observed that this obligation has a wider scope when 
dealing with a case of woman who is killed or ill-treated or whose personal 
liberty is affected within the framework of a general context of violence against 
women.  
 
It will be recalled that one of the points of criticism raised against the CEDAW 
inquiry report into the murders and abductions in Ciudad Juárez was that the 
Committee did not go far enough in articulating the Mexican Government’s 
obligations to address gender stereotyping. The IACrtHR, on the other hand, 
does take this issue further than the Committee by providing concrete guidelines 
to the Mexican Government in its judgment on how the problems of 
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discrimination and gender stereotyping should be addressed inter alia through 
training courses for judges and law enforcement officials.203  
 
Another striking aspect of the Court’s approach is that it interweaves its 
judgment with reference to, for example, the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights and the considerations of the CEDAW inquiry. From a 
normative perspective, this means that the judgment is not limited to the 
standards prevalent in the Inter-American system, but also reflects the principles 
that have gained acceptance internationally. 
 
It is noteworthy that the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women 
made specific reference to the Court’s reparations order in this judgment in her 
recent report on reparations,204 drawing attention to the transformative potential 
of the order and the gender-sensitive approach adopted by the Court.  
 
As suggested at the beginning of this Part, and illustrated by the approach 
adopted by the IACrtHR in its judgment in González et al (‘Cotton Field’) v. 
Mexico, the existing jurisprudence of the Court offers much on which to draw. In 
this regard, Ewing suggests that violence against women can be viewed as a 
comprehensive violation of the American Convention as a whole – in the same 
way that the IACrtHR construed the systematic practice of enforced 
disappearances as the ‘multiple and continuous violation’ of many rights under 
the American Convention.205 While this construction is not required in order to 
                                                 
203  See paras 531-542 of the judgment.  
204  R Manjoo Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences UN Doc A/HRC/14/22 (dated 23 April 2010) para 81. See Chapter 4, 
Section 5.3.2 (b).  
205  Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras op cit note 8 para 155; see Ewing op cit note 25 at 
765-766. 
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bring violence against women within the ambit of human rights protection, given 
the specialised provisions of the Convention of Belém do Pará, it may serve to 
give an additional sense of urgency to State obligations to respond to such 
violence.206  
 
 
PART C: THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The European system, with its foundational instrument, the European 
Convention for the Protection on Human Rights and Freedoms,207 is regarded as 
particularly influential in the context of international human rights.208 The 
reasons for this include the fact the Convention was the first comprehensive 
treaty in the world in this field; it established the first international complaints 
procedure and the first international court for the determination of human rights 
matters. Furthermore, it remains the most judicially developed of all the human 
rights systems and has generated a more extensive jurisprudence than any other 
part of the international system.209 The European Convention has been described 
as an ‘essential component of the political order of Europe’.210 
                                                 
206  I argue that the IACrtHR’s observation in Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras that the 
phenomenon of disappearances is a ‘complex form of human rights violation that must 
be understood and confronted in an integral fashion’ (para 150) equally applies to 
violence against women.  
207  Op cit note 24 [hereafter ‘the European Convention’].  
208  Steiner et al op cit note 5 at 933. 
209  Ibid.  
210  J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 3 ed (2005) 330.  
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There are three inter-governmental organisations in Europe that deal intensively with 
the protection of human rights:211 the European Union (‘EU’)212, the Council of 
Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (‘OSCE’)213. 
This examination focuses on the Council of Europe, the third (and oldest) 
organisation, which was established as a regional intergovernmental human rights 
body in the aftermath of World War II.214 The mandate of the Council is to promote 
social and economic progress and to safeguard the fundamental values of democracy, 
liberty and the rule of law.215  
 
2. KEY INSTRUMENTS 
 
2.1 The European Convention on Human Rights (1953) 
2.1.1 Provisions 
 
The European Convention was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1950 and came 
into operation in 1953. Its provisions, which incorporate civil and political rights, are 
                                                 
211  Nowak op cit note 2 at 157. 
212  The 27-member EU was originally organised as a tool for economic integration only. 
However, it has gradually developed into a political union where human rights are becoming 
increasingly important for domestic and foreign relations - Nowak loc cit; DN Hickey ‘The 
as yet unfulfilled promise and potential of European Union human rights law’ (2008) 30 
Women’s Rights Law Reporter 647 at 648. (See official EU website at 
[europa.eu/abc/european_countries/index_en.htm] for a list of the current Member States.) 
(Accessed on 21 June 2010.)  
213  At the time of writing, the OSCE has 56 Member States, including all sovereign European 
States and certain non-European countries, i.e. the USA, Canada, and certain central-Asian 
successor states of the former Soviet Union – see official OSCE website at 
[www.osce.org/about/13131.html]. (Accessed on 20 June 2010.) The OSCE is primarily a 
regional security organisation, but human rights have always played an important role in the 
body’s comprehensive security concept, both during and after the Cold War. 
214  The founding instrument is the Statute of the Council of Europe ETS No.1, also known as the 
Treaty of London, adopted on 5 May 1949, entered into force on 3 August 1949 [hereafter 
‘the Treaty of London’]. 
215  Idem Preamble, Art 1. 
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binding not only on what was traditionally known as ‘western’ Europe, but also the 
former eastern European States of Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria.216 The Russian 
Federation and Turkey are also included.217  
 
As mentioned, the Convention is limited to civil and political rights. Economic, social 
and cultural rights are dealt with in the European Social Charter (1961).218 Article 1 of 
the European Convention requires Member States to ‘secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction’ the rights set out in the Convention; this provision is supplemented by 
Article 13, which enjoins Member States to ensure an effective remedy before a 
national authority.  
 
The Convention further contains a prohibition of torture and ‘inhuman or degrading 
treatment’,219 and guarantees the rights to liberty and security,220 to a fair trial,221 to 
respect for private and family life222 and to an effective remedy.223 Article 14 provides 
that the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention are to be enjoyed without 
discrimination on a number of listed grounds, including sex.224  
 
 
                                                 
216  See Steiner et al for a brief overview of the establishment of the Council of Europe – op cit 
note 5 at 936-937. 
217  See official Council of Europe website for a list of Member States at 
[www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page=47pays1europe&l=en]. (Accessed on 22 June 2010.) 
218  ETS No. 35, adopted on 18 October 1961, entered into force on 26 February 1965.  
219  European Convention op cit note 24 Art 3.  
220  Art 5. 
221  Art 6. 
222  Art 8. 
223  Art 13. 
224  This implies that Art 14 secures Convention rights to all persons, but one of the other 
substantive Articles needs to be engaged. Protocol 12 of 2000 to the Convention introduces a 
‘freestanding’ right to equality (note 228 below). See P Londono ‘Defining rape under the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ in C McGlynn & VE Munro (eds) Rethinking Rape 
Law (2010) 109 at 117, 119-120. 
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When the Convention was adopted in 1950, a number of proposals were outstanding 
on which agreement could not be reached.225 It was accordingly decided to adopt 
protocols containing additional provisions, and since 1952, fourteen Protocols have 
been introduced. These Protocols address, in addition to procedural matters, the 
important substantive issues of (amongst others) the right to property,226 equality of 
rights and responsibility of spouses227 and a general prohibition of discrimination.228 
Significantly, adoption of these Protocols by Member States is optional.  
 
The Convention does not contain any provisions that make explicit reference to 
violence against women.229 Although Article 5 of the Convention entrenches the right 
to ‘liberty and security of the person’, the European Commission found this provision 
to refer strictly to physical liberty and security in the context of arrest and detention (a 
narrow ‘due process reading’).230 Violence against women has accordingly been dealt 
with under Article 3 (the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment) and Article 8 
(the right to respect for private and family life). This is discussed in more detail below 
in the examination of jurisprudence.   
 
                                                 
225  See Steiner et al op cit note 5 at 938.  
226  First Protocol to the European Convention of 1954, ETS No. 9, entered into force  
18 May 1954. 
227  Protocol 7 to the European Convention of 1984, ETS No. 117, entered into force  
1 November 1988.   
228  Protocol 12 to the European Convention of 2000, ETS No. 177, entered into force  
1 April 2005.  
229  See Hickey op cit note 212 at 658. 
230  See European Commission on Human Rights Adler and Others v Federal Republic of 
Germany Applications No. 5573/72 and 5670/72 (joined) Decision: Admissibility (dated 16 
July 1976) para 28; Dyer v The United Kingdom App No. 10475/83 39 Decision: 
Admissibility (dated 9 October 1984) 246 at 256. See also discussion in Chapter 6, Section 
2.3.1. 
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Commentators have pointed out that the Convention was drafted when there was little 
understanding of women’s rights. It was not designed with women’s needs in mind, 
reflecting their political marginalisation at the time.231 Despite this, Londono notes 
that the ECrtHR has in recent years made progress in developing human rights 
jurisprudence in a manner that assists victims of rape.232 (I argue that this also applies 
to domestic violence.)233 In addition, the Council of Europe has taken steps to 
increase protection for women by drafting a Convention on the combating and 
prevention of violence against women.234 
 
 
2.1.2 Implementation mechanisms 
 
In terms of the European Convention’s original implementation system, a part-time 
European Commission on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) acted as a ‘filtering body’ to 
decide on admissibility and as a mechanism to secure friendly settlements.235 Where a 
settlement was not possible, the Commission reported on the facts and expressed its 
opinion on the merits of the matter.236 The Commission’s reports were submitted to 
the Committee of Ministers237 of the Council, and where no settlement could be 
achieved, the application was referred to a part-time European Court of Human Rights 
                                                 
231  Londono op cit note 224 at 109.  
232  Ibid. 
233  See in this regard also T Abdel-Monem ‘Opuz v Turkey: Europe’s landmark judgment on 
violence against women’ (2009) 17 Human Rights Brief 29 at 30. 
234  See discussion in Section 3 below.  
235  Dugard op cit note 210 at 331. The petition procedure was initially optional, and Member 
States were tentative in accepting it – Steiner et al op cit note 5 at 939.   
236  Ibid. 
237  The Council of Europe consists of two branches: the Committee of Ministers, which is the 
Council’s decision-making body, and the Parliamentary Assembly, which is the deliberative 
branch of the Council – Treaty of London op cit note 214 Art 10; Hickey op cit note 212 at 
657 n 65. 
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(‘ECrtHR’) for a final, binding adjudication including, where appropriate, 
compensation.238  
 
A new system was however implemented in 1999,239 in response to the increased 
work load on part-time commissioners and judges.240 This system entailed the 
abolition of the Commission, and the introduction of a full-time Court, fulfilling in 
effect the function of both Commission and Court.241 
 
Although the system makes provision for an inter-state complaint mechanism,242 this 
has not been used extensively.243 Instead, the majority of cases before the 
Commission (before 1999) and subsequently before the Court have been brought by 
individuals.244 This has been ascribed to the fact that the European Convention is so 
well known that both individuals and their legal representatives view the right of 
individual petition as a basic legal remedy.245  
 
                                                 
238  Steiner et al op cit note 5 at 939; Dugard op cit note 210 at 332. Referral to the Court 
depended on whether the State had opted to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 
In cases that were not referred to the Court but to the Committee of Ministers, the Committee 
could award ‘just satisfaction’ to the victim where it found that there had been a violation of 
the Convention – Steiner et al op cit note 5 at 940. 
239  This system was introduced by Protocol 11 to the European Convention of 1994, ETS No. 
155, entered into force 1 November 1998. 
240  Dugard op cit note 210 at 332; Steiner et al op cit note 5 at 940. 
241  See Section II of the Convention (Articles 19 to 50) for the functions, jurisdiction and 
composition of the Court.  
242  Art 33. 
243  Dugard op cit note 210 at 332; Steiner et al op cit note 5 at 938.  
244  The individual petition procedure is set out in Art 34; see also Dugard loc cit.  
245  Ibid. 
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As noted above, execution of the Court’s judgments of the Court is supervised by the 
Committee of Ministers.246 Similar to the IACrtHR, the European Court also has 
advisory jurisdiction.247 
 
 
3. DRAFT CONVENTION ON PREVENTING AND COMBATING 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE248 
 
3.1 Background 
  
In spite of the absence of explicit provisions in the European Convention addressing 
violence against women, the Council of Europe has in recent years taken steps to 
address this issue.249 An important measure was the adoption by the Council of 
Ministers in 2002 of a Recommendation to Member States on violence against 
women.250 The Recommendation reaffirms that violence against women is leading to 
serious discrimination ‘against the female sex’, both within society and within the 
family, and notes that such violence constitutes a violation of women’s physical, 
psychological and/or sexual integrity.251  
 
The document recommends that the governments of Member States inter alia review 
their legislation and policies with a view to guaranteeing women the enjoyment of 
                                                 
246  Art 46 § 2.  
247  Articles 47-49.  
248  CAHVIO (2009) 32 prov (dated 15 October 2009). 
249  For a discussion of these measures, see Hickey op cit note 212 at 659. 
250  Committee of Ministers Recommendation to Member States on the Protection of Women 
against Violence Rec(2002)5 (dated 30 April 2002).  
251  Rec(2002)5 Preamble. 
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their human rights and fundamental freedoms.252 Member States should further 
recognise that they have an obligation to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate 
and punish acts of violence, whether those acts are perpetrated by the state or private 
persons, and provide protection to victims.253 They are also required to inform the 
Council of Europe on the follow-up given at national level to the provisions of this 
recommendation.254 A number of general measures concerning violence against 
women are then detailed in the Recommendation.255  
 
 From 2006-2008 the Council of Europe ran a campaign to combat violence against 
women, including domestic violence.256 The Council of Europe’s Task Force to 
Combat Violence against Women, including Domestic Violence carried out an 
assessment of national measures to address violence against women taken before and 
during the Campaign and concluded that serious gaps remained in the areas of 
prevention, protection and prosecution. 
 
This assessment furthermore showed the need for harmonised legal standards to 
ensure that victims across Europe benefit from the same level of protection and 
support. The Task Force therefore recommended that the Council of Europe develop a 
human rights convention to prevent and combat violence against women.257 At around 
the same time, the Ministers of Justice of Council of Europe member states began 
discussing the need to improve protection from domestic violence. A study on this 
                                                 
252  Art I § 1. 
253  Art II. 
254  Art IX. 
255  Appendix to Rec(2002)5. 
256  Council of Europe Working towards a Convention on Preventing and 
 Combating Violence against Women and Domestic violence (undated pamphlet) - see official 
Council of Europe website at [www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/violence/default_EN.asp?]. 
(Accessed on 16 June 2010.) 
257  Ibid.  
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subject stressed the importance of setting legally binding standards to ensure adequate 
protection for all victims and recognise it as a crime. 
  
In response, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe created, in 
December 2008, the Ad Hoc Committee on Preventing and Combating Violence 
against Women and Domestic Violence (CAHVIO). In October 2009, the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence (‘CAHVIO’) completed a draft Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence.  
 
At the time of writing, the Committee is scheduled to hold a few more meetings to 
conclude its work.258 Once it has adopted the final draft text of the Convention and the 
accompanying explanatory memorandum, the Convention will be submitted to the 
Parliamentary Assembly for opinion. The step thereafter will be the adoption of the 
Convention by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Subsequently, 
the Convention will open for signature and ratification by member states of the 
Council of Europe.259 
 
 
3.2 The Draft Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence 
 
The Preamble to the Draft Convention places this document in the existing human 
rights framework by making reference to (amongst others) the European Convention, 
the Beijing Platform, the Women’s Convention and its Optional Protocol and the 
                                                 
258  The next meeting of CAHVIO is scheduled for 29 June – 2 July 2010 (Council of Europe 
website note 255 above).  
259  Council of Europe op cit note 256. 
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Rome Statute. Similar to other documents, it makes important statements of principle 
by recognising the structural nature of violence against women as gender-based 
violence, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by 
which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men. It further 
acknowledges that women and girls are exposed to a higher risk of gender-based 
violence than men are, and that domestic violence affects women disproportionately, 
while noting that men may also experience domestic violence. 
 
The Draft Convention sets out certain key definitions in Article 2.260 Violence against 
women is defined as a form of discrimination against women and a violation of 
human rights. It includes all acts of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely 
to result in, physical, sexual, psychological, or economic harm or suffering to women, 
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether 
occurring in public or in private life.  
 
Turning to the substantive contents of the Draft Convention, Article 3 addresses 
‘fundamental rights, equality and non-discrimination’. Paragraph 1 of this Article 
provides that States Parties shall take the necessary legislative and other measures to 
implement the right for everyone, particularly women, to be free from violence in 
both the public and the private sphere.  
 
The rest of this Article (paragraphs 2-5) indicates that this right is closely interlinked 
with aspects of equality. States Parties are required to condemn discrimination 
between women and men and to take, without delay, the necessary legislative and 
                                                 
260  The following terms are defined in the draft Convention: ‘violence against women’; 
‘domestic violence’; ‘gender’; ‘a gendered understanding’.  
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other measures to prevent it.261 The enjoyment of the right to be free from violence is 
interconnected with the Parties’ obligation to secure equality between women and 
men to exercise and enjoy all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights as 
set out in the human rights instruments of the Council of Europe and other 
international instruments, particularly the Women’s Convention, to which they are 
Parties.262 The provisions of the Convention, in particular the measures to protect the 
rights of victims, must be implemented without discrimination on any of a number of 
listed grounds.263 Special measures which are necessary to prevent and protect women 
from gender-based violence will not be considered discrimination in terms of this 
Convention.264 
 
Article 4 of the draft Convention embodies the so-called ‘due diligence’ principle: it 
provides that States Parties shall take the legislative and other measures necessary to 
exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, ‘in accordance with internal law’, 
punish acts of violence against women and domestic violence, whether those acts are 
perpetrated by the state or non-state actors. 
 
The draft Convention then sets out a detailed set of measures to be taken by States 
Parties. (Due to the current ‘draft’ status of the document, I have opted not to include 
it in Annexure A in the table format used in this thesis for similar instruments.) These 
measures include integrated policies; prevention; protection and support services; 
substantive law; investigation, prosecution, procedural law and sentencing; migration; 
international co-operation; and data collection. The document also makes provision 
                                                 
261  Art 3 § 2. The measures required include embodying the principle of equality between 
women and men in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation; and 
prohibiting discrimination between women and men.  
262  Art 3 § 3. 
263  Art 3 § 4. 
264  Art 3 § 5. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5   Regional Human Rights Law 
 
 
 
 
 312
for a group of experts on violence against women and domestic violence to monitor 
the implementation of the Convention.265   
 
 
4. JURISPRUDENCE 
4.1 Introduction  
 
As noted before, the ECrtHR has generated a rich body of jurisprudence, and the 
method of analysis that was decided on was therefore to address a representative 
selection of the influential judgments. One criterion for elimination of judgments was 
again the question of whether the violence has been committed by state officials or 
private actors; this led to the exclusion of cases such as Aydin v Turkey266 and 
Maslova v Russia,267 given that both of these matters dealt with sexual violence 
committed against women (by State officials) whilst in custody.268  
 
It will be recalled that the European Convention does not specifically guarantee the 
right to freedom from violence as such. For this reason, this examination of the 
Court’s jurisprudence aims to trace how the rights in the Convention have been 
interpreted in response to violence against women (and where applicable, inter-
personal violence more broadly). I opted to evaluate earlier developments on a 
thematic basis, rather than to discuss individual judgments at length; the Court’s most 
recent judgment in Opuz v Turkey is however discussed in more depth.  
 
                                                 
265  Art 55.  
266  (1998) 25 EHRR 251. 
267  (2009) 48 EHRR 37. 
268  The issue of torture also featured prominently in both matters, which further places them 
beyond the ambit of this study – see Chapter 2, Section 5.1  
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4.2 Enlisting Article 8 against domestic violence 
 
Article 8 of the European Convention, which guarantees the right to respect for private 
and family life,269 has traditionally been employed to limit State scrutiny of family life 
and relationships between private individuals.270 However, the European Court has also 
interpreted this right as imposing certain duties on the State to intervene in this private 
sphere in cases of domestic violence or other instances of interpersonal violence.  
 
The first of these cases was Airey v Ireland,271 where  Johanna Airey complained that 
she had been trying, for several years, to obtain a decree of judicial separation from 
her estranged husband, who had previously been convicted of assaulting her.272 At the 
relevant time, divorce in the sense of dissolution of a marriage did not exist in Irish 
law. However, spouses could be ‘relieved from the duty of cohabiting’ either by a 
legally binding deed of separation concluded between them or by a court decree of 
judicial separation.273 Decrees of judicial separation were obtainable only in the High 
                                                 
269  Art 8 provides as follows:  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
270  See Abdel-Monem op cit note 233 at 30; also C Pitea ‘Rape as a human rights violation and a 
criminal offence: The European Court’s judgment in MC v Bulgaria’ (2005) 3 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 447 at 453; S Choudhry & J Herring ‘Righting domestic 
violence’ (2006) 20 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 95 at 98-99. 
271  ECrtHR Airey v Ireland Application No. 6289/73 (Judgment dated 9 October 1979.) 
[hereafter ‘Airey judgment’]. 
272  The facts are set out in Paras 8-9 of the judgment.  
273  Also known as a divorce a mensa et thoro. Such a decree had no effect on the existence of 
the marriage in law and could be granted only if the petitioner furnished evidence proving 
one of three specified matrimonial offences, namely, adultery, cruelty or unnatural practices. 
The parties were expected to call and examine witnesses on this issue. 
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Court.274 The parties could conduct their case in person. Ms. Airey was in the 
invidious position that she was unable, in the absence of legal aid and not being in a 
financial position herself to meet the costs involved, to find a solicitor willing to act 
for her. 275   
 
She argued that by not ensuring that there is an accessible legal procedure in family 
law matters, Ireland had failed to respect her family life, thereby violating Article 8 of 
the Convention. The Court noted that although the object of Article 8 is essentially 
that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public 
authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in 
addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations 
inherent in an effective respect for private or family life.276  
 
In Ireland, many aspects of private or family life are regulated by law. As regards 
marriage, husband and wife are in principle under a duty to cohabit but are entitled, in 
certain cases, to petition for a decree of judicial separation; this amounts to 
recognition of the fact that the protection of their private or family life may sometimes 
necessitate their being relieved from the duty to live together. Effective respect for 
private or family life obliges Ireland to make this means of protection effectively 
accessible, when appropriate, to anyone who may wish to have recourse thereto. 
However, it was not effectively accessible to the applicant: not having been put in a 
position in which she could apply to the High Court, she was unable to seek 
                                                 
274  Airey judgment op cit note 271 para 11.  
275  When Ms. Airey brought her application before the Commission, legal aid was not available 
in Ireland for the purpose of seeking a judicial separation, nor indeed for any civil matters. 
However, at the hearings on 22 February 1979, counsel for the Irish Government informed 
the Court that the Government had decided in principle to introduce legal aid in family law 
matters. 
276  Airey judgment op cit note 271 para 32.  
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recognition in law of her de facto separation from her husband. She had therefore 
been the victim of a violation of Article 8.277  
 
This case represents an early recognition by the ECrtHR that the right to respect for 
private or family life, as guaranteed in Article 8, paragraph 1, of the European 
Convention, does not insulate the private or domestic sphere from State scrutiny. 
Instead, in order to ensure that women are protected in this sphere, State intervention 
may occasionally be required. Given the feminist critique of the pervasive public/ 
private dichotomy, this was an important acknowledgment.278  
 
The protection of the right to private or family life was at issue again in the case of X 
and Y v The Netherlands.279 The matter also raised the application of the right not to 
be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in the context of sexual violence, 
i.e. violation of Article 3.   
 
The case originated in an application brought by Mr. X, on behalf of himself and of 
his daughter, Y.280 The daughter, who was mentally disabled281, had been living since 
1970 in a privately-run home for mentally disabled children. Just after her sixteenth 
birthday in December 1977, she was sexually assaulted by one Mr. B, the son-in-law 
of the director of the facility.282 This incident had traumatic consequences for Ms. Y, 
causing her major ‘mental disturbance’. Due to a technical lacuna existing in Dutch 
                                                 
277  Idem para 33. The Court also found a violation of Art 6 § 1.  
278  See Chapter 1, Section 4. 
279  ECrtHR (Judgment dated 26 March 1985) Series A No. 91 [hereafter ‘X and Y judgment’]. 
280   The applicants had asked for their identity not to be disclosed. 
281  The judgment of the ECrtHR uses the term ‘mentally handicapped’; I have substituted 
‘mentally disabled’ here.  
282  Mr. B lived with his wife on the premises of the facility although he was not employed there. 
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criminal law at the time, it was not possible for Mr. X to pursue criminal proceedings 
against the perpetrator (on behalf of this daughter).  
 
Mr. X thus brought an application to the ECHR in January 1980, claiming his 
daughter had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, within the meaning 
of Article 3 of the Convention, and that the right of both his daughter and himself to 
respect for their private life, guaranteed by Article 8, had been infringed.283  
 
The Court recalled, with reference to its judgment in Airey (above) that although the 
object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary 
interference by the public authorities, it not only compels the State to abstain from 
such interference; in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be 
positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life.284 These 
obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for 
private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. 
 
The position taken by the applicants was that, for a young girl like Ms. Y, the 
requisite degree of protection against the wrongdoing in question would have been 
provided only by means of the criminal law.285 On the other hand, the Government’s 
view was that the Convention left it to each State to decide upon the protective means 
to be utilised and did not prevent it from opting for civil law provisions. 
 
                                                 
283  X and Y judgment op cit note 279 para 18. In addition, Mr. X claimed that he and his 
daughter had not had an effective remedy before a national authority as required by Article 
13, and that the situation complained of was discriminatory and contrary to Article 14. 
284  X and Y judgment op cit note 279 para 23.  
285  Idem para 24.  
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The Government explained the difficulty encountered by the legislature in laying 
down criminal law provisions calculated to afford the best possible protection of the 
physical integrity of persons with mental disabilities: to go too far in this direction 
might lead to unacceptable paternalism and occasion an inadmissible interference by 
the State with the individual’s right to respect for his or her sexual life.286 It listed the 
different options in civil law that were available to the applicants, such as an action 
for damages against Mr. B.  
 
The applicants, in turn, pointed out that these civil law remedies were unsuitable.287 
Amongst other reasons, the absence of any criminal investigation made it harder to 
furnish evidence on the elements that had to be established to found an action for 
damages. The Court found in this respect that the protection afforded by the civil law 
in the case of wrongdoing of the kind inflicted on Miss Y was insufficient.288 It made 
the following important comment:  
 
This is a case where fundamental values and essential aspects of 
private life are at stake. Effective deterrence is indispensable in this 
area and it can be achieved only by criminal-law provisions; indeed, it 
is by such provisions that the matter is normally regulated.289 
 
 
Moreover, this was in fact an area in which The Netherlands had generally opted for a 
system of protection based on the criminal law. The only gap was as regards persons 
in the situation of Ms. Y; in such cases, this system met a procedural obstacle that the 
Netherlands legislature had apparently not foreseen. Thus, the Criminal Code did not 
                                                 
286  Idem para 25.  
287  Ibid. 
288  Idem para 27.  
289  Ibid.  
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provide Ms. Y with ‘practical and effective protection’.290 The Court therefore 
concluded, taking account of the nature of the wrongdoing in question, that she was 
the victim of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.291  
 
This judgment not only confirms the point made in Airey that the protection of the 
right to respect for private and family life in Article 8 implies positive State duties, 
but also demonstrates how these State duties are interlinked with the right of the 
victim to pursue an effective remedy when the right has been violated. In this 
instance, because of the ‘fundamental values and essential aspects of private life’ that 
were at stake, civil law could not offer the victim such remedies, and it was therefore 
incumbent on the State to ensure that the criminal law provide the victim with 
practical and effective protection. 
 
The role of Article 8 was again confirmed in the more recent case of Bevacqua and S. 
v Bulgaria.292 The complaint arose from divorce proceedings between the first 
applicant, Valentina Nikolaeva Bevacqua, and her husband, Mr. N., and specifically 
related to an application for an interim custody order for S., the couple’s young son 
(the second applicant).293 While the divorce matter was pending, the two parents of S. 
were unable to reach agreement about custody of their son.  
 
The first applicant had applied for the interim custody order on the same day as filing 
for divorce, and attempted to obtain an interim custody order while awaiting the 
outcome of the divorce proceedings. However, the proceedings relating to the custody 
                                                 
290  Idem para 30.  
291  Having made this finding, the Court did not deem it necessary to give separate decisions on 
the other aspects of the complaint, i.e. the alleged violations of Articles 3 and 13.  
292  EcrtHR Bevacqua and S. v Bulgaria Application No 71127/01 (Judgment dated 12 June 
2008) [hereafter ‘Bevacqua judgment’]. 
293  The facts are set out in paras 5-38 of the judgment.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5   Regional Human Rights Law 
 
 
 
 
 319
order were firstly separated from the divorce matter, and secondly subjected to 
numerous delays, to such an extent that the first applicant eventually abandoned her 
application for interim relief and requested the finalisation of the divorce matter. The 
first applicant was also unable to obtain recourse for violence she had been subjected 
to by her former husband. Relying on Articles 3, 8, 13 and 14, the applicants 
complained that the authorities failed to take the necessary measures to secure respect 
for their family life and failed to protect the first applicant against the violent 
behaviour of her former husband.294  
 
The Court firstly found that in the particular circumstances of the case these 
complaints had to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention. It reiterated the 
principle that the concept of private life includes a person’s physical and 
psychological integrity, and  confirmed again, as stated in X and Y above, that this 
Article may hold positive obligations for the State inherent in effective ‘respect’ for 
private and family life.295  
 
The authorities’ positive obligations – in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 and in other 
instances under Article 8 taken alone or in combination with Article 3 of the 
Convention – may include, in certain circumstances, a duty to maintain and apply in 
practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by 
private individuals.296 The Court made the important statement that the particular 
vulnerability of the victims of domestic violence and the need for active State 
                                                 
294  Bevacqua judgment op cit note 292 para 54. 
295  Idem para 65. 
296  Idem para 66, with reference inter alia to Osman v The United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHHR 95 
(see note 306 below). 
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involvement in their protection has been emphasised in a number of international 
instruments.297 
 
In this instance, the Court concluded that the District Court’s handling of the interim 
measures issue for a period of approximately eight months was open to criticism as 
regards its insufficient attention to the need for speedy finalisation during that period. 
It noted that this attitude, during a period of tense relations between the first applicant 
and her husband that affected adversely the second applicant, a three-year old child at 
the time, was ‘difficult to reconcile with the authorities’ duty to secure respect for the 
applicants’ private and family life’. 
 
Regarding the second aspect, the Court observes that the police and the prosecutors, 
to whom the first applicant turned for help, did not remain totally passive.298 
Furthermore, the Bulgarian legal system provided legal means whereby the first 
applicant could seek establishment of the facts, as well as Mr N.’s punishment, and 
compensation.299 Without overlooking the vulnerability of the victims in many cases 
of domestic violence, the Court did not accept the applicants’ argument that her 
Convention rights could only be secured if Mr N. was prosecuted by the State and that 
the Convention required State-assisted prosecution, as opposed to prosecution by the 
victim, in all cases of domestic violence.   
 
                                                 
297  Idem para 65. Reference is made, inter alia, to Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Art 4(c) of the Violence Declaration and 
the conclusion of the Special Rapporteur in her 2006 thematic report that there is a rule of 
customary international law that ‘obliges States to prevent and respond to acts of violence 
against women with due diligence’ -  paras 49-53 of the Bevacqua judgment. 
298  Mr N. was issued with a police warning and an attempt was made to broker an informal 
agreement between the parents, albeit with little effect in practice. 
299  It was open to her to bring private prosecution proceedings and a civil claim for damages 
against Mr N.  
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On the basis of the facts here, the Court found that certain administrative and policing 
measures would have been called for, for example, a domestic violence protection 
order prohibiting the perpetrator from assaulting her. However, at the relevant time 
Bulgarian law did not provide for specific administrative and policing measures and 
the measures taken by the police and prosecuting authorities on the basis of their 
general powers did not prove effective. The possibility for the first applicant to bring 
private prosecution proceedings and seek damages was not sufficient as such 
proceedings obviously required time and could not serve to prevent recurrence of the 
incidents complained of.  
 
In the Court’s view, the authorities’ failure to impose sanctions or otherwise enforce 
Mr N.’s obligation to refrain from unlawful acts was critical in the circumstances of 
this case, as it amounted to a refusal to provide the immediate assistance the 
applicants needed. The authorities’ view that no such assistance was due as the 
dispute concerned a ‘private matter’ was incompatible with their positive obligations 
to secure the enjoyment of the applicants’ Article 8 rights. 
 
The failure of the District Court to adopt interim custody measures without delay in a 
situation that affected adversely the applicants (and, above all, the well-being of the 
second applicant) accordingly amounted to a failure to assist the applicants contrary to 
the positive obligations of the State under Article 8 of the Convention to secure 
respect for their private and family life. So, too, did the lack of sufficient measures by 
the authorities during the same period in reaction to Mr N.’s behaviour. 
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4.3 Expanding Article 3 to address ‘private’ violence 
 
Article 3 of the European Convention provides protection against torture and inhuman 
or degrading treatment. Early cases indicated a willingness to apply this article to 
cases of rape of women by public or State agents; however, the Court initially 
appeared reluctant to apply Article 3 in situations of sexual violence committed by 
private actors.300 However, a different approach can be discerned from the case of E 
and Others v The United Kingdom301 onwards.  
 
This claim related to an alleged violation of rights in terms of Articles 3, 8 and 13 of 
the Convention, brought by four siblings, E., L. T. and H.302 Their complaint arose 
from long-standing physical and sexual abuse committed against the four applicants 
by W.H., who began cohabiting with the siblings’ mother after the death of their 
father in 1965. In January 1977, W.H. was convicted of indecent acts committed 
against E. and L., and the terms of his sentence prohibited him from further 
cohabitation with the applicants’ mother. The applicants submitted that the evidence 
established that they were abused by W.H., that the abuse continued after January 
1977, that there were material faults in the handling of the situation by the social 
services and that they sustained loss and damage as a result.303  
 
The applicants alleged (inter alia) that the local authority (acting through its social 
services) was aware of proven sexual abuse in January 1977 in relation to E. and L.; 
the authorities therefore knew of the risk of future ill-treatment to the children and 
                                                 
300  See Londono op cit note 224 at 112.  
301    ECrtHR E and Others v The United Kingdom Application no. 33218/96 (Judgment dated 26 
November 2002); 36 EHRR 31 [hereafter ‘E and Others judgment’]. 
302  The facts are set out in paras 8-60 of the judgment.  
303  E and Others judgment op cit note 301 para 79. 
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ought to have been aware of the continuation of actual abuse. The local authority 
however failed to take the necessary protective measures (for example, referral of the 
children) and also failed to properly supervise W.H.’s probation.304 The Government 
conceded that the social services’ actions were inadequate in certain respects, 
particularly with regard to the support offered to the applicants after W.H.’s 
conviction in 1977.305   
 
In its assessment of the general principles, the Court noted that Article 3 of the 
Convention enshrines ‘one of the most fundamental values of a democratic 
society’.306  The obligation on States Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the 
Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed 
to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by private 
individuals. These measures should provide effective protection, in particular, of 
children and other vulnerable persons, and include reasonable steps to prevent ill-
treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge.307  
 
The determining question here was therefore whether the local authority (acting 
through its Social Work Department) was, or ought to have been, aware that the 
applicants were suffering or at risk of abuse and, if so, whether they took the steps 
reasonably available to them to protect them from that abuse.308 Upon considering the 
                                                 
304  It was noted that he had been found in the mother’s home and yet no further investigation 
into the situation occurred. 
305   E and Others judgment op cit note 301 para 86. 
306   Idem para 88.  
307  These principles were set out in Osman v The United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHHR 245; see E 
and Others judgment op cit note 301 para 88; see also discussion in Chapter 2, Section 4.3. 
308   E and Others judgment op cit note 301 para 92. 
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facts, the Court was satisfied that that the social services should have been aware that 
the situation in the family disclosed a history of past sexual and physical abuse from 
W.H. and that, notwithstanding the probation order, he was continuing to have close 
contact with the family, including the children. Even if the social services were not 
aware he was inflicting abuse at this time, they should have been aware that the 
children remained at potential risk.309 Yet the social services failed to take steps that 
would have enabled them to discover the exact extent of the problem and, potentially, 
to prevent further abuse taking place.310 There was, accordingly, a breach of Article 3 
in respect of the applicants in this case.311  
 
This judgment illustrates the application of the principles of State responsibility for 
the acts of private actors, as developed by the Court in the Osman case, to instances of 
violation of Article 3.312 Importantly, it confirms that Article 3, which addresses acts 
of torture or inhuman treatment, finds application in cases of physical and sexual 
abuse, and again shows the linkages between a violation of this right and the right to 
an effective remedy under Article 13. Although States are allowed some ‘margin of 
appreciation’ in their arrangements for such remedies on national level, these 
provisions should allow the victim an effective opportunity to claim compensation for 
non-pecuniary damages.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
309  Idem para 96.  
310  Idem para 97. 
311  Idem paras 100-101.  
312  It will be recalled that the Osman matter specifically dealt with Article 2 of the Convention, 
i.e. the right to life.  
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4.4 The combined effect of Articles 3 and 8 
 
The violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention came under scrutiny again in M.C. 
v Bulgaria.313 The applicant alleged that she had been raped by two men (both 
acquaintances) when she was fourteen years and 10 months old.314 After a prolonged 
investigation, the public prosecutor decided not to institute criminal proceedings 
against the two men,315 having concluded that there was insufficient proof of the 
applicant having been compelled to have sex.  
 
In her complaint before the European Court, the applicant took issue with Bulgarian 
law and its application in rape cases, as well as the investigation into the rape of 
which she had been a victim. She averred that the Bulgarian authorities failed to 
provide effective legal protection against rape and sexual abuse,316 due to an 
unwarranted emphasis on active resistance on the part of the victim. She also claimed 
the authorities had not investigated the events in her case effectively. In this way, they 
had failed to comply with their positive obligations under the European Convention.  
 
In its overall assessment, the Court first dealt with the existence of a positive 
obligation to punish rape and to investigate rape cases. It noted that having regard to 
the nature and the substance of the applicant’s complaints, they fell to be examined 
primarily under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.317  
 
                                                 
313  ECrtHR M.C. v Bulgaria Application no. 39272/98 (Judgment dated 4 December 2003); 40 
EHRR 20 [hereafter ‘MC judgment’]. 
314  See Paras 9-43 of the judgment for an exposition of the facts.  
315  MC judgment paras 44-65.  
316  Idem para 3. 
317  Idem para 148. 
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The Court reiterated that the obligation of the States Parties under Article 1 of the 
Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take 
measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected 
to ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals.318 Positive 
obligations on the State are also inherent in the right to effective respect for private 
life under Article 8, as noted in previous decisions.  
 
While the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of 
protection against acts of individuals is in principle within the State’s margin of 
appreciation, effective deterrence against grave acts such as rape, where fundamental 
values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, requires efficient criminal law 
provisions. Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to 
effective protection. 
 
In a number of cases, it has been confirmed that Article 3 of the Convention gives rise 
to a positive obligation to conduct an official investigation.319 Such a positive 
obligation cannot be considered in principle to be limited solely to cases of ill-
treatment by State agents. Further, the Court had not excluded the possibility that the 
State’s positive obligation under Article 8 to safeguard the individual’s physical 
integrity may extend to questions relating to the effectiveness of a criminal 
investigation. On this basis, the Court found that States have a positive obligation 
inherent in Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to enact criminal law provisions 
                                                 
318  Idem paras 149-150. 
319  Idem paras 151. 
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effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice through effective 
investigation and prosecution.320 
 
The second aspect to be examined was the modern conception of the elements of rape 
and its influence on the substance of Member States’ obligation to provide adequate 
protection. The Court therefore considered the relevant comparative and international 
law and practice relating to rape, with specific reference to the definition of this 
offence, the question of whether the requirement is ‘lack of consent’ or ‘force or 
coercion’ and the minimum age of consent for sexual activity.321  
 
In respect of the means to ensure adequate protection against rape, States undoubtedly 
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.322 In particular, perceptions of a cultural nature, 
local circumstances and traditional approaches are to be taken into account. The limits 
of the national authorities’ margin of appreciation are nonetheless circumscribed by 
the provisions of the Convention. In interpreting them, since the Convention is first 
and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must have regard 
to the changing conditions within contracting States and respond, for example, to any 
evolving convergence as to the standards to be achieved.  
 
The Court observed that the previous decade had seen a clear and steady trend in 
Europe and some other parts of the world towards abandoning formalistic definitions 
and narrow interpretations of the law in this area. Firstly, it appears that a requirement 
                                                 
320  Idem paras 152-153. 
321  Idem paras 88-108. This examination spanned several European jurisdictions, the ICTY, and 
the CEDAW, as well as a submission by Interights on the law of European countries, the 
USA, Australia, Canada and South Africa. The candidate, with Lillian Artz, provided a legal 
opinion to Interights on South African law relating to rape and sexual assault for purposes of 
this submission. 
322  MC judgment op cit note 313 para 154. 
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that a victim must resist physically is no longer present in the statutes of European 
countries.323 The Court also noted that the member States of the Council of Europe, 
through the Committee of Ministers, had agreed that penalising non-consensual 
sexual acts, ‘[including] in cases where the victim does not show signs of resistance’, 
is necessary for the effective protection of women against violence and had urged the 
implementation of further reforms in this area.324  
 
The Court was accordingly persuaded that a rigid approach to the prosecution of 
sexual offences, such as requiring proof of physical resistance in all circumstances, 
risked leaving certain types of rape unpunished and thus jeopardising the effective 
protection of the individual’s sexual autonomy.325 In accordance with contemporary 
standards and trends in that area, the Members States’ positive obligations under 
Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention must be seen as requiring the penalisation and 
effective prosecution of any non-consensual sexual act, including in the absence of 
physical resistance by the victim. 
 
The task of the Court in the instant case was therefore to examine whether or not the 
impugned legislation and practice and their application in the case at hand, combined 
with the alleged shortcomings in the investigation, had such significant flaws as to 
amount to a breach of the respondent State’s positive obligations under Articles 3 and 
8 of the Convention. 
 
                                                 
323  Idem para 157. 
324  Idem para 162. 
325  Idem para 166. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5   Regional Human Rights Law 
 
 
 
 
 329
The Court examined the provision of the Bulgarian Criminal Code that sets out the 
definition of rape,326 and also looked at how this article had been interpreted by the 
courts.327 The outcome of this assessment was that the provisions of Bulgarian 
criminal law were not deemed by the Court to be objectionable in themselves; 
however, it was important to consider how these provisions had been applied by the 
authorities in the instant case.  
 
The Court noted that the authorities (investigator and the prosecutors) had adopted a 
restrictive approach, practically elevating ‘resistance’ to the status of a defining 
element of the offence. This led to several shortcomings in the investigation and the 
eventual evaluation of the available evidence. The Court thus found that the approach 
taken by the authorities fell short of the requirements inherent in the State’s positive 
obligations – viewed in the light of the relevant modern standards in comparative and 
international law – to establish and apply effectively a criminal law system punishing 
all forms of rape and sexual abuse.328 In the present case there had been a violation of 
the respondent State’s positive obligations under both Articles 3 and 8 of the 
Convention.329  
 
                                                 
326  Art 152 § 1 of the Bulgarian Criminal Code defines rape as ‘sexual intercourse with a woman 
- 
(1)  incapable of defending herself where she did not consent 
(2) who was compelled by the use of force or threats 
(3) who was brought to a state of helplessness by the perpetrator.’ – para 74.  
In terms of Art 151 para 1 of  the Criminal Code, sexual intercourse with a person under 
14 years of age is a punishable offence (‘statutory rape’); consent is not a valid defence 
– para 72. 
327  MC judgment op cit note 313 paras 75-84.  
328  Idem para 185. 
329  It also held that no separate issue arose under Art 13 of the Convention. Given this finding, 
the Court considered that it was not necessary to examine the complaint under Art 14 of the 
Convention. 
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This judgment is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates the European 
Court’s willingness to undertake an investigation into the contextual basis of a 
challenged statutory provision or practice; in this instance, the examination included 
an extensive comparative inquiry into jurisdictions in Europe (and more broadly). The 
examination went to the heart of what the criminal provisions aim to achieve, i.e. the 
protection of the individual’s sexual autonomy. Secondly, as Rudolf and Eriksson 
point out, the Court in this matter for the first time applied Articles 3 and 8 jointly to a 
case of rape.330  
 
 
4.5 State obligations to prevent violence 
 
The Court expanded its application of the key articles of the Convention in the recent 
case of Opuz v Turkey,331 where the facts were reminiscent of those in the two 
communications brought before the CEDAW against Austria.332  The applicant, Ms. 
Nahide Opuz, alleged that the Turkish authorities had failed to protect her and her 
mother from domestic violence, which had resulted in the death of her mother and her 
own ill-treatment.333  
 
                                                 
330  B Rudolf & A Eriksson ‘Women’s rights under international human rights treaties: Issues of 
rape, domestic slavery, abortion and domestic violence’ (2007) 5 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 507 at 511; Londono op cit note 224 at 113; Pitea op cit note 270 at 458.  
331  ECrtHR Opuz v Turkey Application No 33401/02 (Judgment dated 9 September 2009) 
[hereafter ‘Opuz judgment’]. The State obligation to act in prevention of (fatal) domestic 
violence was also in focus in Kontrová v Slovakia -  ECrtHR Kontrová v Slovakia 
Application No 7510/04 (Judgment dated 31 May 2007). Given the similarities between this 
matter and the Opuz case, I have elected to focus on the latter.  
332  Communication No. 5/2005: Şahide Goekce (deceased) v Austria (Views adopted on 6 
August 2007, 39th Session.) UN Doc CEDAW/ C/39/D/5/2005 dated 6 August 2007. See 
discussion in Chapter 3, Section 2.6.2. 
333  Opuz judgment op cit note 331 para 3.  
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The applicant’s mother had married A.O. in a religious ceremony. In 1990 the 
applicant and H.O., A.O.’s son, started a relationship and began living together in 
Diyarbakir, a town in south-eastern Turkey. They officially married on 12 November 
1995. They had three children, in 1993, 1994 and 1996 respectively. The applicant 
and H.O. had heated arguments from the outset of their relationship.  
 
The train of events set out by the applicant commenced in 1995 with a complaint of 
assault filed by the applicant and her mother with the Diyarbakir Public Prosecutor’s 
Office against H.O. and A.O., and consisted of a number of incidents of violence over 
a period of years.334 These incidents followed a pattern in that the complaints that 
were laid by the applicant (or her mother) were, at least initially, withdrawn at their 
request. However, there was also a clearly discernible escalation in the degree of 
violence committed by H.O. 
 
H.O.’s actions culminated in the killing of the applicant’s mother in 2002. He was 
convicted of murder and illegal possession of a firearm and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. However, taking into account the fact that the accused had committed 
the offence as a result of alleged provocation335 by the deceased and his good conduct 
during the trial, the court mitigated the original sentence, changing it to fifteen years 
and ten months’ imprisonment and a fine of 180 new Turkish liras. In view of time 
spent in pre-trial detention and the fact that he was appealing against the judgment, 
the court ordered the release of H.O.336 
 
                                                 
334  These events are detailed in paras 9-52 of the judgment. 
335  In his statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the court, H.O. claimed that he had 
killed the applicant's mother because she had induced his wife to lead an immoral life, like 
her own, and had been taking his wife and children away from him – Opuz judgment op cit 
note 331 para 56. 
336  At the time of consideration by the ECrtHR, the appeal was still pending.  
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Following his release, the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, and asked the authorities to take measures to protect her life. She 
reported that H.O. had been issuing threats against her again since his release from 
prison.  
 
Before the Court, the applicant sought to argue that Turkey had violated her mother’s 
right to life under Article 2 in combination with Article 14, and that her rights under 
Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment), in combination 
with Article 14, had been violated. Furthermore, she complained that there had been 
violations of Articles 6 (right to fair trial) and 13 (right to an effective remedy) in light 
of the lack of effective criminal remedies to protect both her mother and herself. 
 
The Court accordingly considered this aspect of the complaint under two broad 
headings, i.e. the State’s alleged failure to protect Ms. Opuz’s mother’s life, and the 
effectiveness of the criminal investigation into the killing of her mother. 
 
(a)  Alleged violation of Article 2: Failure to protect the applicant’s mother’s life  
 
The Court noted the well-established principles, laid down in the Osman case,  that 
where there is an allegation that the authorities have violated their positive obligation 
to protect the right to life it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to 
have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an 
identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they 
failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, 
might have been expected to avoid that risk. It is sufficient for an applicant to show 
that the authorities did not do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a 
real and immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge. This is 
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a question that can only be answered in the light of all the circumstances of any 
particular case. 
 
The Court therefore had to ascertain whether the national authorities had fulfilled their 
positive obligation to take ‘preventive operational measures’ to protect the right to life 
of the applicant’s mother. In this regard, it had to be established whether the 
authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk to the life of the applicant’s mother from criminal acts by H.O. A 
crucial question in the instant case was whether the local authorities displayed due 
diligence to prevent violence against the applicant and her mother, in particular by 
pursuing criminal or other appropriate preventive measures against H.O. despite the 
withdrawal of complaints by the victims. 
 
(i) Whether the local authorities could have foreseen a lethal attack from H.O. 
 
The Court evaluated the sequence of events from the first reported incident of 
violence perpetrated by H.O. against the applicant and her mother in 1995 leading up 
to the final request by the applicant’s mother in February 2002, directed at the public 
prosecutor, to take action against H.O. – given that his threats had intensified and 
their lives were in immediate danger.337 It found that in view of the above events, the 
violence committed against Ms. Opuz and her mother by H.O. was clearly escalating. 
The crimes committed by H.O. were sufficiently serious to warrant preventive 
measures and there was a continuing threat to the health and safety of the victims. 
When examining the history of the relationship, it was obvious that the perpetrator 
had a record of domestic violence and there was therefore a significant risk of further 
                                                 
337  Approximately two weeks after this request, H.O. killed the applicant’s mother. 
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violence. However, the authorities’ reaction to the applicant’s mother’s request was 
limited to taking statements from H.O. about the mother’s allegations.  
 
Having regard to these circumstances, the Court found that the local authorities could 
have foreseen a lethal attack by H.O. While it could not conclude with certainty that 
matters would have turned out differently and that the killing would not have occurred 
if the authorities had acted otherwise, it recalled that a failure to take reasonable 
measures that could have had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the 
harm is sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State.338  
 
(ii)  Whether the authorities displayed due diligence to prevent the killing of the 
applicant’s mother 
 
The Court next examined to what extent the authorities took measures to prevent the 
killing of the applicant’s mother. The Government claimed that each time the 
prosecuting authorities commenced criminal proceedings against H.O., they had to 
terminate those proceedings, in accordance with the domestic law, because the 
applicant and her mother withdrew their complaints.339 The applicant explained that 
she and her mother had been forced to withdraw their complaints because of death 
threats and pressure exerted by H.O. 
 
In this regard, the Court had to examine the legislative framework that was in place, 
with specific reference to the question of whether the consent or cooperation of the 
victim is required to pursue the criminal prosecution against the perpetrator of 
domestic violence. The Court conducted an extensive inquiry into legislation in other 
                                                 
338  With reference to E. and Others op cit note 301.  
339  Opuz judgment op cit note 331 para 137. 
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European jurisdictions,340 and noted that there seemed to be no general consensus 
among States Parties regarding the pursuance of the criminal prosecution against 
perpetrators of domestic violence when the victim withdraws her complaints.341 
Nevertheless, there appeared to be an acknowledgement of the duty on the part of the 
authorities to strike a balance between a victim’s Article 2, Article 3 or Article 8 
rights in deciding on a course of action.  
 
In this connection, having examined the practices in the Member States, the Court 
observed that there are certain factors that can be taken into account in deciding to 
pursue the prosecution. These include (inter alia) the seriousness of the offence and 
whether the attack was pre-planned. The Court noted that it can be inferred from this 
practice that the more serious the offence or the greater the risk of further offences, 
the more likely that the prosecution should continue in the public interest, even if 
victims withdraw their complaints.342 
 
In the Court’s opinion, it did not appear that the local authorities sufficiently 
considered these factors when repeatedly deciding to discontinue the criminal 
proceedings against H.O. Instead, they seemed to have given exclusive weight to the 
need to refrain from interfering in what they perceived to be a ‘family matter’.  
 
                                                 
340  Based on the comparative overview, the Court noted that in 11 Member States of the Council 
of Europe, the authorities are required to continue criminal proceedings despite the victim’s 
withdrawal of complaints in cases of domestic violence. In 27 Member States, the authorities 
have a margin of discretion in deciding whether to pursue criminal proceedings against 
perpetrators of domestic violence. It appears from the legislation and practice of these 27 
countries that the decision on whether to proceed where the victim withdraws his/her 
complaint lies within the discretion of the prosecuting authorities, which primarily take into 
account the public interest in continuing criminal proceedings 
341  Opuz judgment op cit note 331 para 138. 
342  Idem para 139. 
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As regards the Government’s argument that any further interference by the national 
authorities would have amounted to a breach of the victims’ privacy rights under 
Article 8 of the Convention, the Court recalled its ruling in Bevacqua and S. v. 
Bulgaria, where it held that the authorities’ view that no assistance was required as 
the dispute concerned a ‘private matter’ was incompatible with their positive 
obligations to secure the enjoyment of the applicants’ rights.  
 
However, the criminal investigations in the instant case were strictly dependent on the 
pursuance of complaints by the applicant and her mother on account of the domestic 
law provisions in force at the relevant time,343 which prevented the prosecuting 
authorities from pursuing the criminal investigations. In other words, the legislative 
framework then in force fell short of the requirements inherent in the State’s positive 
obligations to establish and apply effectively a system punishing all forms of domestic 
violence and providing sufficient safeguards for the victims. The Court thus found 
that, bearing in mind the seriousness of the crimes committed by H.O. in the past, the 
prosecuting authorities should have been able to pursue the proceedings as a matter of 
public interest, regardless of the victims’ withdrawal of complaints.344 
 
The legislative framework preventing effective protection for victims of domestic 
violence aside, the Court also had to consider whether the local authorities displayed 
due diligence to protect the right to life of the applicant’s mother in other respects.345 
In this connection, the Court noted that despite the deceased’s complaint that H.O. 
had been harassing her, invading her privacy by wandering around her property and 
carrying knives and guns, the police and prosecuting authorities failed either to place 
                                                 
343  Articles 456 § 4, 457 and 460 of the now defunct Criminal Code. 
344  Opuz judgment op cit note 331 para 145, with reference to Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of 
the Committee of Ministers. 
345  Idem para 147. 
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H.O. in detention or to take other appropriate action in respect of the allegation that he 
had a shotgun and had made violent threats with it. While the Government argued that 
there was no tangible evidence that the applicant’s mother’s life was in imminent 
danger, the Court observed that it was not in fact apparent that the authorities had 
assessed the threat posed by H.O. and concluded that his detention was a 
disproportionate step in the circumstances; rather the authorities had failed to address 
the issue at all.346 
 
Furthermore, in the light of the State’s positive obligation to take preventive 
operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk, it might have been 
expected that the authorities, faced with a suspect known to have a criminal record of 
perpetrating violent attacks, would take special measures consonant with the gravity 
of the situation with a view to protecting the applicant’s mother. On the contrary, in 
response to Ms. Opuz’s mother’s repeated requests for protection, the police and the 
Magistrate’s Court merely took statements from H.O. and released him. While the 
authorities remained passive for almost two weeks apart from taking statements, H.O. 
shot dead the applicant’s mother. 
 
In these circumstances, the Court concluded that the national authorities could not be 
considered to have displayed due diligence. They therefore failed in their positive 
obligation to protect the right to life of the applicant’s mother within the meaning of 
Article 2 of the Convention. 
 
                                                 
346  The Court emphasised that in domestic violence cases, the rights of perpetrators cannot 
supersede victims’ human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity (with reference 
to the Fatma Yıldırım v. Austria and A.T. v. Hungary decisions of the CEDAW Committee) – 
ibid. See also Chapter 3, Section 2.6.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5   Regional Human Rights Law 
 
 
 
 
 338
(ii) The effectiveness of the criminal investigation into the killing of the applicant’s 
mother 
 
The Court reiterated that the positive obligations laid down in the first sentence of 
Article 2 of the Convention also require by implication that an efficient and 
independent judicial system should be set in place by which the cause of a murder can 
be established and the guilty parties punished.347 The essential purpose of such 
investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which 
protect the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure 
their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility.  
 
A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in the context of 
an effective investigation within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention. It must 
be accepted that there may be obstacles or difficulties that prevent progress in an 
investigation in a particular situation. However, a prompt response by the authorities 
in investigating a use of lethal force may generally be regarded as essential in 
maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing 
any appearance of tolerance of unlawful acts. 
 
In this instance, a comprehensive investigation had indeed been carried out by the 
authorities into the circumstances surrounding the killing of Ms. Opuz’s mother. 
However, although H.O. was tried and convicted of murder and illegal possession of a 
firearm by the Diyarbakır Assize Court, the proceedings were still pending before the 
Court of Cassation at the time of consideration by the ECrHR. Accordingly, the 
criminal proceedings in question, which had already lasted more than six years, could 
not be described as a ‘prompt’ response by the authorities in investigating an 
                                                 
347  Opuz judgment op cit note 331 para 150.  
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intentional killing where the perpetrator had already confessed to the crime. The 
Court therefore found a violation of Article 2 of the Convention.348 
 
(b) Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention 
 
The applicant complained that she had been subjected to violence, injury and death 
threats several times but that the authorities were negligent towards her situation, 
which caused her pain and fear in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The Court 
reiterated that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall 
within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends 
on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, 
its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and 
state of health of the victim.349 
 
Regarding the question whether the State could be held responsible, under Article 3, 
for the ill-treatment inflicted on persons by non-state actors, the Court recalled the 
principle that the obligation on the States Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the 
Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed 
to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment 
administered by private individuals. Children and other vulnerable individuals, in 
particular, are entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence, against 
such serious breaches of personal integrity. 
 
                                                 
348  Idem para 153.  
349  Idem para 158. 
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In this instance, the Court noted that the applicant could be considered to fall within 
the group of ‘vulnerable individuals’ entitled to State protection. In this connection, it 
noted the violence suffered by the applicant in the past, the threats issued by H.O. 
following his release from prison and her fear of further violence as well as her social 
background, namely the vulnerable situation of women in south-east Turkey. The 
Court observed also that the violence suffered by the applicant, in the form of 
physical injuries and psychological pressure, were sufficiently serious to amount to 
ill-treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.  
 
Therefore, the Court next had to determine whether the national authorities had taken 
all reasonable measures to prevent the recurrence of violent attacks against the 
applicant’s physical integrity. In carrying out this scrutiny, and bearing in mind that 
the Court provides final authoritative interpretation of the rights and freedoms defined 
in Section I of the Convention, the Court explained that it would consider whether the 
national authorities had sufficiently taken into account the principles flowing from its 
judgments on similar issues, even when they concerned other States. 
 
Furthermore, in interpreting the provisions of the Convention and the scope of the 
State’s obligations in specific cases, the Court noted that it would also look for any 
consensus and common values emerging from the practices of European States and 
specialised international instruments, such as the CEDAW, as well as giving heed to 
the evolution of norms and principles in international law through other developments 
such as the Convention of Belém do Pará.  
 
In the light of the foregoing, the Court considered that the response to the conduct of 
the applicant’s former husband was manifestly inadequate to the gravity of the 
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offences in question. Therefore, it observed that the judicial decisions in this case 
revealed a lack of efficacy and a certain degree of tolerance.  
 
Finally, the Court noted ‘with grave concern’, with reference to the threats issued by 
H.O. immediately after his release from prison, that the violence suffered by the 
applicant had not come to an end and that the authorities had continued to display 
inaction.  
 
The Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention as 
a result of the State authorities’ failure to take protective measures in the form of 
effective deterrence against serious breaches of the applicant’s personal integrity by 
her former husband. 
 
(c) Alleged violation of Article 14 of the Convention 
 
The applicant complained under Article 14, in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Convention, that she and her mother had been discriminated against on the basis 
of their gender. Ms Opuz alleged that the domestic law of the respondent State was 
discriminatory and insufficient to protect women, since a woman’s life was treated as 
inferior in the name of family unity. The former Civil Code, which was in force at the 
relevant time, contained numerous provisions distinguishing between men and 
women, such as the husband being the head of the family, his wishes taking 
precedence as the representative of the family union, and so forth.350  
                                                 
350  The applicant alleged that the then Criminal Code treated women as second-class citizens. A 
woman was viewed primarily as the property of society and of the male within the family. 
The most important indicator of this was that sexual offences were included in the section 
entitled ‘Crimes Relating to General Morality and Family Order’, whereas in fact sexual 
offences against women are direct attacks on a woman’s personal rights and freedoms. It was 
because of this perception that the Criminal Code imposed lighter sentences on persons who 
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The Court found that the State’s failure to protect women against domestic violence 
breaches their right to equal protection of the law and that this failure does not need to 
be intentional. The applicant had been able to show, supported by unchallenged 
statistical information, the existence of a prima facie indication that the domestic 
violence affected mainly women and that the general and discriminatory judicial 
passivity in Turkey created a climate that was conducive to domestic violence.  
 
Bearing in mind this finding that the general and discriminatory judicial passivity in 
Turkey, albeit unintentional, mainly affected women, the Court found that the 
violence suffered by the applicant and her mother could be regarded as gender-based 
violence which is a form of discrimination against women. Despite the reforms 
carried out by the Government in recent years, the overall unresponsiveness of the 
judicial system and impunity enjoyed by the aggressors, as found in the instant case, 
indicated that there was insufficient commitment to take appropriate action to address 
domestic violence. The Court thus concluded that there had been a violation of Article 
14, in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, in the instant case.  
 
 
5. EVALUATION: EUROPEAN SYSTEM   
 
As demonstrated by the judgments discussed above, there has been discernible 
progress in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in respect of the 
standards applicable to violence against women, especially in the area of State 
obligations. This development has been incremental, in the sense that it initially only 
engaged either Article 3 or Article 8; one notes that the Court subsequently began 
                                                                                                                                            
had murdered their wives for reasons of family honour. The fact that H.O. received a 
sentence of 15 years was a consequence of that classification in the Criminal Code – idem 
para 178. 
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applying Articles 3 and 8 in conjunction with each other, and in the most recent 
judgment in Opuz v Turkey, an important additional application is Article 14, which 
guarantees equal protection of the rights under the Convention.351   
 
An aspect that comes to the fore very clearly in the interpretation of the European 
Court is the interaction between the rights to physical and psychological integrity 
(and, I would argue, freedom from violence) and the right to access to an effective 
judicial remedy when there has been a violation of those rights. This is apparent from 
the early case of Airey onwards.  
 
Another aspect that is clearly visible is the emphasis placed by the Court on the values 
underlying the emerging jurisprudence regarding violence against women. This was 
specifically pointed out in X and Y v The Netherlands, where the Court made 
reference to ‘fundamental values and essential aspects of private life’ being at 
stake,352 as well as in E and Others v The United Kingdom, where the rights in 
Articles 2 and 3 were referred to as the ‘most fundamental provisions’ of the 
Convention.353 
 
As Londono points out, the case of Opuz has significant implications for the way in 
which authorities address domestic violence.354 They are required to take a proactive 
approach in cases where the violence is serious and must endeavour to bring criminal 
proceedings against perpetrators of such violence regardless of whether the 
                                                 
351  See in this regard Abdel-Monem op cit note 233 at 31-32; P Londono ‘Developing human 
rights principles in cases of gender-based violence: Opuz v Turkey in the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2009) 9 Hum Rts L Rev 657 at 667. 
352  Section 4.2 above. 
353  It will be recalled that Art 2 guarantees the right to life; Art 3 prohibits torture and inhuman 
treatment. The Court had found a violation of Art 3 in the instant case – see Section 4.3 
above.  
354  Ibid.   
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complainant is willing to give evidence. Given that the victims of domestic violence 
are regarded by the Court as ‘vulnerable’ for the purposes of Article 3, this puts a far 
greater onus on States to take measures to protect them. In particular, it may call for 
State authorities to take action against perpetrators in the absence of the victim’s 
consent to do so, as well as the obligation to provide assistance and support for 
victims.  
 
Although the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR can already be described as relatively 
progressive, the introduction of a specialised Convention on Violence against Women 
and Domestic Violence will significantly augment the normative environment. This 
Convention (in its current draft form) contains an explicit guarantee of the right to 
freedom from violence, and imposes positive duties on the State to ensure the 
implementation of this right. Similar to the Convention of Belém do Pará, this draft 
instrument makes it clear that the right to freedom from violence goes hand in hand 
with the prohibition of sex-based discrimination. In this way, it consolidates the 
existing jurisprudence of the ECrtHR and aligns it with fellow regional human rights 
bodies.355 
 
 
 
                                                 
355  It will be recalled that the IACrtHR cited the Opuz case in its judgment in González et al v 
Mexico, specifically on the issue of violence against women as discrimination – see Part B, 
Section 3.3.2 (c) above. 
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PART D: AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM356 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The African human rights system is often seen as the ‘least developed’ among 
the regional systems.357 This view rests on an under-estimation of the 
contribution that Africa has made to international human rights law.358 
Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that African regional human rights 
jurisprudence is lacking in the area of women’s rights and more specifically, 
violence against women.  
 
The African system is complicated by the interaction between constitutional, 
statutory and customary law, the construction of notions of ‘custom’, ‘culture’ 
and ‘tradition’359 and the limitations of their rights that women experience in 
practice.360 These tensions, played out against the larger backdrop of the long-
standing debate between cultural relativism and the universality of women’s 
                                                 
356  This part is an updated version of the chapter published as H Combrinck ‘Rape law 
reform in Africa: “New opportunities” or more of the same?’ in C McGlynn & VE 
Munro (eds) Rethinking Rape Law (2010) 122-135. 
357  Steiner et al op cit note 5 at 1062-1063. 
358  See eg generally F Viljoen ‘Africa’s contribution to the development of international 
human rights and humanitarian law’ (2001) 1 African Journal on Human Rights 18-39. 
359  ‘Religious norms’ (both Christian and Islamic) are increasingly playing a role in the 
African context, and should therefore be added to this list.  
360  See in this regard eg S Ndashe ‘Using customary human rights instruments to re-
envision gender in customary law’ in C van der Westhuizen (ed) Gender Instruments in 
Africa (2005) 77 at 77-78; see also Chapter 2, Section 2.1. 
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human rights,361 become especially pertinent when it comes to, for example, the 
definition of concepts such as ‘harmful traditional practices’.362   
 
It has been pointed out that the initial African regional organisation, the 
Organisation of African Unity (‘OAU’), was primarily concerned with the 
struggle against colonialism and apartheid, the preservation of territorial integrity 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of States – rather than the 
prioritisation of human rights.363 With the transition from the OAU to the African 
Union (‘AU’) in 2002 this position changed significantly: human rights and 
democratic values are clearly expressed as founding principles of the AU.364 
 
The Constitutive Act of the AU determines the promotion of gender equality as 
one of the body’s guiding principles.365 The AU has accordingly undertaken a 
number of initiatives aimed at the achievement of this objective. Prominent 
among these have been the adoption in 2004 of the Solemn Declaration on 
Gender Equality in Africa.366 The Preamble to the Declaration notes with 
                                                 
361  There is a significant body of literature addressing this issue; a comprehensive 
exploration is beyond the specific focus of this thesis. See eg  R Coomaraswamy ‘To 
bellow like a cow: Women, ethnicity, and the discourse of rights’ in RJ Cook (ed) 
Human Rights of Women (1994) 39-57; AA An-Na’im ‘State responsibility under 
international human rights law to change religious and customary laws’ in RJ Cook (ed) 
Human Rights of Women (1994) 167-188; E Brems ‘Enemies or allies? Feminism and 
cultural relativism as dissident voices in human rights discourse’ (1997) Human Rights 
Quarterly 136 at 147-150, 154-164; R Murray ‘A feminist perspective on reform of the 
African human rights system’ (2001) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 206 at 220-
221; S Tamale ‘The right to culture and the culture of rights: A critical perspective on 
women’s sexual rights in Africa’ (2008) 16 Feminist Legal Studies 47 at 47-48.  
362  See Section 2.2.2 below.  
363  G Naldi ‘The African Union and the regional human rights system’ in M Evans and R 
Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2 ed (2008) 20 at 45.  
364  See Preamble of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted by the 36th 
Ordinary Session of the OAU, meeting in Lomé, Togo in July, 2000; entered into force 
on 26 May 2001. 
365  Idem Art 4(1). 
366  Assembly/AU/Decl 12 (III) Rev 1 (2004). 
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concern the negative impact on women of issues such as the high incidence of 
HIV/AIDS among girls and women, poverty, harmful traditional practices, 
violence against women and women’s exclusion from politics. The document 
then sets out a range of commitments aimed at advancing gender equality, 
including accelerating measures aimed at combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic,367 
and initiating and engaging in sustained public campaigns against gender-based 
violence.368 
 
The adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa369 (‘the African Women’s Protocol’) 
and the prioritisation of women in activities of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (‘NEPAD’) are further examples of initiatives undertaken by the 
AU.370 Stefiszyn argues (convincingly) that although significant obstacles still 
exist, opportunities have been created at every level of AU structures for the 
advancement of African women’s rights.371  
 
Similar to the approach adopted in respect of the inter-American and European 
systems, this Part of the chapter examines the key African instruments as well as 
their implementation mechanisms. Specific attention is devoted to the African 
Women’s Protocol.372 
 
 
                                                 
367  Idem para 1. 
368  Idem para 4. 
369  CAB/LEG/66 6/Rev 1 (2003), entered into force on 25 November 2005. 
370  Similar to the approach adopted in respect of the two other regional human rights 
systems, this Part will not examine the broader regional organisation, i.e. the AU, but 
will focus on the implementation mechanisms of the key human rights instruments.  
371  K Stefiszyn ‘The African Union: Challenges and opportunities for women’ (2005) 5 
African Human Rights Law Journal 358 at 360, 384-385. 
372  See Section 2.2 below.  
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2. KEY INSTRUMENTS 
 
2.1 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) 
2.1.1 Provisions 
 
The foundational instrument in the African human rights system is the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘the African Charter’).373 Article 18(3) 
of the Charter calls on States to ensure the elimination of discrimination against 
women and also to ensure the protection of the rights of women and the child as 
stipulated in international declarations and conventions. 
 
The African Charter further guarantees the right to liberty and security of the 
person,374 as well as the right to respect of ‘the dignity inherent in a human 
being’.375 These rights are bolstered by Article 4, which states that ‘human 
beings are inviolable’. It also provides that every human being is entitled to 
respect for ‘his’ life and the integrity of his person.  
 
Article 2 states that every individual is entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set out in the Charter, without distinction based on a number of listed 
grounds (including sex). The broad undertaking on the part of States Parties to 
recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and to adopt 
legislative or other measures to give effect to these rights, is found in Article 1. 
 
 
                                                 
373  OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, entered into force on 21 October 1986. 
374  Art 6. 
375  Art 5. This article also prohibits all forms of exploitation, particularly slavery, slave 
trade and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment. 
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2.1.2 Implementation mechanisms 
 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘ACHPR’) is the main 
implementation body for purposes of the African Charter. Established in terms of 
Article 30 of the Charter, the Commission has both a promotional and protective 
mandate.376 
 
The promotional aspects of the Commission’s mandate are carried out mainly by 
means of the examination of State reports, which are to be submitted every two 
years.377 The compliance (or lack thereof) of African States with their reporting 
obligations under the African Charter has placed serious constraints on the ability 
of the ACHPR to properly carry out this aspect of its work.378 Other promotional 
aspects include special mechanisms, such as the appointment of Special 
Rapporteurs. A mandate of Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in 
Africa was established in 1998; the impact of this mandate has been variable, 
with much emphasis in recent years being placed by mandate holders on the 
drafting and adoption of the Women’s Protocol.379  
                                                 
376  Viljoen provides an in-depth discussion of the ACHR, its functions and its constraints – 
see F Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa (2007) 310-417. See also 
Steiner et al op cit note 5 1065-1066; Naldi op cit note 363 at 34-40. 
377  Art 62 of the Charter. 
378  Evans & Murray describe the situation that pertains in practice regarding State 
reporting: see M Evans & R Murray ‘The state reporting mechanisms of the African 
Charter’ in M Evans & R Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 2 ed (2008)  49-75; see also TS Bulto ‘Beyond the promises: Resuscitating the 
state reporting procedure under the African Charter under Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
(2006) 12 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 57 at 69-76; Viljoen op cit note 376 at 
369-392.  
379  R Murray ‘The Special Rapporteurs in the African system’ in M Evans & R Murray 
(eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2 ed (2008) 344 at 360-364; 
Viljoen op cit note 376 at 397-398.   
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The protective mandate of the ACHPR revolves around individual 
communications,380 inter-state communications and ‘on-site’ or ‘fact-finding’ 
missions,381 with individual communications being the most important aspect. As 
noted above, the Commission has not yet been presented with communications 
relating to violence against women.382  
 
When the African Charter was first adopted, the ACHPR was established as the 
supervisory body. The drafters of the Charter believed that a supranational 
judicial institutional, similar to the courts in the European and inter-American 
regional human rights systems, was not appropriate at that time, and accordingly 
introduced the Commission, a quasi-judicial body, instead.383 However, the 
possibility of introducing an African human rights court remained alive, and in 
1998, the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted.384 Unfortunately, Member 
                                                 
380  Viljoen points out that the African Charter does not refer to ‘individual’ 
communications as such; instead, Art 55 of the Charter makes reference to ‘other’ 
communications –  F Viljoen ‘Communications under the African Charter: Procedure 
and admissibility’ in M Evans & R Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 2 ed (2008) 76 at 76. The admissibility requirements for such 
communications are set out in Art 56. 
381  See Viljoen op cit note 376 at 318-367. 
382  The ACHPR’s  decisions in respect of ‘general’ Articles of the Charter may, depending 
on the facts, also be applicable to cases of violence against women: see eg 
Communication 245/02: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Zimbabwe (adopted at 
39th Ordinary Session held from 11– 5 May 2006 in Banjul, The Gambia) in which the 
Commission dealt inter alia with the State’s duty to recognise the rights enshrined in 
the Charter, arising from Art 1, and made reference to the IACrtHR’s judgment in 
Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras – paras 114-146.   
383  The findings of the Commission are not legally binding: the Commission issues 
‘recommendations’ to States Parties. See F Viljoen & L Louw ‘State compliance with 
the recommendation with the African commission on Human and People’s Rights, 
1993-2004’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Civil Society Law 22 at 23.  
384  OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT (III), entered into force 25 January 2004 [hereafter 
‘the African Court Protocol’]. See Viljoen op cit note 376 at 420-421 for the historical 
background to the adoption of this Protocol. 
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States were not very eager to ratify the Protocol, with the result that it only came 
into force on 25 January 2005.385 
 
The first eleven judges were elected in 2006, and although the establishment of 
the Court was troubled by a number of delays,386 it is now operational.387 Based 
in Arusha, Tanzania, the Court may receive cases from States Parties, the 
ACHPR, and individuals and NGO’s with observer status before the ACHPR, 
provided that the State Party in question has recognised the Court’s jurisdiction 
in respect of direct access by individuals and NGO’s.388  
 
2.2 African Women’s Protocol (2003) 
2.2.1 Background 
 
The wording of Article 18(3) of the African Charter, referred to above, was one 
of the factors that led African activists to consider whether an alternative 
                                                 
385  In the interim, the Protocol on the Court of Justice of the African Union had been 
adopted (on 11 July 2003), and steps had been put in place for the merger of the two 
courts – Viljoen op cit note 376 at 457-459; see also I Kane & AC Motala ‘The creation 
of  a new African Court of Justice and Human Rights’ in M Evans & R Murray (eds) 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2 ed (2008) 406 at 408-417. In 
2008, the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights was 
adopted, which will formally merge the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
with the African Court of Justice. This Protocol will enter into force once it has been 
ratified by 15 Member States; at the time of writing, it had received two ratifications – 
see official AU website at [www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/treaties.htm]. (Accessed on 20 June 2010.)  
386  These delays resulted inter alia from the need to draft the Internal Rules of Procedure 
of the Court; it was also necessary to harmonise the rules of procedure that govern the 
relations between the Court and the ACHPR to ensure complementarity between the 
two bodies. 
387  The first judgment was handed down in December 2009 in Michelot Yogogombaye v 
The Republic of Senegal Application No. 001/2008 (Judgment dated 15 December 
2009) – see official Court website at [www.african-court.org/en/cases/latest-
judgments/]. (Accessed on 20 June 2010.) 
388  See Articles 5(3) and 34(6) of the African Court Protocol op cit note 383. At the time of 
writing, States Parties have displayed very little interest in making the declaration 
required in terms of Art 34(6).   
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instrument for the promotion of women’s rights was required.389  Concern arose 
from the close alignment of this provision with the preceding sub-articles, which 
require State protection for the family as ‘the custodian of morals and traditional 
values recognised by the community’.390 The emphasis on traditional values in 
the African Charter391 was particularly identified as troubling from a women’s 
rights perspective.392  
 
Article 18 therefore appeared to contain an inherent contradiction between the 
duty of the State to protect the family as the custodian of traditional values, at the 
same time as ensuring the protection of the rights of women. A practical 
difficulty was that there were no decisions from the ACHPR to resolve this 
apparent contradiction.393 
 
A further reason for the drafting of the African Women’s Protocol was the fact 
that the African Charter does not explicitly address issues affecting the rights of 
women such as female genital cutting, forced marriages and violence against 
women.394 It was also argued that women in Africa continued to be victims of 
harmful practices and discrimination, in spite of the widespread ratification of 
                                                 
389  See Section 2.1.1 above.  
390  Articles 18(1) and (2). 
391  See African Charter op cit note 372 Preamble, Articles 29(1) and 61. 
392  ME Adjami ‘African courts, international law, and comparative case law: Chimera or 
emerging human rights jurisprudence?’ (2002) 21 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 103 at 123; MS Nsibirwa ‘ A brief analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women’ (2001) 1 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 1 at 41; H Onoria ‘Introduction to the African system of 
protection of human rights and the draft Protocol’ in W Benedek et al (eds) Human 
Rights of Women (2002) 231 at 234; Viljoen op cit note 376 at 269; see however DM 
Chirwa ‘Reclaiming (wo)manity: The merits and demerits of the African Protocol on 
Women’s Rights’ (2006) 53 Netherlands International Law Review 63 at 69-70 contra.   
393  Onoria loc cit. 
394  See R Karugonjo-Segawa The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2005) 6-7. 
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the African Charter and international such as the Women’s Charter by African 
States.395  
 
The Protocol emerged from two parallel processes. In March 1995, the ACHPR 
(working in association with Women in Law and Development in Africa) held a 
seminar on women’s rights, where it was decided that an additional protocol to 
the African Charter should be drawn up to address women’s rights.396 The OAU 
Assembly Heads of State and Government affirmed the need for such a protocol 
in July 1995, and a draft document (known as ‘the Draft Kigali Protocol’) was 
approved by the ACHPR in 1999. At the same time, the Women’s Unit in the 
OAU was working on a draft OAU Convention on the elimination of all forms of 
harmful practices affecting the fundamental rights of women and girls.397 A draft 
Protocol, consisting of an integrated version of the two documents, was 
completed in September 2000. The final version was adopted in July 2003 in 
Maputo, Mozambique, and the Protocol acquired legal force on 25 November 
2005. At the time of writing, 27 countries had ratified the Protocol.398 
 
 
2.2.2 Overview of contents 
 
This section briefly outlines the key articles of the Protocol in the field of 
violence against women, with reference to international instruments, particularly 
the Women’s Convention. 
 
                                                 
395  D Olowu ‘A critique of the rhetoric, ambivalence, and promise in the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa’ 
(2006) Human Rights Review 78 at 81.  
396  Nsibirwa loc cit. 
397  Idem at 42. 
398  See AU website op cit note 385. (Accessed on 20 June 2010.) 
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Article 1 comprises the definition section of the African Women’s Protocol, 
where the meaning of the terms ‘discrimination against women’ as well as 
‘violence against women’ are set out (among others). The definition of 
‘discrimination against women’ is almost verbatim to that employed in CEDAW, 
and it is clear that both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ forms of discrimination are 
included. ‘Violence against women’ is defined as follows: 
 
[A]ll acts perpetrated against women which cause or could cause 
them physical, sexual, psychological, and economic harm, 
including the threat to take such acts; or to undertake the 
imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or deprivation of 
fundamental freedoms in private or public life in peace time and 
during situations of armed conflicts or of war. 
 
This definition is broader than the one contained in the Violence Declaration in 
that it includes ‘economic harm’.399 This is important in the African context 
where, for example, widows may be denied their inheritance through the practice 
of ‘property-grabbing’.400 The definition also includes the phrase ‘in peacetime 
and during situations of armed conflicts or of war’ – again a valuable emphasis 
in the African situation.401 Furthermore, Article 1 uniquely provides a definition 
for ‘harmful practices’, i.e. all behaviour, attitudes and practices that negatively 
affect the fundamental rights of women and girls, such as their rights to life, 
health, dignity and physical integrity.402 
 
                                                 
399  In this respect the definition is similar to that proposed in the draft Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence currently 
under preparation by the Council of Europe – see Part C, Section 3.2 above.  
400  F Banda ‘Building on a global movement: Violence against women in the African 
context’ (2008) 8 African Human Rights Law Journal 1 at 18; LH Limann ‘Practices 
and rites related to widowhood and the rights of women in Africa: The Ugandan 
experience’ (2002) Human Rights Development Year Book 187 at 215-217. 
401  Karugonjo-Segawa op cit note 394 at 16. 
402  Idem at 15. 
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Similar to the Women’s Convention, Article 2 of the African Women’s Protocol 
imposes a series of obligations on States to combat discrimination against 
women through appropriate legislation, institutional and other measures, such as 
the inclusion of the principle of equality between men and women in their 
national constitutions.403 States also have a duty to ‘modify the social and 
cultural  patterns and conduct of women and men’ with a view to eliminating 
harmful cultural and traditional practices, as well as all other practices based on 
the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes, or on 
stereotyped roles for women and men.404 In contrast to Article 2(e) of the 
Women’s Convention, the Protocol does not impose an explicit duty on States to 
‘take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any 
person, organisation or enterprise’.405 
 
The Women’s Protocol provides that every woman has the right to dignity 
inherent in a human being and to the recognition and protection of her human 
and legal rights.406 States must take measures to prohibit the exploitation or 
degradation of women, and to ensure the protection of every women’s right to 
respect for her dignity. Importantly, this includes the protection of women from 
all forms of violence, particularly sexual and verbal violence.407 The link drawn 
here between the protection from all forms of violence and dignity is a 
significant one, given the statement in both the ICCPR and ICESCR that other 
rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.408 
 
                                                 
403  Art 2 § 1(a). 
404  Art 2 § 2. 
405  Chirwa op cit note 392 at 73. 
406  Art 3 § 1. 
407  Art 3 §§ 3 and 4. 
408  See ICCPR and ICESCR Preamble; also S Cowen ‘Can “dignity” guide South Africa’s 
equality jurisprudence?’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 34 at 49. 
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Article 4, which states that every woman is entitled to respect for her life and the 
integrity and security of her person, is the central clause dealing with violence 
against women (although this issue is also interwoven with several other articles 
of the document).409 States are required to take a range of measures to address 
violence against women, including enacting and enforcing laws to prohibit all 
forms of violence against women, ‘including unwanted or forced sex whether the 
violence takes place in private or public’.410 This provision is a key one in 
respect of jurisdictions where the criminalisation of marital rape remains 
problematic.411 
 
States are further expected to adopt such ‘other legislative, administrative, social 
and economic measures as may be necessary’ to ensure the prevention, 
punishment and eradication of all forms of violence against women.412 The 
omission from the Protocol of any reference to the ‘due diligence’ standard is 
notable. In addition, a review of key international instruments shows that duties 
are imposed on States to respond ‘by all appropriate means and without delay’.413 
The language used in Article 4 of the Protocol seems curiously weak by 
comparison. States are required to ‘take appropriate and effective measures’ – 
there is no reference to urgency or responding ‘without delay’. Also surprisingly 
absence from this article of the Protocol is any statement to the effect that 
violence against women constitutes discrimination.  
 
                                                 
409  See F Banda ‘The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa’ in M Evans and R Murray (eds) The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2 ed (2008) 441 at 456.   
410  Art 4 § 1(a). 
411  Banda op cit note 400 at 13. 
412  Art 4 § 1(b). 
413  See discussion of CEDAW’s General Recommendation No. 1 in Chapter 3, the 
Violence Declaration and the Beijing Platform in Chapter 4 and the Convention of 
Belém do Pará in Part B of this Chapter. See also Tables 1 to 4 of Annexure A.  
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Having said this, the provisions of Article 4 remain important. States are 
required, inter alia, to identify the causes and consequences of violence against 
women and to take measures to prevent and eliminate such violence.414 In 
addition, they should take steps to eradicate elements in traditional and cultural 
beliefs, practices and stereotypes that legitimise the persistence and tolerance of 
violence against women.415 They are furthermore expected to establish 
mechanisms and accessible services for effective information, rehabilitation and 
reparation for victims of violence against women.416 Importantly, States must 
provide adequate budgetary and other resources for the implementation and 
monitoring of actions aimed at preventing and eradicating violence against 
women.417 The Article also addresses specific instances of vulnerability, such as 
trafficking, medical experiments without women’s consent and the situation of 
women refugees.  
 
In dealing with the special protection of elderly women,418 States Parties 
undertake to ensure the rights of elderly women to freedom from violence, 
including sexual abuse and discrimination based on age.419 Article 23 mirrors 
this provision in respect of women with disabilities. 420 
 
Against the background of the AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa,421 Article 
14, which deals with health and reproductive rights, is also worth mentioning. In 
terms of this provision, States Parties must ensure that the right to health of 
women, including sexual and reproductive health, is respected and promoted. 
                                                 
414  Art 4 § 1(c). 
415  Art 4 § 1(d). 
416  Art 4 § 1(f). 
417  Art 4 § 1(i). 
418  Art 22. 
419  Art 22(b). 
420  Art 23(b). 
421  See Chapter 2, Section 2.1. 
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This includes the right to self-protection and to be protected against sexually 
transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS, as well as the right to be informed 
on one’s health status and on the health status of one’s partner, particularly if 
affected with sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS, in 
accordance with internationally recognised standards and best practices.422 
 
Article 16 provides that women have the right to equal access to housing and to 
acceptable living conditions in a healthy environment. To ensure this right, States 
Parties must grant to women, whatever their marital status, access to adequate 
housing. This recognition is significant, given the links between women’s lack of 
access to adequate housing and domestic violence.423 The UN Special 
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing has described Article 16 as a model example 
for ‘regional recognition of women’s equal rights to access housing’.424 In this 
regard, the African Women’s Protocol expands on the Women’s Convention, 
which only refers to women’s right to have access to adequate housing in a very 
limited sense.425 
 
The African Women’s Protocol further protects women’s equal right to acquire 
and manage her own property during the course of marriage, and to equal benefit 
in the distribution of joint property on dissolution of marriage.426 It also 
guarantees widows certain rights,427 and provides that women have the right to 
inherit, in equal shares with men, the property of their parents.428 Property 
ownership has been shown as a valuable strategy to reduce women’s 
                                                 
422  Art 14(1)(d) and (e). See in this regard Viljoen op cit note 376 at 272-273. 
423  H Combrinck Living in Security, Peace and Dignity (2009) 1-2. 
424  M Kothari Report by the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing: Women and 
Adequate Housing UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/118 (dated 27 February 2006) para 24. 
425  See Art 14(2)(h) of the Women’s Convention. 
426  Articles 6(j) and 7(d). 
427  Art 20. 
428  Art 21(1). 
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vulnerability to gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS,429 and therefore these 
provisions are important when considering issues of violence against women in 
the African context. Finally, the Protocol requires States Parties to ensure 
effective access by women to judicial and legal services, including legal aid,430 
and to provide for appropriate remedies to any woman whose rights or freedoms 
have been violated.431 
 
South Africa has ratified the Protocol; at the time of ratification, it also noted 
certain reservations and interpretative declarations.432 
 
 
2.2.3 Implementation mechanisms 
 
The African Women’s Protocol does not introduce any ‘new’ mechanisms to 
oversee its implementation.433 Instead, the implementation and interpretation of 
the document is slotted into the existing arrangements for the African Charter. In 
this way, the Protocol is unfortunately subject to the same shortcomings that 
have limited the implementation of the Charter.434 
 
                                                 
429  ICRW et al Women’s Property Rights, HIV and AIDS and Domestic Violence: 
Research Findings from Two Districts in South Africa and Uganda (2008) viii.  
430  Art 8(a). 
431  Art 25(a). 
432  See JD Mujuzi ‘The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa: South Africa’s reservations and interpretative 
declarations’ (2008) 12 Law, Democracy and Development 41 at 52-60. None of these 
reservations or declarations relate directly to violence against women. 
433  See Articles 26, 27 and 32.  
434  R Murray ‘Women’s rights and the Organization of African Unity and African Union: 
The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa’ in D Buss & A Manji (eds) 
International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches (2005) 253 at 269-270; Banda op cit 
note 409 at 470-471. 
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The ACHPR is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Protocol – 
through the system of state reporting.435 Article 27 provides that the African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights has jurisdiction over matters of 
interpretation of the Protocol.436  
 
The thorny question is whether the ACHR has the resources and the commitment 
to women’s rights issues to carry out this task in a vigorous and progressive 
way.437 Murray has pointed out that while the Commission has a broad rage of 
mechanisms at its disposal to protect and promote the rights in the Charter, few 
have historically been used to enhance the rights of women.438 On the positive 
side, considerable gains have been made, as seen, for example, in the 
establishment of the mandate of a Special Rapporteur on women’s rights and the 
adoption of resolutions specific to women by the Commission since 2004.439 
However, as noted, little jurisprudence applicable to women’s rights has emerged 
from the Commission. 
 
Previously, this was partly due to the fact that women’s organisations did not 
fully explore the potential role of the ACHPR in protecting women’s rights.440 
This situation arose from a number of factors, including an initial focus on 
development rather than on human rights among African women’s organisations, 
                                                 
435  Art 26. 
436  See discussion of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Section 2.1.2 
above.  
437  Banda op cit note 409 at 471. 
438  Murray op cit note 434 at 259. 
439  See eg Resolution on the Situation of Women in Africa (ACHPR/Res.66(XXXXV)04 
dated 2004); Resolution on the Status of Women and the Entry into Force of the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa (ACHPR/Res.85(XXXXVIII)05 dated 2005); Resolution on the situation of 
Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ACHPR/Res.103(XXXX)06 dated 
2006).  
440  Murray op cit note 434 at 259-260. 
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a lack of awareness about the system on the part of such organisations, and a lack 
of financial resources.441 Certain of these factors, such as resource constraints, 
may still currently have an impeding effect. It is nonetheless interesting to note 
that even with a greatly increased degree of attentiveness among women’s 
organisations to human rights and participation in the activities of the ACHPR, 
these organisations have not made use of the complaints mechanism, even now 
that the Protocol has entered into force. The reasons for this remain to be 
explored.442 
 
 
 
3. GENDER-RELATED INSTRUMENTS: DEVELOPMENTS AT 
SUB-REGIONAL LEVEL 
 
In addition to the adoption of the African Protocol, the African system has lately 
seen certain developments indicating that sub-regional bodies may in the future 
play a more prominent role in the protection and promotion of women’s rights. 
For example, the Economic Community of West African States (‘ECOWAS’) 
Court of Justice recently handed down the first ruling on women’s rights by a 
sub-regional body in Hadijatou Mani Koraou v Niger.443 Furthermore, two 
                                                 
441  CE Welch ‘Human rights and African women: A comparison of protection under two 
major treaties’ (1993) 15  Human Rights Quarterly 549 at 557-558; F Butegwa ‘Using 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to secure women’s access to land in 
Africa’ in RJ Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International 
Perspectives (1994) 495 at 509-510. 
442  This exploration, while important, falls outside the focus of this study.  
443  Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08 (dated 27 October 2008). Unofficial English 
translation of judgment provided by Interights available at [www.interights.org/view-
document/index.htm?id=533]. (Accessed on 15 March 2010.) The matter dealt with the 
customary practice of ‘wahiya’, which entails a man acquiring a young woman to work 
as a servant (as well as a concubine) under slave-like conditions. While the Court found 
in favour of the applicant, there are several aspects of the judgment that are 
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gender-related instruments have been adopted in the southern and central African 
subregions respectively that may also contribute to the normative framework 
relating to violence against women. These are the Great Lakes Protocol on the 
Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children444 
and the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, discussed next. 
 
 
3.1 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development 
 
The most recently adopted sub-regional instrument is the Southern African 
Economic Development Community (‘SADC’) Protocol on Gender and 
Development.445 At the time of writing, the Protocol had attracted two 
ratifications (those of Namibia and Zimbabwe).   
 
The SADC Protocol had its genesis in the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender 
and Development446 and an Addendum on violence against women, accepted in 
                                                                                                                                    
disconcerting, for example, the Court’s unwillingness to examine the legislation of 
Niger to establish whether there had been a violation of Art 1 of the African Charter 
(which requires the State to take legislative and other measures to give effect to the 
rights in the Charter) – para 60. This stands in contrast to the approach taken by other 
human rights bodies.   
444  The Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women 
and Children, agreed on by eleven countries in the Great Lakes region in 2006, came 
into force in June 2008. This Protocol, innovative in its combination of international 
humanitarian law and international criminal law, was developed in the specific context 
of sexual violence against women and children during and after the protracted armed 
conflict in the Great Lakes region. Because of this particular focus, the document falls 
outside the ambit of this study, and will accordingly not be discussed here. For a brief 
discussion, see Banda op cit note 409 at 458. 
445  Adopted at the SADC Summit and Heads of Government in Johannesburg, South 
Africa, on 17 August 2008. 
446  Adopted on 8th September 1997. Text available at official SADC website at 
[www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/174]. (Accessed on 16 June 2010.) Building on the 
SADC Treaty, the Women’s Convention and the Beijing Platform, Action, the 
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1998,447 which called for States to consider the adoption of a legally binding 
instrument on the prevention of violence against women and children.   
 
In 2005, the process of transforming the Declaration and its Addendum into a 
binding document formally commenced, steered by the SADC Secretariat in 
collaboration with civil society organisations. Adopted in August 2008, the 
Protocol will enter into force after ratification by two-thirds448 of the Member 
States. 
 
Part Six of the SADC Protocol (Articles 20 to 25) deals in depth with gender-
based violence and State obligations to address such violence. Importantly, it 
attaches time-frames to the duties undertakes by States. The key articles deal 
with legislative requirements, setting out how States should (by 2015) address 
gender-based violence in legislation. States must also review and reform their 
criminal laws and procedures to (inter alia) eliminate gender bias. Further 
articles address in detail the provision of services to victims of gender-based 
violence, including police, prosecutorial, health, social welfare and legal services 
and mandate training for service providers.  
 
The implementation of the Protocol, set out in Articles 34 and 35, rests on States 
Parties in the form of the obligation to firstly ensure that national action plans, 
                                                                                                                                    
Declaration inter alia requires signatories to take urgent measures to prevent and deal 
with the increasing levels of violence against women – para H. 
447  Addendum on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and Children 
(1998). Reprinted in (1999) 26 Review of African Political Economy 415-417. This 
Addendum set out further detailed commitments regarding measures to address 
violence against women and children. It also contained a provision stating that urgent 
consideration should be given to the adoption of legally binding SADC instruments on 
preventing violence against women and children – para 26. 
448  At the time of writing, SADC has fifteen Member States. This means that 10 
ratifications are required.  
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with measurable time frames, are in place.449 They are also required to ensure 
that national and regional monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are developed. 
In order to facilitate such monitoring, States Parties must collect and analyse 
baseline data against which progress in achieving targets can be measured.450 
Significantly, States Parties are expected to mobilise and allocate the necessary 
human, technical and financial resources for the successful implementation of the 
Protocol.451 As a further aspect of implementation, States Parties are required to 
submit progress reports to the SADC Council and Summit for consideration once 
every two years.452  
 
This document is potentially far-reaching in that it sets out tangible time-frames 
and in-depth provisions relating to the monitoring of its implementation. 
However, full compliance with the Protocol will undeniably have resource 
implications for States in areas where service provision is already imperilled, 
such as the public health sector. For example, Article 20, paragraph 2, requires 
the provision of universal access to post exposure prophylaxis to victims of 
sexual offences to reduce the risk of contracting HIV.453  
 
On a more fundamental level, though, commentators have rightly questioned the 
wisdom of adopting a treaty on gender and development in the SADC (i.e. 
subregional) context, when there is already a legally binding instrument on 
women’s rights at the continental level.454 I concur with the conclusion reached 
by Forere and Stone that the SADC Protocol to a large extent constitutes a 
                                                 
449  Art 35 § 2. 
450  Art 35 § 3. 
451  Art 33 § 2. 
452  Art 35§§ 4 and 5.  
453  Art 20 § 2(b).   
454  See M Forere & L Stone ‘The SADC Protocol on Gender and Development: 
Duplication or complementarity of the African Union Protocol on Women’s Rights?’ 
(2009) 9 African Human Rights Law Journal 434 at 438. 
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duplication of the African Women’s Protocol, with serious question marks 
hanging over the capacity of the sub-regional human rights institutions to 
effectively oversee the implementation of the SADC Protocol.455 This 
duplication, and the energy and resources that may be expended towards the 
‘maintenance’ of this sub-regional document in the future, appears even more 
unfortunate when one considers the dearth of communications on women’s rights 
brought before the African Commission.456   
 
 
4. EVALUATION: AFRICAN SYSTEM 
 
The African Women’s Protocol has been met with mixed reviews. On one hand, 
gender activists have referred to the adoption of the Protocol as ‘an important 
event in the history of African women’s struggle for the recognition of their 
rights’.457 MacKinnon has also praised the Protocol for putting Africa ‘in the lead 
on women’s equality in world law’.458 
 
Similarly, Viljoen is of the opinion that the Protocol takes an ‘undeniable 
normative step forward’.459 However, he expresses concern that the main reasons 
for the deficiencies in the supervisory procedures under the African Chapter (as 
well as the Women’s Convention) – i.e. lack of compliance with reporting 
obligations, the failure on the part of States to domesticate treaty obligations and 
implement concluding observations, and the limited use of complaints 
                                                 
455  Idem at 453-456.  
456  See discussion in Section 2.2.2 above.  
457  K Adjamagbo-Johnson ‘The entry into force of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in 
Africa: A challenge for Africa and women’ Pambazuka News (24 June 2004) cited in 
Chirwa op cit note 392 at 64. 
458  CA MacKinnon Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues (2006) 9. 
459  Viljoen op cit note 375 at 272; see also Banda op cit note 400 at 84; Olowu op cit note 
395 at 85. 
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mechanisms – are also likely to plague the implementation of the African 
Women’s Protocol.460 
 
Murray, on the other hand, has questioned why the decision was taken in the first 
place to propose an additional Protocol, when existing mechanisms such as the 
State reporting system and the ability to submit cases before the ACHPR had not 
been fully explored.461 Her assessment of the substantive provisions is that the 
Protocol is hardly a ‘comprehensive restatement of existing obligations’, nor is it 
structured to be an interpretation of the Charter for women.462 She concludes that 
one of the underlying aims in drafting the Protocol was to develop a document 
that would be a promotional tool and over which there would be a sense of 
ownership on the part of African organisations. What is missing, according to 
her, is an overall vision of how the Protocol would consolidate existing 
standards, interpret the African Charter for women or ensure mechanisms for 
enforcement.463 
 
Chirwa observes that while the Protocol has great potential to transform 
women’s lives on the continent, it also provides the raw materials for its own 
failure.464 He argues that the Protocol’s greatest weakness is that it departs 
significantly from the core components of African perspectives on human rights 
as established by the African Charter and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child.  
 
                                                 
460  Viljoen op cit note 376 at 275. 
461  Murray op cit note 434 at 261. 
462  Idem at 269. 
463  Idem at 271. 
464    Chirwa op cit note 392 at 64. 
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Looking at the provisions on violence against women, I concur with 
commentators who have noted that the Protocol advances the existing normative 
structure. Firstly, the Protocol emphasises the importance of ‘institutional 
machinery’ (such as the allocation of budgetary resources) and the provision of 
services to victims that underpin the State’s legislative response to violence 
against women. While it is true that certain of these duties have been set out in 
other documents, the African Women’s Protocol now constitutes a legally 
binding document465 in the African human rights system, which elevates its 
significance as a standard-setting document.  
 
The articles specific to violence against women (or harmful practices, as the case 
may be) should, secondly, be read with other inter-locking provisions, such as 
Article 25, which requires the States to ensure access to justice for women and to 
provide appropriate remedies where women’s rights have been violated.466 
Another example is the right to equal access to housing.467 
 
By thus considering the provisions on violence against women in conjunction 
with other articles of the Protocol, the progressive potential of the document 
becomes even more apparent. This reading is in line with the general principle of 
the indivisibility of and inter-relationship between rights. One hopes that the 
Commission and in due course, the African Court, will be presented with an 
opportunity to consider the provisions of the African Women’s Protocol in 
respect of violence against women, especially since there is now forward-looking 
jurisprudence from other regional human rights bodies to provide guidance 
(depending of course, on the facts and legal question in the particular case).  
 
                                                 
465  In respect of ratifying States. 
466  See discussion in Section 2.2.1 above.  
467  Art 16 – see Section 2.2.1.   
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I have argued elsewhere that interpretative guidance may be one way in which 
the newly emergent African human rights instruments may have an impact on 
law reform initiatives. In jurisdictions where the law reform process has faltered 
or remains incomplete, a court challenge to existing (or recently amended) 
legislation may be the only way to effect changes. For example, in spite of recent 
amendments to legislation on sexual violence, both Kenyan and Ethiopian law 
still fail to criminalise marital rape.468 This is a serious shortcoming, and there 
can be no doubt that these two countries are falling short of the standards set in 
the African Women’s Protocol, which requires States to ensure the prevention, 
punishment and eradication of all forms of violence against women. This failure 
should be open to court challenge at national level, even though both countries at 
the time of writing are only signatories to the Protocol (i.e. they have yet to ratify 
the document).469  
 
Another prospective level of impact is that of advocacy and mobilisation. Ebeku 
identifies a number of instances where the African Women’s Protocol, even 
when it was still in draft form, already made its influence felt in law reform 
initiatives at the national level.470 The potential of these instruments as 
promotional tools for the purposes of advocacy and other strategies should not be 
underestimated, especially when it comes to the ‘infrastructure’ provisions such 
as budget allocation, training of police officials and other aspects that are crucial 
to the successful implementation of legislation.  
 
                                                 
468  S 3(1) read with s 43(5) of the Kenyan Sexual Offences Act 3 of 2006; Art 620 of the 
Ethiopian Criminal Code as amended in 2005.  
469  See AU website op cit note 385. (Accessed on 20 June 2010.)  
470  KSA Ebeku ‘Considering the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa’ (2006) 36 
Africa Insight 24 at 26.  
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In this respect, the effect of the ‘interlocking’ provisions of the Protocol and 
other documents should once again be taken into consideration. For example, 
given the intersections between sexual violence and women’s disproportionate 
vulnerability to contracting HIV, the provisions of the Protocol that relate to 
health and reproductive rights471 should be taken into account when advocating 
for changes to existing legislation on sexual violence. Similarly, the provisions 
on the elimination of harmful practices, read with the guarantee of the rights of 
widows,472 may be important tools for advocacy in jurisdictions where 
systematic violations such as ‘widow-cleansing’ or property-grabbing are still 
tolerated.  
 
In this regard, the sense of ownership that Murray mentions, and the credentials 
of these instruments as ‘African’ documents, may go a long way to consolidate 
their power.473 This can imply power in a direct, short-term sense of overcoming 
instances of lack of political will on the part of governments (for example, to 
allocate the required budgetary resources). But it can also indicate the longer-
term transformative power of these instruments – in other words, to change the 
societal beliefs and norms that underlie unequal gender relations and contribute 
to violence against women.  
 
Individual African countries are at present in the process of either reviewing or 
introducing new legislation addressing gender-based violence. Even a country 
such as Sierra Leone, still reeling in the after-shock of eleven years of armed 
conflict, recently introduced three laws aimed at combating gender inequality, 
                                                 
471  Art 14. 
472  Art 22. 
473  Murray op cit note 434 at 271; see also C Ocran (2007) 15 ‘The Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa’ African 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 147 at 152.  
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including domestic violence.474 It has been argued that the speed with which the 
Africa Women’s Protocol attracted the number of ratifications required to come 
into force is an indication of a renewed commitment among African states to 
address women’s rights concerns.475 All of these developments, together with the 
adoption of the instruments described above, indicate a gathering of momentum 
on the continent to address violations of women’s rights. 
 
 
PART E: EVALUATION – REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS 
 
Despite the difference between the three regional systems described above, 
instructive similarities can be observed. The first similarity is that all three 
systems have seen developments by means of a specific instrument outlining 
women’s right to freedom from violence. In the Inter-American system, this 
instrument was adopted in 1994 in the form of the Convention of Belém do Pará, 
which focuses particularly on violence against women; in the case of the 
European system, a draft Convention that is also specifically directed at violence 
against women is currently in the process of development. And the African 
Women’s Protocol, adopted in 2003, includes detailed provisions addressing 
violence against women in the form of Articles 3 and 4. The regional human 
rights systems have therefore all embarked on formal standard-setting processes, 
albeit at different stages during the past sixteen years.  
 
These instruments have the following in common: a clear definition of ‘violence 
against women’; a link between violence against women and discrimination (in 
the case of the Convention of Belém do Pará and the draft European 
                                                 
474  E Hanciles ‘From frameworks and norms on sexual and gender-based violence to 
action’ Pambazuka News (14 July 2008). 
475  Ocran op cit note 473 at 152. 
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Convention); and an exposition of State obligations to address violence against 
women. The first two documents also contain an explicit statement of the right to 
freedom from violence. All three documents are legally binding on ratifying 
States.  
 
The emerging jurisprudence has been constructed around the foundational 
instruments (the American Declaration and the American Convention, and the 
European Convention respectively), as well as existing case law relating to 
positive State obligations to protect rights and prevent violations by private 
actors. The human rights bodies have therefore drawn on existing principles, and 
expanded these principles to apply to situations of violence against women.  
 
However, it is notable that both the IACrtHR and the ECrtHR have pointed out 
that additional considerations may apply in the case of violence against women. 
For example, in the case of González et al v Mexico, the IACrtHR held that an 
obligation of ‘strict due diligence’ arose when the three young women were 
reported as missing, given the context of the case and the fact that the State was 
aware that there as a real and imminent risk that the victims would be sexually 
abused, subjected to ill-treatment and killed. This obligation of ‘strict due 
diligence’ required prompt and immediate action to try and find the victims alive. 
The Court found that the obligations imposed on the State were amplified by 
Article 7(b) of the Convention of Belém do Pará. Similarly, the Court held that 
the obligation to conduct an effective investigation has a wider scope when 
dealing with a case of a woman who is killed or ill-treated or whose personal 
liberty is affected within the framework of a general context of violence against 
women. 
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The European Court followed an analogous approach in Bevacqua v Bulgaria, 
where the Court emphasised the vulnerability of victims of domestic violence 
and the concomitant need for active State involvement in their protection.476  
 
One notes that in this way the regional human rights jurisprudence confirms and, 
in fact, strengthens the norms and standards that have simultaneously developed 
in international law (in the global sense). 
 
                                                 
476  Bevacqua judgment op cit note 292 para 65. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
WOMEN’S RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE  
IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Having charted the recognition of women’s right to freedom from violence in 
international human rights law in previous chapters, this thesis now turns to 
South African law. It first examines the right to freedom from violence as 
included in the South African Constitution, with reference to the broader 
environment of the constitutional text. It then investigates the interpretation of 
this right by the two highest courts, i.e. the Constitutional Court and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (‘SCA’).1  
 
This inquiry is done with reference to the central research question of this study, 
which has been formulated as establishing how the development of women’s 
right to freedom from violence in international and regional human rights law 
should guide the understanding of this right in South African jurisprudence.2 
Two sub-questions were identified:  positive duties on the South African State to 
address private acts of violence against women; and State liability arising from 
failure to comply with such duties. These aspects will accordingly receive 
particular attention.  
                                                 
1  One exception is the High Court judgment in S v Engelbrecht 2005 (2) SACR 41 
(WLD); this decision was included because of the importance of the issue dealt with 
(i.e. the defence of ‘private defence’ in cases of battered women killing their abusive 
partners) as well as the instructive approach taken by the court in this instance. See 
Section 3.4.3 below. 
2  See Chapter 2, Section 3. 
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2.  THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 
 
2.1 Constitutional provision 
 
Section 12 of the South African Constitution3 reads as follows: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which 
includes the right –  
(a)  not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; 
(b)  not to be detained without trial; 
(c)  to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private 
sources; 4 
(d)  not to be tortured in any way; and 
(e)  not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading 
way. 
 
(2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which 
includes the right –  
(a)   to make decisions concerning reproduction; 
(b) to security in and control over their body; and 
(c)  not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without 
their informed consent.  
 
 
2.2 Background 
 
Commentators have observed that the individual’s right to physical and 
psychological integrity (as an adjunct to both the right to life and the right to 
liberty) is not a new invention - the rights to life, liberty and property have long 
                                                 
3  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 [hereafter ‘the 
Constitution’].  
4  Emphasis added.  
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been recognised as the three ‘classic’ fundamental rights.5 Bishop and Woolman 
make the persuasive point that the constitutional protection of the right to 
freedom and security of the person (as in the case of section 12) is a recognition 
that the history of emancipation associated with the modern nation-state is often, 
if not inevitably, accompanied by domination.6 They observe that this section 
accordingly represents a ‘preoccupation with the worst forms of abuse that the 
State – and modern society – can visit upon the individual’.7 (I would argue that 
the ‘domination’ referred to by the authors in this instance also includes the 
power imbalances and inequality inherent in gender-based violence.) Article 12 
therefore aims to curb State excesses such as unlawful arrest and detention or 
torture, but also, importantly, violence committed by ‘private’ actors. 
 
The right to freedom from violence, as set out in section 12(1)(c), constitutes an 
innovation in the 1996 Constitution,8 since it was not expressly9 included in the 
interim Constitution. Albertyn explains that the constitutional protection of 
women’s right to freedom from violence had not been a particular focus of 
advocacy during the negotiations for the interim Constitution in 1992, when the 
main concerns were gender equality and the relationship between customary law 
and the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.10 However, both gender-based 
                                                 
5   G Carpenter ‘The right to physical safety as a constitutionally protected human right’ in 
G Carpenter (ed) Suprema Lex: Essays on the Constitution presented to Marinus 
Wiechers (1998) 139 at 140.  
6  M Bishop & S Woolman ‘Freedom and security of the person’ in S Woolman et al 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (Original Service, 2006) 40-23.  
7  Idem at 40-24 – 40-25. See also G Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of 
Rights (1999) 129.  
8    I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 303.  
9  Bishop and Woolman point out that this right had already been recognised by the courts 
under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 [hereafter ‘the 
1993 Constitution’] – Bishop and Woolman op cit note 6 at 40-48 and authorities cited 
there. See also discussion in Section 3.3.1 below. 
10    C Albertyn ‘Introduction: Women’s freedom and security of the person’ in E Bonthuys 
& C Albertyn (eds) Gender, Law and Justice (2007) 295 at 297 fn 14.  
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violence and reproductive rights formed the subject of feminist advocacy during 
the subsequent Constitutional Assembly process, leading to the inclusion of 
section 12(1)(c) in the final document. 
 
Although the exact history of the incorporation of the right to freedom from 
violence in the Bill of Rights is not well-documented, it appears that this 
inclusion occurred through the Women’s Charter for Effective Equality, a 
document that was adopted by the National Women’s Coalition (‘NWC’) in 
1994.11 The NWC was a broad coalition of South African women’s organisations 
that operated during 1992-1994 with the aims of mobilising women around 
equality and involving women in the constitutional process.12 During the second 
half of 1993, the NWC engaged in a series of nation-wide thematic campaigns on 
issues of concern to women.13 One of these campaign initiatives focused on 
violence to women.  
 
The demands made by women during this campaign in respect of gender-based 
violence were eventually reflected in Article 10 of the Women’s Charter for 
Effective Equality.14 These claims included legal protection against sexual and 
racial harassment, abuse and assault; a call for facilities staffed by trained 
personnel where women could report cases of violence; the provision of 
accessible and affordable shelters and counselling services for survivors; and 
appropriate education and training for all service providers, including the police, 
prosecutors, magistrates, judges and district surgeons. 
                                                 
11  See P Singh ‘Protection from violence is a right’ in S Liebenberg (ed) The Constitution 
of South Africa from a Gender Perspective (1995) 135 at 142. 
12  C Albertyn ‘Women and the transition to democracy in South Africa’ in C Murray (ed) 
Gender and the New South African Legal Order (1994) 39 at 50-57. 
13  C Albertyn et al Engendering the Political Agenda (1999) 121.  
14  Women’s Charter for Effective Equality (Second draft of Charter drawn up through the 
National Women’s Coalition structures, and approved at the National Conference on 27 
February 1994 - copy on file with candidate).  
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Importantly, Article 10 of the Women’s Charter also spells out the right to 
freedom from violence: 
 
Women shall be entitled to security and integrity of the person 
which shall include the right to be free from all forms of violence 
in the home, in communities, in the workplace and in public 
spaces.  
 
 
According to Currie and De Waal,15 the right provided for in section 12(1)(c) is 
modeled on Article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination.16 The first part of this article reads as follows: 
 
In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in 
article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit 
and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to 
guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, 
colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, 
notably in the enjoyment of the following rights:  
(a)  The right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other 
organs administering justice;  
(b)  The right to security of person and protection by the State 
against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by 
government officials or by any individual group or 
institution; 
(c) … 
 
The authors note that this Convention will provide useful comparative material 
for the interpretation of the right to freedom from violence, particularly in 
relation to the obligation that the rights impose on the State to prevent violence 
from private sources.17  
                                                 
15  Currie & De Waal op cit note 8 at 303 fn 51; Bishop & Woolman op cit note 6 at 40-48 
fn 5.  
16  GA Res 2106A (XX) dated 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969 
[hereafter ‘the Race Convention’]. 
17     Currie & De Waal op cit note 8 at 303 fn 51.  
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However, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination18 has 
pointed out in its General Recommendation No. 20 that Article 5 of the Race 
Convention, apart from requiring a guarantee that the exercise of human rights 
shall be free from racial discrimination, does not in itself create civil, political, 
economic, social or cultural rights, but assumes the existence and recognition of 
these rights.19 It notes that most of these rights have been elaborated in the 
International Covenants on Human Rights.20 For this reason, I look at one of 
these, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in more detail 
below.  
 
 
2.3 ‘The right to freedom and security of the person’ 
 
Bishop and Woolman recount that section 11 of the interim Constitution 
originated from two distinct rights found in the early drafts of this document: a 
right to personal liberty and a right to freedom from torture and inhuman 
punishment.21 The Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights then drafted a 
new right to ‘Security of the Person’ (which included the right to be free from 
torture or inhuman punishment) and combined this with the right to personal 
liberty. This combined provision was termed ‘Freedom and Security of the 
Person’ in the interim Constitution.22  
                                                 
18     The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [hereafter ‘CERD’] is 
tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Race Convention. 
19  CERD General Recommendation No. 20: Non-Discriminatory Implementation of 
Rights and Freedoms (Art. 5) (dated 15 March 1996) para 1.  
20  Ibid. 
21  Bishop & Woolman op cit note 6 at 40-1. 
22    Section 11 of the 1993 Constitution provided as follows: 
(1)  Every person shall have the right to freedom and security of the person, which 
shall include the right not to be detained without trial. 
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The enacted version of Section 12 in the 1996 Constitution differs substantially 
from both Section 11 in the interim Constitution and early draft formulations of 
Section 12.23 The right to freedom of the person and the right to security of the 
person (which had been separated in the drafts) are placed in the same 
subsection, i.e. 12(1). This subsection now embraces three different kinds of 
freedoms that had previously been placed in different subsections: freedom of the 
person and its largely procedural subsections, freedom from all kinds of violence 
and freedom from torture and crucial and degrading treatment and punishment. 
Subsection 12(2) underwent a change in name and substance. It is no longer the 
right to security; instead, it is the right to bodily and psychological integrity.  
 
Bishop and Woolman point out that when viewed through the lens of women’s 
rights, the re-organisation in the enacted version of section 12(2) is not ideal.24 In 
earlier drafts, the freedom from all forms of violence had been joined to the 
rights to reproductive choice and to bodily integrity. All three these subsections 
thus dealt with matters of great importance for South African women. Under the 
reorganised section 12(2), reproductive rights are combined with the right to be 
free from medical experimentation without informed consent. Although bodily 
control is central to both these rights, women’s concerns are no longer the focus 
of the section.25  
 
                                                                                                                                    
(2)  No person shall be subject to torture of any kind, whether physical, mental, or 
emotional, not shall any personal be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
23  Bishop & Woolman op cit note 6 at 40-4.  
24  Idem at 40-5. 
25  The authors do concede that the jurisprudence emanating from section 12 suggests that 
these structural alterations have not in fact diminished women’s rights: ‘Real 
revolutions in the law have already been wrought from… [section] 12’s protection of 
individuals against various sources of physical violence and psychological harm.’ 
(Ibid.) 
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Carpenter similarly notes that it is unfortunate that a number of diverse issues are 
dealt with in a single provision: subsections 12(1)(a) and (b) deal with physical 
freedom (or liberty); section 12(1)(c) with the right (expressed in positive terms) 
to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources and 
12(1)(d) and (e) with the right (couched in negative terms) not to be tortured or 
to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.26 Subsection (2) 
moves to the right to bodily and psychological integrity, with specific reference 
to decisions concerning reproduction, control over one’s body and the right not 
to be subjected to scientific experiments. While Carpenter proposes that all these 
aspects are obviously closely related, she cautions that the positive right to be 
free from violence could easily be overlooked, especially if one takes into 
account the detail in which the rights of arrested, accused and detained persons 
are spelled out in section 35.27  
 
In spite of what may appear to be logical inconsistencies in the organisation of 
the subsections, the particular formulation of ‘the right to freedom and security’ 
in the 1996 Constitution, with the elaboration of discrete aspects such as the right 
to freedom from all forms of violence, clarified a number of the jurisprudential 
debates that have historically occurred around these rights in other jurisdictions 
(and initially, in South Africa, under the interim Constitution). I briefly consider 
certain of these debates.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26  Carpenter op cit note 5 at 141. 
27  Idem at 141-142. 
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2.3.1 One right - or two? 
 
One of the initial questions, arising from the combination of the right to liberty or 
freedom and the right to security in the majority of human rights instruments,28 
was whether these are in fact separate rights or whether they are ‘two sides of the 
same coin’.29 The generally accepted view appears to be that these are in fact 
different and distinct rights,30 in spite of bodies such as the European 
Commission on Human Rights holding that the term ‘liberty and security’ must 
be read as a whole, and, in view of its context, must be taken as referring only to 
physical liberty and security (in the context of freedom from unlawful arrest or 
detention).31  
 
In this regard it is useful to look at the interpretation of Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
Although Article 9 has usually been invoked as protection against unlawful arrest 
or detention (in other words, in the context of ‘due process’), the article also 
guards the right to security of the person.32 This was confirmed by the Human 
Rights Committee in Delgado Páez v Columbia.33 The author, a Columbian 
teacher of religion and ethics, had received death threats as a result of complaints 
                                                 
28  See eg Art 9 of the ICCPR, Art 5 of the European Convention; Art 6 of the African 
Charter. 
29  See H Combrinck ‘Positive state duties to protect women from violence: Recent South 
African developments’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 666 at 682. 
30    Idem at 683; see also D Davis ‘Freedom and security of the person’ in MH Cheadle et al 
(eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2 ed (2005) 7-1 at 7-1. 
31  European Commission on Human Rights Adler and Others v Federal Republic of 
Germany Applications No. 5573/72 and 5670/72 (joined) Decision: Admissibility 
(dated 16 July 1976) para 28; Dyer v The United Kingdom App No. 10475/83 39 
Decision: Admissibility (dated 9 October 1984) 246 at 256.  See also M Nowak UN 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 2 ed (2005) 213.  
32  S Joseph et al The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2 ed (2004) 
304. 
33  Human Rights Committee Views: Delgado Páez v Columbia Communication No. 
195/1985 UN Doc CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985 (1990).  
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he had submitted against the Apostolic Prefect and the education authorities 
regarding discrimination against him. After a work colleague was shot to death 
by unknown assailants and he himself was attacked, he left the country and 
obtained political asylum in France. The author filed a complaint alleging that 
the Columbian government had violated its obligation to protect his rights to 
equality, justice and life and therefore he had found it absolutely essential to 
leave the country.  
 
In spite of the author not initially relying on this right, the Committee found a 
violation of Article 9(1) on the ground that the State Party had not taken, or had 
been unable to take, appropriate measures to ensure the author’s right to security 
of the person. It stated that although the only reference in the Covenant to the 
right to security of person is to be found in Article 9, there is no evidence that it 
was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of 
formal deprivation of liberty.34    
 
 
2.3.2 Meaning of the term ‘freedom’ or ‘liberty’ 
 
Nowak explains that the term ‘liberty of the person’35 is fairly narrow and should 
not be confused with that of liberty (or freedom) in general.36 It could be said 
that all human rights ultimately serve the realisation of ‘human freedom’ (in the 
broad sense), even when in accordance with their object and purpose they relate 
to differing dimensions of liberty. Liberty of the person, on the other hand, 
relates only to a very specific aspect of human liberty, i.e. the freedom of bodily 
                                                 
34  Idem para 5.5. 
35  The right to freedom is set out in most of the international human rights instruments, 
although the term ‘liberty’ is generally used rather than ‘freedom’.  
36  Nowak op cit note 31 at 212. Although Nowak’s discussion relates to the rights as set 
out in the ICCPR, I submit that his comments are also more broadly applicable.  
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movement in the narrowest sense. An interference with liberty of the person in 
this sense results from the forceful detention of a person at a ‘certain, narrowly 
bounded location’, such as a prison or other detention or correctional facility, a 
psychiatric facility, a rehabilitation facility for persons with substance addictions 
as well as an order for house arrest.37 In these cases, the procedural guarantees 
under Article 9 of the ICCPR (comparable to section 12(1)(a) and (b) of the 
South African Constitution) are applicable.38 Where the arrest or detention takes 
place in criminal proceedings, the procedural guarantees in Article 9, paragraphs 
2 and 3, will also apply.39 
 
All ‘less grievous’ restrictions on bodily movement, such as limitations on 
domicile or residency or expulsion from State territory, fall to be dealt with 
under freedom from movement under Articles 12 or 13 of the ICCPR (and 
                                                 
37  Ibid.  
38  Art 9 of the ICCPR provides the following, under the heading ‘Liberty and security of 
the person’: 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person. No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty 
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established 
by law. 
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for 
his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.  
3.  Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before 
a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be 
entitled by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a 
reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting 
trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to 
appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should 
occasion arise, for execution of the judgment.  
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay 
on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not 
lawful.  
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation.  
39  The equivalent rights in the South African Constitution are s 35(1) and (2).  
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section 21 of the Constitution).40 Restrictions on other rights of liberty, such as 
freedom of religion, association or assembly, ‘come still less under the coverage 
of personal liberty’.41 
 
In Ferreira v Levin NO & Others,42  the South African Constitution Court 
grappled with this question, i.e. whether the concept of ‘freedom’ as set out in 
subsection 11(1) of the interim Constitution included all forms of liberty or only 
physical liberty.43 Bishop and Woolman observe (correctly) that because of the 
‘far stricter and more specific formulation’ of section 12(1), this debate about the 
meaning of freedom that arose in respect of section 11(1) of the interim 
Constitution has largely been settled.44 All five aspects or dimensions of the 
right, as listed in subsections (a) to (e), relate to physical liberty and aim to 
protect the bodily integrity of the individual against unwarranted intrusion by the 
State.45 (The scope of subsection (c) however extends much further.46) The 
                                                 
40  Nowak op cit note 31 at 212.  
41  Ibid. The equivalent rights under the South African Constitution are s 15 (freedom of 
religion, belief and opinion) and s 18 (freedom of association).  
42  1996 1 BCLR 1 (CC). See also Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa 
1995 (4) SA 631 (CC); 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC) para 44 for a summary of the 
questions animating this debate.  
43  Ackermann J, in his minority judgment, proposed a ‘broad and generous’ reading of s 
11(1): he argued that the right to freedom should be defined negatively as the right of 
individuals not to have obstacles to possible choices and activities placed in their way 
by the State - para 54. He further maintained that this section protected an unspecified 
number of ‘residual’ freedom rights. That is, it guaranteed protection of rights not 
specifically protected elsewhere in the Bill of Rights of the interim Constitution, such 
as immunity against self-incrimination under circumstances where the fair trial rights 
set out in section 25(3) of the interim Constitution did not apply. However, the majority 
(per Chaskalson P) disagreed with this interpretation, and held that the primary purpose 
of the right to freedom is to ensure that the physical integrity  of every person is 
protected, for this is how a guarantee of freedom and of security of the person would 
ordinarily be understood. This is also the primary sense in which the phrase ‘freedom 
and security’ is used in public international law – Ferreira v Levin NO & Others para 
170. 
44  Bishop & Woolman op cit note 6 at 40-22; see also Currie & De Waal op cit note 8 at 
293. 
45  Ibid. 
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protection of physical liberty is therefore clearly the primary purpose of s 12(1). 
Section 12(2) carries this purpose further by protecting aspects of bodily self-
determination.47  
 
 
2.4 ‘The right to bodily and psychological integrity’ 
 
As explained above, section 12(2) entrenches the right to ‘bodily and 
psychological integrity’. This right, as formulated here, has three components, 
i.e. the right to make decisions concerning reproduction, the right to security in 
and control over the body, and the right to be free from coercive medical and 
scientific experiments. 
 
Commentators note that the structure of this provision makes it somewhat 
difficult to give ‘distinct meaning’ to ‘bodily and psychological integrity’ on the 
one hand, and ‘security in and control over the body’ on the other.48 This also 
applies to the provisions in section 12(1): as Davis points out, the concept of 
bodily integrity lies at the heart of the right to freedom from torture and from 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.49 The right to bodily and 
psychological integrity furthermore links up with the right to freedom from 
violence, and I would argue that the dividing line between these two is a 
relatively permeable one. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
46  See discussion in Section 2.5 below.  
47  Currie & De Waal op cit note 8 at 293. 
48  Bishop & Woolman op cit note 6 at 40-76. 
49  Davis op cit note 30 at 7-16 – 7-17.  
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Bishop and Woolman suggest that section 12(2) recognises, at a minimum, that 
each ‘physical’ body is of equal worth and is entitled to equal respect.50 They 
note that while the three subsections of section 12(2) give ‘bodily integrity’ 
concrete content, the same cannot be said for ‘psychological integrity’.51 
Although psychological integrity already receives comprehensive protection in 
South African common law in the form of delictual damages for ‘emotional 
shock’ (and courts award such damages for a broad array of psychological 
trauma), it has been proposed that section 12(2) may be specifically meaningful 
in instances where the harm suffered by the complainant may not specifically fall 
under the right to dignity or the right to privacy.52 For example, a father who 
suffered psychological harm because of his inability to protect his daughter from 
being raped.53  
 
The right to ‘security in and control over one’s body’, as guaranteed in section 
12(2)(b), has to date received little explicit attention in South African law.54 
According to Bishop and Woolman, this provision creates a sphere of ‘individual 
inviolability’ with two components.55 ‘Security in’ one’s body means the 
protection of bodily integrity against physical invasions by the State and others.56 
The meaning of the right to ‘control over one’s body’, in terms of section 
12(2)(b), has not expressly been tested by the Constitutional Court; however, it 
                                                 
50  Bishop & Woolman op cit note 6 at 40-77. 
51  Idem at 40-78 – 40-79.  
52  Ibid.  
53  L Magnus ‘Dad gets rape-trauma payout’ Beeld (16 February 2006).  
54  Davis op cit note 30 at 7-4. 
55  Bishop & Woolman op cit note 6 at 40-85. 
56  The interpretation of s 12(2)(b) arose in two matters where the court had to decide 
whether the surgical removal of a bullet from a suspect in a criminal case constituted a 
limitation of the suspect’s right to bodily integrity. Two divisions of the High Court 
reached different conclusions as to whether the surgical invasion constituted a 
justifiable limitation under s 36 of the Constitution – see S v Xaba 2003 (2) SA  703 (D) 
708H; S v Gaca 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C) 658H contra. 
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has been argued that the judgment in S v Jordan57 suggests that the Court may 
not be particularly sympathetic to ‘uses’ of the body that it finds morally 
problematic.58  
 
The analysis of South African jurisprudence below, especially the judgments 
relating to sentencing, indicates that the Constitutional Court and the SCA have 
made progress in the recognition of women’s right to sexual autonomy as a 
protected interest in the context of rape and sexual violence. I suggest that this 
right is an aspect of the right to control over one’s body as guaranteed in section 
12(2)(b), even where this is not explicitly articulated as such.  
 
 
2.5  Formulation of Section 12(1)(c) 
 
2.5.1 ‘Violence’ 
 
The use of the phrase ‘all forms of violence’ in section 12(1)(c) indicates an 
intention to include not only physical, but also emotional, verbal and 
psychological abuse in the ambit of this subsection.59 South African legislation, 
most notably the Domestic Violence Act, is in line with this broad understanding 
in that it recognises ‘economic abuse’ as a form of domestic violence.60   
                                                 
57  2002 (6) SA 642 (CC); 2002 (11) BCLR 1117 (CC). The case related to the alleged 
unconstitutionality of provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 prohibiting 
different aspects of commercial sex work, including ‘sex for reward’ (s 20(1)(Aa)) and 
‘brothel-keeping’ (s 2). 
58  Bishop & Woolman op cit note 6 at 40-89.  
59  Cf the definition of ‘domestic violence’ in s 1 of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 
1998 [hereafter ‘the DVA’]. 
60  According to s 1(ix) of the DVA, ‘economic abuse’ includes -  
(a)  the unreasonable deprivation of economic or financial resources to which a 
complainant is entitled under law or which the complainant requires out of 
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There appears to be a difference of opinion between certain commentators as to 
whether ‘violence’ for purposes of this subsection should be interpreted as a 
‘grave invasions of personal security’ or whether the concept should be taken 
more broadly to also include ‘ordinary’ invasions.61 As a general statement of 
principle I concur with Bishop and Woolman that the notion of ‘violence’ 
contemplated by this provision should not be construed in a narrow sense. 
 
2.5.2 ‘From either public or private sources’ 
 
From a feminist perspective, the phrase ‘from either public or private sources’ is 
one of the most significant ones in this section. I have asserted elsewhere that the 
inclusion of this phrase clearly shows that the Constitution does not sustain any 
distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ violence.62 This distinction has 
traditionally operated to justify an unwillingness on the part of the State to 
intervene in, for example, domestic violence.63  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
necessity, including household necessities for the complainant, and  mortgage 
bond repayments or payment of rent in respect of the shared residence; or 
(b)  the unreasonable disposal of household effects or other property in which the 
complainant has an interest.  
61  See Bishop & Woolman op cit note 6 at 40-49, commenting on Currie & De Waal op 
cit note 8 at 304. I suggest, however, that this apparent dispute rests on a misreading of 
Currie & De Waal and that the latter do not in fact intend to suggest that the 
Constitution provides the individual with protection only in the case of ‘grave 
invasions’. 
62  H Combrinck ‘The right to freedom from violence and the reform of sexual assault law 
in South Africa’ in J Sarkin & W Binchy (eds) The Citizen and the State – South 
African and Irish Perspectives (2001) 185. 
63  Ibid. See also Chapter 1, Section 4.  
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Looking more closely at the obligations imposed on the State, Currie and De 
Waal observe that the State is required to protect individuals, both negatively by 
refraining from invasions of personal security itself and positively by 
discouraging private individuals from such invasions.64 According to 
commentators, one likely area of controversy in relation to the negative 
obligations imposed on the State will be in assessing the limits of the State’s 
power to use force, for example, in effecting arrests.65  
 
Section 12(1)(c) imposes positive obligations on the State to protect individuals 
against violations of their physical integrity by others. It is this set of duties that 
is of particular interest in the context of violence against women,66 where the 
perpetrators almost always stand in a private relationship to the victim.67 It is 
also these positive obligations, amplified by section 7(2) of the Constitution, 
which enjoins the State to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfill’ the rights in the 
Bill of Rights, that have provided the impetus for developments in the South 
African law of delict, initiated predominantly by the Constitutional Court 
judgment in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security.68 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64  Currie & De Waal op cit note 8 at 304. Bishop & Woolman op cit note 6 at 40-49 – 40-
55. 
65  Currie & De Waal op cit note 8 at 304. See Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security & 
Others: In re Ex parte Walters & Another 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 663 
(CC), which dealt with the issue of ‘minimum force’ required to effect arrest. 
66  Currie & De Waal op cit note 8 at 304. 
67  The so-called ‘vicarious liability’ cases are an exception to this principle – see  
discussion below.  
68  See Section 3.3.1. 
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3. WOMEN’S RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE 
EXAMINED BY SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS69  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Shortly after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution, I argued that although the 
inclusion of the right to freedom from violence might have far-reaching 
implications generally, its effect was likely to be felt most keenly in the area of 
violence against women.70 I submit that this has been borne out by the body of 
case law that has since emerged. This body of case law pays particular attention 
to these positive State obligations to protect individuals against acts of private 
violence. 
 
The jurisprudence relating to the right to freedom from violence is evolving 
around certain broad themes. For purposes of the discussion below, I have 
grouped the cases according to these broad themes. The first among these is the 
state duty to enact legislative measures to address domestic violence, which has 
been addressed in two judgments. Secondly, a substantial corpus of decisions 
deals with a failure on the part of the State to prevent acts of violence. Thirdly, a 
number of issues have arisen in the context of criminal law that elude easy 
classification under a single State obligation. These include recognition of the 
interests of the victim in sentencing in sexual violence cases and developing the 
principles of criminal liability in respect of abused women who kill the 
perpetrators.  
                                                 
69  This section is to a large extent based on H Combrinck ‘The dark side of the rainbow: 
Violence against women in South Africa after ten years of democracy’ (2005) Acta 
Juridica 171-199. 
70   Combrinck (1998) op cit note 29 at 667.  
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As explained in Chapter 2,71 the discussion of judgments in this chapter will 
consider which sources of international law the courts consulted in these 
judgments, where applicable, and how much weight was attached to these 
sources. In certain instances, I describe the facts of each case in some detail in 
order to also provide an overview of the circumstances in which the right to 
freedom from violence has been invoked.  
 
 
3.2 The State duty to enact legislative measures to address domestic 
violence 
 
The first significant judgment in this line was S v Baloyi,72 where the 
constitutionality of a key provision of the Prevention of Family Violence Act73 
was challenged. The appellant averred that section 3(5)74 of the Prevention of 
Family Violence Act placed a reverse onus of proving absence of guilt on a 
person charged with breaching a family violence interdict. In doing so, the 
provision allegedly conflicted with the presumption of innocence, a limitation 
that could not be constitutionally justified.75  
 
As an introduction to his assessment of the constitutionality of this provision, 
Sachs J establishes that the State is under a direct constitutional obligation to deal 
                                                 
71  Chapter 2, Section 4.1. 
72   2000 (1) SACR 81 (CC) [hereafter ‘Baloyi’].  
73  Act 133 of 1993. Except for two provisions, this Act was repealed by the DVA.  
74   This section prescribed the procedure to be followed at an inquiry into an alleged 
breach of an interdict: it provided that the procedure set out in s 170 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 would be applicable to such an inquiry. 
75  The Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court (as it then was) had initially ruled 
in the appellant’s favour and declared the section invalid. The matter was accordingly 
referred to the Constitutional Court for confirmation of the declaration of invalidity.   
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effectively with domestic violence, which includes the duty to enact appropriate 
legislation to reduce and prevent family violence.76 This imperative is derived 
from section 12(1)(c), as read with section 7(2) of the Constitution. The Court 
points out that domestic violence further compels ‘constitutional concern’ in that 
it both reflects and reinforces patriarchal domination, which implies that the non-
sexist society promised in the foundational clauses of the Constitution and the 
right to equality and non-discrimination are undermined when perpetrators enjoy 
impunity.77  
 
The Court further notes that in enacting the Prevention of Family Violence Act, 
the legislature was acting in compliance with South Africa’s international 
obligations. Sachs J finds these international duties firstly in the UDHR  
(referring to the right to freedom from fear).78 In addition, he cites the provisions 
of a number of instruments that enjoin states to pursue policies to eliminate 
violence or discrimination against women (including by passing legislative 
measures), such as Article 4(d) of the Violence Declaration, Article 2 of the 
‘Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women’ (sic), and 
Article 18 of the African Charter.79 In terms of the weight to be attached to these 
instruments, the Court observes, with reference to section 233 of the 
Constitution, that ‘these injunctions are directly relevant’ here.80  
 
On the other side of the equation, Sachs J emphasises that the need to protect 
family members from violence must be balanced against the protection that the 
                                                 
76   Baloyi op cit note 72 para 11.   
77   Idem para 12. 
78      Idem para 13.  
79     Ibid.  
80     Ibid.  
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Constitution must afford (in the form of the presumption of innocence) to 
persons against whom the domestic violence interdict has been granted.81  
 
The eventual conclusion reached in this instance was that an alleged violator of 
an interdict is an ‘accused person’ as contemplated by section 35(3)(h) of the 
Constitution and accordingly entitled to the benefit of the presumption of 
innocence.82 However, Sachs J held that section 3(5) does not impose a reverse 
onus on the accused and is therefore not inconsistent with the Constitution.83 
This conclusion was the result of the interpretation of section 170 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act preferred by the Court: a reading that imported only the summary 
procedure contained in section 170 and not the reverse onus.84  
 
This judgment, and its treatment of domestic violence, was generally welcomed 
by commentators.85 The significance of the judgment lies firstly in its 
unequivocal identification of the constitutional obligation resting on the State to 
deal effectively with domestic violence through the enactment of appropriate 
legislation.86 Secondly, the recognition that domestic violence is a concern from 
the perspective of gender equality (in addition to violating the right to freedom 
and security of the person) is important.87  Thirdly, and most importantly for 
current purposes, Sachs J clearly demonstrates how the ‘constitutional 
                                                 
81     Baloyi op cit note 72 at para 14. 
82  Idem para 23.  
83  Idem paras 25–33. 
84  See Baloyi paras 25, 33. Sachs J noted that the aim was to find the interpretation of the 
text which best fit the Constitution and balanced the duty of the state to deal effectively 
with domestic violence with its duty to guarantee accused persons the protection 
involved in a fair trial – para 26. 
85  See eg P Andrews ‘The Constitutional Court provides succour for victims of domestic 
violence’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 337 at 339-341; S Jagwanth ‘Equality in criminal law’ 
(2000) 117 SALJ 681 at 687-688. 
86  Idem at 688-689. 
87   See in this regard Jagwanth op cit note 85 at 687-688. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6    South African Law 
 
 
 394
imperatives’ to enact appropriate legislation to reduce and prevent family 
violence are amplified by the standards set in international human rights law.  
 
The Baloyi case has been influential in shaping subsequent judgments, not only 
in terms of providing an understanding of the peculiar nature of domestic 
violence (for example, its gendered dimensions),88 but also in terms of 
emphasising that the State has clear constitutional (and international law) 
obligations to respond to violence against women.  
 
The subsequent judgment in Omar v Government of South Africa89 indeed to a 
large extent followed in the footsteps of Baloyi. The challenge here related to the 
successor of the Prevention of Family Violence Act, namely the DVA. The 
applicant disputed the constitutionality of section 8 of the DVA (which provides 
for a suspended warrant of arrest to be issued simultaneously with the granting of 
a protection order in terms of sections 5 or 6 of the Act).90 He argued that section 
8 violated his rights to freedom and security of the person, to a fair trial and to 
access to the courts.  
 
Taking a similar approach to that adopted by Sachs J in the Baloyi judgment, 
Van der Westhuizen J first examines the context of the DVA. This includes 
looking at the context and purpose of the legislation as set out in the Preamble to 
the Act.91 Significantly, the Preamble makes specific reference to the rights to 
equality and to freedom and security of the person as well as the ‘international 
commitments and obligations of the State towards ending violence against 
women and children’. 
                                                 
88     See eg S v Engelbrecht op cit note 1 para 334. 
89   Omar v Government of the RSA 2006 (2) SA 289 (CC) [hereafter ‘Omar’].  
90      See Omar paras 20-31 for a useful description of the operation of these sections.  
91     Idem para 11. 
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Van der Westhuizen J remarks that domestic violence ‘brutally offends’ the 
values and rights enshrined in the Constitution.92 These rights include the right to 
be free from all forms of violence, which must be understood in conjunction with 
the rights to dignity, life, equality and privacy. Importantly, Van der Westhuizen 
J points out that the Constitutional Court has previously recognised the 
constitutional requirement to deal effectively with domestic violence (with 
reference to Baloyi).93 He furthermore notes the Court’s observation in the 
Carmichele judgment94 that South Africa also has a duty under international law 
to prohibit all gender-based discrimination that has the effect or purpose of 
impairing the enjoyment by women of fundamental rights and freedoms and to 
take reasonable and appropriate measures to prevent the violation of those 
rights.95 (Interestingly, this point had already been made by Sachs J in the Baloyi 
judgment.) 
 
Returning again to Baloyi, Van der Westhuizen observes that the complex 
private as well as public character of domestic violence and the need to combine 
civil and criminal remedies to address it were previously recognised by the 
Constitutional Court. Because victims are ambivalent about their fate and 
reluctant to go through with criminal prosecution, it is understandable for the 
legislature to enact measures that differ from those generally applicable to 
                                                 
92   Idem para 17. 
93   Ibid.  
94   See discussion in Section 3.3.1 below.  
95   Para 17 fn 17. The reference here is to Carmichele (CC) para 62 fn 67 (Section 3.3.1 
below). Van der Westhuizen J adds that the principles of CEDAW are also evident in 
two further documents, namely in the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and Article 4(d) of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women of 1994, which were also cited in Baloyi.  
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criminal arrests and prosecutions. It is thus clear that the Act serves a very 
important social and legal purpose.96  
 
This does not mean, however, that in addressing domestic violence the 
legislature may disregard the fundamental rights and fair trial procedures 
guaranteed in the Constitution.97 The applicant’s submission was that this was 
the case; however, the exact basis of his complaint was somewhat murky.98 The 
Court concluded that no case was made that section 8 of the DVA falls foul of 
any of the provisions of the Constitution on which the applicant relied.99  
 
The progression from Baloyi to the Omar judgment to some extent foretells the 
pattern that will also be distinguishable in the so-called ‘police liability’ cases 
below. One notes that the initial ‘foundational’ judgment contains a relatively 
superficial analysis of the State’s obligations arising under international law. The 
subsequent judgments then reproduce this analysis with its conclusion, and as the 
conclusion becomes more entrenched in later judgments, the conclusion or 
rationale only is relied on. There is in principle nothing wrong with this type of 
progression – some would call it a fairly simplistic summary of the law of 
precedent at work. However, what is of interest is that the later judgments do not 
contain an ‘independent’ analysis of international law sources, despite the fact 
that further normative developments may have taken place in the international or 
regional human rights systems subsequent to the ‘foundational’ judgment.   
 
                                                 
96   Omar at para 18. Van der Westhuizen J noted earlier that there is clearly a need for an 
adequate legal response to domestic violence, and that the legislature, in recognition of 
the need for effective domestic violence legislation, had enacted the Prevention of 
Family Violence Act of 1993 – paras 13-14.  
97   Idem para 19.  
98   Van der Westhuizen J accurately described the applicant’s case as ‘neither precisely 
stated nor fixed’ - see Omar at para 32.  
99   Idem at para 63. 
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A second observation is that the notion of proportionality was strongly expressed 
in both judgments. In Baloyi, it was emphasised that the need to protect family 
members from violence must be balanced against the protection that the 
Constitution must afford to persons against whom the domestic violence interdict 
has been granted. Similarly, the court in Omar pointed out that in enacting 
‘specialised’100 legislation to address domestic violence, the legislature may not 
disregard the fundamental rights and fair trial procedures (of the alleged 
perpetrator) guaranteed in the Constitution.  
 
 
3. 3 Development of the State obligation to prevent acts of violent crime  
 
It is interesting to note that one area that has seen a great deal of development in 
South African law, i.e. the liability of State agencies for their failure to prevent 
acts of violence against women, also corresponds with significant advances in 
terms of standard-setting in international and regional jurisprudence.101  
 
A claim that yielded significant milestones in the development of State 
responsibility to prevent acts of violence against women is that brought by Alix 
Carmichele against the Minister of Safety and Security and the Minister of 
Justice. It is fair to state that the judgment of the Constitutional Court in this case 
has had a profound effect on the evolution of the law of delict generally and the 
principles relating to State responsibility to prevent acts of violent crime more 
specifically. As could be expected, it has also generated considerable academic 
analysis.102 The following section discusses the series of judgments ensuing from 
                                                 
100    My term.  
101   See discussions in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively.  
102   See J Neethling ‘Die regsplig van die polisie om die reg op die fisies-psigiese integriteit 
te beskerm’ (2000) 63 THRHR 150-154; J Neethling ‘Die regsplig van die staat om die 
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the Carmichele matter, as well as related cases, in some detail. The discussion 
focuses on the aspects relevant to this study, as outlined earlier.   
 
 
3.3.1 The Carmichele case: judgment in the Constitutional Court   
 
Alix Carmichele had been attacked and seriously injured by a perpetrator (one 
Francois Coetzee) who was at the time awaiting trial on a charge of rape.103 At 
his first court appearance in the rape matter, Coetzee was released 
unconditionally on his own recognizance in spite of a previous conviction for 
indecent assault. Neither the police nor the prosecution had offered any 
opposition to his release, in spite of the investigating officer being aware of his 
previous conviction. Coetzee subsequently attacked Carmichele, leaving her with 
serious head injuries and a broken arm.104   
 
Ms. Carmichele accordingly sought to hold the police and prosecution liable in 
delict for their negligent failure to take proactive steps to protect potential 
                                                                                                                                    
reg op die fisies-psigiese integriteit teen derdes te beskerm’ (2001) 64 THRHR 489-
495; J Neethling & JM Potgieter ‘Die regsplig van die staat om die reg op die fisies-
psigiese integriteit teen aantasting deur derdes te beskerm: Twee teenstrydige 
beslissings’(2002) 65 THRHR 273-278; B Leinius & JR Midgley ‘The impact of the 
Constitution on the law of delict: Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security’ (2002) 
119 SALJ 17-27; M Pieterse ‘The right to be free from public or private violence after 
Carmichele’ (2002) 119 SALJ 27-39; G Carpenter ‘The Carmichele legacy – enhanced 
curial protection of the right to physical safety’(2003) 18 SAPR/PL 252-266; J Van der 
Walt ‘Horizontal application of fundamental rights and the threshold of the law in view 
of the Carmichele saga’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 517-540; J Neethling ‘Die Carmichele-saga 
kom tot ‘n gelukkige einde’ (2005) TSAR 402-409; A Fagan ‘Reconsidering 
Carmichele’ (2008) 125 SALJ 659-673.  
103   The facts are set out comprehensively in the judgment of the Constitutional Court 
reported as Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC); 2001 
(10) BCLR 995 (CC) [hereafter ‘Carmichele (CC)’] para 5 et seq.  
104   Coetzee was convicted of housebreaking and attempted murder in respect of this 
incident, and sentenced to an effective twelve and a half years’ imprisonment – 
Carmichele (CC) op cit note 103 at para 24. 
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victims against further violent acts committee by Coetzee. In order to succeed, 
she would have to establish at trial firstly, that the police or the prosecutors had a 
legal duty to protect her, and secondly, that they negligently acted in breach of 
such duty. Thirdly, she would have to show that there was a causal connection 
between such negligent breach of the duty and the damage she suffered.105 
 
The Cape Provincial Division of the High Court106 (per Chetty J) initially 
granted an order for absolution from the instance on the basis that the plaintiff 
had not shown that the defendants owed her a legal duty to prevent the harm she 
had suffered.107 The Court reached this finding by applying the common-law test 
for determining the wrongfulness of omissions.108 This test has been summarised 
as one of ‘reasonableness, determined with reference to the legal perceptions of 
the community as assessed by the court’.109 This ‘test’ entails a value judgment 
based on balancing the interests of the parties and conflicting interests of the 
community. The plaintiff’s subsequent appeal to the SCA was also dismissed, 
with Vivier JA confirming the finding of the court a quo regarding the (pre-
constitutional) common-law inquiry into wrongfulness.110  
 
On further appeal to the Constitutional Court, Ms. Carmichele advanced the 
argument that both the CPD and the SCA had erred in failing to apply the 
provisions of the Constitution in their examination of the question whether the 
police had a legal duty towards her. She specifically relied on the constitutional 
                                                 
105   Idem para 25.   
106  As it then was [hereafter ‘CPD’]. 
107  This finding is set out in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 
2002 (10) BCLR 1100 (C) [hereafter ‘Carmichele CPD’] para 1.  
108   Idem para 2.  
109  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (1) SA 489 (SCA) 
[hereafter ‘Carmichele (SCA) 1’] para 7.  
110  Carmichele SCA (1) loc cit. The court inter alia referred to the common-law locus 
classicus on this point, viz  Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A). 
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obligation imposed on all courts to develop the common law with regard to ‘the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’,111 and averred that if the CPD 
and SCA had considered the impact of the Bill of Rights, their finding regarding 
a legal duty would have been different.112  
 
The Constitutional Court agreed that the assessment of whether a legal duty 
existed must now (i.e. after the introduction of a new constitutional dispensation) 
be carried out in line with the Bill of Rights.113 The relevant factors must be 
weighed in the context of a constitutional state founded on dignity, equality and 
freedom and in which government has positive duties to promote and uphold 
such values. The Court emphasises that the Constitution is not merely a formal 
document regulating public power: it also embodies an objective, normative 
value system, and it is within the matrix of this value system that the common 
law should be developed as envisaged in section 39(2) of the Constitution.114 The 
Court thus highlights that the normative context had undergone a significant and 
irreversible shift. 
 
Exploring the content of these norms, Ackermann and Goldstone JJ point out that 
the constitutional entrenchment of the rights to life, dignity and freedom and 
security of the person implies a duty on the State and all its organs to refrain 
from infringing on these rights.115 In some circumstances, it also implies a 
                                                 
111   S 39(2) of the Constitution; s 35(3) of the 1993 Constitution.  
112   Carmichele (CC) op cit note 103 para 28. 
113   Idem para 43. 
114   Idem para 54. Van der Walt poses the interesting question whether there really is a 
fundamental gap between the common law of delict and the fundamental rights in the 
Constitution – Van der Walt op cit note 102 at 519 et seq. 
115    Pieterse op cit note 102 at 33 points out that the right to be free from violence was not 
explicitly relied upon by the parties, firstly because the claim originated under the 
interim Constitution and s 12(1)(c) does not have an explicit counterpart in the 1993 
Constitution. Secondly, the matter turned on the duty of the courts to develop the 
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positive duty to provide appropriate protection to everyone ‘through laws and 
structures designed to afford such protection’.116 
 
While finding that the High Court had misdirected itself in relation to the 
requirements of section 39(2), the Court was however reluctant to embark on the 
formulation of a new order without the benefit of considered judgments from the 
preceding courts on these issues.117 It accordingly limited its decision to whether 
absolution from the instance should have been granted in the CPD.  
 
Ackermann and Goldstone JJ considered the provisions of the interim 
Constitution118 and the Police Act,119 and found positive obligations on members 
of the police force in both. The judges note that in addressing these obligations in 
relation to dignity and the freedom and security of the person ‘few things can be 
more important to women than freedom from the threat of sexual violence’.120 
The Court further refers to the State’s duty under international law ‘to prohibit all 
gender-based discrimination that has the effect or purpose of impairing the 
enjoyment by women of fundamental rights and freedoms and to take reasonable 
and appropriate measures to prevent the violation of those rights’. As authority it 
cites here the Women’s Convention, including the ‘due diligence’ provision121 
                                                                                                                                    
common law in accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, and 
the specific application of any particular constitutional right was thus not required.  
116   Carmichele (CC) op cit note 103 para 44. 
117   The applicant had not relied on s 39(2) in its arguments before the CPD or the SCA, 
and neither of these fora addressed this aspect in its judgment.   
118    S 215 of the 1993 Constitution. 
119   S 5 of Act 7 of 1958. 
120    Carmichele (CC) op cit note 103 para 62.  
121  CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 para 9 (see discussion in Chapter 3, Section 
2.3.2.) The Court also makes reference to Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHHR 
245 as authority for the point that the Constitution imposes positive obligations on the 
State to prevent harm – para 45. (See discussion of Osman v United Kingdom in 
Chapter 2, Section 4.3.)  
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from the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation No. 19 and the 
preceding judgment in Baloyi.122  
 
The Court observes that the police service is one of the primary agencies of the 
State responsible for the protection of the public in general, and women and 
children in particular, against the invasion of their fundamental rights by 
perpetrators of violent crime.123 Regarding the prosecution, the Court noted that 
the Constitution did not contain any provisions dealing with the duties of 
prosecutors. However, prosecutors have always owed a duty to carry out their 
public functions independently and in the interest of the public.124 In relation 
specifically to bail, prosecutors are obliged to place before the court any 
information relevant to the question of whether or not an accused person should 
be released on bail.125  
 
Based on this exploratory examination, the Court was satisfied that the evidence 
already led was sufficient to place the respondents on their defence. It held that 
absolution from the instance had been incorrectly ordered,126 and the case was 
accordingly remitted to the CPD.  
 
The CPD heard further evidence and Chetty J reached a finding in Carmichele’s 
favour, not only in relation to the existence of a legal duty but also on the other 
elements of delictual liability. The Ministers of Safety and Security and of 
Justice subsequently lodged an appeal against this finding.127 
 
                                                 
122    See Carmichele (CC) op cit note 103 para 62 fn 67.  
123   Idem paras 61-62. 
124   Idem para 72. 
125   Ibid.  
126   Idem para 77. 
127   The discussion of the second SCA judgment follows in Section 3.3.3 below.  
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3.3.2  Meanwhile: Van Duivenboden and Van Eeden  
 
Following the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Carmichele, the SCA was 
presented with two cases revolving around the legal duty of the police to prevent 
acts of violence.128 The plaintiff in Minister of Safety and Security v Van 
Duivenboden129 sought to hold the Minister of Safety and Security liable for 
injuries he had sustained at the hands of one Neil Brooks, his neighbour. On the 
day in question, Brooks, who had a history of excessive alcohol abuse and 
committing domestic violence with his (licenced) firearms while under the 
influence of alcohol, embarked on a shooting spree in the course of which he 
killed his own wife and daughter and wounded Van Duivenboden when the latter 
attempted to intervene.  
 
Van Duivenboden claimed that the police had been negligent in failing to take 
the steps available in law to deprive Brooks of his firearms before the tragic 
shooting occurred (while there were clear grounds for doing so), and that this 
negligence was a cause of his being shot.130 Before the fatal incident took place, 
various police officers had information that adversely reflected on Brooks’s 
fitness to be in possession of a firearm.131 However, they failed to take steps to 
act on this information by initiating an inquiry aimed at declaring him unfit to 
possess firearms.132  
 
                                                 
128    The discussion here will only deal with this requirement, although the other elements of 
delictual liability were also in dispute in certain of the cases examined below.  
129    2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) [hereafter ‘Van Duivenboden’]. 
130   Idem para 2.  
131   Idem para 4.  
132  Idem paras 3, 11. This inquiry would have been held in terms of s 11 of the Arms and 
Ammunitions Act 75 of 1969 (now repealed by the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000).  
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The first aspect that the SCA accordingly had to address was the wrongfulness of 
the omission on the part of the police, or simply put, the existence of a legal duty 
towards Van Duivenboden. The majority (per Nugent JA)133 adopted the 
approach taken by the Constitutional Court in Carmichele, i.e. that the notion of 
the ‘legal convictions of the community’ that is central to the common-law test 
for wrongfulness must now be informed by the norms and values embodied in 
the Constitution.134  
 
The Court found that where there is a potential threat of the kind in issue here, 
the constitutionally protected rights to human dignity, to life, and to security of 
the person, are all placed in peril and the State, represented by its officials, has a 
constitutional duty to protect them. (This conclusion is drawn without recourse to 
international law.) 
 
In some instances, the exigencies of effective government or some other 
considerations of public policy may outweigh the need to hold the State 
accountable, but these considerations do not arise here.135 The Court accordingly 
recognized that the police officers who, in the exercise of duties on behalf of the 
State, were in possession of information that reflected on Brooks’s fitness to 
possess firearms were under an actionable duty to members of the public to take 
reasonable steps to act on that information in order to avoid harm occurring.136  
 
Shortly after handing down judgment in Van Duivenboden, the SCA was called 
on to consider a further claim arising from alleged police dereliction of duty. The 
                                                 
133    Howie JA, Heher AJA and Lewis AJA concurring. 
134   Van Duivenboden op cit note 129 para 17.  
135     Idem paras 20-22.  
136    Idem para 22.  
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plaintiff in Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security137 was raped and robbed 
by one André Gregory Mohamed, a known dangerous criminal and serial rapist 
who had escaped from police custody some time before the attack on her.138 
Mohamed was facing 22 serious charges (including rape, indecent assault and 
armed robbery) when he escaped from police cells in Durban through the simple 
expedient of leaving via an unlocked security gate. The plaintiff claimed that 
members of the police owed her a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent 
Mohamed from escaping and causing her harm, and that they negligently failed 
to comply with this duty.139 
 
The court a quo considered itself bound by the (initial) judgment of the SCA in 
Carmichele, and accordingly held that the police did not have a duty towards the 
appellant to prevent harm.140 However, while Van Eeden’s appeal to the SCA 
was pending, the Constitutional Court gave its Carmichele judgment, which had 
the effect of materially reshaping the SCA’s consideration of the Van Eeden 
case.  
 
The SCA, in Van Eeden, reiterated the importance of the Constitution in shaping 
‘the legal convictions of the community’.141 Vivier ADP notes that the 
entrenchment of fundamental rights and values in the Bill of Rights affords them 
a higher status in that all law, State actions, court decisions and even the conduct 
of natural and juristic persons may be tested against them. All private law rules, 
                                                 
137   2002 (4) AllSA 346 (SCA) [hereafter ‘Van Eeden’]. 
138   Idem para 1. 
139   Idem para 3.  
140   This decision was reported as Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 
646 (T). 
141   Van Eeden op cit note 137 para 12.  
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principles or norms, including those regulating the law of delict, are subjected to 
and thus given content in the light of the basic values in the Bill of Rights.142  
 
The Court recognised that section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution in itself imposed a 
positive duty on the State to protect everyone from violent crime.143 Freedom 
from violence is recognized as essential to the equal enjoyment of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.144 It is noted that section 12(1)(c) requires the State 
to protect individuals, both by refraining from such invasions itself and by taking 
active steps to prevent violation of the right.145  
 
Similar to the approach taken in Baloyi and Carmichele (CC), Vivier ADP 
considers the State obligations arising in terms of international law to protect 
women against violent crime and against the gender discrimination inherent in 
violence against women.146 He refers to the preamble of the UDHR, Article 4(d) 
of the Violence Declaration and Article 2 of the Women’s Convention.147 
 
The Court also considers section 205(3) of the Constitution (where the objects of 
the police service are set out),148 and the provisions of the South African Police 
Service Act.149 It reiterates the dictum from Carmichele (CC) that the police 
service is one of the primary agencies of the State responsible for the discharge 
of the constitutional duty to protect the public in general and women in particular 
                                                 
142  Ibid. 
143   Idem para 13.  
144   Ibid, citing S v Baloyi.  
145   Ibid.  
146   Idem para 15.  
147    Ibid. 
148   This section reads as follows: 
 ‘The objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to 
maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their 
property, and to uphold and enforce the law.’ 
149  Act 68 of 1995. 
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against the invasion of their fundamental rights by perpetrators of violent 
crime.150 Against the backdrop of this exposition, the Court’s conclusion that the 
police indeed had a legal duty to act positively to prevent Mohamed’s escape 
becomes unavoidable.  
 
The principles emerging from the Carmichele, Van Duivenboden and Van Eeden 
cases were similarly applied by the SCA in its subsequent judgment in Minister 
of Safety and Security v Hamilton.151 In casu the respondent was shot by one 
Erna McArdell with a licenced firearm in the course of an argument about a 
parking bay and was rendered a tetraplegic. Hamilton alleged that when the 
police issued McArdell, who had a history of psychiatric illness, with a firearm 
licence, they failed to take reasonable steps to investigate whether she was 
competent and fit to possess a firearm. The question that arose on appeal was to 
what extent the police authorities charged with considering applications for 
firearm licences were under a legal duty to further investigate the information 
furnished to them by the applicant.  
 
The Court refers to the formulation of the test for wrongfulness in Van Eeden,152 
and notes that the affected interest here is the respondent’s right to bodily 
integrity and security of the person, a right long regarded in our law as ‘one of an 
individual’s absolute rights of personality’.153 As is abundantly clear from its 
inclusion in both the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions, this right is one deemed 
worthy of legal protection. Even prior to the advent of the 1993 and 1996 
Constitutions, our law recognised that ‘the police are under a positive duty in law 
                                                 
150   Van Eeden para 16. 
151   (2) SA 216 (SCA) para 35. See also Minister of Safety and Security v De Lima [2006] 4 
All SA 433 (SCA). 
152   Idem para 16. 
153   Idem para 19.  
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to protect citizens from assault when in a position to do so and that, if they 
negligently fail to do so, the State will be liable in damages’.154 
 
After consideration of the relevant legislation and regulations, the Court finds 
that police members are under a legal duty to take proper measures to screen an 
application for a firearm licence by making such enquiries as are reasonable in 
the circumstances to corroborate the veracity of the information furnished to 
them by the applicant in relation to his or her physical, temperamental and 
psychological fitness to possess a firearm.155 This duty is particularly important 
in a country where high levels of violence are notorious and are fostered to a 
significant degree by access to firearms.156 
 
Van Heerden AJA points out that should firearm licences be issued to unfit 
persons, then the bodily integrity, safety and security, and even the lives, of 
members of the general public are potentially at risk. Thus, the imposition of 
such a legal duty on the relevant police members is clearly reasonable and 
‘congruent with the court’s appreciation of the sense of justice of the 
community’.157 
 
The Court reaches the conclusion that there was indeed a legal duty on the police 
members as contended by the respondent.158 The source of this legal duty is both 
the common law and the statutory provisions analysed by the court. Interestingly, 
the court reaches this conclusion without relying directly on the provisions of the 
Bill of Rights in either the 1993 or the 1996 Constitutions (both of which came 
into operation after the dates relevant to this matter and neither of which has 
                                                 
154   Idem para 20.   
155   Idem para 32.  
156   Idem para 33. 
157   Ibid.  
158   Idem para 36. 
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retrospective operation). The Court was, however, satisfied that the existence of 
a legal duty on the police in these circumstances is entirely consistent with the 
norms and values of South African society as embodied in both Constitutions.159 
 
In Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail and Others160 the 
first applicant was a voluntary association established as a result of grave public 
concern about the levels of violent crime on trains operated by the first 
respondent in the Western Cape. The Rail Commuters Action Group, alleging 
that Metrorail and the other respondents161 owed rail commuters in the Western 
Cape a duty of care to protect their lives and property against criminal activities 
on commuter trains and train stations, approached the High Court for an order 
aimed at ensuring the provision of a safe rail commuter service in which violent 
attacks on passengers would be prevented. 162  
 
While the Rail Commuters Action Group was initially successful in the High 
Court,163 the matter was taken on appeal to the SCA, and the judgment of the 
High Court was set aside.164 In the subsequent appeal to the Constitutional Court,  
O’Regan J evaluated whether any of the respondents were under an obligation to 
provide for the safety and security of commuters on Metrorail trains in the 
                                                 
159   Ibid.  
160     2003 (3) BCLR 288 (C). 
161  The four respondents were the following: first respondent was Transnet trading as 
Metrorail; second respondent was the South African Rail Commuter Corporation; third 
respondent was the Minister of Transport; fourth respondent was the Minister of Safety 
and Security. 
162     See 291F-H. 
163  The High Court declared that the respondents had a legal duty to protect the lives and 
property of members of the public who commute by rail, whilst they are making use of 
the rail transport services provided and ensured by, respectively, the first and second 
respondents- 352D. The Court also mandated certain steps to be put in place by the 
first, second and third respondents in order to protect the constitutional rights of rail 
commuters- 352E-H. 
164  Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail and Others v Rail Commuters Action Group and Others 
2003 (6) SA 349 (SCA); 2003 (12) BCLR 1363 (SCA).  
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Western Cape. Specifically, the question was whether such an obligation arose 
from the relevant legislation165 or the provisions of the Constitution.166  
 
The Court observed that it is clear that rights other than the social and economic 
rights in the Constitution also at times impose positive obligations, and makes 
specific reference to Baloyi and Carmichele to illustrate this point (in respect of 
the rights to life, dignity and security).167 O’Regan J points out that since the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment in Carmichele, the SCA has developed the legal 
principles governing the State’s delictual liability in respect of its constitutional 
obligations, and particularly, those relating to the rights to dignity, life and 
freedom and security of the person in a series of cases.
 
 
 
Considering the context within which these obligations are to be performed and 
the need to hold the first and second respondents (Metrorail and the Commuter 
Corporation) accountable for the exercise of their powers, O’Regan J concluded 
that Metrorail and the Commuter Corporation bear a positive obligation arising 
from the relevant statutory provisions, read with the Constitution, to ensure that 
reasonable measures are in place to provide for the security of rail commuters 
when they provide rail commuter services.168  
 
                                                 
165  In this instance, the Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act 9 of 
1989. 
166  Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC) para 61 [hereafter 
‘Rail Commuters CC’] 
167  Idem para 71.  
168    The Court finally issued a declaratory order to the effect that the first and second 
respondents (Metrorail and the Commuter Corporation) have an obligation to ensure 
that reasonable measures are taken to provide for the security of rail commuters whilst 
they are making use of rail transport services provided and ensured by, respectively, the 
first and second respondents – idem para 111. 
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Important for purposes of this thesis, the Court notes that what constitutes 
‘reasonable measures’ will depend on the circumstances of each case.169
 
Factors 
that would ordinarily be relevant would include the nature of the duty, the social 
and economic context in which it arises, the range of factors that are relevant to 
the performance of the duty, the extent to which the duty is closely related to the 
core activities of the duty-bearer – the closer they are, the greater the obligation 
on the duty-bearer, and the extent of any threat to fundamental rights should the 
duty not be met as well as the intensity of any harm that may result. The more 
grave the threat to fundamental rights, the greater the responsibility on the duty-
bearer.170 A final consideration will be the relevant human and financial resource 
constraints that may hamper the organ of state in meeting its obligation.  
 
This last criterion will require careful consideration when raised. In particular, an 
organ of state will not be held to have reasonably performed a duty simply on the 
basis of a bald assertion of resource constraints. Details of the precise character 
of the resource constraints, whether human or financial, in the context of the 
overall resourcing of the organ of state will need to be provided. The standard of 
reasonableness so understood conforms to the constitutional principles of 
accountability, on the one hand, in that it requires decision-makers to disclose 
their reasons for their conduct, and the principle of effectiveness on the other, for 
it does not unduly hamper the decision-maker’s authority to determine what are 
reasonable and appropriate measures in the overall context of their activities. 
 
 
 
                                                 
169  Idem para 88. 
170  Thus, an obligation to take measures to discourage pickpocketing may not be as intense 
as an obligation to take measures to provide protection against serious threats to life 
and limb. 
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3.3.3 Carmichele: Supreme Court of Appeal (again)   
 
It cannot be disputed that when the SCA contemplated the Carmichele matter for 
the second time, the geography of the legal landscape had undergone seismic 
shifts. The Constitutional Court’s ruling had infused not only the findings of the 
trial court (CPD) upon remittal171 but also the subsequent SCA judgments in Van 
Duivenboden and Van Eeden, so that the impact of the Constitution on the 
inquiry into the existence of a legal duty was by now quite clear.  
 
It will be recalled that the case had been remitted to the High Court, and that the 
trial court had ruled in favour of Ms. Carmichele. The Ministers of Safety and 
Security and of Justice appealed against this finding, which meant that the SCA 
would now re-examine the case.  
 
In its second consideration of Carmichele,172 Harms JA sets out what he terms 
‘the general norm of accountability’ by explaining that the State is liable for its 
failure to perform the duties imposed upon it by the Constitution unless it can be 
shown that there is compelling reason to deviate from that norm.173 As in Van 
Eeden, the SCA found no reason here to depart from this ‘general norm of 
accountability’.174  
 
                                                 
171    For an interesting reflection on the matter by the trial judge, see D Chetty ‘The 
perspective of a High Court judge’ (2004) 121 SALJ 493 at 495-497.  
172   Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2004 (3) SA 305 (SCA) [‘hereafter 
Carmichele SCA (2)’]. 
173   Idem para 43. See also para 34, where the Court confirms that this ‘general norm’ 
relates to the test for wrongfulness ‘in the light of constitutional demands’.    
174    The Court’s conclusions regarding the elements of negligence and causation similarly 
favoured the plaintiff, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6    South African Law 
 
 
 413
Given its acceptance of ‘the general norm of accountability’, the Court 
(presumably) did not find it necessary to specifically consider international 
human rights law in order to determine whether the State had a duty towards 
Carmichele. Vivier ADP does reiterate the Constitutional Court’s reference to the 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Osman v United Kingdom, 
and cites a further paragraph not quoted in the Carmichele judgment.175 This 
relates to the point that in certain circumstances there may a positive duty on 
State authorities to take preventive measures to protect a person whose life is at 
risk from the criminal acts of another individual (in terms of the European 
Convention on Human Rights), but that this duty is not an unlimited one.176 It 
does not however appear that this reference in any way influences or changes the 
application of the Carmichele dictum by the SCA in this instance. 
 
While one agrees with the eventual conclusion reached by the SCA in 
Carmichele SCA (2), the following statement is somewhat startling: 
 
Both [the Constitutional Court and the CPD] emphasised, quite 
rightly, the special constitutional duty of the State to protect 
women against violent crime in general and sexual abuse in 
particular. But this should not be seen as implying that the State's 
liability in a case such as this is necessarily determined by or 
dependent on the sex of the victim or the nature of or motive 
behind the assault. 177 
 
I contend that the ‘sex of the victim and the nature of or motive behind the 
assault’ are indeed aspects of great significance when considering whether or not 
certain duties rest on the state, given firstly the standards that have emerged 
                                                 
175    Carmichele SCA (2)’ op cit note 172 paras 32-33. Viviers ADP also takes issue with the 
understanding of the Constitutional Court of the judgment of the ECrtHR in Z v United 
Kingdom [2001] 10 BHRC 384 – para 41 fn 36.  
176  See discussion of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Chapter 
5, Part C, Section 4. 
177   Carmichele SCA (2) op cit note 172 at para 42. Emphasis added.  
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internationally and secondly, the incidence of gender-based violence in South 
Africa. The fact that this is a form of interpersonal violence with singular 
characteristics and sequelae raises specific expectations of State intervention; 
this is clear from the way in such violence and concomitant State duties have 
been considered by international human rights bodies.178 The above dictum 
further stands in contrast to the judgment of the Constitutional Court in  
S v Baloyi, where Sachs J (correctly) considered the peculiar gender-based nature 
of domestic violence in assessing the constitutionality of the impugned provision.  
 
And so the lengthy Carmichele saga drew to a close (at least as far as the 
determination of the merits was concerned).179 It should be clear from this initial 
discussion already that the judgment of the Constitutional Court has been greatly 
influential in the development of this line of cases, and it has also had an impact 
on other facets of the right to freedom from violence, as will be apparent from 
the rest of this chapter. Much of the commentary on the judgment has related to 
its implications for the law of delict, specifically the element of wrongfulness.180  
                                                 
178   For example, CEDAW and the IACrtHR.  
179  The CPD awarded Ms. Carmichele approximately R1 million in 2008. This was about a 
quarter of her original R4,6 million claim – see K Breytenbach ‘Crime victim awarded 
R1m in damages’ The Mercury (9 September 2008).  
180   Considerable academic discussion has arisen from the question whether the 
Constitutional Court and SCA correctly applied the tests for wrongfulness and 
negligence in Carmichele and subsequent matters – see A Fagan ‘Rethinking 
wrongfulness in the law of delict’ (2005) 122 SALJ 90-141; J Neethling & JM Potgieter 
‘Die regsoortuigings van die gemeenskap as selfstandige onregmatigheidskriterium’ 
(2006) TSAR 609-616; J Neethling ‘The conflation of wrongfulness and negligence: Is 
it always such as bad thing for the law of delict?’ (2006) 123 SALJ 204-214; RW 
Nugent ‘Yes, it is always a bad thing for the law: A reply to Professor Neethling’ 
(2006) 123 SALJ 557-563; J Neethling & JM Potgieter ‘Wrongfulness and negligence 
in the law of delict: A Babylonian confusion?’ (2007) 70 THRHR 120-130; A Fagan 
‘Blind faith: A response to Professors Neethling and Potgieter’ (2007) 124 SALJ 285-
295; FDJ Brand ‘Reflections on wrongfulness in the law of delict’ (2007) 124 SALJ  
76-83; J Neethling & JM Potgieter ‘In (self-) defence of the distinction between 
wrongfulness and negligence’ (2007) 124 SALJ 280-284; A Paizes ‘Making sense of 
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What is noteworthy about this series of cases is that section 39(2) has been the 
‘driving force’ behind its development. This may be one of the reasons why the 
right to freedom from violence itself as set out in section 12(1)(c) has not been 
the subject of extensive analysis by the courts. (Other reasons include the fact 
that a case such as Hamilton was not decided with express reference to 
constitutional provisions, but rather common law and statute.) The consideration 
of the constitutional right by the SCA in Van Eeden is arguably the most detailed 
among the cases examined here.   
 
Carpenter, in her discussion of Carmichele, Van Duivenboden and Van Eeden, 
predicts that this line of this line of jurisprudence regarding State liability has 
clearly not yet reached its final development.181 She observes that cases that are 
factually more difficult and complex could arise, and it is therefore gratifying 
that ‘such a sound foundation’ has been laid for the future development of our 
law.182 Her point regarding further development is borne out by the approach 
adopted by the Constitutional Court in K v Minister of Safety and Security,183 
where the question at issue was one of vicarious liability (and more specifically, 
the so-called ‘deviation situation’, where the employer acts outside the scope of 
the employer’s mandate).    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
wrongfulness’ (2008) 125 SALJ 371-412. A discussion of this issue is beyond the focus 
of this thesis.   
181   Carpenter op cit note 102 at 265-266. 
182    Idem at 266.  
183    2005 (6) SA419 (CC) [hereafter ‘K v Minister’], discussed in Section 3.3.4 below. 
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3.3.4  Developing the doctrine of vicarious liability  
 
The ‘liability’ cases discussed above, brought against representatives of the State 
(for the most part the Minister of Safety and Security) were generally all founded 
in the doctrine of vicarious liability. This doctrine entails that the acts, or 
omissions, of individual employees, such as police officials who negligently 
allow a notorious rapist to escape from police cells, are ascribed to their 
employer, the Minister of Minister of Safety and Security, who is then held liable 
for any harm that ensues as a result of the escape, such as subsequent rapes 
committed by the fugitive.184 The question of vicarious liability was not in 
dispute in any of the matters discussed above. However, in K v Minister of Safety 
and Security the scope of vicarious liability was raised as the central issue.  
 
Ms. K., the applicant, had been raped by three uniformed and on-duty policemen 
after she accepted a lift home from them when she found herself stranded in the 
early hours of the morning. Both the High Court and SCA dismissed Ms. K.’s 
claim on the ground that the Minister of Safety and Security was not vicariously 
liable for the conduct of the policemen. The SCA applied the existing principles 
of vicarious liability, with specific reference to the so-called ‘deviation’ cases 
(where the employee deviates from the course and scope of his employment in 
committing the delict), and was not persuaded by the argument advanced on 
behalf of Ms. K. that it had a duty185 to develop these common law principles.186 
 
                                                 
184    See facts of Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security note 137 above.  
185    As set out in s 39(2) of the Constitution - K v Minister op cit note 183 para 9.  
186  See overview of the common law position as provided by O’Regan at paras 21-33 of 
the judgment, including the leading cases with regard to ‘deviation’, i.e. Feldman (Pty) 
Ltd v Mall 1945 AD 733 and Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 (1) SA 117 (A).  
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The Constitutional Court (per O’Regan J) had to consider as a preliminary point 
whether this matter raised a constitutional issue. Starting with the constitutional 
requirement that a court, when developing the common law, should promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution, O’Regan J reiterated the 
acknowledgement of the ‘pervasive normative effect of our Constitution’ in 
Carmichele (CC). She considered the circumstances when the need for 
development of the common law in terms of section 39(2) would arise, and 
concluded that the overall purpose of this provision is to ensure that our common 
law is infused with the values of the Constitution.187 It is therefore not only in 
cases where existing rules are clearly inconsistent with the Constitution that such 
an infusion is required: the normative influence of the Constitution must be felt 
throughout the common law.188 Where courts are making decisions that involve 
the incremental development of the rules of the common law, and the values of 
the Constitution are relevant, they are also bound by the terms of section 39(2): 
 
The obligation imposed upon courts by section 39(2) of the 
Constitution is thus extensive, requiring courts to be alert to the 
normative framework of the Constitution not only when some 
startling new development of the common law is in issue, but in 
all cases where the incremental development of the rule is in 
issue.189  
 
In casu, the applicant’s argument that the principles of vicarious liability are 
inconsistent with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights (and 
therefore need to be developed to hold the respondent liable) did raise a 
constitutional issue.190 The question of the protection of Ms. K.’s rights to 
security of the person, dignity, privacy and substantive equality were of profound 
constitutional importance. In addition, it was clear that it was part of the three 
                                                 
187    K v Minister op cit note 183 paras 16-17. 
188    Idem para 17. 
189    Ibid.  
190    Idem para 18. 
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policemen’s work to ensure the safety and security of all South Africans and to 
prevent crime. These obligations arise from the Constitution191
 
and are affirmed 
by the Police Act.192
  
 
O’Regan J further referred to the dictum in Carmichele (CC) that in terms of 
addressing these (State) obligations in relation to dignity and the freedom and 
security of the person, few things can be more important to women than freedom 
from the threat of sexual violence.193  She confirmed that these comments were 
of equal importance in the present case.194 The obligations imposed upon courts 
by sections 8(1) and 39(2) of the Constitution are not applicable only to the 
criterion of wrongfulness in the law of delict; in considering the common-law 
principles of vicarious liability, and the question of whether that law needs to be 
developed in that area, the normative influence of the Constitution must be 
considered.195  
 
The Court proceeds to consider the current (common-law) principles of vicarious 
liability, with specific reference to the so-called ‘deviation’ cases.196 The 
approach developed in South African law to the latter category entails two 
questions. The first is whether the wrongful acts were done solely for the 
purposes of the employee. This question requires a subjective consideration of 
the employee’s state of mind and is a purely factual question. Even if it is 
answered in the affirmative, however, the employer may nevertheless be liable 
                                                 
191    S 205(3) of the Constitution, where the objects of the police service are set out (see note 
148 above).  
192    Preamble to the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. 
193  K v Minister op cit note 183 para 18.  The original dictum further noted that the State 
also has duties under international law to respond appropriately to violence against 
women – see Carmichele (CC) op cit note 103 para 62. 
194   K v Minister op cit note 183 para 19.  
195   Idem.  
196   Idem paras 24 et seq.  
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vicariously if the second question, an objective one, is answered affirmatively. 
That question is whether, even though the acts have been done solely for the 
purpose of the employee, there is nevertheless a sufficiently close link between 
the employee’s acts for his own interests and the purposes and the business of the 
employer. This question does not raise purely factual questions, but mixed 
questions of fact and law. The questions of law it raises relate to what is 
‘sufficiently close’ to give rise to vicarious liability.
 
It is in answering this 
question that a court should consider the need to give effect to the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.197  
 
This objective element, which relates to the connection between the deviant 
conduct and the employment, approached with the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Constitution in mind, is sufficiently flexible to incorporate not only 
constitutional norms, ‘but other norms as well’.198 It requires a court when 
applying it to articulate its reasoning for its conclusions as to whether there is a 
sufficient connection between the wrongful conduct and the employment or not.  
 
In this instance, as to the first leg of the Rabie test, it is clear that the three 
policemen were, subjectively viewed, acting in pursuit entirely of their own 
objectives and not those of their employer.199 But this conclusion is not the end 
of the matter. The next question is whether their conduct was sufficiently close to 
their employer’s business to render the respondent liable.200 The Court found 
three important points indicating a close connection. First, the policemen bore a 
statutory and constitutional duty to prevent crime and protect the members of the 
public. Secondly, the police here had offered to assist the applicant and she had 
                                                 
197    Idem para 32. 
198    Idem para 44.  
199   Idem para 50.  
200   Idem para 51. 
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accepted their offer. The fact that they were in uniform (which is aimed at 
making it easier for members of the community to identify police officials when 
they require their assistance) contributed to her placing her trust in them. Thirdly, 
the conduct of the policemen which caused harm constituted a simultaneous 
commission and omission.201 The commission lay in their brutal rape of the 
applicant. Their simultaneous omission lay in their failing while on duty to 
protect her from harm, something which they bore a general duty to do, and a 
special duty on the facts of this case.  
 
According to O’Regan J, these three inter-related factors made it plain that 
viewed against the background of the Constitution, and, in particular, the 
constitutional rights of the applicant and the constitutional obligations of the 
respondent, the connection between the conduct of the policemen and their 
employment was sufficiently close to render the respondent liable.  
 
Commentators have offered divergent perspectives on this judgment. Neethling 
and Potgieter, for example, welcome the judgment;202 in their comment on the 
SCA judgment, they called for an expansion of the common-law principles of 
vicarious liability on the same policy grounds as those eventually employed by 
the Constitutional Court, and were therefore vindicated by the eventual 
pronouncement in the latter forum.203 Calitz appears to have certain misgivings 
about the justification provided by the Constitutional Court for hearing the 
case,204 but nevertheless agrees with the Court’s finding that the test is a policy 
                                                 
201   Idem para 53. 
202    J Neethling & JM Potgieter ‘Middellike aanspreeklikheid van die staat vir verkragting 
deur polisiebeamptes’ (2005) TSAR 595 at 602. 
203    Idem at 601-602. 
204    K Calitz ‘The close connection test for vicarious liability’ (2007) 18 Stell LR 451 at 
460. 
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decision based on values.205 She does caution that it may be difficult to establish 
the limits of this liability in cases where ‘non-constitutional issues’ are not as 
prominent. 
 
The most intriguing comment, for purposes of this thesis, is that of Hopkins, who 
points out that customary international law could have offered the appellant an 
interesting argument.206 This putative argument rests, firstly, on section 232 of 
the Constitution, which provides that customary international law is 
automatically part of our domestic legal system.207 The second leg of the 
argument consists of the principles of international law relating to liability of 
States for private conduct of individuals in their employ.208 Hopkins 
demonstrates that international law has recognized a rule to the effect that the 
conduct of an organ of State or a person or entity empowered to exercise of 
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the state under international 
law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its 
authority or contravenes instructions.209 He concludes that in terms of customary 
international law, the State would, on the facts of K v Minister of Safety and 
Security, be responsible for the conduct of the three police officials who raped 
the appellant.210 
 
This ‘alternative’ approach proposed by Hopkins is important in the light of my 
earlier observation that following the initial examination of international law in 
Baloyi and Carmichele, the courts have not engaged with the normative 
                                                 
205    Idem at 468.  
206    K Hopkins ‘Can customary international law play a meaningful role in our domestic 
legal order: A short case study to consider’ (2005) 30 SAYIL 276 at 277.  
207    Idem at 280. 
208    Idem at 283 et seq.  
209    See Hopkins op cit note 206 at 286-287, citing Art 7 of the Articles on State 
Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission on 9 August 2001.   
210    Idem at 287-288. 
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developments that have been taking place on international level. O’Regan J does 
not specify here which ‘other norms’ may be considered in addition to 
constitutional norms to amplify the second objective leg of the test for vicarious 
liability, but section 232 of the Constitution already provides a possible answer 
in the case of rules of customary international law. (In fact, based on this section 
it could be argued that ‘customary international law’ forms part of the notion of 
‘constitutional norms’.) In any event, I suggest that rules of international law, for 
example, so-called ‘soft law’, that do not yet constitute customary law should 
also be included in the category of ‘other norms’ referred to by O’Regan J.  
 
 
3.4  Interpretation of women’s right to freedom from violence in criminal 
matters  
3.4.1 Introduction  
 
It is noticeable that women’s right to freedom from violence has increasingly 
been discussed in criminal proceedings arising from acts of violence against 
women. These pronouncements were predominantly made in sentencing 
proceedings, although the courts have also expressly given consideration to the 
rights of the rape victim in other situations arising in the course of criminal 
proceedings.211 I discuss developments in three groupings of cases here: 
sentencing principles, criminal liability (with specific reference to the common-
law defence of ‘private defence’) and the common-law offence of rape.  
 
                                                 
211   For example, in S v M 1999 (1) SACR 664 (CPD) the Court noted (obiter) that the 
sordid and unduly protracted cross-examination of the complainant by the accused 
constituted a ‘gratuitous violation’ of her dignity. It would therefore have constituted a 
reasonable and justifiable limitation of the accused’s right to a fair trial if the court a 
quo had investigated and ruled this cross-examination inadmissible in order to protect 
the complainant’s dignity – at 673g-j.  
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3.4.2   Sentencing principles  
 
It is a long-established principle that in determining an appropriate sentence, a 
court should take into account three main factors: the seriousness of the offence, 
the personal circumstances of the offender and the interests of society.212 The 
impact of the crime on the victim is usually considered in assessing the 
seriousness of the offence. It is interesting to note that the courts are increasingly 
placing this examination of the impact of the crime on the victim within a human 
rights framework, as demonstrated in the 1997 judgment in S v Chapman.213 
 
In casu the SCA strongly affirmed that rape constitutes a ‘humiliating, degrading 
and brutal invasion of the privacy, the dignity and the person of the victim’.214 
The Court acknowledged that the ubiquitous threat of sexual violence limits 
women’s freedom to exercise their rights, and explains that women have a 
legitimate claim to walk peacefully in the streets, to enjoy shopping and 
entertainment, to travel to and from work, and to enjoy the peace and tranquility 
of their homes without the fear of sexual assault and the insecurity that 
constantly diminishes the quality and enjoyment of their lives.215  
                                                 
212   S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A). 
213   1997 (3) SA 341 (SCA).  
214   Idem at 344J.  
215   Idem at 345A-B. This statement is in line with the observations of feminist 
commentators regarding sexual violence as a form of social control. See in this regard 
generally L Artz & H Combrinck ‘Sexual assault’ in E Bonthuys & C Albertyn (eds) 
Gender, Law & Justice (2007) 298 at 305-307. 
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It was emphasised that courts are under a duty to send the following 
unambiguous message to the accused, to other potential rapists and to the 
community: 
 
We are determined to protect the equality, dignity and freedom of 
all women, and we shall show no mercy to those who seek to 
invade those rights.216  
 
Despite the apparent clarity (and the strongly protective language) of this dictum, 
sentencing in rape matters subsequently emerged as the subject of some 
controversy. This controversy arose against the background of the introduction in 
1997 of so-called mandatory minimum sentences for serious offences. The 
Criminal Law Amendment Act217 provides that a court is bound to impose a 
specified minimum sentence where an accused is convicted of certain listed 
offences.218 A departure from the prescribed minimum sentence is permitted 
where the court is satisfied that ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ 
exist.219 The legislature initially did not include any guidelines as to the meaning 
of the phrase ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’, thus leaving its 
interpretation entirely to the courts.220  
 
The judicial interpretation of ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ in rape 
matters subsequently led to concern when certain judicial officers found such 
circumstances in outdated and stereotypical assumptions about rape and its effect 
                                                 
216   S v Chapman op cit note 213 at 345C-D.  
217   Act 105 of 1997.  
218   Ss 51 and 52.  
219   S 51(3)(a). 
220   The SCA and the Constitution Court subsequently examined the meaning of this phrase 
and provided guidance on its interpretation: S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA) at 
paras 8-10; S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) at paras 11, 40.   
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on victims.221 In addition to revealing some startling perceptions about sexual 
assault,222 the interpretation of these provisions also led the courts to engage in a 
‘grading exercise’ of rape matters falling within the prescribed categories for 
imposition of a minimum sentence. Where a particular case did not comply with 
the worst imaginable case in the category concerned, this appeared to present a 
justification for departing from the set minimum sentence.223   
 
A case in point was S v Abrahams,224 where the accused was convicted of raping 
his 14-year old daughter, and the court a quo found substantial and compelling 
circumstances justifying a lesser sentence than the prescribed sentence of life 
imprisonment.225 The judgment in the court a quo had (controversially) created 
the impression that rape is less reprehensible when committed within a family 
than rape outside the family context.226  
 
                                                 
221    For a detailed analysis of the interpretation of this concept, see NJ Kubista 
‘“Substantial and compelling circumstances”: Sentencing of rapists under the 
mandatory minimum sentencing scheme’ (2005) 18 SACJ 77 at 77. 
222   The ruling of the court a quo in S v Mahomotsa 2002 (2) SACR 435 (SCA) provides a 
particularly unfortunate example. Kotze J found ‘substantial and compelling 
circumstances’ justifying a departure from the prescribed minimum sentence inter alia 
in the fact that the sexual assault of the two complainants had resulted from the 
accused’s ‘virility’ as well as in the fact that the complainants had been sexually active 
prior to the incidents of rape – see paras 10-13 of the SCA judgment, where Kotze J’s 
reasoning is recounted. 
223   Kubista op cit note 221 at 82-86 presents well-founded criticism of this development. 
224   2002 1 SACR 116 (SCA). 
225   Instead, the accused was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment.  
226   S v Abrahams op cit note 224 at 124d-g. In considering the State’s appeal, the SCA 
carefully scrutinised the judgment of the High Court (per Foxcroft J), and came to the 
conclusion that although the judge’s comments had been ‘incautiously expressed’, they 
did not intend to convey the proposition that rape within the family context was of a 
less serious nature (124g). The Court also pointed out that in this particular instance the 
fact that the rape occurred within the family complicated the damaging effects of the 
violation –  125d-g. 
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On appeal, the SCA found that the High Court had materially misdirected itself 
in certain respects.227 However, in considering what an appropriate sentence 
would be, Cameron JA agreed with the court a quo that this was not ‘one of the 
worst cases of rape’.228 This does not mean that rape could ever be condoned; 
however, some rapes are worse than others and not all instances of rape deserve 
equal punishment. 
 
The amicus curiae argued that the Constitution, as well as international treaty 
obligations, require the government and the courts to take special steps to protect 
the public in general and women in particular against violent crime. These 
obligations must be accorded appropriate weight in the sentencing process. 
Cameron JA concurred with this submission, making reference to Baloyi and 
Carmichele (CC); however, he pointed out that to disregard the proportionality 
between the offence and the period of imprisonment would be in turn to deny the 
offender’s humanity.229 The original sentence of seven years’ imprisonment 
imposed by the High Court was accordingly substituted by one of 12 years’ 
imprisonment. 
 
Although this ‘mandatory minimum’ sentencing legislation was initially 
introduced in 1998 as a temporary measure,230 it was eventually in 2007 made 
permanent. Due to submissions by women’s groups, the Act now includes a 
provision to the effect that when imposing a sentence in respect of the offence of 
rape, certain factors are excluded from constituting substantial and compelling 
                                                 
227   S v Abrahams op cit note 224 at 122g – 124d. 
228   Idem at 127d. 
229  S v Abrahams op cit note 224 at 127g-h. The notion of proportionality, also expressed 
as the principle that ‘the punishment should fit the crime’, is associated with retribution 
as a purpose of punishment. See SS Terblanche The Guide to Sentencing in South 
Africa 2 ed (2007) 166-167; S v Makwanyane 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) para 129. 
230  The Act came into effect on 1 May 1998 for a period of two years but could be 
extended by proclamation for two years at a time.  
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circumstances, i.e. the complainant’s previous sexual history; an apparent lack of 
physical injury to the complainant; an accused person’s cultural or religious 
beliefs about rape; or any relationship between the accused person and the 
complainant prior to the offence being committed.231 (These factors have 
traditionally played a role in stereotyped assumptions on the part of judicial 
officers regarding rape and its impact on the victim.)  
 
The need to achieve a sense of proportionality between competing interests in the 
sentencing process was also expressed in a different context in S v Ferreira, 
where an abused woman was on trial for killing the perpetrator of the abuse.232 
The first appellant had hired two men (the second and third appellants 
respectively) to kill her abusive partner. The fact that the killing was 
premeditated brought the three appellants within the ambit of the prescribed 
minimum sentence of life imprisonment,233 and the court a quo duly imposed this 
sentence after finding that there were no substantial and compelling 
circumstances justifying a lesser sentence.234 
 
On appeal, the SCA held that substantial and compelling circumstances did in 
fact exist in respect of the first appellant,235 and found these circumstances in the 
history of repeated and ever-escalating abuse that she had experienced at the 
hands of the deceased.236 Howie JA notes that the appellant’s actions must be 
judicially evaluated ‘not from a male perspective’ but by the court placing itself 
                                                 
231  S 51(3)(aA) of Act 105 of 1997 (as amended). 
232   2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA).   
233   S 51(1)(a) read with Part I of Schedule 2 of Act 105 of 1997. 
234   S v Ferreira op cit note 232 at paras 1-4. 
235   The SCA found no such circumstances in respect of the second and third appellants. 
Their position is not germane to the present discussion.  
236   S v Ferreira  op cit note 232 at para 43.  
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as far as it can in the position of the woman concerned, with a fully detailed 
account of the abusive relationship and the assistance of expert evidence. 
 
Only by judging the case on that basis can the offender’s equality 
right under s 9(1) of the Constitution be given proper effect. It 
means treating an abused woman accused with due regard for 
gender difference in order to achieve equality of judicial 
treatment… It also, therefore, means having regard to an abused 
woman accused’s constitutional rights to dignity, freedom from 
violence and bodily integrity that the abuser has infringed.237   
 
The Court does immediately add that in the weighing process due emphasis 
should be accorded to the fact that the offender had taken the extreme step of 
depriving the abuser of his constitutional right to life.238  
 
 
3.4.3 Criminal liability: the defence of ‘private defence’ 
 
The matter of S v Engelbrecht239 is akin to that of S v Ferreira (above) in that it 
also deals with a woman who killed her husband after years of long-standing and 
pervasive abuse under circumstances suggesting premeditation. The accused in 
Engelbrecht denied criminal liability, and argued for a development of the 
normative theory of culpability, which would excuse her from the act of killing 
the deceased.240 Alternatively, it was contended that if the lawfulness of her 
conduct had to be tested against an established ground of justification, the 
                                                 
237   Idem para 40. Footnotes omitted.   
238   Idem para 41. The ultimate conclusion reached by the SCA was that the sentence of life 
imprisonment was set aside and substituted by a sentence of six years’ imprisonment, 
with the portion that the appellant had not yet served to be suspended. At the time of 
finalisation of the appeal, the appellant had already served more than three years of the 
original sentence – para 46. 
239  Op cit note 1 [hereafter ‘Engelbrecht’].   
240   Idem paras 15-16. 
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elements of such defence should be developed in order to promote the spirit, 
purport and object of the Bill of Rights.241 
 
In a well-reasoned judgment, Satchwell J considers the requirements for the 
common-law defence of private or self defence.242  She points out that it has 
generally been stated that the question whether an accused who relies on self-
defence has acted lawfully must be judged by objective standards.243 The test 
here is one of ‘reasonableness’.  It is also accepted that the ‘reasonableness’ test 
is the vehicle to ascertain the legal convictions of the community or the 
community’s sense of equity and justice (the boni mores).244 In conducting this 
enquiry, the court must be driven by the values and norms underpinning the 
Constitution.245 The Constitution is a system of objective normative values for 
legal purposes;246 an approach to the ‘legal convictions’ test would be informed 
by the foundational values of the Constitution, namely human dignity, equality 
and freedom.  
 
The Court observes that such approach will necessarily have at its core the 
circumstances and perceptions of the accused. In the context of an abused 
woman who killed her abuser, it requires the court to have regard to her 
experience of abuse as well as the impact of the abuse on her.247 Importantly, 
Satchwell J not only acknowledges the gendered dimension of domestic violence 
                                                 
241   Idem para 17.  
242  See also discussion by M Reddi ‘Domestic violence and abused women who kill: 
Private defence or private vengeance?’ (2007) 124 SALJ 22 at 22. 
243   Engelbrecht op cit note 1 para 327.  
244   Idem para 330.  
245   Idem para 332. 
246   Satchwell J cites inter alia the Van Duivenboden and Van Eeden judgments as authority 
here.  
247   Engelbrecht op cit note 1 para 333. 
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(with reference to Carmichele (CC) and Baloyi),248 but also recognises that the 
development of the law relating to defences excluding unlawfulness has been 
gendered in that this development has ‘largely ignored women’s lives and their 
experience of violence’.249  
 
Satchwell J agrees that there may be a need to develop the common law to 
promote and protect the right to equality and to equal treatment before the law. 
She proceeds to examine the common-law requirements for private or self 
defence, including the requirement that the unlawful attack against the defender 
must be ‘imminent’.250 In casu the State argued that there was no immediately 
threatening attack on the accused or her daughter at the time of the killing.251  
The court finds that where abuse is frequent and regular such that it can be 
termed a ‘pattern’ or ‘cycle of abuse, the requirement of imminence should 
extend to encompass abuse that is ‘inevitable’.252 It follows that premeditation of 
the defensive act is not necessarily inconsistent with reliance placed on this 
ground of justification.253 Although the accused here was ultimately convicted of 
murder,254 the significance of the interpretation given to the notion of 
‘imminence’ is obvious.   
 
                                                 
248   Idem para 334. 
249   Idem paras 334-337.  
250    Idem para 227 et seq. 
251   Idem para 232. In fact, the deceased was either sleeping or unconscious at the point 
when the accused placed a plastic bag over his head, resulting in death by suffocation.  
252   Idem para 346-350.  
253   Idem para 350. 
254   The conviction turned on the application of the requirements that the defensive action 
must be ‘necessary’ to avert the unlawful attack and must be proportional to the attack. 
Satchwell J concluded that the accused had exhausted all other options available to her, 
and killing the deceased was therefore both reasonably necessary and proportionate. 
The two assessors however preferred a different conclusion on the facts, which then 
constituted the majority finding of the court – idem paras 399-449. The accused was 
sentenced to be detained until the rising of the court.  
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3.4.4 Developing the common-law offence of rape 
 
In Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions (Pretoria)255 the Constitutional 
Court had to consider the constitutional validity of the common-law definition of 
rape, which was traditionally formulated as ‘the unlawful, intentional sexual 
intercourse with a woman without her consent’. This definition excluded anal 
penetration and was gender-specific both in relation to the perpetrator and the 
victim.  
 
Mr. Masiya, the applicant, had been tried in the regional court at Graskop on a 
charge of raping a nine-year old girl.256 The evidence established that the 
complainant was penetrated anally instead of vaginally. The State argued for his 
conviction of indecent assault, a competent verdict on a charge of rape.257 The 
regional court considered mero motu whether the common law definition of rape 
needed to be developed to include anal penetration, and concluded that such 
development was required in order to ‘promote constitutional objectives’.  
 
The regional court thus extended the definition of rape to include ‘acts of non-
consensual sexual penetration of the male sexual organ into the vagina or anus of 
another person’. Mr. Masiya was accordingly convicted of rape (in terms of this 
extended definition) and was committed to the High Court for sentencing. The 
High Court made an order to the effect that the common law definition of rape 
was unconstitutional, and extended this definition to include acts of non-
                                                 
255   2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) [hereafter ‘Masiya’]. 
256    The facts are set out in paras 6-15 of Nkabinde J’s judgment.  
257    See s 261(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
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consensual sexual penetration of the male penis into the vagina or anus of 
another person.258  
 
Although the Constitutional Court was divided over the outcome, the majority 
and the minority judgments were in agreement about most of the issues before 
the court. They agreed that the common-law definition of rape is not in itself 
objectionable; however, the problem was that it was ‘under-inclusive’ and 
therefore had to be expanded to include anal penetration by a male penis. The 
majority and minority views parted company on one most essential aspect of the 
case, i.e. whether this expansion should be a gender-neutral one. This entails 
whether the definition should include both male and female victims, or whether it 
should be gender-specific, in the sense of being limited to female victims only. 
The latter view was the one held by the majority.259  
 
In order to explain this limited expansion, Nkabinde J firstly pointed out that the 
facts in casu did not require the Court to consider non-consensual penetration of 
a male anus by a penis. She also referred to the separate roles of the courts and 
the legislature – in a constitutional democracy the legislature, and not the courts, 
has the major responsibility for law reform.260 The development of the common 
law is a power that has always vested in our courts, and is exercised ‘in an 
incremental fashion’ as the facts of each case require.261 The Court noted that -  
 
… [H]istorically, rape has been and continues to be a crime of 
which females are its systematic target. It is the most 
                                                 
258  Certain accompanying legislation referring to the offence of rape was also declared 
unconstitutional to the extent that these references were gender-specific. (This 
declaration required referral to the Constitutional Court.) 
259     Nkabinde J, with Moseneke DCJ, Kondile AJ, Madala J, Mokgoro J, O’Regan J, Van 
der Westhuizen J, Van Heerden AJ and Yacoob J concurring. 
260  Masiya op cit note 255 para 30. 
261  Idem para 31. 
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reprehensible form of sexual assault constituting as it does a 
humiliating, degrading and brutal invasion of the dignity and the 
person of the survivor. It is not simply an act of sexual 
gratification, but one of physical domination. It is an extreme and 
flagrant form of manifesting male supremacy over females.262 
 
 
For further support of her point, Nkabinde J referred to the Violence Declaration, 
which ‘enjoins member States to pursue policies to eliminate violence against 
women’.263 She noted that non-consensual anal penetration of women and young 
girls such as the complainant in this case constitutes a form of violence against 
them equal in intensity and impact to that of non-consensual vaginal penetration. 
The object of the criminalisation of this act is therefore to protect the dignity, 
sexual autonomy and privacy of women and young girls as being generally the 
most vulnerable group.  
 
The extended definition would protect the dignity of survivors, especially young 
girls who may not be able to differentiate between the different types of 
penetration.264 Nkabinde J also listed further ways in which an extended 
definition would afford women and girls increased protection.265  
 
The Court nevertheless held, with reference to the principle of legality,266 that 
this extended definition should not apply to Mr. Masiya. His conviction was 
accordingly amended to one of indecent assault and he was referred back to the 
regional court for sentencing.  
 
                                                 
262   Idem para 36. 
263   Idem para 37. 
264   Idem para 38. 
265   Idem paras 38-39. 
266  This principle prevents an accused from being convicted in respect of an act that was 
not an offence at the time of commission. 
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In his minority judgment, 267 Langa CJ made the incisive comment that today 
rape is recognised as being less about sex and more about the expression of 
power through degradation and the concurrent violation of the victim’s dignity, 
bodily integrity and privacy.268 He noted, with reference to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), that the essence of rape is not the 
particular details of the body parts and objects involved, but rather the aggression 
that is expressed in a sexual manner under conditions of coercion.269 
 
Langa CJ was of the opinion that the anal penetration of a male should be treated 
in the same manner as that of a female.270 He provided three reasons for this 
view. Firstly, to do otherwise fails to give full effect to the constitutional values 
of dignity, equality and freedom: dignity through recognition of a violation; 
equality through equal recognition of that violation; and freedom as rape negates 
not only dignity, but bodily autonomy. All these concerns apply equally to men 
and women and necessitate a definition that is gender-neutral concerning 
victims.271  
 
The fact that women are the primary target of rape cannot be 
ignored by this court; nor can it be denied that male domination of 
women is an underlying cause of rape.272  
 
However, this does not mean that men must be excluded from the definition, 
since the criminalisation of rape is about protecting the ‘dignity, sexual 
autonomy and privacy’ of all people, irrespective of their sex or gender. Here, 
                                                 
267    With Sachs J concurring. 
268   Masiya op cit note 255 para 78. 
269   Idem para 78, citing Prosecutor v Musema Case No ICTR-96-13-A (Judgment dated 27 
January 2000) para 226. 
270  Idem para 80.  
271   Idem para 80. 
272   Idem para 84.  
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Langa CJ again drew on the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for authority.273 
 
Secondly, there is no reason to believe that including men in the definition will in 
any way decrease the protection afforded to women.274 Thirdly, the groups of 
men who are most often the survivors of rape, young boys, prisoners and 
homosexuals, are, like women, also vulnerable groups in our society.275 
Moreover, they, and most other male victims, are raped precisely because of the 
gendered nature of the crime. Finally, Langa CJ pointed out that the extension to 
male survivors was in line with both recent foreign experience and international 
criminal and humanitarian law.276 
 
 
There are several reasons why Langa CJ’s analysis in the minority judgment is 
preferable to that of Nkabinde J.277 For purposes of the current discussion, it is 
important to note that both judgments draw on international law to bolster the 
arguments regarding the expansion of the common law definition of rape. 
However, the way in which this is done differs considerably. Langa CJ, on the 
one hand, cites specific paragraphs from recent tribunal judgments and statutes 
that go directly to the points he is seeking to support. Nkabinde J, on the other 
hand, refers only to one source, i.e. the 1993 Violence Declaration, (without 
citing a particular provision of the Declaration). She notes that this document 
‘enjoins member States to pursue policies to eliminate violence against women’, 
and then proceeds to argue for the ‘criminalisation’ of anal penetration. This is 
                                                 
273   Idem para 84 fn 8, citing Prosecutor v Furundzija Case No IT-95-17/1-T  
(Judgment dated 10 December 1998) para 183.  
274   Idem para 85. 
275   Idem para 86.  
276    Langa CJ notes that the ICTR and the ICTY have both defined rape as including male 
anal penetration, and the Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court also 
include male anal penetration under the definition of rape –  idem para 87. 
277    See also discussion in Section 4.3 below.  
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however not what is in issue – coerced anal penetration was already criminalised, 
albeit as another offence (indecent assault). As Langa CJ points out, there is no 
question here of criminalisation or decriminalisation – it is rather a matter of re-
categorisation.278 
 
Nkabinde J’s recourse to international law, in additional to displaying evidence 
of inadequate research, therefore does not address the issue that lies at the heart 
of the difference between the two points of view. In contrast, Langa CJ captures 
the gist of the matter perfectly. 
 
The outcome of the Masiya judgment has since been overtaken by the 
promulgation of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act,279 which contains an expansive gender-neutral definition of 
rape.280 However, the majority judgment remains disconcerting, as I discuss in 
the general evaluation below.281 
 
 
 
3.5 Delays in institution of action 
 
The applicant in Bothma v Els282 had instituted a private prosecution against the 
first respondent, alleging that thirty-nine years before, when she had been a 
thirteen year old schoolgirl, he had subjected her to a pattern of sexual abuse for 
a period of more than two years.283 Mr Els, who denied this charge, successfully 
applied to the High Court for an order permanently staying the private 
                                                 
278    Masiya op cit note 255 para 83.  
279   Act 32 of 2007 [hereafter ‘the 2007 Sexual Offences Act’]. 
280   See s 3.  
281  See Section 4 below. 
282  2010 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
283  Idem para 1.  
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prosecution. The High Court held that the unreasonable delay, for which it 
regarded Ms. Bothma as being fully culpable, would result in irreparable trial 
prejudice to Mr Els, thus denying him his constitutional right to a fair trial.  
 
The Constitutional Court (per Sachs J) held that the High Court had erred in 
granting the stay of prosecution. It found that in deciding whether a particular 
lapse of time (before institution of prosecution) was reasonable, it was important 
to also consider the nature of the offence and public policy dimensions.284 In his 
evaluation of the nature of the offence, Sachs J observed the following: 
 
Rape often entails a sexualised act of humiliation and punishment 
that is meted out by a perpetrator who possesses a mistaken sense 
of sexual entitlement. The criminal justice system should send out 
a clear message through effective prosecution that no entitlement 
exists to perpetrate rape.285  
 
He stated that a notable feature of recent decades has been the manner in which 
adult women have through newly discovered insight found themselves suddenly 
empowered to come to grips with and denounce sexual abuse they had suffered 
as children.286  
 
Sachs J undertook a brief survey of regional standards and comparative law, 
stating that the need for courts to give an effective response to rape, and 
                                                 
284  Idem para 38. The High Court had considered the following three factors: the length of 
the delay; the reason for the delay; and the trial prejudice caused to Mr Els by the delay 
– idem para 39.  
285  Idem para 46. 
286  In Van Zijl v Hoogenhout 2005 (2) SA 93 (SCA), the appellant, at the age of forty-
eight, sued her uncle for sexual abuse over a period of eight years of her childhood. The 
issue to be determined was the date from which civil prescription would run. The 
appellant argued that the prescription period ran not from the dates of the commission 
of the crime, but rather from the date on which she subjectively realised that a wrong 
had been done to her by her uncle. This contention was upheld in the SCA. See also S v 
Cornick and Another 2007 (2) SACR 115 (SCA), where the appellants were convicted 
of rapes committed nineteen years before the complainant laid charges against them.  
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especially the rape of young girls, has been emphasised throughout the world. He 
made reference to Article 4 of the African Women’s Protocol,287 as well as the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and furthermore 
included jurisprudence from courts in the Southern African region.288 On this 
basis, Sachs J concludes that the High Court had failed to give appropriate 
weight to the nature of the offence.289  
 
This judgment is of significance due to its emphasis on the importance of an 
effective response (in this instance, by the courts) to sexual violence, in 
particular where the victims are vulnerable persons, such as young girls. One 
further hopes that criminal courts will take guidance from the carefully worded 
statements of Sachs J regarding new knowledge and insights into the reasons for 
extended delays between incidents of sexual violence and the institution of 
action.290  
 
 
4.  EVALUATION 
 
In this section, I provide comments on aspects of South African jurisprudence 
relating to the right to freedom from violence as outlined in this chapter, and also 
attempt to identify areas where the standards and norms in international and 
regional human rights law may have an impact on South African law.  
                                                 
287  This provision states that every woman is entitled to respect for her life and the 
integrity and security of her person. 
288  Bothma v Els op cit note 282 para 57.  
289  Idem para 83.  
290  The 2007 Sexual Offences Act includes a provision to the effect that in criminal 
proceedings involving the alleged commission of a sexual offence, the court may not 
draw any inference only from the length of any delay between the alleged commission 
of such offence and the reporting thereof – s 59. (See also s 58 of the Act.) These 
provisions were introduced to counter long-standing stereotyped views on the part of 
judicial officers regarding how women who have been raped are ‘expected’ to behave.    
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6    South African Law 
 
 
 439
 
4.1 Formulation of the right to freedom from violence in the Constitution 
 
Although there may be logical inconsistencies in the organisation of the 
subsections of section 12, section 12(1)(c) is clearly defined. The fact that it 
refers to all forms of violence from either public or private sources leaves no 
doubt about the ambit of the right or the fact that the State duties associated with 
this right include both negative and positive obligations. Section 7(2), which 
requires the State to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfill’ the rights in the Bill of 
Rights further reinforces these obligations 
 
 
4.2 The State duty to prevent acts of violent crime  
 
The approach in this series of judgments, set in motion by the decision of the 
Constitutional Court in Carmichele, has been to concentrate on the constitutional 
obligation to develop the common law with regard to the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights in accordance with the injunction in section 39(2) of 
the Constitution.  
 
The Constitutional Court’s assessment in Carmichele of the question as to 
whether a legal duty existed towards the assault victim cannot be faulted, at least 
from a constitutional perspective. Importantly, the Court emphasised that this 
determination must take place within the matrix of the ‘objective normative 
value system’ embodied by the Constitution. This normative value system 
included the principles of international (and regional) human rights law 
considered by the Court. The radical shifts brought about by the application of 
this approach are tangibly demonstrated when comparing the SCA’s two 
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judgments in the Carmichele case: one before the Constitutional Court judgment, 
and the other afterwards.291  
 
The Carmichele judgment accordingly laid the basis for what could have been a 
vibrant expansion of this matrix of constitutional values in subsequent judgments 
on police dereliction of duty (and, arguably, other aspects of interpersonal 
violence)292 through closer regard of the normative value system relating to 
violence against women that was simultaneously emerging international human 
rights law.293  Unfortunately, as discussed above, this promise has not yet been 
realised, whether because of superficial analysis of section 39(2) or due to an 
assumption that the law is settled and that further recourse to international law is 
therefore redundant. I submit that this is an oversight that should be avoided in 
future where section 39(2) is applicable, and even more so where the direct 
interpretation of the right to freedom from violence is in issue.  
 
In this regard, the guidelines that have been laid down by international and 
regional human rights bodies in respect of the state obligation to prevent violence 
against women (and the application of the standard of due diligence) should be 
borne in mind.  
 
 
 
                                                 
291  The same can be said in respect of the Van Eeden judgment, although the initial 
judgment holding that the police did not have a legal duty towards the victim was 
handed down by the High Court. The SCA subsequently dealt with the appeal against 
this ruling after Carmichele (CC). 
292  Cf eg the Rail Commuters (CC) judgment op cit note 166.  
293  As illustrated with reference to the article by Hopkins, K v Minister of Safety and 
Security is a case in point. The minority judgment in Masiya, and its examination on 
international human rights and humanitarian law, is however an example of how these 
emerging standards have influenced (and enriched) the Court’s analysis.  
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4.3 Reliance on section 39(2) of the Constitution  
 
Woolman, in his analysis of Masiya and two other recent judgments,294 
disapproves of what he describes as the Constitutional Court’s persistent refusal 
to engage in the direct application of the Bill of Rights.295 He notes that ‘flaccid 
analysis’ in respect of three vaguely defined values (dignity, equality and 
freedom) almost invariably substitutes for more rigorous interrogation of 
constitutional challenges in terms of the specific substantive rights in Chapter 2 
of the Constitution.296 
 
Secondly, he argues, by continually relying on section 39(2) to decide challenges 
both to rules of common law and to provisions of statutes, the court obviates the 
need to give the specific substantive rights in Chapter 2 the content necessary to 
determine the actual validity of the rule being challenged in the instant matter 
and of similar matters challenged in subsequent matters.297 This is his main point 
of criticism against the Masiya judgment: the fact that it never truly considers the 
direct application of the substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights to the 
challenged common-law rule regarding the definition of rape.298 This view is 
shared by other commentators.299  
 
                                                 
294  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (7) BCLR 691 (CC); NM v Smith 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC). 
These judgments do not relate to violence against women, and are accordingly not 
included in the discussion here.  
295  S Woolman ‘The amazing, vanishing Bill of Rights’ (2007) SALJ 762 at 762-763. 
296   Idem at 763. 
297    Ibid. 
298    At 768. 
299    See eg K Phelps ‘A dangerous precedent indeed – A response to CR Snyman’s note on 
Masiya’ (2008) 125 SALJ 648 at 653. 
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Looking at the way in which the right to freedom from violence has been applied 
by the courts as set out above, I have to concur with Woolman. The continued 
reliance on the initial foundational judgments, i.e. Baloyi and Carmichele (and to 
a lesser degree, Van Duivenboden and Van Eeden), and Chapman in the context 
of sentencing, has resulted in a lack of analysis of the right itself. It has also led 
to this line of jurisprudence beginning to lag behind recent developments in 
international law.300 This does not mean that one disagrees with the approach 
taken in Baloyi and Carmichele. However, the (majority) Masiya judgment is a 
clear demonstration of a superficial application of section 39(2).  
 
 
4.4 Sentencing principles 
 
Although it has been encouraging to note that the courts are increasingly 
articulating women’s right to freedom from violence as a protected interest in 
respect of sentencing, the controversy in South African law regarding the 
operation of the so-called mandatory minimum sentencing legislation (and 
particularly, the interpretation of the phrase ‘substantial and compelling 
circumstances’) has to a large extent obscured the question of how much weight 
the court should attach to the violation of the victim’s rights. It may be useful, for 
future purposes, to consider that State duties, as formulated, for example, by 
CEDAW, include the obligation to act with due diligence to punish violence 
against women,301 and how this connects with existing sentencing principles.  
 
 
                                                 
300  Cf also E De Wet ‘The “friendly but cautious” reception of international law in the 
jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court: Some critical remarks’ (2005) 
28 Fordham International Law Journal 1529 at 1556-1558, albeit with reference to 
judgments other than the ones analysed here.  
301  See eg CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 (Chapter 3, Section 2.3.2).  
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4.5 Areas for future development: hard cases, good law? 
 
 
It is axiomatic that the courts can only adjudicate those legal problems placed 
before them. The following issues are therefore raised on the assumption that the 
Constitutional Court may have an opportunity to respond to these matters at 
some point in the future.  
 
In Brooks v Minister of Safety and Security,302 the appellant was the son of Neil 
Brooks, the perpetrator in the Van Duivenboden matter.303 Brooks Jnr. brought a 
claim for damages against the Minister of Safety and Security based on loss of 
support (as a result of his father’s incarceration). His argument, similar to that of 
Van Duivenboden, was that the police had been negligent in failing to remove 
his father’s firearm. Had this been done, the tragedy would have been averted 
and his father would not have been incarcerated. The SCA made short shrift of 
this argument, with reference to the material differences between the action for 
bodily injury (the basis of Van Duivenboden’s claim) and the action for loss of 
the breadwinner (which formed the basis of the instant claim) as well as other 
policy considerations.304 While this approach may be technically correct under 
South African law, the end result nevertheless appears anomalous.305 
                                                 
302  [2008] ZASCA 141.   
303  See Section 3.3.2 above.  
304  See paras 10-13 of the judgment.  
305  The case of Minister of Safety and Security v Madyibi [2009] ZASCA 95 similarly 
included a claim for the loss of the breadwinner. Ms. Madyibi had instituted a claim for 
damages against the Minister after her husband, a sergeant in the South African Police 
Service, shot her in the throat in their home in Ngqeleni in 2003. He then committed 
suicide with the same firearm. Her argument in the Eastern Cape High Court was that 
the suicide was the consequence of a failure by the police to confiscate an official 
firearm from her husband, despite repeated previous requests by her and others to do 
so. It was also contended that Sergeant Madyibi had repeatedly threatened to shoot his 
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Returning to the practical examples set out in Chapter 2 above,306 the exposition 
of standards in international human rights law allows us to venture some answers 
in response to the questions posed there. It should be noted that these examples 
were selected not only because of their practical relevance, but also to include 
certain of the legislative and other measures required of States as part their 
response to violence against women.  
 
The first example is that of the victim of domestic violence who wishes the 
prosecution to appeal against the acquittal of the perpetrator on charges of 
breaching the protection order that she had obtained against him. As explained 
earlier, in South African law the complainant is not a party to the criminal trial, 
and she accordingly does not have standing to challenge any findings, such as a 
decision to release the accused on bail, or the outcome of the case.307  
 
The fact that the accused may appeal against his conviction on both a factual 
finding and a point of law, but the prosecution may only appeal against an 
acquittal on a point of law is understandable, given the traditional power 
imbalance between the State and the (often unrepresented) accused person; 
however, where the charges are of a deeply personal nature, as is usually the case 
with violence against women, it does appear that the pendulum of the power 
imbalance can swing too far in the other direction. This is particularly true when 
the complainant’s personal safety is staked on the outcome of the criminal case, 
                                                                                                                                    
wife. Her claim included loss of income to her and four children. Both the High Court 
and SCA found in her favour; however, this was largely because of concessions made 
on the part of the Minister.  
306  Chapter 2, Section 2.2.  
307  See also discussion in H Combrinck ‘Claims, entitlements or smoke and mirrors? 
Victims’ rights in the Sexual Offences Act’ in L Artz & D Smythe (eds) (2008) Should 
We Consent? Rape Law Reform in South Africa 262 at 266. 
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as may happen in the hypothetical example where the perpetrator has been 
acquitted of breaching a domestic violence protection order.  
 
I would therefore argue that the State’s obligation to effectively prosecute acts of 
violence against women necessitates an amendment to section 310 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act to allow an appeal against an acquittal based on factual 
findings as well as points of law.  
 
The second example entails the police forensic laboratory misplacing the 
medico-legal samples taken in a rape case, resulting in the matter being 
permanently withdrawn without any prospect of a prosecution. The question is 
whether the rape victim can hold the State accountable for this mishap.  
 
In this instance, it is important to firstly bear in mind that the State has a duty to 
conduct an investigation into alleged acts of violence against women with due 
diligence. The IACrtHR provided detailed guidelines on the standards for 
forensic investigations in its judgment in González et al (‘Cotton Field’) v 
Mexico.308 In the absence of a satisfactory explanation of how the samples were 
lost, the State is in breach of its obligations. (It is useful to also recall the 
comments of the ECrtHR in the case of X & Y v The Netherlands, to the effect 
that the absence of a criminal investigation made it harder to furnish evidence on 
the elements that had to be established to found an action for damages.) This is 
similar to our example in the sense that without the DNA analysis, there will be 
no way for the victim to identify the perpetrator, and thus no way for her to take 
action in civil law against the identified perpetrator. The loss of the sample thus 
precludes any effective remedy in law for the victim.   
                                                 
308  IACrtHR (Unreported judgment dated 16 November 2009). See discussion in Chapter 
5, Part B, Section 3.3.2.  
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The third example of lesbian women subjected to corrective rape, accompanied 
by a reluctance on the part of criminal justice officials to pay adequate attention 
to these cases both individually and as a group, is unfortunately not a 
hypothetical one in South Africa, as indicated by recent research reports.309 The 
second part of the question, i.e. whether these women can compel the police and 
prosecutors to conduct diligent and timely investigations and prosecutions, based 
on their right to freedom from violence, brings this scenario squarely within the 
ambit of the ‘due diligence’ standards of international law, as discussed in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Similarly, reading the provisions of the Women’s 
Convention (as interpreted by the CEDAW in its inquiry into the situation of 
women in Ciudad Juárez) with the South African Constitution, one can make a 
strong argument that there is a duty on the South African Government to address 
the destructive gender stereotypes and homophobia underpinning the current 
wave of sexual violence against lesbian women in South Africa.  
 
Another area that may serve before the courts is that of victim compensation. In 
terms of section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act,310 a court may upon 
conviction make an order for the accused to pay to the victim compensation for 
damage to or loss of property, including money. However, this section does not 
allow for compensation for physical, psychological or other injury, or for loss of 
income or support. Its provisions are therefore fairly limited.311  
                                                 
309  See in this regard A Martin et al Hate Crimes: The Rise of Corrective Rape in South 
Africa (2009) 13 for a discussion of inadequate criminal justice responses to recent 
violence against lesbian women in South Africa; also People Opposing Women Abuse 
(POWA) et al Criminal Injustice: Violence against Women in South Africa (2010) 15.  
310  Act 51 of 1977. 
311  Interestingly, in terms of clause 27 of the Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in 
Persons Bill B7-2010 (which has been introduced in the National Assembly and at the 
time of writing, awaits debate by the portfolio committee), a court may order a person 
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While it is true that the victim may bring a civil claim against the perpetrator, the 
cost of civil proceedings (and the fact that legal aid assistance in civil matters is 
generally very limited) places this option beyond reach of most victims of 
violence against women. There is at present no State-funded compensation 
scheme for victims of violent crime in operation in South Africa, although the 
possibility has been raised on a number of occasions by the South African Law 
Reform Commission. 
 
In 2004, the National Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
introduced a Victims’ Charter aimed at ‘consolidation of the present legal 
framework in South Africa relating to the rights of and services provided to 
victims of crime’.312 The Charter addresses victims’ rights under seven broad 
headings, which includes the right to compensation. The document briefly 
explains the process under section 300, and also informs victims that they can 
institute a civil claim against the accused where the criminal court did not grant a 
compensation order.313  
 
                                                                                                                                    
convicted of an offence to pay appropriate compensation to any victim of the offence 
for - 
(a)  damage to or the loss or destruction of property, including money; 
(b)  physical, psychological or other injury; 
(c)  being infected with a life-threatening disease; or 
(d)  loss of income or support, 
 suffered by the victim as a result of the commission of that offence.  
This provision, if included in the final version in the legislation, would place victims of 
human trafficking in a better position in terms of being able to claim compensation as 
part of the criminal proceedings against an alleged ‘trafficker’, compared to victims of 
all other violent crime (including violence against women).  
312  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Service Charter for Victims of 
Crime in South Africa (2004) Preamble. According to the Preamble, the objectives of 
this Charter are to eliminate secondary victimisation in the criminal justice process and 
to ensure that victims remain central in this process – ibid. 
313  Idem at 13-14.  
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Given the standards that have been set in international law in respect of the 
State’s duty to investigate, prosecute, punish and compensate for, acts of 
violence against women, I question whether the current position in South Africa, 
which allows for such a narrow ‘right to compensation’, are in line with these 
standards. While the question of victim compensation is admittedly applicable 
not only to crimes of violence against women, but to victims of crime more 
broadly, I argue that one has to consider this question first and foremost in the 
light of international and regional human rights standards relating to violence 
against women.  
 
Finally, an issue that has not yet reached our courts, but is bound to do so before 
long,314 is the question of the State’s obligation to realise the right to have access 
to adequate housing of women experiencing gender-based violence. Here, one 
would have a confluence of the right to freedom from violence with the right to 
have access to adequate housing; I have argued elsewhere that considering the 
standards established in international law in respect of these rights, South Africa 
is not currently complying with its obligations to protect and fulfill these 
rights.315 This is where an understanding of equality, and particularly, substantive 
equality,316 as an aspect of the right to freedom from violence becomes 
important.  
                                                 
314  Given firstly, the high levels of violence against women and secondly, the lack of a 
specific government housing policy (at the time of writing) to accommodate women 
experiencing domestic violence  – see H Combrinck Living in Security, Peace and 
Dignity: The Right to have Access to Housing of Women who are Victims of Gender-
Based Violence (2009) 30-31. 
315  Idem at 54-55. 
316  I argue that the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
applied this understanding of the right to freedom from violence in its views on A.T. v 
Hungary, where it made clear the linkages between women’s lack of access to adequate 
housing and their vulnerability to domestic violence (see Chapter 3, Section 2.6.1). See 
also Liebenberg and Goldblatt, who make a cogent case for an interpretative approach 
to socio-economic rights that integrates the value of equality - S Liebenberg & B 
Goldblatt ‘The interrelationship between equality and socio-economic rights under 
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As Bumiller points out, the international human rights framework is useful firstly 
for affirming norms and standards and secondly, for holding the State to those 
standards.317 However, I submit that this process can only be effective as long as 
the courts fully comply with the injunction set out in section 39(1)(b) of the 
Constitution. Given the findings set out above, my conclusion is that when held 
up to the normative mirror of current international law and regional law, the 
position in South African jurisprudence relating to women’s right to freedom 
from violence is in danger of becoming a pale imitation of what it rightfully 
should be.   
                                                                                                                                    
South Africa’s transformative Constitution’ (2007) 23 SAJHR (2007) 335 at 351. They 
explain that such an equality perspective alerts us to the fact that socio-economic 
programmes may be implemented in such a way that they exclude or are practically 
inaccessible for disadvantaged groups. Significantly, the examples listed by the authors 
include a housing programme that failed to make provision for the housing needs of 
women seeking refuge from abusive partners (ibid).  
317  K Bumiller ‘Freedom from violence as a human right: Toward a feminist politics of 
nonviolence’ (2005) 28 Thomas Jefferson Law Review 327 at 344. See also Meyersfeld, 
who applies the theory of ‘non-coercive compliance’ to conceptualise international law 
as a  ‘standard-setting spectrum’: an enunciation of norms to which states can aspire 
and on which individuals can rely in holding their governments to account - Domestic 
Violence and International Law (2010) 253. (Non-coercive compliance theory holds 
that international law influences the behaviour of states through a cooperative rather 
than a coercive process – Meyersfeld loc cit; see  also HH Koh ‘Why do nations obey 
international law?’ (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2599-2659.) 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The personal is political.1 
 
This thesis set out to address, as one of its central research questions, how the 
understanding given to women’s right to freedom from violence in international 
human rights law should guide the interpretation of this right under the South 
African Constitution. This research question, as phrased here, has two unspoken 
assumptions bound up within it. The first assumption is that where developments 
take place in international human rights law with regard to a particular right that 
is guaranteed under the South African Constitution, these advances should in 
turn also guide the interpretation of this right in South African jurisprudence. The 
basis for this assumption is to be found in section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution, 
which requires courts to consider international law when interpreting the rights in 
the Bill of Rights. I return to this assumption momentarily.  
 
The second assumption is that there have indeed been some significant 
developments relating to women’s right to freedom from violence in 
international human rights law worthy of incorporation in South African law. 
This implies that when relating the rules, principles and standards of 
international human rights law, more than an exposition of the status quo is 
                                                 
1  Feminist slogan – see eg J Oloka-Onyango & Sylvia Tamale ‘“The personal is 
political,” or why women’s rights are indeed human rights: An African perspective on 
international feminism’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 691 at 692. 
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required: it is important to also reproduce the sense of movement from a previous 
situation to the present one. In tracing the progress of women’s rights generally, 
and the recognition of women’s right to freedom from violence specifically, from 
the early 1990s to date, I accordingly found it difficult to provide a fleeting 
‘bird’s eye view’ or a neatly wrapped summary – instead, each step forward as 
documented (albeit at some length) in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 is presented to 
demonstrate the extent of the distance traveled in the elaboration of this right.2  
 
 
2. WOMEN’S RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL (GLOBAL) LAW 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, the key international instrument dealing with 
women’s equality, i.e. the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, was enacted to address the silence regarding 
women’s concerns in the ‘mainstream’ documents such as the UDHR, ICCPR, 
ICESCR, and so forth.3 Unfortunately, the drafters of the Women’s Convention 
themselves left a deafening silence: the absence of provisions explicitly 
addressing violence against women. This required the monitoring committee to 
include ‘gender-based violence’ in the ambit of the Convention through 
constructive interpretation in its General Recommendation No. 19, adopted in 
1992. This General Recommendation represented the ‘base line’ against which 
future developments were to be measured; importantly, because of its foundation 
                                                 
2  This is where the personal element – the inescapable fact of my also having traveled 
this distance as a feminist lawyer working in the area of violence against women while 
these changes were taking place – has resulted in a particular end product.   
3  Chapter 3, Section 2.1. 
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in the Women’s Convention, ‘gender-based violence’ is first and foremost 
addressed from the perspective of the prohibition of sex-based discrimination.4  
 
In 1993, the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights provided women’s 
rights activists, organised into a powerful coalition, with an opportunity to 
successfully advocate for the inclusion of women’s rights, and particularly the 
issue of violence against women, in the final conference document.5 This point 
also signified the inclusion of violence against women (and by extension, 
women’s rights) in the ‘mainstream’ international human rights agenda. Given 
that women’s rights were merely ‘shimmering on the horizon’ of the broader 
international human rights law environment at the beginning of the 1990s, this 
incorporation was a remarkable achievement in itself, and provided the starting 
point for subsequent developments detailed below.  
 
The following year saw the adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women (‘the Violence Declaration’), which also introduced a 
period of consolidation of the norms initially set out in CEDAW’s General 
Recommendation No.19.6 These norms include not only the recognition that 
violence against women is a form of discrimination against women, but also the 
principle that States are held responsible for acts of private violence if they fail to 
act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecute and compensate such 
acts. Further consolidation occurred by means of the Beijing Platform of Action.7  
 
                                                 
4  Chapter 3, Section 2.3.2. See also Chapter 4, Section 7.2. 
5  Chapter 4, Section 3. 
6  Chapter 4, Section 4.  
7  Chapter 4, Section 5.  
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The Beijing Platform recognised violence against women as one of its twelve 
critical areas of concern, and outlined actions to be taken by Governments and 
other entities. As indicated in the evaluation of the international instruments,8 the 
Beijing Platform has been influential not only on its own terms, but also in the 
sense of amplifying the effect of, for example, the Women’s Convention.9  
 
Recalling the typology of State duties that was set out as part of the framework 
of analysis for this thesis,10 and which formed the outline for the table that was 
constructed for each of the international instruments11 and the State obligations12 
listed there,13 one notes that there are also increments across these obligations. 
One example is the State obligation to provide shelters for victims of violence 
against women.14 
 
At around the same time as the adoption of the Violence Declaration in 1994, the 
mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences was established. The mandate holders have been well-placed not 
only to document developments in the normative framework of international law; 
I submit that they have also contributed to this framework through, for example, 
thematic reports such as the 2006 report on due diligence.15  
 
                                                 
8  Chapter 4, Section 4.1. 
9  See Chapter 4, Section 7.1. 
10  Chapter 2, Section 4.2. 
11  CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19, the Violence Declaration and the Beijing 
Platform.  
12  The term ‘obligation’ is used here in the broad sense, with the acknowledgment that 
these instruments are not all legally binding in international law.  
13  Tables 1-3 of Annexure A.  
14  This example is discussed in Chapter 4, Section 7.1.   
15  See Chapter 4, Section 7.1. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7     Conclusions  
 
 
 
 454
The coming into force of the Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention in 
2000 provided renewed opportunities for expansion of the normative framework 
through more in-depth interpretation, brought about by the individual complaints 
mechanism introduced by this Protocol. The CEDAW’s interpretation of the 
Convention and General Recommendation No. 19 in the three communications 
before it dealing with violence against women, as well as its inquiry into the 
gender-based murders of women in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, gave insight into the 
practical operation of the emerging international standards.16 For example, in the 
two communications brought against Austria, the Committee observed that even 
where the State has a well-developed legislative structure and impressive policy 
arrangements in place to address violence against women, these commitments 
have to be implemented by individual State officials acting with due diligence.17  
 
In the case of Mexico, the Committee pointed out clearly how the stereotyped 
approach of the Mexican authorities had contributed to violence against 
women.18 (This view was subsequently borne out by the judgment of the 
IACrtHR in the ‘Cotton Field’ case.) 
 
As part of the investigation into international law (in the global sense), I examine 
the question whether it can be said that women’s right to freedom from violence 
has achieved full recognition at this level. The answer, I submit, can be found, in 
the thematic reports of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women 
(which make repeated reference to this right) as well as two recent enactments, 
i.e. the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Declaration 
on Indigenous Peoples, which both contain reference to the right to live free from 
                                                 
16  Chapter 3, Section 2.6. 
17  Chapter 3, Section 2.6.2. 
18  Chapter 3, Section 2.6.4. 
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violence. In addition, one should consider the cumulative impact of the various 
instruments addressing violence against women. This means that even though 
there is at the time of writing no dedicated (binding) international instrument that 
explicitly guarantees women’s right to freedom from violence, this right has 
nevertheless gained acknowledgment in international law as a right eo nomine.  
 
At the same time, international law has developed a framework consisting of the 
Women’s Convention, the Violence Declaration and the Beijing Platform, which 
contains a clear understanding of what violence against women entails (both as a 
form of sex-based discrimination and a human rights violation per se), and an 
broad exposition of State obligations to respond to violence against women. 
These obligations have been affirmed not only by CEDAW, but also by other 
human rights bodies such as ICESCR and the Human Rights Council, and have 
recently been identified by the UN General Assembly itself as matters of priority. 
This indicates an ‘evolving convergence’19 of standards, extending well beyond 
the recognition of the right to freedom from violence, on international level.    
 
 
3. THE CONTRIBUTION FROM REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 
 
It is useful here to first look at the Inter-American system. The reason for this is 
that the leading regional instrument, i.e. the Convention of Belém do Pará, was 
adopted in this system in 1994. While it is virtually impossible to draw a clearly 
perceptible direct line between this Convention and subsequent events in the 
international arena (such as the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women 
                                                 
19  The term is used by the ECrtHR in MC v Bulgaria – see Chapter 5, Part B, Section 4.3 
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referring to the right to freedom from violence as a matter of course in her 
thematic reports), I argue that the influence of this Convention has carried 
beyond its immediate sphere of application.  
 
However, it is not only the express articulation of the right to freedom from 
violence in the Inter-American Convention of Belém do Pará that is of 
importance to this study. The incorporation, within the understanding of this 
right, of the right to be free from discrimination and the right to be educated and 
valued free from stereotypes has already proved to be crucial in that it carries an 
‘equality interpretation’ into the heart of the right to be free from violence – not 
as an incidental adjunct or parallel investigation, but as a central part of this 
interpretation.20 A similar approach has been followed by the drafters of the 
proposed European Convention on Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence.21 This interpretation of violence against women resolves the concern 
identified earlier in respect of international law, i.e. whether violence against 
women should be typified predominantly as a form of discrimination or as a 
violation per se.22  
 
As can be expected, given its previous jurisprudence in this area, the IACrtHR 
has laid down important guidelines in respect of the State’s obligations to 
respond to violence against women, most notably in the recent case of Gonzáles 
et al (‘Cotton Field’) v Mexico, which specifically addresses the obligation to 
prevent acts of gender-based violence, as well as the obligation to conduct a 
diligent and effective investigation.   
                                                 
20  See in this regard the analysis of the IACrtHR in the ‘Cotton Field’ case – Chapter 5, 
Part B, Section 3.3.2.  
21  See Chapter 5, Part C, Section 3.  
22  See Chapter 3, Section 3; Chapter 4, Section 7.2.  
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Because of the particular provisions of the European Convention (and the ‘due 
process’ interpretation attached to the right to liberty and security in this 
context), the interpretation of the applicable rights has followed a slightly 
different route from the Inter-American one. Rather than focusing on the right to 
freedom from violence, the European Court has found protection for women 
against domestic violence and sexual violence in Articles 3 and 8 of the 
European Convention (dealing with the right to freedom from torture and 
inhuman treatment and the right to respect for privacy and family life 
respectively). The fact that the Court recently found a violation of the equal 
protection provision in Article 14 of the Convention in the Opuz v Turkey case 
further broadens the protection provided under this instrument.23  
 
The draft Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women 
and Domestic Violence, currently being prepared by the Council of Europe, with 
its explicit recognition of the right to freedom from violence, due diligence 
standards and detailed State measures to respond to violence against women, 
holds much promise for the future.24 
 
The African regional system currently awaits full implementation of the African 
Women’s Protocol, an instrument that was drafted to supplement the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.25 (At the risk of generalisation, it can be 
said that while the document is formally in operation, its impact has yet to fully 
filter through to practice on domestic level.) Whether ‘implementation’ therefore 
                                                 
23  Chapter 5, Part D, Section 4.5. 
24  However, at the time of writing, this document is still in the drafting stages and the 
final product may therefore differ substantially from the version analysed here.  
25  Chapter 5, Part D, Section 2.2. 
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in this sense means domestication of the Protocol, law reform initiatives, 
interpretative guidance or ‘direct’ implementation through the regional human 
rights bodies such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, it 
is clear that the African Women’s Protocol has the potential to provide 
significant normative guidance at national level – especially if taken together 
with the standards emerging from the other regional systems.  
 
In conclusion, the assessment of the regional human rights systems shows firstly 
that in spite of differences, these systems have all moved towards the formal 
consolidation of norms regarding violence against women, or women’s rights 
more broadly, in dedicated instruments (albeit at different points in the past 
sixteen years): the Convention of Belém do Pará, the draft European Convention 
on Violence against Women and Domestic Violence and the African Women’s 
Protocol.26 All three instruments guarantee women’s right to freedom from 
violence;27 the first two also explicitly link the right to freedom from violence 
with a prohibition of sex-based discrimination. Similarly, the first two 
instruments both contain provisions on the State duty to respond with due 
diligence to violence against women.28  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26  Chapter 5, Part E.  
27  The African Women’s Protocol refers to the State duty ‘to ensure the protection of 
women from all forms of violence’ – Art 3; Art 4 states that every woman is entitled to 
respect for the integrity and security of her person. 
28  Art 4 of the African Women’s Protocol does set out a number of measures to be taken 
by States to address violence against women; however, the ‘due diligence’ terminology 
is not employed.  
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4. THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE IN SOUTH 
AFRICAN LAW 
 
Unless we make the linkages and begin to see how we ourselves 
can exercise power differently, with different interests, objectives, 
choices, values, and priorities, we will not make the link in a 
sustained way between the instruments, the commitments on 
paper, and the changes in peoples’ lives.29 
   
The investigation of South African law has firstly shown that the right to 
freedom from violence has not yet received much attention from theorists.30 In 
particular, the implications of the intersections between this right and the right to 
equality deserve further attention. (This intersection was, significantly, noted by 
the Constitutional Court in its judgment in S v Baloyi.31) 
 
Turning to the investigation of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, certain trends were distinguished.32 When 
examining the two judgments on the obligation to enact legislation to address 
domestic violence, I observed that the initial ‘foundational’ judgment (Baloyi) 
contained a relatively superficial analysis of the State’s obligations arising under 
international law. The subsequent judgment (Omar) then reproduced this 
analysis with its conclusion, and as the conclusion became more entrenched in 
later judgments, the conclusion or rationale only was relied on. This meant that 
the later judgments do not contain an ‘independent’ assessment of international 
law, in spite of the constitutional provision requiring courts to consider 
                                                 
29  P Govender ‘Leadership and the exercise of power after Beijing+10’ in C van der 
Westhuizen (ed) Gender Instruments in Africa (2005) 22 at 24.  
30  Chapter 6, Section 2.  
31  Chapter 6, Section 3.2. 
32  Chapter 6, Section 4.  
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international law. In practice, this implied that an opportunity was lost to 
commence a developmental trajectory reflecting progress in international law.  
 
This pattern is particularly discernible in the line of cases relating to police 
liability for failure to prevent acts of violence following the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in Carmichele.33 While the analysis of international law in 
Carmichele was apt at the time, it is questionable whether this relatively 
uncomplicated analysis, which has now become solidified in South African law 
through its repeated application as described above, is really of any assistance to 
courts that may be confronted with more complex legal problems.  
 
This is illustrated by the ‘alternative’ approach offered by Hopkins in response to 
the case of K v Minister of Safety of Security,34 where the Constitutional Court 
relied on section 39(2) to expand the common-law rules of vicarious liability.35 
He argues that the application of customary international law would similarly 
have resulted in a finding of State responsibility for the conduct of the three 
police officials who raped the appellant.36  
 
In this instance, the result would have been the same. And so, why does it matter, 
the skeptic may well ask. Why undertake a wide-ranging (potentially time-
consuming) excursus into international human rights law when the ‘simple’ 
application of South African constitutional principles will bring the same result? 
                                                 
33  Chapter 6, Section 4.2. 
34  2005 (6) SA419 (CC). 
35  K Hopkins ‘Can customary international law play a meaningful role in our domestic 
legal order: A short case study to consider’ (2005) 30 SAYIL 276 at 277. See Chapter 6, 
Section 3.3.4. 
36  Hopkins does not go as far as to suggest this application as an alternative to the Court’s 
approach, which was to develop the common-law principles of vicarious liability in 
terms of section 39(2) to reach a finding of State liability. He merely proposes this as an 
‘interesting possibility’. The phrase ‘alternative approach’ is mine. 
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After all, the right to freedom from violence is clearly and unequivocally 
enshrined in the South African Constitution; why trouble oneself with an 
interpretative framework where, at least on international level, the guarantee of 
this right is not even clearly spelled out?  
 
The first part of my response to this (understandably) skeptical interlocutor is to 
be found in the conclusion to the examination of international law in Chapter 4, 
i.e. that the value of the principles that have developed in international law since 
the adoption by CEDAW of Recommendation No. 19 to date lies not so much in 
the emergence of a right to freedom from violence for women as such, but rather 
in the whole of the normative framework supporting this right.37 This framework 
consists of, inter alia, the various sets of State duties to respond to violence 
against women as set out in the international instruments (which includes the 
duty to act with due diligence in response to such violence). I argue that this 
framework also includes the increasing sense of urgency with which the 
international community has in recent years regarded violence against women, 
and the resulting prioritisation of this issue.38 On a more practical level, the 
normative framework provides guidance in respect of the standards that are 
expected of State actors, for example, when considering whether or not to detain 
a perpetrator of violence,39 when deciding whether or not to respond to 
emergency calls from victims of violence,40 in conducting an investigation into 
allegations of violence against women,41 and so forth.  
 
                                                 
37  Chapter 4, Section 7.3. 
38  See Chapter 4, Section 6.  
39  See Fatma Yildirim (deceased) v Austria (Chapter 3, Section 2.6.2).  
40  See Şahide Goekce (deceased) v Austria (Chapter 2, Section 2.6.2).  
41  See Gonzales v Mexico (Cotton Field) (Chapter 5, Part B, Chapter 3.3.2).  
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The second part of my response can be found in the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in S v Masiya.42 I submit that the differences between 
Nkabinde J’s majority and Langa CJ’s minority judgments illustrate the necessity 
of a more measured reliance on international law by the courts. Langa CJ’s 
detailed consideration of international human rights law and international 
criminal law allowed him to recognise that criminalisation of rape is about 
protecting the ‘dignity, sexual autonomy and privacy’ of all people, irrespective 
of their sex or gender; Nkabinde J’s brief reference to the Violence Declaration 
stands in contrast.43 
 
In order to further strengthen my argument, I will briefly refer to certain areas of 
South African law where a more in-depth consideration of international and 
regional human rights law may result in changes or development of the current 
position.44 For example, in the evaluation of sentencing judgments, I argued that 
the controversy around ‘compelling and substantial circumstances’ (applicable to 
the so-called mandatory minimum sentences) has to a large extent clouded the 
development of the line of cases recognising the violation of the victim’s rights 
as a significant aspect in the imposition of sentence.45 The enlightening recent 
report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women on reparations 
could especially be instructive here, for example, through the emphasis on a 
gender-sensitive understanding of ‘harm’.46 Closely linked is the difficult area of 
                                                 
42  Chapter 6, Section 3.4.4. 
43  See also the evaluation in Chapter 6, Section 4.  
44  In setting out this argument, I am conscious of the principle that it is not the primary 
function of the courts to reform or enact law.  
45  Chapter 6, Section 4.4. 
46  See Chapter 4, 5.3.2 (b). 
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State compensation for acts of violence against women, where I argue that South 
Africa is not at present meeting the international standards.47  
 
There are aspects of South African law, with a bearing on violence against 
women, where the influence of the standards of international human rights law 
could lead to a change in the current position. As indicated in Chapter 6, these 
include, for example, the action for loss of support where the breadwinner (who 
may be the perpetrator) is still alive (but incarcerated as a result of the violence), 
and the question of State liability for failure to prevent or diligently investigate 
acts of violence against lesbian women based on homophobic stereotypes.48  
 
Given the fact that the South African legal system is moving (albeit slowly) 
towards growing sophistication in the way that its legislative and policy 
framework is set up to address violence against women, it is in my opinion likely 
that the courts may in future have to increasingly adjudicate instances of 
individual failures by State agents to act with due diligence,49 analogous to the 
communications brought against Austria before the CEDAW.50 I submit that the 
notion of ‘due diligence’, as it has developed in international and regional human 
rights law, can usefully be applied by the courts to amplify the common-law 
standard of the legal convictions of the community. 
 
In order for such shifts to happen in South African jurisprudence, however, one 
would have to see firstly an interrogation of international law similar to that 
undertaken by Langa CJ in Masiya – reflecting more than a ‘rote recitation’ of 
                                                 
47  Chapter 6, Section 4.5. 
48  Chapter 6, Section 4.5. This is not an exhaustive list.  
49  Rather than challenges based on shortcomings in the legal and policy framework itself.  
50  Chapter 3, Section 2.6. 
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the approximately relevant international instruments, without a real consideration 
of the contents (such as that found in the majority judgment of Nkabinde J in the 
same matter). A second requirement, to avoid the ‘flaccid analysis’ against which 
Woolman cautions, is for the courts to engage more rigorously with the 
substantive right to freedom from violence, rather than a one-dimensional 
reliance on section 39(2) of the Constitution.51 In this way, I would argue, one 
can move closer to the first assumption expressed at the beginning of this 
chapter: that the developments in international human rights law will breathe 
new life into South African jurisprudence on women’s right to freedom from 
violence.  
 
In terms of such guidance, one would also like to discern, for example, an 
understanding of the right to freedom from violence similar to that set out in the 
Convention of Belém do Pará, in other words, incorporating the right to be free 
from discrimination. Such a conceptualisation of the right to freedom from 
violence will entail a broader range of State obligations, and may even attribute 
certain socio-economic aspects to the right.52 
 
This brings us back to the central hypothesis set out in respect of the study, i.e. 
that a more in-depth and nuanced understanding of the nature and scope of 
women’s rights to freedom from violence, as it has recently emerged in 
international human rights law, is essential for a correct and comprehensive 
interpretation of this right. I argue that this hypothesis has been borne out by the 
research findings, as demonstrated by the examples provided above.  
 
 
                                                 
51  Chapter 6, Section 4.3. 
52   See discussion of CESCR General Comment No. 16 in Chapter 4, Section 7.2.  
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5. FINAL COMMENTS   
 
What the feminist debate around violence shows is that human 
rights are not static.53 
 
 
It will be recalled that I earlier referred to the statement by Mokgoro J in S v 
Makwanyane that the task of interpretation often involves making constitutional 
choices by balancing competing fundamental rights and freedoms.54 She noted 
that this can often only be done by reference to a system of values extraneous to 
the constitutional text itself, and that guidance as to such a cohesive set of values, 
ideal to an open and democratic society, may be found in the international 
system of human rights protection.  
 
I have argued that international and regional human rights law indeed offer such 
a ‘cohesive set of values’ to guide the interpretation of women’s right to freedom 
from violence in South African law.  I have also demonstrated that much of the 
promise seen in the early judgments of the Constitutional Court in S v Baloyi and 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Others, with their well-placed 
reliance on international law, has since lost momentum and become little more 
than a worn refrain in recent decisions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
53  UA O’Hare ‘Realizing human rights for women’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 
364 at 402. 
54   Para 302. See Chapter 2, Section 4.1. 
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What one would therefore like to see reflected in the future jurisprudence of our 
courts is not those ‘flat narratives of gender-based violence,’55 but the energising, 
transformative potential bound up in contemporary international human rights 
law, as demonstrated by the findings of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55  The term is borrowed from the previous Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women – see Y Ertürk 15 Years of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, its Causes and Consequences (1994-2009) - A Critical Review UN Doc 
A/HRC/11/6/Add.5 (dated 27 May 2009) para 107. (It is however used in a different 
context in the Special Rapporteur’s report.) 
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ANNEXURE A: 
 
TABLES SETTING OUT STATE OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: CEDAW General  Recommendation No. 19 (1992) 
 
 
Table 2: Declaration on Elimination of Violence against Women (1994) 
 
 
Table 3: Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action (1995) 
 
 
Table 4: Convention of Belém do Pará (1994)  
 
 
 
 
ANNEXURE A 
 
Table 1: CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 (1992) 
 
Statement of 
principle 
• Gender-based violence is discrimination. 
• Seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights on basis of equality with men. 
• Women’s Convention in Art 1 defines discrimination; this includes gender-based violence. 
 
Statement right 
to freedom from 
violence? 
• Not explicitly 
• Gender-based violence, which impairs enjoyment of women of rights under international law generally or human rights conventions, is 
discrimination. 
• These rights include rights to life, liberty and security etc.   
 
Due diligence Under general international law and specific human rights covenants, States may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due 
diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation. 
 
 
 
Respect Create Institutional 
Machinery – Realise 
Protect Provide Goods & Services 
- Satisfy 
Promote 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effective complaints 
procedures and remedies, 
including compensation, 
should be provided;  
 
 
 
 
 
States Parties should - 
 
•  take appropriate and effective 
measures to overcome all forms 
of gender-based violence, 
whether by public or private act; 
 
•  ensure that laws against family 
violence and abuse, rape, 
sexual assault and other gender-
based violence give adequate 
protection to all women, and 
respect their integrity and 
dignity.  
 
•  take measures to overcome 
such practices [gender-based 
States Parties should – 
 
•  establish or support 
services for victims of 
family violence, rape, 
sexual assault and other 
forms of gender-based 
violence, including 
refuges, specially trained 
health workers, 
rehabilitation and 
counselling;  
 
•  ensure that services for 
victims of violence are 
accessible to rural 
women and that where 
States Parties should – 
 
•  encourage the 
compilation of statistics 
and research on the 
extent, causes and 
effects of violence, and 
on the effectiveness of 
measures to prevent 
and deal with violence; 
 
•  introduce education and 
public information 
programmes to help 
eliminate prejudices that 
hinder women's equality 
(Recommendation No. 
 
 
 
 
violence] and should take 
account of the Committee's 
recommendation on female 
circumcision (Recommendation 
No. 14) in reporting on health 
issues;  
 
•  ensure that measures are taken 
to prevent coercion in regard to 
fertility and reproduction, and to 
ensure that women are not 
forced to seek unsafe medical 
procedures such as illegal 
abortion because of lack of 
appropriate services in regard to 
fertility control;  
 
•  take all legal and other 
measures that are necessary to 
provide effective protection of 
women against gender-based 
violence, including, inter alia, 
effective legal measures, such 
as penal sanctions, civil 
remedies and compensatory 
provisions to protect women 
against all kinds of violence, 
including inter alia violence and 
abuse in the family, sexual 
assault and sexual harassment 
in the workplace; 
 
•  take all legal and other 
measures that are necessary to 
provide effective protection of 
women against gender-based 
violence;  
 
 
necessary, special 
services are provided to 
isolated communities;  
 
Appropriate protective and 
support services should be 
provided for victims; 
 
Measures to protect rural 
women from violence should 
include training and 
employment opportunities and 
the monitoring of the 
employment conditions of 
domestic workers;  
 
Measures that are necessary 
to overcome family violence 
should include: 
(a)  Services to ensure the 
safety and security of 
victims of family violence; 
(b)  Rehabilitation 
programmes for 
perpetrators of domestic 
violence;  
(c)  Support services for 
families where incest or 
sexual abuse has 
occurred;  
 
 
 
 
3, 1987);  
 
•  take all legal and other 
measures that are 
necessary to provide 
effective protection of 
women against gender-
based violence, 
including, inter alia, 
preventive measures, 
such as  public 
information and 
education programmes 
to change attitudes 
concerning the roles and 
status of men and 
women;  
 
Effective measures should be 
taken to – 
 
•  ensure that the media 
respect and promote 
respect for women;  
 
•  overcome attitudes, 
customs and practices 
that perpetuate violence 
against women; 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender-sensitive training of judicial 
and law enforcement officers and 
other public officials is essential for 
the effective implementation of the 
Convention;  
 
Specific preventive and punitive 
measures are necessary to 
overcome trafficking and sexual 
exploitation;  
 
Measures that are necessary to 
overcome family violence should 
include: 
(a)  Criminal penalties where 
necessary and civil remedies in 
cases of domestic violence;  
(b)  Legislation to remove the 
defence of honour in regard to 
the assault or murder of a 
female family member;  
 
 
Reporting measures: 
States parties in their reports should - 
•  identify the nature and extent of attitudes, customs and practices that perpetuate violence against women and the kinds of violence that result;  
•  report on the measures that they have undertaken to overcome violence and the effect of those measures; 
•  describe the extent of all these problems and the measures, including penal provisions, preventive and rehabilitation measures that have been taken to protect 
women engaged in prostitution or subject to trafficking and other forms of sexual exploitation. The effectiveness of these measures should also be described;  
•  include in their reports information on sexual harassment, and on measures to protect women from sexual harassment and other forms of violence of coercion 
in the workplace; 
•  take account of the Committee's recommendation on female circumcision (Recommendation No. 14) in reporting on health issues; 
•  state the extent of problems relating to fertility and reproduction and should indicate the measures that have been taken and their effect; 
•  report on the risks to rural women, the extent and nature of violence and abuse to which they are subject, their need for and access to support and other 
services and the effectiveness of measures to overcome violence;  
•  report on the extent of domestic violence and sexual abuse, and on the preventive, punitive and remedial measures that have been taken; 
•  report on all forms of gender-based violence, and such reports should include all available data on the incidence of each form of violence and on the effects of 
 
 
 
 
such violence on the women who are victims; 
•  include information on the legal, preventive and protective measures that have been taken to overcome violence against women, and on the effectiveness of 
such measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Declaration on Elimination of Violence against Women (1994) 
 
 
Statement of 
principle 
•  Recognition of urgent need for the universal application to women of the rights and principles with regard to equality, security, liberty, 
integrity and dignity of all human beings (as enshrined in international instruments).  
•  Violence against women –  
-  constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women and impairs or nullifies their enjoyment of those rights and 
freedoms; 
-   is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and 
discrimination against women by men; 
-  is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men. 
 
Statement right 
to freedom from 
violence? 
• Not explicitly 
• Women are entitled to the equal enjoyment and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural, civil or any other field. These rights include, inter alia, right to life, security, etc. 
 
 
Due diligence 
 
States should exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against 
women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons. 
 
 
 
Respect Create Institutional 
Machinery – Realise 
 
Protect Provide Goods & 
Services - Satisfy 
Promote 
 States should refrain from 
engaging in violence 
against women;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
States should –  
 
•  consider the possibility 
of developing national 
plans of action to 
promote the protection 
of women against any 
form of violence, or to 
include provisions for 
that purpose in plans 
already existing, taking 
into account, as 
appropriate, such 
cooperation as can be 
provided by NGO’s  
States should –  
 
•  condemn violence 
against women and 
should not invoke any 
custom, tradition or 
religious consideration 
to avoid their 
obligations with respect 
to its elimination;  
 
•  pursue by all 
appropriate means and 
without delay a policy 
of eliminating violence 
States should work to 
ensure, to the maximum 
extent feasible in the light 
of their available resources 
and, where needed, within 
the framework of 
international cooperation, 
that women subjected to 
violence and, where 
appropriate, their children 
have specialised 
assistance, such as 
rehabilitation, assistance in 
child care and 
maintenance, treatment, 
States should - 
•  adopt all appropriate 
measures, especially in 
the field of education, 
to modify the social and 
cultural patterns of 
conduct of men and 
women and to eliminate 
prejudices, customary 
practices and all other 
practices based on the 
idea of the inferiority or 
superiority of either of 
the sexes and on 
stereotyped roles for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•  include in government 
budgets adequate 
resources for their 
activities related to the 
elimination of violence 
against women;  
 
•  take measures to 
ensure that law 
enforcement officers 
and public officials 
responsible for 
implementing policies 
to prevent, investigate 
and punish violence 
against women receive 
training to sensitise 
them to the needs of 
women; 
 
•  encourage the 
development of 
appropriate guidelines 
to assist in the 
implementation of the 
principles set forth in 
the present 
Declaration; 
 
•  women who are 
subjected to violence 
should be provided with 
access to the 
mechanisms of justice 
and, as provided for by 
national legislation, to 
just and effective 
remedies for the harm 
against women; 
 
•  develop penal, civil, 
labour and 
administrative 
sanctions in domestic 
legislation to punish 
and redress the wrongs 
caused to women who 
are subjected to 
violence; 
 
•  develop, in a 
comprehensive way, 
preventive approaches 
and all those measures 
of a legal, political, 
administrative and 
cultural nature that 
promote the protection 
of women against any 
form of violence, and 
ensure that the re-
victimisation of women 
does not occur 
because of laws 
insensitive to gender 
considerations, 
enforcement practices 
or other interventions;  
 
• adopt measures 
directed towards the 
elimination of violence 
against women who are 
especially vulnerable to 
violence;  
counselling, and health and 
social services, facilities 
and programmes, as well 
as support structures, and 
should take all other 
appropriate measures to 
promote their safety and 
physical and psychological 
rehabilitation;  
 
men and women;  
 
•  recognise the important 
role of the women's 
movement and NGO’s 
world wide in raising 
awareness and 
alleviating the problem 
of violence against 
women;  
 
•  facilitate and enhance 
the work of the 
women's movement 
and NGO’s and 
cooperate with them at 
local, national and 
regional levels;  
 
•  encourage 
intergovernmental 
regional organisations 
of which they are 
members to include the 
elimination of violence 
against women in their 
programmes, as 
appropriate; 
 
•  inform women [who are 
subjected to violence] 
of their rights in seeking 
redress through the 
mechanisms [of 
justice]; 
 
•  promote research, 
collect data and 
compile statistics, 
 
 
 
 
that they have suffered; 
  
 
 
especially concerning 
domestic violence, 
relating to the 
prevalence of different 
forms of violence 
against women and 
encourage research on 
the causes, nature, 
seriousness and 
consequences of 
violence against 
women and on the 
effectiveness of 
measures implemented 
to prevent and redress 
violence against 
women;  
 
•  those statistics and 
findings of the research 
will be made public; 
 
 
Reporting measures: 
•  Include, in submitting reports as required under relevant human rights instruments of the UN, information pertaining to violence against women and measures taken to 
implement the present Declaration; 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) 
 
Statement of 
principle 
•  Violence against women - 
-   both violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.; 
-   is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and 
discrimination against women by men; 
-  is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men. 
•  Any harmful aspect of certain traditional, customary or modern practices that violates the rights of women should be prohibited and 
eliminated.  
•  Governments should take urgent action to combat and eliminate all forms of violence against women in private and public life, whether 
perpetrated or tolerated by the State or private persons. 
 
Statement right 
to freedom from 
violence? 
• Not explicitly. 
• Gender-based violence (such as battering and other domestic violence, sexual abuse and sexual harassment), as well as violence 
against women, resulting from cultural prejudice, racism and racial discrimination, xenophobia, pornography, ethnic cleansing, armed 
conflict, foreign occupation, religious and anti-religious extremism and terrorism are incompatible with the dignity and the worth of the 
human person and must be combated and eliminated.  
 
Due diligence  
Exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether 
those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons 
 
 
 
Respect Create Institutional 
Machinery – Realise 
 
Protect Provide Goods & 
Services - Satisfy 
Promote
Strategic 
Objective D1: 
Take integrated 
measures to 
prevent and 
eliminate 
violence against 
women 
 
Actions to be 
taken by 
 
Refrain from engaging in 
violence against women;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Provide women who 
are subjected to 
violence with access to 
the mechanisms of 
justice and, as provided 
for by national 
legislation, to just and 
effective remedies for 
the harm they have 
suffered;  
 
 
•  Condemn violence 
against women and 
refrain from invoking 
any custom, tradition or 
religious consideration 
to avoid their 
obligations with respect 
to its elimination as set 
out in the Violence 
Declaration; 
 
 
•  Ensure that women 
with disabilities have 
access to information 
and services in the field 
of violence against 
women; 
 
 
 
•  Promote an active and 
visible policy of 
mainstreaming a 
gender perspective in 
all policies and 
programmes related to 
violence against 
women;  
 
•  Actively encourage, 
support and implement 
 
 
 
 
Governments  
 
 
 
 
 
•  Create or strengthen 
institutional 
mechanisms so that 
women and girls can 
report acts of violence 
against them in a safe 
and confidential 
environment, free from 
the fear of penalties or 
retaliation, and file 
charges; 
 
•  Create, improve or 
develop and fund the 
training programmes 
for judicial, legal, 
medical, social, 
educational and police 
and immigrant 
personnel, in order to 
avoid the abuse of 
power leading to 
violence against 
women and sensitise 
such personnel to the 
nature of gender-based 
acts and threats of 
violence so that fair 
treatment of female 
victims can be assured; 
 
•  Allocate adequate 
resources within the 
government budget and 
mobilise community 
resources for activities 
related to the 
elimination of violence 
against women, 
•  Enact and/or reinforce 
penal, civil, labour and 
administrative 
sanctions in domestic 
legislation to punish 
and redress the wrongs 
done to women and 
girls who are subjected 
to any form of violence, 
whether in the home, 
the workplace, the 
community or society; 
 
•  Adopt and/or 
implement and 
periodically review and 
analyse legislation to 
ensure its effectiveness 
in eliminating violence 
against women, 
emphasising the 
prevention of violence 
and the prosecution of 
offenders;  
 
•  Take measures to 
ensure the protection of 
women subjected to 
violence, access to just 
and effective remedies, 
including compensation 
and indemnification and 
healing of victims, and 
rehabilitation of 
perpetrators; 
 
•  Enact and enforce 
legislation against the 
perpetrators of 
measures and 
programmes aimed at 
increasing the 
knowledge and 
understanding of the 
causes, consequences 
and mechanisms of 
violence against 
women among those 
responsible for 
implementing these 
policies, such as law 
enforcement officers, 
police personnel and 
judicial, medical and 
social workers, as well 
as those who deal with 
minority, migration and 
refugee issues, and 
develop strategies to 
ensure that the 
revictimisation of 
women victims of 
violence does not occur 
because of gender-
insensitive laws or 
judicial or enforcement 
practices; 
 
•  Formulate and 
implement, at all 
appropriate levels, 
plans of action to 
eliminate violence 
against women; 
 
•  Adopt all appropriate 
measures, especially in 
the field of education, 
 
 
 
 
including resources for 
the implementation of 
plans of action at all 
appropriate levels; 
 
 
practices and acts of 
violence against 
women, such as female 
genital mutilation, 
female infanticide, 
prenatal sex selection 
and dowry-related 
violence, and give 
vigorous support to the 
efforts of non-
governmental and 
community 
organisations to 
eliminate such 
practices; 
 
•  Adopt laws, where 
necessary, and 
reinforce existing laws 
that punish police, 
security forces or any 
other agents of the 
State who engage in 
acts of violence against 
women in the course of 
the performance of 
their duties;  
 
•  Review existing 
legislation and take 
effective measures 
against the perpetrators 
of such violence; 
 
to modify the social and 
cultural patterns of 
conduct of men and 
women, and to 
eliminate prejudices, 
customary practices 
and all other practices 
based on the idea of 
the inferiority or 
superiority of either of 
the sexes and on 
stereotyped roles for 
men and women;  
 
•  Inform women who are 
subjected to violence of 
their rights in seeking 
redress through the 
mechanisms of justice. 
 Respect Create Institutional 
Machinery – Realise 
 
Protect Provide Goods & 
Services - Satisfy 
Promote 
Actions to be 
taken by 
   
• Recognise the 
 
• Provide well-funded 
 
• Support initiatives of 
 
 
 
 
Governments, 
including local 
governments, 
community 
organisations, 
NGO’s, 
educational 
institutions, 
public and 
private 
sectors, and 
mass media, as 
appropriate 
vulnerability to violence 
of women migrants, 
including women 
migrant workers, whose 
legal status in the host 
country depends on 
employers who may 
exploit their situation; 
 
 
shelters and relief 
support for girls and 
women subjected to 
violence, as well as 
medical, psychological 
and other counselling 
services and free or 
low-cost legal aid, 
where it is needed, as 
well as appropriate 
assistance to enable 
them to find a means of 
subsistence; 
 
•  Establish linguistically 
and culturally 
accessible services for 
migrant women and 
girls, including women 
migrant workers, who 
are victims of gender-
based violence; 
 
•  Provide, fund and 
encourage counselling 
and rehabilitation 
programmes for the 
perpetrators of 
violence; 
 
 
women’s organisations 
and NGO’s all over the 
world to raise 
awareness on violence 
against women and to 
contribute to its 
elimination; 
 
•  Organise, support and 
fund community-based 
education and training 
campaigns to raise 
awareness about 
violence against women 
as a violation of 
women’s enjoyment of 
their human rights and 
mobilise local 
communities to use 
appropriate gender-
sensitive traditional and 
innovative methods of 
conflict resolution; 
 
• Recognise, support and 
promote the 
fundamental role of 
intermediate institutions, 
such as primary health-
care centres, family-
planning centres, 
existing school health 
services,  etc in the field 
of information and 
education related to 
abuse; 
 
• Organise and fund 
information campaigns 
 
 
 
 
and educational and 
training programmes in 
order to sensitise girls 
and boys and women 
and men to the personal 
and social detrimental 
effects of violence in the 
family, community and 
society; teach them how 
to communicate without 
violence and promote 
training for victims and 
potential victims so that 
they can protect 
themselves and others 
against such violence; 
 
• Disseminate information 
on the assistance 
available to women and 
families who are victims 
of violence; 
 
• Raise awareness of the 
responsibility of the 
media in promoting non-
stereotyped images of 
women and men and in 
eliminating patterns of 
media presentation that 
generate violence, and 
encourage those 
responsible for media 
content to establish 
professional guidelines 
and codes of conduct; 
also raise awareness of 
the important role of the 
media in informing and 
 
 
 
 
educating people about 
the causes and effects 
of violence against  
women and in 
stimulating public debate 
on the topic; 
•  Promote research to 
further efforts 
concerning counselling 
and rehabilitation 
programmes for 
perpetrators of violence 
so as to prevent the 
recurrence of such 
violence. 
 
 Respect Create Institutional 
Machinery – Realise 
 
Protect Provide Goods & 
Services - Satisfy 
Promote 
 
Actions to be 
taken by 
Governments, 
employers, trade 
unions, 
community and 
youth 
organisations 
and NGO’s, as 
appropriate  
 
   
•  Develop programmes 
and procedures to 
eliminate sexual 
harassment and other 
forms of violence 
against women in all 
educational institutions, 
workplaces and 
elsewhere; 
 
• Take special measures 
to eliminate violence 
against women, 
particularly those in 
vulnerable situations, 
such as young women, 
refugee, displaced and 
internally displaced 
 
•  Develop counselling, 
healing and support 
programmes for girls, 
adolescents and young 
women who have been 
or are involved in 
abusive relationships, 
particularly those who 
live in homes or 
institutions where abuse 
occurs; 
 
 
 
•  Develop programmes 
and procedures to 
educate and raise 
awareness of acts of 
violence against women 
that constitute a crime 
and a violation of the 
human rights of women; 
 
 
 
 
 
women, women with 
disabilities and women 
migrant workers, 
including enforcing any 
existing legislation and 
developing, as 
appropriate, new 
legislation for women 
migrant workers in both 
sending and receiving 
countries. 
 
Actions to be 
taken by the 
Secretary 
General of the 
UN 
 
Provide the Special Rapporteur of the CHR on violence against women with all necessary assistance, in particular the staff and resources required to 
perform all mandated functions, especially in carrying out and following up on missions undertaken either separately or jointly with other special 
rapporteurs and working groups, and adequate assistance for periodic consultations with the CEDAW and all treaty bodies. 
 
 
Actions to be 
taken by 
Governments, 
international 
organisations 
and NGO’s:  
 
 
Encourage the dissemination and implementation of the UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women and the UNHCR Guidelines on the 
Prevention of and Response to Sexual Violence against Refugees. 
 
 
 Respect Create Institutional 
Machinery – Realise 
 
Protect Provide Goods & 
Services - Satisfy 
Promote 
Strategic 
Objective D2: 
Study the 
causes and 
consequences 
of violence 
against women 
and the 
effectiveness of 
preventive 
measures 
    • Promote research, 
collect data and compile 
statistics, especially 
concerning domestic 
violence relating to the 
prevalence of different 
forms of violence 
against women, and 
encourage research into 
the causes, nature, 
seriousness and 
 
 
 
 
 
Actions to be 
taken by 
Governments, 
regional 
organisations, 
the UN, other 
international 
organisations, 
research 
institutions, 
women’s and 
youth 
organisations 
and NGO’s, as 
appropriate: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
consequences of 
violence against women 
and the effectiveness of 
measures implemented 
to prevent and redress 
violence against women; 
 
• Disseminate findings of 
research and studies 
widely; 
 
• Support and initiate 
research on the impact 
of violence, such as 
rape, on women and girl 
children, and make the 
resulting information and 
statistics available to the 
public; 
 
•  Examine the impact of 
gender role stereotypes, 
including those 
perpetuated by 
commercial 
advertisements which 
foster gender-based 
violence and 
inequalities, and how 
they are transmitted 
during the life cycle, and 
take measures to 
eliminate these negative 
images with a view to 
promoting a violence-
free society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reporting measures: 
Include in reports submitted in accordance with the provisions of relevant UN human rights instruments, information pertaining to violence against women and measures 
taken to implement the Violence Declaration; 
 
International: 
•  Work actively to ratify and/or implement international human rights norms and instruments as they relate to violence against women, including those contained in the 
UDHR, ICCPR, the ICESCR and the CAT;  
 
•  Implement the Women’s Convention, taking into account General Recommendation 19, adopted by the CEDAW;  
 
•  Cooperate with and assist the Special Rapporteur of the CHR on violence against women in the performance of her mandate and furnish all information requested; 
cooperate also with other competent mechanisms, such as the Special Rapporteur of the CHR on torture and the Special Rapporteur of the CHR on summary, 
extrajudiciary and arbitrary executions, in relation to violence against women; 
 
•  Recommend that the CHR renew the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women when her term ends in 1997 and, if warranted, to update and 
strengthen it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Convention of Belém do Pará (1994) 
 
Statement of 
principle 
•  Every woman has the right to the recognition, enjoyment, exercise and protection of all human rights and freedoms embodied in regional 
and international human rights instruments. These rights include, among others, The right to have her physical, mental and moral integrity 
respected and The rights to have the inherent dignity of her person respected and her family protected; The right to simple and prompt 
recourse to a competent court for protection against acts that violate her rights; 
 
•  Every woman is entitled to the free and full exercise of her civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and may rely on the full 
protection of those rights as embodied in regional and international instruments on human rights. The States Parties recognize that 
violence against women prevents and nullifies the exercise of these rights. 
 
Statement right 
to freedom from 
violence? 
•  Yes – Article 3   
• The right of every woman to be free from violence includes, among others: 
• The right of women to be free from all forms of discrimination; and 
• The right of women to be valued and educated free of stereotyped patterns of behavior and social and cultural practices based on 
concepts of inferiority or subordination. 
 
 
Due diligence 
 
[States Parties undertake to] apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for violence against women; 
 
 
 
Respect Create Institutional 
Machinery – Realise 
 
Protect Provide Goods & 
Services - Satisfy 
Promote 
  
States Parties undertake 
to refrain from engaging 
in any act or practice of 
violence against women 
and to ensure that their 
authorities, officials, 
personnel, agents, and 
institutions act in 
conformity with this 
obligation; 
 
 
 
States Parties undertake 
to establish the 
necessary legal and 
administrative 
mechanisms to ensure 
that women subjected to 
violence have effective 
access to restitution, 
reparations or other just 
and effective remedies;  
States Parties 
undertake to - 
 
• include in their 
domestic legislation 
penal, civil, 
administrative and 
any other type of 
provisions that may 
be needed to prevent, 
punish and eradicate 
violence against 
women and to adopt 
States Parties 
undertake to - 
 
• provide appropriate 
specialised services 
for women who have 
been subjected to 
violence, through 
public and private 
sector agencies, 
including shelters, 
counseling services 
for all family members 
States Parties undertake to - 
 
• promote awareness and 
observance of the right of 
women to be free from 
violence, and the right of 
women to have their human 
rights respected and 
protected; 
 
• modify social and cultural 
patterns of conduct of men 
and women, including the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
appropriate 
administrative 
measures where 
necessary; 
 
• adopt legal measures 
to require the 
perpetrator to refrain 
from harassing, 
intimidating or 
threatening the 
woman or using any 
method that harms or 
endangers her life or 
integrity, or damages 
her property; 
 
• take all appropriate 
measures, including 
legislative measures, 
to amend or repeal 
existing laws and 
regulations or to 
modify legal or 
customary practices 
which sustain the 
persistence and 
tolerance of violence 
against women; 
 
• establish fair and 
effective legal 
procedures for 
women who have 
been subjected to 
violence which 
include, among 
others, protective 
measures, a timely 
where appropriate, 
and care and custody 
of the affected 
children; 
 
• provide women who 
are subjected to 
violence access to 
effective readjustment 
and training programs 
to enable them to fully 
participate in public, 
private and social life; 
 
development of formal and 
informal educational programs 
appropriate to every level of 
the educational process, to 
counteract prejudices, 
customs and all other 
practices which are based on 
the idea of the inferiority or 
superiority of either of the 
sexes or on the stereotyped 
roles for men and women 
which legitimise or exacerbate 
violence against women; 
 
• promote the education and 
training of all those involved in 
the administration of justice, 
police and other law 
enforcement officers as well 
as other personnel 
responsible for implementing 
policies for the prevention, 
punishment and eradication of 
violence against women; 
 
• promote and support 
governmental and private 
sector education designed to 
raise the awareness of the 
public with respect to the 
problems of and remedies for 
violence against women; 
 
•  encourage the 
communications media to 
develop appropriate media 
guidelines in order to 
contribute to the eradication of 
violence against women in all 
 
 
 
 
hearing and effective 
access to such 
procedures; 
 
• adopt such legislative 
or other measures as 
may be necessary to 
give effect to this 
Convention. 
 
 
its forms, and to enhance 
respect for the dignity of 
women; 
 
• ensure research and  
gathering of statistics and 
other info relating to causes, 
consequences and frequency 
of violence against women, in 
order to assess effectiveness 
of measures to prevent, 
punish and eradicate violence 
against women and to 
formulate and implement 
necessary changes;  
 
•  foster international 
cooperation for the exchange 
of ideas and experiences and 
the execution of programs 
aimed at protecting women 
who are subjected to violence. 
 
 
 
• Reporting measures: 
States Parties shall include in their national reports to the Inter-American Commission of Women information on measures adopted to prevent and prohibit 
violence against women, and to assist women affected by violence, as well as on any difficulties they observe in applying those measures, and the factors that 
contribute to violence against women.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXURE B 
 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND: COMMUNICATIONS CONSIDERED  
BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST WOMEN1 
 
 
 
1. A.T. v Hungary2 
 
The author in A.T. v Hungary had been the victim of domestic violence 
committed over a four-year period by one L.F., her (former) common-law 
husband and father of her two children, one of whom was severely intellectually 
disabled.3 Despite threats by L.F. to kill the author, she had not gone to a shelter, 
reportedly because no shelter in the country was equipped to accommodate a 
severely disabled child together with his mother and sister. The author also stated 
that there were at the time no protection orders or restraining orders available 
under Hungarian law. Her efforts to bar L.F. from the family apartment through 
civil proceedings had proved fruitless and the two criminal procedures arising 
from charges she had laid against L.F. were both still pending at the time of 
submitting her communication to CEDAW.4 
 
 
                                                 
1  See Chapter 3, Section 2.6. In each of the communications examined in the thesis, the 
set of facts is relatively lengthy. However, because it was considered important to 
provide the reader with access to the factual circumstances of each case, (in order to 
fully appreciate the Committee’s Views, for example, relating to the State Party’s 
compliance with the standard of ‘due diligence’), a short précis of the facts is given in 
the text, and a longer version is set out here in Annexure B.   
2  CEDAW Communication No 2/2003 Ms. A. T. v. Hungary (Views adopted on 26 
January 2005, Thirty-second session). 
3  The facts are set out in paras 2.1 – 2.7 of CEDAW Communication No 2/2003 op cit 
note 2. 
4   CEDAW op cit note 2 para 2.6. One of the criminal trials began in 1999, the other in 
July 2001.  
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In March 1999, L.F. moved out of the family apartment. His subsequent visits 
were allegedly typically marked by loud shouting and battering, aggravated by 
his being in a drunken state. In March 2000, L.F. reportedly moved in with a new 
female partner and left the family home, taking most of the furniture and 
household items with him. The author claimed that he did not pay child support 
for three years, thus forcing her to claim this support through the courts and 
police. She alleged that he used this tactic of financial abuse in addition to 
continuing to threaten her physically.  
 
In March 2000, hoping to protect herself and the children, A.T. changed the lock 
on the front door of the apartment. On 14 and 26 March 2000, L. F. filled the 
lock with glue and on 28 March 2000, he kicked in a part of the door when the 
author refused him entrance. On 27 July 2001, he broke into the apartment using 
violence. 
 
L. F. reportedly battered the author severely on several occasions, beginning in 
March 1998. Since then, 10 medical certificates had been issued in connection 
with separate incidents of severe physical violence, even after L. F. had left the 
family residence, which, the author submitted, constituted a continuum of 
violence. The last incident took place when he broke into the apartment in July 
2001 and subjected A.T. to a severe beating, which required her hospitalisation. 
 
The author initiated civil proceedings against L.F. to bar his access to the 
family’s residence, a 2½ room apartment (of 54 by 56 square metres) jointly 
owned by L. F. and A.T.5 Decisions by the court of the first instance, the Pest 
                                                 
5   Para 2.4. These events vividly illustrate the linkages between domestic violence and 
access to housing. The perpetrator had not only succeeded in preventing the victim 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXURE B    Factual Background: CEDAW Communications 
 489
Central District Court, were rendered on 9 March 2001 and 13 September 2002 
(supplementary decision). On 4 September 2003, the Budapest Regional Court 
issued a final decision authorising L.F. to return and use the apartment. The 
judges reportedly based their decision on the following grounds: lack of 
substantiation of the claim that L. F. regularly battered the author; and L.F.’s 
right to the property, including possession, which could not be restricted. A.T. 
claimed that since that date, and on the basis of the earlier attacks and verbal 
threats by her former partner, her physical integrity, physical and mental health 
and life were at serious risk, and that she lived in constant fear.6  
 
The author reported that there were two ongoing criminal procedures against L.F. 
arising from incidents of his assaulting her. In both cases, the trials were yet to 
take place at the time of submitting her communication.7 She further pointed out 
that L.F. had not been detained at any time in connection with these procedures 
and that no actions were taken by the Hungarian authorities to protect her from 
him.  
 
The author also recounted that she had requested assistance in writing, in person 
and by telephone, from the local child protection authorities, but that her requests 
had been to no avail since the authorities allegedly felt unable to do anything in 
such situations. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
from finding safety within the apartment; by contesting her attempts to gain control of 
the apartment, he turned the apartment itself into an instrumentality of coercion. A.T. 
first attempted to exclude him from the apartment ‘mechanically’ by changing the 
locks. When he then brought trespass proceedings against her, she attempted to obtain 
legal tenure of the apartment by bringing an action against L.F. for separation of their 
common property – see Para 5.2.  
6   The author reportedly submitted to the Supreme Court a petition for review of the 4 
September 2003 decision, which was pending at the time of her submission of 
supplementary information to the Committee on 2 January 2004. 
7   Para 2.6.  
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2. Şahide Goekce (deceased) v Austria8 
 
The matter arose from a history of domestic violence perpetrated against Şahide 
Goekce by her husband, Mustafa Goekce.9 The first known attack against her 
was in December 1999, resulting in a report to the police. The police issued an 
‘expulsion and prohibition to return’ order against Mustafa Goekce. However, in 
order to prosecute him on the serious charge of ‘making a dangerous criminal 
threat’, authorisation from the threatened spouse (or a relative) was required; 
Şahide did not provide this and Mustafa was acquitted on a charge of causing 
bodily harm.  
 
In August 2000, the police were again summoned to the apartment; Şahide 
reported that Mustafa had threatened to kill her. A second ‘expulsion and 
prohibition to return’ order was issued and the police requested the Public 
Prosecutor to detain Mustafa. This request was however denied. On five 
subsequent occasions, the police were called to the Goekce apartment because of 
reports of disturbances and disputes and/or battering.  
 
A third ‘expulsion and prohibition to return’ order was issued against Mustafa 
Goekce as a result of an incident on 8 October 2002 that Şahide Goekce had 
called in. She pressed charges against her husband for causing bodily harm and 
making a dangerous criminal threat. The police interrogated him and again 
requested that he be detained. Again, the Public Prosecutor denied the request.  
 
                                                 
8  CEDAW Communication No. 5/2005: Şahide Goekce (deceased) v Austria (Views 
adopted on 6 August 2007, 39th Session) UN Doc CEDAW/ C/39/D/5/2005 (dated 6 
August 2007). 
9  The facts are set out in Paras 2.1 – 2.12. 
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On 23 October 2002, a District Court issued an interim injunction for a period of 
three months against Mustafa, which forbade him from returning to the family 
apartment and its immediate environs and from contacting Şahide or the 
children. (The three children were all minors born between 1989 and 1996.)  
 
In November 2002, the Youth Welfare Office (which had been in constant 
contact with the Goekce family because of the violent assaults that took place in 
front of the children) informed the police that Mustafa Goekce had not obeyed 
the interim injunction and was living in the family apartment. The police 
however did not find him there when they checked. 
 
According to the authors, the police knew from other sources that Mustafa 
Goekce was dangerous and owned a handgun. Both Şahide’s father and 
Mustafa’s brother had informed the police of Mustafa’s frequent threats to kill 
her or another family member. Neither report was recorded or taken seriously.  
 
On 5 December 2002, the Public Prosecutor stopped the prosecution of Mustafa 
for causing bodily harm and making a criminal dangerous threat on grounds that 
there was insufficient reason to prosecute him. On 7 December 2002, Mustafa 
Goekce shot Şahide Goekce with a handgun in their apartment in front of their 
two daughters. The police report reads that no officer went to the apartment to 
settle the dispute between Mustafa Goekce and Şahide Goekce prior to the 
shooting. Two-and-a-half hours after the commission of the crime, Mustafa 
Goekce surrendered to the police. He is reportedly currently serving a sentence 
of life imprisonment in an institution for ‘mentally ill’ offenders.10 
 
                                                 
10  According to an expert witness testifying at his trial, he had committed the murder 
under the influence of a paranoid jealousy psychosis that absolved him of criminal 
responsibility – Para 4.10. 
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3. Fatma Yildirim (deceased) v Austria11 
 
Fatma Yildirim married Irfan Yildirim on 24 July 2001.12 She had three children 
from her first marriage, two of whom were adults. Her youngest daughter, 
Melissa, was born on 30 July 1998. Irfan reportedly threatened to kill Fatma for 
the first time in July 2003. Fatma Yildirim wanted to divorce Irfan Yildirim, but 
he would not agree and threatened to kill her and her children should she divorce 
him. 
 
In August 2003, fearing for her life, Fatma and her five-year-old daughter, 
Melissa, moved in with her eldest daughter, Gülen. Two days later, she returned 
to their apartment to pick up some of her personal belongings, believing that 
Irfan was at work. Irfan entered the apartment while she was still there. He 
grabbed her wrists and held her — but she managed to escape. Subsequently, he 
called her on her cell phone and threatened to kill her again. Fatma went to the 
Vienna Federal Police to report Irfan for assault and for making a criminal 
dangerous threat.  
 
On the same day, the police issued an ‘expulsion and prohibition to return’ order 
against Irfan covering the apartment. They also informed the Vienna Intervention 
Centre against Domestic Violence and the Youth Welfare Office of the issuance 
of the order and the grounds therefore. The police further reported to the Vienna 
Public Prosecutor on duty that Irfan Yildirim had made a criminal dangerous 
threat against Fatma and requested that he be detained. The Public Prosecutor 
rejected that request. 
                                                 
11  Communication No. 6/2005: Fatma Yildirim (deceased) v Austria (Views adopted on 6 
August 2007, 39th Session) UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 dated 1 October 2007. 
12  The factual background is set out in Paras 2.1-2.14. 
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On 8 August 2003, with the assistance of the Vienna Intervention Centre against 
Domestic Violence, Fatma Yildirim applied on her own behalf and on behalf of 
her youngest daughter, to the Vienna District Court for an interim injunction 
against Irfan. The District Court informed the Vienna Federal Police about the 
application. 
 
During the course of the next few days, Irfan repeatedly harassed and threatened 
Fatma. She reported these incidents to the police, who intervened and also 
reported the matter to the Public Prosecutor, requesting that Irfan Yildirim be 
detained. Again, this request was refused.  
 
On 26 August 2003, Fatma filed a petition for divorce at the Vienna District 
Court and shortly thereafter, the same court issued an interim injunction against 
Irfan valid until the end of the divorce proceedings and an interim injunction for 
Melissa valid for three months. The order forbade Irfan Yildirim from returning 
to the family’s apartment and its immediate surroundings, from going to Fatma 
Yildirim’s workplace and from meeting or contacting Fatma or Melissa. 
 
Eleven days later, Irfan followed Fatma home from work and fatally stabbed her 
on in the street near the family’s apartment. He was convicted of killing Fatma 
and is serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 
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4. Ms NSF v The United Kingdom13 
 
The author of this communication (dated 21 September 2005) was Ms NSF, a 
Pakistani asylum seeker, at the time living in the United Kingdom with her two 
children.14 She claimed to fear for her life at the hands of her former husband in 
Pakistan and for her two sons’ future and education if the authorities of the 
United Kingdom deported her. In her communication to the CEDAW, she did 
not invoke specific provisions of the Women’s Convention nor demonstrated 
how the Convention may have been violated, but her claims appeared to raise 
issues under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. The author represented herself.15  
 
The author requested interim measures of protection in accordance with Article 
5, paragraph 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention. The Committee 
accordingly requested the State Party (the United Kingdom) not to deport the 
author and her two children while the case was pending before the Committee.  
 
Ms NSF got married in Pakistan in 1996 and two sons were born from this 
union.16 Her husband’s personality and behaviour changed towards her 
immediately after the marriage took place; he started to subject her to numerous 
instances of ill-treatment – particularly when he was affected by alcohol and 
drugs or after he had incurred gambling losses. He compelled her with threats to 
obtain money from her parents and he used the money to provide for his habits. 
She also endured marital rape.  
 
                                                 
13  CEDAW Communication 10/2005 UN Doc CEDAW/C/38/D/10/2005 (dated 12 June 
2007). 
14  Introductory Para. 
15  Ibid.  
16  The facts as represented by the author are set out in Paras 2.1 – 2.14.  
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She eventually divorced her husband in 2002 and fled to a nearby village with 
her two sons. Her ex-husband continued to harass her after the divorce and she 
had to move two more times. Although she reported him to the police, she did 
not receive any protection. In January 2003, the author’s ex-husband came to her 
home with other men armed with knives and threatened to kill her. After this 
incident, she decided to flee the country.  
 
Ms. NSF arrived in the United Kingdom on 14 January 2003 with her two 
children and applied for asylum on the same day. On 27 February 2003, the 
Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the Home Office rejected her asylum 
application. The author then went through an extended series of legal 
proceedings in her attempt to obtain asylum in the UK.17 
 
In February 2005, the Immigration and Nationality Directorate informed the 
author that she had no further right of appeal; it reminded her that she had no 
basis to stay in the United Kingdom and should make arrangements to leave the 
United Kingdom without delay. She was apprised of where to call for help and 
advice on returning home.  
                                                 
17  She firstly appealed against the ‘Refusal of Leave to Enter after Refusal of Asylum’ by 
the Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the Home Office, basing her claim on 
the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In April 2004 the Adjudicator sitting as the 
first instance court dismissed the author’s appeal on both asylum and human rights 
grounds. While sympathising with her situation and accepting her factual case, the 
Adjudicator did not accept the author’s submission that she could not relocate further 
away from her ex-husband within Pakistan. As a result, he concluded that he could not 
see why there would be a serious possibility or reasonable chance of her being at risk of 
further persecution on return to Pakistan if she relocated within the country. He also 
found that the difficulties that she might experience on return would not constitute 
‘persecution’ as such and that she would be sufficiently protected in Pakistan, including 
because the parties were no longer married. In July 2004, the Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal refused Ms. NSF’s application for permission to appeal. She challenged this 
decision by applying for Statutory Review before the High Court of Justice, Queens 
Bench Division, Administrative Court. In October 2004, the High Court affirmed the 
decision. She was advised that this decision was final.  
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The author’s efforts to avoid deportation included an application to the European 
Court of Human Rights alleging a violation by the United Kingdom of her rights 
under Article 3 (prohibition of torture) and Article 8 (right to respect for private 
and family life). In November 2005, this Court declared the communication 
inadmissible on the basis that it ‘did not disclose any appearance of a violation of 
the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols’.  
 
In May 2006, the Home Office refused the author’s request for discretionary 
leave on humanitarian grounds. The decision indicated that the author had no 
basis to stay in the United Kingdom and should make arrangement to leave the 
country without delay. If she failed to do so, the Home Department would take 
steps to ensure her removal to Pakistan. No deadline was given.  
 
Ms NSF claimed that she came to the United Kingdom to save her life and her 
children’s future and education.18 She alleged that as a single woman with two 
children, she would not be safe outside of the United Kingdom. She asserted that 
if she were deported back to Pakistan, she would no longer be protected and 
would be killed by her ex-husband; her children’s future and education would be 
put at risk. She therefore asked that she and her two children be allowed to live in 
the United Kingdom and be granted temporary protection.  
                                                 
18  Paras 3.1.-3.2. 
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